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Abstract
There are few investigations that consider both the practical and symbolic 
dimensions of wartime destruction and post-war reconstruction of cities, and 
almost none that do so for the particular case of the Spanish Civil War and 
Franco’s dictatorship. This thesis examines the wartime destruction and post-war 
rebuilding of three prominent sites in Barcelona, Bilbao and Madrid during the 
Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) and the first two decades of the Franco regime 
(1939-1959) from an interdisciplinary perspective at the intersection of history, 
social and political theory, urban planning, and architecture. The thesis is based 
on extensive archival material, and includes primary textual sources (military 
reports, administrative documentation, and official publications), secondary 
textual sources (press material, political, academic and technical literature, and 
fiction), and primary visual sources (maps, plans, architectural drawings, and 
aerial photographs of the sites).
The thesis introduces the selected sites as exemplary of three propositions on the 
relationship between history, political discourse, and the built environment during 
and in the aftermath of conflict and violent regime change. While Barcelona’s 
Avinguda de la Catedral demonstrates that wartime destruction can act as a 
catalyst for urban redevelopment, Bilbao’s bridges exemplify the way that post­
war reconstruction can be used to mark a change of political regime, and the ruins 
of Madrid’s Cuartel de la Montana reveal how post-war regimes tend to design 
ambitious reconstruction plans, which they are not necessarily able to implement. 
By considering the historical, military, political-administrative, and aesthetic 
aspects of the destruction and rebuilding of these sites, the thesis proposes an 
interdisciplinary approach to the study of urban destruction and reconstruction.
A cknow ledgem ents
There are a number of people whose support in the process of researching and 
writing this thesis I wish to acknowledge. First, I wish to thank Dr. Fran Tonkiss 
and Prof. David Frisby for their dedicated, constructive supervision and their help 
at other, more practical, levels throughout this long and at times difficult journey. 
I am grateful to Dr Maria Moreno Carranco, Prof. Paul Preston, Dr. Enriqueta 
Tuiion and the members of the NYLON group for their valuable comments on 
aspects of my research as well as Rafael Munoz-Rojas for the numerous informal 
conversations on Spain under Franco that we had over the course o f the past three 
years. I am also thankful to Prof. Richard Sennett and Prof. Mary Vincent for 
agreeing to examine my thesis.
Further, I am indebted to the archivists and librarians who assisted me in my 
research in Barcelona, Bilbao and Madrid. A special mention to the staff at the 
Arxiu Municipal Administratiu and Arxiu Historic in Barcelona, the Archivo 
Municipal in Bilbao and the Colegio de Arquitectos de Madrid and the Archivo 
del Ministerio de Fomento in Madrid for their kind and professional approach.
I wish to extend my thanks to Jose Luis Alvarez Garcia for his hospitality while 
staying in Mexico City where I began my writing. Thanks also to my friends 
Anais Tarrago, Albert Armengol and Natalia Matas for offering their homes while 
I was undertaking my archival work in Barcelona and to Assumptio Planelles for 
receiving me at hers and talking to me about the disappeared Barri de la Catedral. 
A special thanks to Prof. Mauricio Tenorio for his advice and assistance prior to 
commencing this doctoral programme.
Finally, I am grateful for the financial support received from the London School 
of Economics and Political Science, the Economic and Social Research Council 
and the University of London, which has allowed me to devote more time and 
energy to completing this thesis than I would otherwise have been able to.
Table o f  C ontents
Declaration..........................................................................................................................2
Abstract............................................................................................................................... 4
Acknowledgements............................................................................................................5
Table of contents................................................................................................................ 6
List of illustrations........................................................................................................... 11
Introduction_________________ ___________________________________________
Introduction......................................................................................................................... 16
Structure of the thesis........................................................................................................ 22
Chapter 1
Wartime destruction and post-war reconstruction in perspective______________
1. Introduction.................................................................................................................... 27
1.1 Destruction.................................................................................................................28
1.1.1 War and the city ...............................................................................................28
1.1.2 Aerial warfare..................................................................................................31
1.1.3 Terrorism.......................................................................................................... 33
1.1.4 Urbicide.............................................................................................................35
1.2 Reconstruction............................................................................................................38
1.2.1 Reconstruction phases.....................................................................................38
1.2.2 Continuity and change in post-war urban reconstruction.........................39
1.3 Restore, replace or leave in ruins?..........................................................................45
1. Conclusion...................................................................................................................... 50
Chapter 2
The challenges of archival research_________________________________________
2. Introduction.................................................................................................................... 53
2.1 Why archival research?............................................................................................ 54
2.2 Materials sought........................................................................................................ 55
2.3 The experience in the archives.................................................................................57
2.4 Archives visited, materials collected.......................................................................60
2.4.1 National archives and libraries.....................................................................60
2.4.2 Archives in Barcelona.....................................................................................61
2.4.3 Archives in Bilbao ........................................................................................... 62
6
2.4.4 Archives in Madrid.......................................................................................... 63
2.5 Using the archival material...................................................................................... 64
2.6 Note on terminology.................................................................................................69
2. Conclusion...................................................................................................................... 70
C hapter 3
The Spanish Civil W ar and its afterm ath (1936-1959)________________________
3. Introduction.................................................................................................................... 72
3.1 The outbreak of the Spanish Civil W ar................................................................. 73
3.2 The role of Italian Aviazione Legionaria and the German Luftwaffe............... 76
3.3 The role of the three cities in the conflict and their different experiences of
the w ar.........................................................................................................................78
3.4 Emergency reconstruction efforts........................................................................... 81
3.5 Post-war reconstruction.............................................................................................83
3.5.1 A new order...................................................................................................... 83
3.5.2 Organisation o f  reconstruction......................................................................85
3.5.3 Cities in the reconstruction process.............................................................. 91
3.5.4 The national style(s): sources and influences..............................................95
3. Conclusion.....................................................................................................................103
C hapter 4
W artim e destruction as a catalyst for urban redevelopment: the opening of 
Barcelona’s Avenida de la Catedral after the Spanish Civil W ar______________
4. Introduction.................................................................................................................. 107
P a r t i ..................................................................................................................................112
4.1 A brief history of the area opposite the Cathedral and the western city-gate .112
4.1.1 The emergence o f Els Arcs outside the Roman city-wall..........................112
4.1.2 The formation o f Plaqa Nova/Plaza Nueva................................................ 112
4.1.3 Continued transformations in El Barri de la Catedral.............................113
4.2 The plans for a transversal avenue across old Barcelona...................................115
4.2.1 Cerda’s plan ................................................................................................... 115
4.2.2 Baixeras ’ p la n ................................................................................................ 116
4.2.3 Darder ’s plan ................................................................................................. 117
4.2.4 Vilaseca ’s p lan ............................................................................................... 119
4.2.5 Residents ’ objections to Vilaseca’s plan .....................................................120
4.2.6 Architects ’ criticisms o f Vilaseca’s plan .....................................................122
4.3. The bombings................................................................................................. 124
4.3.1 Barcelona bombed...................................................................................... 124
7
4.3.2 The construction o f anti-air-raid shelters...................................................128
4.3.3 Destruction in the Barri de la Catedral...................................................... 131
Part I I ................................................................................................................................137
4.1 Funding the reconstruction of Barcelona..............................................................137
4.1.1 The extraordinary budget..............................................................................137
4.1.2 State subsidies................................................................................................ 137
4.1.3 State loans.......................................................................................................139
4.1.4 Private loans .................................................................................................. 140
4.1.5 Urban estate owners complain..................................................................... 140
4.2 Reconstruction and redevelopment in the Barri de la Catedral..........................141
4.2.1 Clearing the area ...........................................................................................141
4.2.2 The works on Avenida de la Catedral......................................................... 145
4.2.3 The disclosure o f the remains o f  the Roman city-wall..............................149
4.2.4 A 'functional” building for Plaza N ueva ...................................................155
4.3 Reactions to the opening of Avenida de la Catedral...........................................157
4.3.1 Praising progress...........................................................................................157
4.3.2 Mourning the Barrio de la Catedral........................................................... 159
4.3.3 By way o f epilogue: the 600th anniversary o f Plaza N ueva ..................... 162
4. Conclusion.....................................................................................................................166
C hapter 5
Reconstruction as a m arker of a regime change; Bilbao’s post-war bridges_____
5. Introduction.................................................................................................................. 170
P a r t i ..................................................................................................................................174
5.1 Some historical background to the bridges in B ilbao.........................................174
5.1.1 San Anton, San Francsico and La Merced................................................. 176
5.1.2 Isabel I I ...........................................................................................................179
5.1.3 Perro Chico.................................................................................................... 179
5.2 Building modem Bilbao— the construction of two new drawbridges..............181
5.2.1 Urban plans.................................................................................................... 181
5.2.2 The drawbridges.............................................................................................185
5.3 The war and the bridges..........................................................................................188
5.3.1 Material shortages and pressure to finish the drawbridges.................... 188
5.3.2 Provisional opening o f the Deusto bridge ................................................. 190
5.3.3 The use o f the Deusto bridge to hide military supplies.............................191
5.4 The offensive against Bilbao and the destruction of the bridges...................... 192
5.4.1 The dynamiting o f the bridges...................................................................... 192
5.4.2 Motivations fo r  the destruction o f  the bridges...........................................194
Part I I ................................................................................................................................ 199
5.1 The reconstruction of the fixed bridges: shaping the New Spain..................... 199
5.1.1 Commander Arbex’spontoon bridge.......................................................... 199
5.1.2 “A severe and acceptable ensemble” .........................................................201
5.1.3 Markers o f the change o f regim e................................................................ 204
5.1.4 Funding the reconstruction process............................................................ 209
5.2 The reconstruction of the drawbridges: rebuilding the unfinished...................211
5.2.1 Unclear contractual responsibilities........................................................... 211
5.2.2 Lengthy indemnification proceedings.........................................................214
5.2.3 The financial difficulties faced by the city council.................................... 216
5.3 The inauguration of the Generalisimo Franco’s drawbridge............................ 218
5.3.1 Programme o f events..................................................................................... 218
5.3.2 Mayor Zuazagoitia’s speech ........................................................................ 219
5.3.3 Post scriptum: lunch at the Club Maritimo del Abra ................................222
5. Conclusion.....................................................................................................................223
Chapter 6
From grand reconstruction plans to piecemeal rebuilding: Imperial M adrid 
and the ruins of the Cuartel de la M ontana__________________________________
6. Introduction.................................................................................................................. 228
P a r t i ..................................................................................................................................232
6.1 Historical overview of the Montana del Principe P io ..............................232
6.1.1 A strategic site ................................................................................................232
6.1.2 The shootings o f the 3rd o f  May 1808..........................................................236
6.2. Destruction in the capital c ity ......................................................................241
6.2.2 The role o f the Comite de Reforma, Reconstruccion y  Saneamiento 242
6.3 Planning the capital city during the war............................................................... 245
6.3.1 The project fo r the Montana del Principe P io ...........................................245
6.3.2 Besteiro 's Plan ...............................................................................................245
P art I I ............................................................................................................................... 249
6.1 Planning Madrid after the war................................................................................249
6.1.1 Maroto ’s P lan ................................................................................................249
6.1.2 Bidagor ’s P lan ...............................................................................................249
6.1.3 Organisation and implementation o f the new urban planning 
guidelines................................................................................................................. 258
6.2 Falangist aesthetics and post-war architecture in the capital c ity .....................260
6.2.1 Seventeenth-century Imperial Madrid.........................................................260
6.2.2 Historic Madrid..............................................................................................261
9
6.3 The Falangist programme abandoned...................................................................264
6.4 The projects for the ruins of the Cuartel de la M ontana.................................... 267
th6.4.1 Commemorating the events o f  the 20 o f  Ju ly ...........................................267
6.4.2 The successive projects fo r the ruined plot o f the Cuartel.......................271
6.4.3 A park and an Egyptian temple....................................................................274
6. Conclusion..................................................................................................................282
Conclusion_______________________________________________________________
Conclusion.........................................................................................................................286
References_______________________________________________________________
References......................................................................................................................... 296
Appendix
Archives and archival sources______________________________________________
Archives.............................................................................................................................309
Libraries with archival sources........................................................................................309
Primary textual sources.................................................................................................... 310
Military reports............................................................................................................... 310
Administrative reports and documentation on Barcelona.......................................... 311
Administrative reports and documentation on Bilbao.................................................316
Administrative reports and documentation on Madrid................................................320
Official publications and legislation............................................................................. 322
Secondary textual sources................................................................................................ 324
Press material, articles, conference papers and fiction................................................324
Press material, articles, conference papers and fiction on Barcelona......................... 327
Press material, articles, conference papers and fiction on Bilbao.............................. 331
Press material, articles, conference papers and fiction on Madrid............................. 332
Primary visual sources.......................................................................................................334
Maps, plans and photographs of Barcelona....................................................................334
Maps, plans and photographs of Bilbao........................................................................335
Maps, plans and photographs of Madrid...................................................................... 335
Additional archival sources.............................................................................................. 337
Second-hand interviews..................................................................................................337
10
List of illustrations
Chapter 3
Fig. 3.1 Inauguration of Ciudad Universitaria, Madrid, 1943 (adapted from the web, 
unknown URL).
Fig. 3.2 Johannes Blau, El Escorial, 16th century (adapted from a postcard).
Fig. 3.3 Luis Gutierrez Soto, project for the Air Ministry, 1943 (adapted from Revista 
Nacional de Arquitectura, no. 20, 1943).
Fig. 3.4 Francisco Cabrero, project for the Cruz de los Caidos, 1941 (adapted from 
http://perso.wanadoo.es/asiscabrero/VC.htm, accessed on 22 January 2009).
Fig. 3.5 Francisco Cabrero, Casa Sindical, constructed 1949-1955 (adapted from 
http://perso.wanadoo.es/asiscabrero/CSindical.htm. accessed on 22 January 2009).
Fig. 3.6 J. Salgado, Brunete, street (private collection).
Fig. 3 .7 J. Salgado, Brunete, main square (private collection).
Chapter 4
Fig. 4.1 Pre-war map of old Barcelona (Arxiu Municipal Administratiu de Barcelona).
Fig. 4.2 J. Gaspar, old Barcelona, 1925 (Arxiu Historic de la Ciutat, Arxiu Fotografic).
Fig. 4.3 Contemporary map of Barcelona (adapted from 
www.mapscd.com/citvmaps/images/barcelona.ipg. accessed on 10 February 2009).
Fig. 4.4 Perez de Rozas, Plaza Nueva and the Roman gate, 1933 (Arxiu Historic de la 
Ciutat, Arxiu Fotografic).
Fig. 4.5 Close view of the Roman gate, 2007 (photographed by the author).
Fig. 4.6 Cerda, Plan for Barcelona, 1859 (adapted from 
www.upf.edu/.../img/img temes/026cerdal 859.jpg. accessed on 22 October 2008).
Fig. 4.7 Baixeras, Plan for Gran Via C www.ub.es/geocrit/sn-63-4.gif, accessed on 22 
October 2008).
Fig. 4.8 Darder, Plan for Gran Via C (scanned copy from Adolfo Florensa’s Memorias 
de la Real Academia de Ciencias y  Artes de Barcelona, 1961).
Fig. 4.9 Vilaseca, Plan for Gran Via C (scanned copy from Adolfo Florensa, Memorias 
de la Real Academia de Ciencias y  Artes de Barcelona, 1961).
11
Fig. 4.10 Anti-air raid shelter, Pla<?a del Diamant (adapted from 
http://w3.bcn.eS/V01/Serveis/Noticies/V01NoticiesLlistatNoticiesCtl/0.2138.29065221 
9 29084874 2 204848075.00.html?accio=detall&home=. accessed on 28 October 
2008).
Fig. 4.11 Impact of the bombing raids of 30th January 1938 (Arxiu Municipal 
Administratiu de Barcelona).
Fig. 4.12 Impact of the air-raids of 23rd November 1938 (Arxiu Municipal 
Administratiu de Barcelona).
Fig. 4.13 Corribia street before the war. Anonymous (Arxiu Historic de la Ciutat, Arxiu 
Fotografic).
Fig. 4.14 Corribia street after the war. Anonymous (Arxiu Historic de la Ciutat, Arxiu 
Fotografic).
Fig. 4.15 Ruined and half-demolished houses in the Barrio de la Catedral, 1942 (Arxiu 
Historic de la Ciutat, Arxiu Fotografic).
Fig. 4.16 Ramirez, the Barrio de la Catedral demolished, 1944 (Arxiu Historic de la 
Ciutat, Arxiu Fotografic).
Fig. 4.17 Remains of the houses on Corribia-Plaza Nueva that were attached to the 
fa?ade of the House of the Archdeacon, 1958. Anonymous (Arxiu Historic de la Ciutat, 
Arxiu Fotografic).
Fig. 4.18 The House of the Archdeacon, 2006 (photographed by the author).
Fig. 4.19 Reconstructed Roman arch, 1958 (Arxiu Historic de la Ciutat, Arxiu 
Fotografic).
Fig. 4.20 Reconstructed Roman arch, 2006 (photographed by the author).
Fig. 4.21 Plaza Nueva, 2007 (photographed by the author).
Fig. 4.22 Central section of Avenida de la Catedral, 2007 (photographed by the author).
Fig. 4.23 View of Avenida de la Catedral looking east, 2006 (photgraphed by the 
autor).
Fig. 4.24 View of Avenida de la Catedral looking west, 2007 (photographed by the 
autor).
Fig. 4.25 View of Avenida de la Catedral from the Cathedral, 2006 (photographed by 
the author).
12
Chapter 5
Fig. 5.1 Frans Hogenberg, old Bilbao and the San Anton bridge, 1544 (adapted from 
Institut Cartografic de Catalunya).
Fig. 5.2 Map with Bilbao’s bridges (adapted from AGS. Cartografia Bilbao 2006).
Fig. 5.3 Alzola, San Francisco iron footbridge, 1880; Hoffmeyer, La Merced stone-and- 
brick bridge, 1891 (Archivo Foral de Bizkaia).
Fig. 5.4 La Merced bridge and San Francisco iron footbridge, 1893 (Archivo Foral de 
Bizkaia).
Fig. 5.5 The Perro Chico and the city hall, 1894 (Archivo Foral de Bizkaia).
Fig. 5.6 Bilbao ca 1900 (adapted from Institut Cartografic de Catalunya).
Fig. 5 .7 Section of Zuazo’s 1921 Plan (Ayuntamiento de Bilbao).
Fig. 5.8 Secundino Zuazo. Reforma viaria parcial del interior de Bilbao, 1923 
(Ayuntamiento de Bilbao).
Fig. 5.9 Ricardo Bastida. Plano de Enlaces de Bilbao con los pueblos colindante, 1923 
(Ayuntamiento de Bilbao).
Fig. 5.10 Section of Zuazo’s Plan, the San Mames lowland (Ayuntamiento de Bilbao).
Fig. 5.11 View of the Begona bridge destroyed, 1937 (Archivo Foral de Bizkaia).
Fig. 5.12 The Deusto bridge destroyed, 1937 (Archivo Foral de Bizkaia).
Fig. 5.13 View of the destroyed Perro Chico and Begona bridges, 1937 (Archivo Foral 
de Bizkaia).
Fig. 5.14 Provisional gangway by the San Francisco bridge (Archivo Foral de Bizkaia).
Fig. 5.15 Pontoon bridge by the destroyed Arenal bridge, 1937 (Archivo Foral de 
Bizkaia).
Fig. 5.16 La Victoria bridge and the platform over the Portugalete station (adapted from 
the web).
Fig. 5.17 Stone ornamentation with ‘the yoke and the arrows’ (adapted from 
www.foroporlamemoria.info/.../PICT3294.JPGV
Fig. 5.18 San Anton bridge.
Fig. 5.19 La Merced/General Sanjurjo bridge, 2006 (photographed by the author).
13
Fig. 5.20 San Francisco/Coronel Ortiz de Zarate bridge, 2006 (photographed by the 
author).
Fig. 5.2J Isabel II/E1 Arenal/La Victoria bridge, 2006 (photographed by the author).
Fig. 5.22 The Deusto/Generalisimo Franco’s bridge, 2006 (photographed by the 
author).
Fig. 5.23 The Ayuntamiento/Begona/General Mola’s bridge, 2006 (photographed by 
the author).
Chapter 6
Fig. 6.1 Francisco de Goya, La pradera de San Isidro, 1787 (adapted from 
www.museodelprado.es/es/pagina-principal/coleccion/galeria-on-line/galeria-on- 
line/obra/la-pradera-de-san-isidro/. accessed on 10 October 2008).
Fig. 6.2 Bird’s eye view of western Madrid (adapted from the web).
Fig. 6.3 Partial view of the Cuartel de la Montana, 1933 (Archivo Regional de la 
Comunidad de Madrid).
Fig. 6.4 The Royal Palace and the Almudena Cathedral, 2007 (photographed by the 
author).
Fig. 6.5 Francisco de Goya, El 3 de mayo de 1808 en Madrid: los fusilamientos en la 
montana del Principe Pio, 1808 (adapted from www.museodelprado.es/es/pagina- 
principal/coleccion/galeria-on-line/galeria-on-line/obra/el-3-de-mavo-de-1808-en- 
madrid-los-fusilamientos-en-la-montana-del-principe-pio/. accessed on 10 October 
2008).
Fig. 6.6 Section of wartime Ciudad Universitaria (adapted from 
http://guerracivil.forumup.es/post-19660-guerracivil.html. accessed on 21 October 
2008).
Fig. 6.7 Map of section of Argiielles, 1937-38 (scanned photocopy from the CRRS’s 
Memoria 1937-1938).
Fig. 6.8 Protective structure covering La Cibeles fountain during the war (adapted from 
www.madrid 1936.es/madrid/cibeles.htmlT
Fig. 6.9 Hollow structure and ruined fa9ade of the Cuartel de la Montana, (Archivo 
General de la Administration).
Fig. 6.10 Bidagor’s Plan, 1946 (adapted from 
www.madrid.org/cs/Satellite?blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobcol=urldata&blobkev= 
id&blobheadervalue 1 =filename%3DPlano+cuadricula.pdf&blobwhere= 115862759145 
5 &b lobheademame 1 =Content-
14
Disposition&ssbinarv=true&blobheader=application%2Fpdf. accessed on 20 November 
2008).
Fig. 6.11 Bombed-out houses in Argtielles (adapted from 
www.cronicasderetaguardia.es/GALER DESTRC/pages/GC 12 25.htm).
Fig. 6.12 The district of Argtielles and the ruins of the Cuartel de la Montana (scanned 
photograph from the Cartoteca de la Consejeria de Urbanismo y Medio Ambiente de la 
Comunidad de Madrid).
Fig. 6.13 Gathering in the ruins of the Cuartel de la Montana (Archivo Regional de la 
Comunidad de Madrid).
Fig. 6.14-15 Squatters living in a ruined house on Paseo del Pintor Rosales, 1953 
(Archivo Regional de la Comunidad de Madrid).
Fig. 6.16 Mass in the ruins of the Cuartel de la Montana, 1941 (Archivo Regional de la 
Comunidad de Madrid).
Fig. 6.17 Improvised altar in the ruins of the Cuartel de la Montana, 1942 (Archivo 
Regional de la Comunidad de Madrid).
Fig. 6.18 Model of the Casa del Partido, 1943 (scanned photograph from Fotos. 
Semanario Grafico, 24/07/1943).
Fig. 6.19 Drawings for the projected Casa del Partido (scanned from Cuadernos de 
Arquitectura y  Urbanismo, no. 1, Jan. 1977).
Fig. 6.20 The Temple of Debod, 2007 (photographed by the author).
Fig. 6.21 Vaquero Turcios, sculpture in memory of the fallen on the 20th of July 1936, 
2007 (photographed by the author).
15
Introduction
“The National Reconstruction Plan involves nothing more and nothing less than 
providing our homeland with a perfectly functioning corporeal organisation, 
alive and beautiful, where the spirit of the former is allowed to bear fruit, 
gloriously fulfilling its universal mission.”1 
(Servicios Tecnicos de FET y de las JONS, 1939)
This thesis examines the wartime destruction and post-war reconstruction of three 
prominent sites in Barcelona, Bilbao and Madrid during the Spanish Civil War (1936- 
1939) and the first two decades of Franco’s dictatorship (1939-1959) from an 
interdisciplinary perspective at the intersection of history, social and political theory, 
urban planning and architecture. The thesis introduces the selected sites—Avinguda de 
la Catedral, Bilbao’s bridges and the ruins of the Cuartel de la Montana— as exemplary 
of three propositions on the relationship between history, political discourse and the 
built environment during and in the aftermath of conflict and violent regime change. 
While Barcelona’s Avinguda de la Catedral demonstrates that wartime destruction can 
act as a catalyst for urban redevelopment, Bilbao’s bridges exemplify the way that post­
war reconstruction can be used to mark a change of political regime, and the ruins of 
Madrid’s Cuartel de la Montana reveal how post-war regimes tend to design ambitious 
reconstruction plans, which they are not necessarily able to implement. The thesis aims 
to contribute to the analysis of the practical and symbolic dimensions of the processes 
of violent physical destruction and rebuilding of cities, and to a better understanding of 
the two processes in the specific context of the Spanish Civil War and post-war period. 
Further, it seeks to demonstrate the theoretical advantage of studying the two processes 
together and, more generally, the usefulness of approaching historical events and the 
accompanying political discourses by examining the built environment.
1 “El Plan de Reconstruccion Nacional se refiere, ni mas ni menos, que a dotar a la Patna espanola de una 
organization corporea de perfecto funcionamiento, viva y bella, donde su espiritu fructifique y cumpla 
gloriosamente su mision universal.” Seccion de Arquitectura Servicios Tecnicos de F. E. T. y de las J. O. 
N. S., “Ideas Generales Sobre El Plan Nacional De Ordenacion Y Reconstruccion,” (Madrid: Servicios 
Tecnicos de F. E. T. y de las J. O. N. S., Seccion de Arquitectura, 1939).
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Wars have played a key role in the history of cities and the transformations of their built 
environment. Both wars themselves and the recovery from them constitute intense 
political, social and economic processes. In ancient times, cities often originated in 
defensive constructions such as forts and citadels. As war techniques progressed, cities 
transformed themselves according to the requirements that the new techniques 
demanded. The advent of aerial warfare techniques in the early twentieth century turned 
wartime destruction into a trigger of urban reform. If cities used to shape themselves for 
war, many cities have since been shaped by war.
The massive destruction and extensive reconstruction of cities during and after the last 
global confrontation, the Second World War, suggests that the two processes are 
characterised by certain recurrent patterns, problems, challenges and accomplishments, 
even though each city reveals a unique process of destruction and reconstruction. For 
example, destruction in modem times has tended to be concentrated in port areas and 
city centres. The London docks during the Blitz is a good example. Ports are of course 
strategic targets. Their destruction can be justified militarily, but that of the residential 
areas adjacent to them cannot, and yet they have often ended in ruins. The destruction 
of the latter has been the result of not only the early bombers’ lack of precision, but also 
the deliberate aim of terrorising the civilian population from the air. Furthermore, city 
centres are often targeted, regardless of their historic value. Because of the density of 
buildings and people and the particular quality of their construction materials, city 
centres soon proved easy preys to the flames caused by incendiary bombs, which were 
used extensively for the first time during the Second World War. Other recurrent 
patterns that can be identified in the wartime destruction and post-war reconstruction of 
cities are the efficiency of wartime emergency reconstruction efforts compared with 
reconstruction proper. The latter is often prolonged because o f lack of state funding and 
the unremitting housing shortages caused by the continuous arrival of an uprooted rural 
population in the aftermath of war. Moreover, post-war urban reconstruction is also 
often marked by the survival of pre-war social ties, institutional arrangements and 
economic power structures, which can both complicate and facilitate the rebuilding 
process.
Urban destruction and reconstruction during the Spanish Civil War and the Franco 
regime share many of the above features, while offering unique characteristics that stem
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from Spain’s divergent path in the context of twentieth-century Europe. Such 
commonalities and divergences appear intertwined. For example, while the Spanish 
Civil War is one of the few instances of a civil confrontation based on modem 
ideological grounds, it is often presented as a prelude to the Second World War and the 
international collision of Fascism, Liberalism and Socialism. The ideological nature of 
the conflict also had an impact on how destruction and rebuilding took place. Although 
a civil war, the early intervention of Germany and Italy in support of the military rebels 
quickly involved the international community in the conflict. Aside from the foreign 
soldiers who assisted the rebel side, thousands of international volunteers participated 
on the Republican side, contributing to casting the conflict under the romantic aura of 
revolutionary freedom fighting, which largely persists in the global imagination today. 
As a result of the German and Italian intervention, unprecedented destruction was 
caused to Spanish towns and cities. New aerial warfare techniques were deployed by 
the German and Italian air forces, and the Luftwaffe, especially, was successful in 
applying the lessons leamt in the Spanish Civil War during the Second World War. 
Unlike Italy and Germany, which saw their fascist states defeated in the war, the victors 
of the Spanish Civil War turned Spain into a military dictatorship, which initially 
presented itself to the world as a fascist regime with totalitarian aspirations. At this 
juncture, General Franco, the Caudillo, was given the unparalleled opportunity of 
rebuilding the country almost from scratch mirroring the values that the rebels had 
fought to reinstate: unity, discipline, honour, hierarchy. Such values became the 
ideological pillars of the new regime. However, the material scarcity o f post-war Spain 
and Franco’s pragmatic, if not opportunistic, running of state politics resulted in a 
relatively modest use of this exceptional situation.
As historically competing political, cultural and economic nuclei, Barcelona, Bilbao 
and Madrid form a geographical triangle and a potentially forceful political and cultural 
trilogy. The three cities resisted the military uprising and suffered destruction during the 
Spanish Civil War. And more importantly for the purposes of this thesis, in all three 
cities it is possible to identify prominent urban sites that underwent significant 
transformations as a direct result of the conflict. As intimated earlier, each of the three 
sites identified in this thesis is used to illustrate one of the three propositions that were 
introduced at the beginning.
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The first proposition, which implied that wartime destruction can act as a catalyst for 
urban redevelopment, is exemplified by the evolution of the area in front of Barcelona’s 
old Cathedral. The area was repeatedly bombed by the rebel air force throughout the 
Civil War, but especially in 1938. After the war, a whole neighbourhood was 
demolished and the area was turned into an avenue, according to plans that existed 
before the outbreak of the conflict. Attempting to turn destruction, not only wartime 
destruction, into an opportunity for urban redesign is something cities have done 
repeatedly throughout history, but perhaps more consciously in modem times. Other, 
notorious examples are Lisbon following the 1755 earthquake, Chicago after the great 
fire in 1871 and Rotterdam in the aftermath of the Second World War.
The second proposition suggested that post-war reconstruction can be used visibly and 
symbolically to mark a change of political regime. This proposition is illustrated by the 
case of Bilbao’s reconstructed bridges. During the Civil War, the Basque-Republican 
troops blew up Bilbao’s bridges— eight in total—before they left the city in June 1937. 
The bridges that the new rebel authorities rebuilt offered a very different appearance 
from their predecessors, and such a difference was emphasised by the discourses that 
accompanied the inauguration ceremonies of the bridges. Another example of explicit 
political marking of the built environment is the post-war reconstruction of a divided 
Berlin, where buildings such as the television tower in East Berlin were intended as 
representations of the power of Communist Germany, while projects such as the 
Kulturforum in West Berlin were created as representations of Western pluralism.
Finally, the third proposition claimed that post-war regimes tend to conceive of novel or 
ambitious reconstruction plans, but are not necessarily able to live up to them. Because 
of economic, political legal and/or ideological constraints, in most cases, the post-war 
physical rebuilding of cities constitutes a fairly painful, piecemeal process, which 
produces more continuity with than change from the pre-war city. The case of the ruins 
of the military barracks that stood on the Montana del Principe Pio in western Madrid 
are illustrative of this. The barracks were completely ruined during the Civil War. After 
the war followed several prominent, official projects, initially as part of the plans for a
2 See Joan (ed.) Ockman, ed., Out o f  Ground Zero : Case Studies in Urban Reinvention (Temple Hoyne 
Buell Center for the Study o f  American Architecture, Columbia University; Munich; N ew  York N.Y.: 
Prestel, 2002).
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neo-imperial capital city. None of them was ever accomplished, and since 1972 the site 
has contained a park and an ancient Egyptian temple. The ambition to redesign post-war 
cities completely existed in many European urban planners’ projects in the aftermath of 
the Second World War, yet relatively few of their aspirations materialised because of 
the above-mentioned constraints. What is interesting perhaps in the case of post-war 
Europe is that even in cities where destruction had not been as critical, planners shared 
the aspiration to build something new, which suggests that material devastation might 
not be the only reason for post-war planners’ dreams of urban renewal.
The first proposition involves a pragmatic attitude towards reconstruction— making the 
best out of destruction— whereas the latter two entail idealist approaches based on the 
attempt to use reconstruction for ideological purposes. In the first case, destruction is 
turned into an advantage for carrying out plans that existed prior to destruction, whereas 
in the other two it is reconstruction that is seen as an opportunity for planning a new 
city. The third proposition implies that the attempt to plan everything from scratch 
according to new ideas does not necessarily work, while the proposition that 
reconstruction can be used to mark a change of regime and ideology suggests almost the 
opposite.
This apparent contradiction can be seen as the result o f the tension between the 
continuities and discontinuities that seem to characterise the post-war recovery of cities. 
For the purposes of this thesis, the Spanish Civil War is considered a fundamental 
disruption or discontinuity, which allows for a line to be drawn between the pre-war 
and post-war situation of Barcelona, Bilbao and Madrid. However, once such a line is 
drawn, it is possible to distinguish between additional continuities and discontinuities 
that operate on at least three levels: historical, practical and ideological. It seems 
pertinent to speak in terms of historical continuities and discontinuities when referring 
to events that date back beyond Spain’s immediately and politically relevant recent past 
at the time. Examples are the continuous relevance of water in the history of the area in 
front o f the Cathedral in Barcelona; or the repeated destruction and reconstruction of 
the bridges of Bilbao over the centuries as a result of floods and wars; but also the 
discontinuity that the removal of Barcelona’s city-wall and Bilbao’s annexation of 
adjacent lands in the nineteenth century entailed for these two cities’ development. 
Practical continuities and discontinuities are related to the country’s most immediate
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past, including the permanence and/or rejection of pre-war plans, pre-war 
administrative staff, practices and contractors in the reconstruction processes. Finally, it 
is argued, ideological continuities and discontinuities become apparent when a post-war 
regime deliberately uses reconstruction as a means of asserting itself. The discourses 
around reconstruction, the actual projects and the appearance of the finished sites often 
involve—as they do in the three sites examined in this thesis—an emphasis on breaking 
with the most recent past, the Second Republic, while seeking continuities with the 
moral and aesthetic values of earlier historical periods, most notably in this case, 
sixteenth-century Spain.
At a time of heated debates on the historic memory of the Spanish Civil War and 
Franco’s dictatorship— including the question on what to do with the monumental 
legacy of the latter—it is important to note that, although the enormous relevance of 
these contemporary debates cannot be ignored, this thesis strives to examine the 
decisions and discourses that produced Spanish post-war planning and architecture from 
the point of view of the time period under consideration, and within the context of 
European post-war reconstruction more generally.3 In the current political situation, in 
which reminiscences of the political animosity that detonated the Civil War can be 
detected, more historicised investigations of Spain’s recent past seem necessary as a 
way of fostering a more informed and substantive intellectual debate on the conjunction 
of events, decisions and motivations that led the Spanish population to a fratricidal 
confrontation in the 1930s and the victorious side to replace a democratic system with a 
dictatorial regime which lasted for almost four decades. In particular, the study of less 
researched and apparently less controversial aspects of the conflict and Franco’s
3 On the 26th o f  December 2007 the Ley p o r  la que se reconocen y  amplian derechos y  se eslablecen  
m edidas en fa vo r  de quienes padecieron persecucion o violencia durante la guerra civil y  la dictadura  
(Law according to which rights are acknowledged and extended and measures established in favour o f  
those who suffered persecution or violence during the civil war and the dictatorship)— commonly 
referred to as Ley de la Memoria Histdrica  (Law o f  Historic Memory)— was passed in the Spanish 
Parliament. O f the different actions envisioned by the Law, the regulation o f  the disinterment o f  bodily 
remains buried in mass graves probably receives the most attention. However, the Law also contemplates 
the removal o f  symbols and public monuments that exalt the military uprising, the Civil War and the 
repression o f  the dictatorship, except when they are o f  artistic or architectural value. Spanish town and 
city councils are now obliged to remove those symbols and monuments that have not been listed and 
ensure that private owners do the same in their properties. It is suggested that the attempt to reconcile a 
radical proposition according to which nothing ought to remind the population o f  the Civil War and the 
dictatorship in a celebratory tone with a simultaneous appeal to moderation on the grounds o f  aesthetic 
values— thus arguing for maintaining that which is beautiful and/or well designed regardless o f  whether it 
celebrates the Civil War and the dictatorship— highlights the difficulty o f  finding a universal and 
consistent legal solution to the legacy o f  the Franco regime more than three decades after the dictator’s 
death and Spain’s transition to democracy.
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dictatorship such as the destruction and reconstruction of Spanish cities may contribute 
to a more complex understanding of the country’s recent past and the challenges of its 
present political culture.
Structure of the thesis
Following this introduction, Chapter 1 critically reviews some of the available literature 
on wartime destruction and post-war reconstruction of cities, and seeks to identify some 
general insights into the two processes that help frame the Spanish case. The chapter 
begins by briefly examining the historical role of wars for cities with a particular 
emphasis on the arrival of aerial warfare in the early twentieth century and its impact on 
urban formations. The chapter then goes on to discuss terrorism and the war on terror as 
the most recent form of warfare. The terrorist attacks of 11th September 2001 prompted 
new research on urban conflict and conflict resolution, highlighting the centrality and 
vulnerability of cities in the post-Cold War order. Prior to the World Trade Center 
attacks, the conflict in the Balkans produced the concept of urbicide to describe the 
deliberate and systematic destruction of the urban, here understood as the freedom and 
cultural heterogeneity that often characterise cities—a phenomenon that predates the 
Balkan War.
The section on reconstruction commences by discerning different phases or stages of 
reconstruction and their characteristics, and then goes on to discuss specific cases of 
post-war reconstruction. Because of the geographical context and the time period 
studied here, it is the main findings of scholars who have analysed the reconstruction 
processes in Europe after the Second World War that are considered. As suggested 
earlier, funding difficulties, prolonged housing shortages, but also continuity in 
planning and building design were some of the issues that post-war European cities, 
including Spanish cities, experienced. Following this, some of the scholarship that 
examines more contemporary cases of reconstruction, for example in the Middle East, 
is discussed. New challenges are involved in these processes that have to do with the 
influence of the colonial legacy and the prominent participation of international 
organisations in these countries’ reconstruction processes. The chapter concludes by 
considering three basic modes of reconstruction— restoring, replacing and leaving in 
ruins— and the theoretical and practical implications of each o f them.
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Chapter 2 is devoted to the methodological aspects of this research. The reason for 
choosing archival research to approach the empirical cases that underpin this thesis is 
explained, and some details on the selection, systematisation and analysis of the 
archival material are addressed. The chapter also discusses some of the challenges 
involved in each stage of the processes of information collection and analysis, 
particularly the author’s different experiences of the archives in Barcelona, Bilbao and 
Madrid in terms of availability of and accessibility to the materials. There is also a brief 
clarification on how certain key terminology is used throughout the text.
Chapter 3 seeks to situate the three empirical cases in the historical context of wartime 
and post-war Spain. While Chapter 1 seeks to put forward a wider theoretical and 
geographical framework within which to situate the three cases, Chapter 3 aims to delve 
into some of the particularities that characterised the Spanish experience of wartime 
destruction and post-war reconstruction, especially of its cities. The chapter commences 
with a general explanation of the outbreak of the war, after which it concentrates on the 
roles o f Barcelona, Bilbao and Madrid in the conflict, and their experiences, which 
arguably affected their situation under the dictatorial regime that followed. The 
Republican and rebel sides’ emergency reconstruction efforts across Spain are briefly 
described. When the war finished and the victorious rebel military established itself in 
power under General Franco’s leadership, these emergency measures turned into 
reconstruction projects proper. The institutions that were created for this task as well as 
their priorities, values and aesthetics are explored as a way of further illuminating the 
specific situations of post-war Barcelona, Bilbao and Madrid, including the three 
selected sites.
All three empirical chapters are divided into two main parts, the first focusing on the 
pre-war history of the site and its destruction and the second on its reconstruction. In the 
first empirical chapter, Chapter 4, the opening of Avenida de la Catedral in front of the 
Cathedral in Barcelona in the aftermath of the Civil War is introduced as representative 
of the idea that wartime destruction can act as a catalyst for urban redevelopment. The 
plans for the opening existed since the mid-nineteenth century, but the densely built 
historic fabric of this area worked against their implementation. When the Civil War 
left in ruins several of the buildings whose demolition the plans anticipated, the new 
city council did not hesitate to seize the opportunity, and finally opened the avenue. In
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this case, wartime destruction was seen less as an opportunity for realising new plans, 
and more as an occasion for carrying out previous, unaccomplished plans.
The first part of the chapter introduces the various pre-war plans for the opening of the 
avenue and the public’s responses to them. Following this, the destructive impact on the 
city of the bombings during the Civil War—particularly on the area in front of the 
Cathedral—is described. Barcelona’s wartime emergency measures, essentially the 
construction of air-raid shelters, are also portrayed. The second part of the chapter 
summarises the events immediately after the end of the conflict and explains the 
somewhat intricate funding procedures followed by the new city council to address the 
various reconstruction projects, including the demolition of the damaged area in front of 
the Cathedral and the opening of Avenida de la Catedral. Next, the sequence of projects 
that gradually led to the opening are analysed. Furthermore, the public’s various 
responses to these significant transformations at the heart of the old city—bearing in 
mind the limitations on the freedom of speech under Franco’s dictatorship— are 
discussed in some detail.
Chapter 5 examines the reconstruction of the destroyed bridges in Bilbao as illustrative 
of the idea that reconstruction can be used to mark a change of political regime. Not 
only were the four reconstructed fixed bridges aesthetically different from their 
predecessors, and arguably representative of the values of the New Spain, but the 
official rhetoric inspiring their reconstruction and inauguration ceremonies seemed to 
reinforce the aim of visually and symbolically marking the advent of an extraordinary 
change in the course of Spain’s history. Furthermore, the destruction and reconstruction 
of the two drawbridges Deusto and Begona, which were not fully finished when they 
were blown up, arguably challenged the boundaries between reconstruction and new 
construction, allowing the new Bilbaoan authorities to subtly confuse the two, and take 
almost full credit for the design and building of the drawbridges.
The first part of the chapter considers the pre-war history of Bilbao’s bridges, especially 
their changing function from infrastructures with the sole aim of securing 
communication between the two riverbanks to key sections of the new axial 
thoroughfares that gradually structured modem Bilbao. As an industrial port city, 
Bilbao came to play a strategic role during the Civil War, and the half-accomplished
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drawbridges also came to play theirs, partly as improvised military infrastructures. 
TheBasque-Republican troops’ decision to dynamite all the bridges before leaving the 
city on the 19th of June 1937 is subsequently examined and contrasted with the rebels’ 
accounts of the “Red barbarism” that, according to them, was the only motivation 
behind the extensive damage inflicted on the city. The second part o f the chapter looks 
into the design and funding of the reconstructed four fixed bridges and the two 
drawbridges, thereby emphasising the different challenges encountered in the rebuilding 
processes of these two groups of bridge infrastructures. The official discourses 
accompanying the reconstruction processes and the final opening ceremonies are 
examined subsequently.
Finally, Chapter 6 introduces the Franco regime’s early plans for a neo-imperial capital 
city, including the transformation of the ruins of Madrid’s Cuartel de la Montana into 
one of the city’s three most representative buildings—Falange’s (the state party’s) 
headquarters—as expressing the idea that post-war regimes often start out with grand 
reconstruction plans, which they gradually have to abandon because of structural and/or 
circumstantial impediments. In the case of Madrid, it will be argued, ideological and 
political reasons carried weight—particularly Franco’s relatively early distancing of 
himself from Fascist and Nazi ideals— but more than these, the severe material scarcity 
that affected Spain as it emerged from the Civil War accounts for the regime’s difficulty 
in maintaining its initial plans for the capital city.
The first part of the chapter examines the pre-war history of the Montana del Principe 
Pio, which witnessed the outbreak of the Spanish War of Independence in the early 
nineteenth century, and later the construction of the military barracks known as Cuartel 
de la Montana, which was completed in 1863. The Cuartel de la Montana, in turn, 
became the scenario of the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in Madrid when 
Republican militias stormed the barracks where the rebel mutineers had gathered in July 
1936. The impact of the Spanish Civil War on the capital city is subsequently analysed 
together with the various emergency and planning efforts that the Republican 
authorities undertook during the war. This allows for a comparison of the Republican 
wartime urban plans with the Franco regime’s post-war plans for the capital city in the 
second section of the chapter. This section commences by reviewing the latter in light 
also of European planning at the time. The architectural style and aesthetic ideals
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proposed by Falange in the early post-war period are examined next, followed by a 
discussion of the reasons for the regime’s gradual abandonment of these ideals, and the 
replacement, more generally, of the concept of state planning for a pragmatic approach. 
This incorporated private capital, and resulted in a fragmented rebuilding process and a 
fairly unsystematic expansion of the city. The fate of the ruins of the Cuartel de la 
Montana between 1939 and 1972 dramatically illustrates the evolution of the regime’s 
planning and architectural activities in and discourses about the capital city. The 
different uses made of, and projects for, the site are discussed bearing in mind the 
significance that the ruins purportedly had within the regime’s imagination as a 
contradictory symbol of Falangist heroism and downfall.
The Conclusion summarises the main findings of the discussion conducted in the 
preceding chapters. It aims to synthesise both the general features and the 
distinctiveness of the processes of wartime destruction and post-war reconstruction in 
the context of the Spanish Civil War and its aftermath against the backdrop of the two 
initial arguments: first, the advantage o f studying these two processes together; second, 
and more generally, the additional insights that an examination of the actual and 
planned transformations of the built environment might generate for a fuller 
understanding of a particular historical period and its political discourses.
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Chapter 1
Wartime destruction and post-war reconstruction in perspective 
1. Introduction
There exist few comparative studies of historically and geographically diverse 
experiences of wartime destruction and post-war rebuilding as both independent and 
interrelated processes. Moreover, there is no comprehensive general theory available on 
wartime destruction and post-war reconstruction akin to the theories that scholars have 
on social revolutions and political transitions, for example.4 Different aspects of the two 
phenomena have been analysed and debated by scholars in various disciplines within 
the social sciences and the humanities, but the interest in studying the two processes 
systematically is relatively recent. This might be why case studies have been more 
predominant than the attempt to compare different situations and create wide-ranging 
theoretical frameworks.5 Further, it is worth recalling that there has generally been less 
interest among scholars in producing grand theories and universal models in the past 
two decades.
This thesis considers specifically the destruction and rebuilding of the physical 
environment of cities from both a practical and a symbolic perspective. The aim of this 
chapter, therefore, is to review critically some of the literature that addresses aspects of 
these two processes, attempting to put forward some general insights into how and why 
cities are and have been destroyed in the context of war, and how they are 
reconstructed. The first part of the chapter examines the historical role of wars for 
cities, the dramatic shift that the advent of aerial technology in the early twentieth 
century entailed for the urban experience of war, and the implications of more recent 
forms of wartime destruction threatening cities—essentially large-scale terrorist attacks.
4 The author has in mind, for example, Charles T illy’s comparative analysis o f  social revolutions and 
Juan Linz’s analysis o f  transitions to democracy.
5 Yet there appears to exist a growing interest in Britain in creating a broader theoretical framework 
through initiatives such as Eric Hobsbawm’s project “Reconstruction in the immediate aftermath o f  war: 
a comparative study o f Europe, 1945-50”, awarded the 2003 International Balzan Prize, and developed in 
the Department o f  History at Birkbeck College, 2004-2007. There is also the Post-war Reconstruction 
and Development Unit, which Prof. Sultan Barakat created in the Department o f  Politics at the University 
o f  York in 1992. The Unit has its own Master’s and PhD programmes. Finally, there is the Cambridge 
University Post-Crisis and Post-Conflict Group, which was founded by graduate students in 2005 and 
was recently awarded a grant by the Centre for Research in the Arts, Social Sciences and Humanities 
(CRASSH).
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The second part discusses different experiences of urban post-war reconstruction 
especially after the Second World War. Because of the location and the time period 
under consideration in this thesis, more time is spent on reviewing the experiences of 
post-war Europe. Studies of more recent cases of post-war urban recovery, such as that 
of Beirut and other Middle Eastern cities, are proliferating, and will be discussed 
briefly. It is suggested that although many of the findings provided by these more recent 
cases show numerous similarities with the European post-war scenarios, they also 
involve new challenges, which have to do with these countries having to contend with 
colonial pasts and the extensive participation of the international community—often via 
international organisations such as the United Nations— in their reconstruction efforts.
The final section of the chapter considers different ways of reconstructing—restoring, 
replacing and leaving in ruins—and succinctly explores the theoretical grounding that 
underpins each process, while offering some examples. The conclusion offers a 
summary of the main points discussed throughout the chapter.
1.1 Destruction
1.1.1 War and the city
The role of wars in the history of cities has been reflected on by renowned social 
theorists such as Max Weber, Lewis Mumford and Walter Benjamin. Weber refers to 
the role of the castle as a political and military projection in medieval and early modem 
cities. The counterpart of the castle, the marketplace, which symbolised peaceful 
commerce, was also often used to assemble troops. Weber seems to imply that war 
constituted a latent presence that could hardly be ignored by medieval urban dwellers 
even in times of peace.6 Castles, city-walls, military towers and esplanades for troops to 
gather comprised essential urban structures. In The Culture o f  Cities, Lewis Mumford 
discusses the role of war as the driving force for early-modem urban transformations: 
“The intensive development o f the art of fortification shifted the emphasis in 
building from architecture to engineering, from esthetic [sic] design to material 
calculations of weight, number and position: prelude to the wider techniques of 
the machine. But especially it altered the urban picture from the short-range
6 Max Weber, La Ciudad  (Madrid: Las Ediciones de la Piqueta, 1987).
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world of the medieval city, with its walking distances, its closed vistas, its 
patchwork space, to the long-range world of baroque politics, with its long­
distance gunfire and its wheeled vehicles and its increasing desire to conquer 
space and make itself felt at a distance.”7
As the means to wage wars evolved, traditional military structures such as city-walls, 
moats and towers gradually became obsolete. Furthermore, with the industrial 
revolution a new “enemy”, the working class, appeared. For capitalists and most 
governments, the working class constituted a perennial menace to public order. Baron 
Haussmann’s re-design of Paris is often presented as the paradigmatic example o f how 
national authorities responded to these changes. The new, broad avenues and streets, 
which replaced the old city’s dense, medieval street grid not only symbolised state 
power, but made it easier for troops and security forces to circulate and more difficult 
for rebellious masses to congregate or set up barricades. Yet, as Richard Sennett 
suggests, while repressing “the movements of the urban masses”, the new avenues
O
consciously privileged “the motions of individuals” . Flaneurs and shoppers were 
hardly seen as a threat in the emergent consumer-capitalist society.
The arrival of aerial warfare techniques in the early part of the twentieth century 
exposed the city in an unprecedented way. Defensive structures above the ground were 
less useful now as they could be easily destroyed from the air. An exception would be 
the flak towers that Hitler had construct in German cities after 1940. But in most cities, 
both military and civilians had to go beneath the ground to find shelter. Subterranean 
galleries and basements were suddenly part of a parallel urban system, not so much 
designed for living as for sheer survival— like the ancient Roman catacombs perhaps.
In his explorations of the late nineteenth century, Walter Benjamin already notes the 
implications of the new forms of destruction for the late-modern individual and 
collective psyches. In the Arcades Project, when reflecting on various, one might say, 
lugubrious aspects of the city—Paris, in this case— Benjamin suggests:
7 Lewis Mumford, The Culture o f  Cities (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1938).
8 Richard Sennett, Flesh and Stone. The Body and the City in Western Civilization  (London - Boston: 
Faber and Faber, 1996) 329.
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“The fantasies of the decline of Paris are a symptom of the fact that technology 
was not accepted. These visions bespeak the gloomy awareness that along with 
the great cities have evolved the means to raze them to the ground.”9 
Modem fantasies of urban decline, destruction and total annihilation have become 
popular and powerful motifs in the past century. They were initially stimulated by 
artistic-political movements such as the Futurists, who urged their society to destroy 
culture and heritage in their craving for a new dawn of civilisation. The content of such 
fantasies reached new dimensions as some of the worst atrocities ever imagined came 
true, especially during the Second World War, and more recently in the proliferation of 
civil wars and international wars across the globe.
Historically, however, cities seldom served as battlefields and the distinction between 
soldiers and civilians was for the most part respected. Wars were usually waged far 
away from cities or at their outskirts, but not inside the city-walls. Only at the end of a 
particular battle, or in the final stages of a war, were cities assaulted and looted. It was 
not only in the defenders’ interest not to ruin the city until the end of the siege, but also 
in the attackers’ interest to keep the spoils as intact as possible. As G.J. Ashworth 
suggests in War and the City, “such mutual aversion to fighting in the city [...] was 
elevated to a convention in military society”.10 Ashworth argues that even twentieth 
century warfare “provides remarkably few examples of the deliberate choice of an 
urban battlefield, although the few were often memorable”.11 Among these were 
Madrid during the Spanish Civil War. According to Ashworth, Madrid and other 
Spanish cities proved that urban environments could nonetheless work as good 
defensive terrain in spite of an attack/defence manpower ratio of 10:1 as compared to 
3:1 in rural areas.12 As will be explained in Chapter 3, Madrid was able to resist the 
occupation of Franco’s troops for almost three years.
1.1.2 Aerial warfare
Beginning in the early twentieth century, the use of aircraft to drop bombs and 
chemicals on military targets, but also civilian populations and constructions generated
9 Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, trans. R olf Tiedemann (Cambridge, Mass., London: Belknap 
Press, 2002) 97.
10 G. J. Ashworth, War and the City (London: Routledge, 1991) 113.
11 Ibid. 115.
12 Ibid. 116, 20.
30
new military strategies. The opportunity to destroy factories, warehouses, power plants 
and water deposits at relatively little cost constituted an effective means of depriving 
the enemy of essential supplies. Moreover, the possibility of intimidating civilians and 
actually annihilating entire neighbourhoods and districts together with their inhabitants 
was more and more viewed as a method for weakening the enemy’s morale. As 
geographer Kenneth Hewitt explains, in the new strategy of area or carpet bombing it 
was “the spread of fires from the incendiaries the bombers dropped [that] was the main 
cause of damage and casualties”.13 People died more often of bums and suffocation 
than of the wounds caused by shrapnel and flying debris.
Furthermore, Hewitt claims that as early as 1914, aeronautical studies predicted that the 
level of damage from incendiaries was as much the result o f the type of constructions 
targeted as of the number of bombs dropped. Densely constructed residential 
neighbourhoods in the inner city, where wooden structures and poorer construction 
materials such as plaster and brick often predominate, “were ideal places to start a mass 
fire”.14 Both the German raids on British cities and the British raids on German cities 
during the Second World War testify to this early observation. As it happens, working- 
class families and poorer residents not only populated the most tightly built 
neighbourhoods, but were often unable and sometimes unwilling to leave their 
dwellings during the bombing campaigns. Hewitt and other scholars argue that the 
socio-economic origin of the victims of the bombings during the Second World War 
partly explains why the different governments involved in the conflict did not feel 
compelled to put an end to the massive raids.15
But prior to the Second World War, the German and Italian air forces, and to a less 
extent the Soviet air force, had the opportunity to test their war machines in the Spanish 
Civil War. In his thorough examination of the development of the Luftwaffe between 
the First and the Second World Wars, James S. Corum devotes a chapter to the 
Germans’ role in the Spanish Civil War.16 According to him, the Luftwaffe’s
13 K. Hewitt, “When the Great Planes Came and Made Ashes o f  Our City - Towards an Oral Geography 
o f  the Disasters o f  War ” Antipode 26, no. 1 (1994): 453.
14 Ibid.: 462.
15 See Kenneth Hewitt, “Place Annihilation. Area Bombing and the Fate o f  Urban Places,” Annals o f  the 
Association o f  American Geographers 73, no. 2 (1983): 271.
16 James S. Corum, The Luftwaffe. Creating the Operational Air War 1918-1940  (Lawrence, Kansas: 
University Press o f  Kansas, 1997).
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experience in the Spanish conflict “had an enormous impact on Luftwaffe doctrine, 
tactics, and technology”.17 Over 19,000 staff members served in Spain between 1936 
and 1939, and the German air force “had the opportunity to conduct virtually every type 
of air campaign”,18 which meant that “by 1939 the Luftwaffe had more veterans who 
had participated in a modem air war than any other air force in western Europe”.19
Brian R. Sullivan, on the other hand, analyses the involvement of the Italians in the 
Spanish conflict and concludes that, unlike the Germans who greatly benefited from 
this prelude to the Second World War, “the resources consumed in Spain left the Italian
JOArmy and Air Force seriously weakened”. Sullivan suggests that the Italian military 
leaders did not have the time or the right mentality to digest the lessons from the 
Spanish Civil War, and were also unable to replace their technical equipment quickly 
before the Second World War broke out. This would explain their relatively poor 
performance between 1940 and 1941.21
The Italians might not have leamt as much as they could have from their Spanish 
experience, but there is hardly any doubt that the Aviazione Legionaria was successful 
in its campaigns over the Spanish Mediterranean coast, assisting considerably the 
military rebels’ cause. According to Spanish military historian Alcofar Nassaes, the 
Italians sent their best aircraft to Spain, and for a time their forces enjoyed significant 
autonomy, even though in principle they depended on the Spanish rebel military. The 
impact of the bombings on Barcelona and other Catalan localities has been thoroughly 
documented in the past years by Catalan historians—notably Josep Maria Sole i Sabate 
and Joan Villarroya i Font—who have also more cursorily examined the bombings of 
other Spanish cities. An interactive exhibition at the Museu d’Historia de Catalunya in 
Barcelona in spring 2007 with the title Quart plovien bombes (Catalan for “When
17 Ibid. 219.
18 Ibid. 220.
19 Ibid.
20 Brian R. Sullivan, “Fascist Italy’s Military Involvement in the Spanish Civil War,” The Journal o f  
Military Studies 59, no. 4 (1995): 697, 726.
21 Ibid.
22 Alcofar Nassaes, La Aviacion Legionaria En La Guerra Espahola (Barcelona: Editorial Euros, 1975) 
223 ,27 .
23 See Josep M. Sole i Sabate and Joan Villarroya i Font, Catalunya Sota Les Bombes (1936-1939) 
(Barcelona: Publicacions de 1‘Abadia de Montserrat, 1986), Josep M. Sole i Sabate and Joan Villarroya, 
Espaha En Llamas: La Guerra Civil Desde El A ire , 1. ed., Temas D e Hoy. H istoria  (Madrid: Temas de 
Hoy, 2003), Joan Villarroya i Font, Els Bombardeigs D e Barcelona Durant La Guerra Civil (1936-1939), 
2nd edition ed. (Barcelona: Publicacions de 1’Abadia de Montserrat, 1999).
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bombs rained down”) further testifies to what may be a growing interest in making 
visible the arguably less known fate of the bombed Catalan towns.
1.1.3 Terrorism
In the Anglophone world, the interest in studying the effects of war and terrorism on 
cities picked up after 11 September 2001 for perhaps obvious reasons. The analysis of 
the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center has given rise to an abundance of 
scholarly works. One of the earliest scholarly responses to the events came from Craig 
Calhoun, Paul Price and Ashley Timmer, the editors of Understanding September 11, 
who attempted to meet “the need for well formulated and clearly presented analyses 
that reveal rather than hide their intellectual underpinnings” amidst the proliferation of 
interpretations of the attack based on conceived wisdom, official consensuses and 
conspiratorial arguments.24 Outside the vast national and international political 
implications of 9/11 and closer to the topic under consideration in this chapter, Edward 
L. Glaeser and Jesse M. Shapiro took the opportunity to explore the impact of terrorism 
on urban form. Nevertheless, their schematic discussion of the four ways “in which 
physical danger has affected urbanisation” and their empirical evidence (Berlin, Paris 
and London during the World Wars; London and the IRA; and Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv) 
are more revealing than their conclusion: when evaluating the effects of the 9/11 attack 
on New York and the potential overall impact of terror on America’s cities, the authors 
conclude (reassuringly perhaps) that such impact will be small.25
Stephen Graham’s edited book Cities, War, and Terrorism is another example of this 
renewed interest in the urban experience of war and terrorism. The title explicitly 
suggests that we might be witnessing the emergence of a new field within urban 
studies— urban geopolitics. The contributors to the piece— including Zygmunt Bauman,
24 Craig Calhoun, Paul Price, and Ashley Timmer, eds., Understanding Septem ber 11 (New York: The 
N ew Press, 2002) 15.
25 Edward L. Glaeser and Jesse M. Shapiro, “Cities and Warfare: The Impact o f  Terrorism on Urban 
Form,” Journal o f  Urban Economics, no. 51 (2002). Glaeser and Shapiro start their article by establishing 
four ways “in which physical danger has affected urbanisation” (historically): 1) the “safe harbour” 
effect, which relates to the need to crowd together in the face o f  land-based attacks; 2) the target effect, 
which results from crowding together since “urban density means that it is possible to destroy (or steal) a 
large amount in a short time”; 3) the impact on costs o f  transportation, that is, in times o f  war, 
transportation becomes dangerous, thus it makes sense to remain in the city at least while the target effect 
does not outdo the cost o f  moving out (in the case o f  air raids, for example); and 4) the effect o f  the actual 
destruction o f  buildings.
26 Stephen (ed.) Graham, ed., Cities, War, and Terrorism. Towards an Urban Geopolitics. (Malden MA- 
Oxford-Victoria: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2004).
33
Peter Marcuse and Michael Sorkin—view cities as the emerging key actors in 
contemporary politics and international relations.
As the centres of economic, financial and political activity, a number of large cities in 
the world have become the targets of global terrorist networks. The implications of 
terrorism and, even more, of the defence against terrorism for the urban experience is 
especially noticeable in cities in the so-called democratic world, which became 
accustomed to unique levels of freedom and stability after the end of the Second World 
War. Graham argues that the planning and management of cities like New York and 
London are increasingly “being brought within the widening umbrella of ‘national 
security’”.27 In the past few years, residents and visitors in these cities have had to get 
used to exceptional and extraordinary security measures, which would have been 
considered appropriate for an authoritarian state a decade ago. The militarisation of 
cities— including “random” security checks, closed circuit televisions and harsher 
immigration rules—is merely one of the consequences of “the global vicious circle of 
terror”, which involves state-backed terror and informal terror. As Graham explains, it 
is often “state-backed terror, atrocity, and crimes against humanity that breed informal 
terrorist atrocity and crimes against humanity” to begin with. Then, “states respond with 
more of the same while invoking states of emergency and cultures of fear”, which in 
turn “allow legal restraints to be dispensed with more state-backed terror”.28
For cities that allegedly breed terrorist networks— Baghdad and Kabul being the 
obvious examples—the consequences of this logic are o f course worse. Surveillance is 
here accompanied by destruction—no buildings are spared when it comes to hunting 
down potential terrorists. Graham argues, however, that with their intricate and often 
unpredictable fabric, cities (especially in the Middle East) somehow “get in the way of 
the US military’s [and their allies’?] fantasies of trans-global, real-time omnipotence”.29 
Increasingly, high-tech military strategies have had to adapt to the “urbanisation of 
resistance”, but the urban battlefield still remains more dangerous and technically 
challenging for regular combatants.30
27 Ibid. 11.
28 Ibid. 14.
29 Ibid. 20.
30 See Ibid. 19.
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Aside from economic and financial nodes, cities also often act as cultural and 
ideological centres. They are appropriated as metaphors and/or metonyms for larger 
social and political formations such as nations and religious communities, and therefore 
easily identified as the physical materialisations of particular sets of values and ideas. In 
some conflicts, the deliberate eradication of the urban, cultural and architectural 
heritage of the opponent becomes a means of depriving the enemy community of its 
very foundations or its physical testimony of an age-old existence on which to continue 
building its present and future.
Robert Bevan, who in a recent book examines the destruction of architecture and 
memory in several (mainly twentieth-century) conflicts and revolutions across the 
world— including the Balkan war, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Second World 
War, the Chinese Cultural Revolution and the Turkish-Greek conflict in Cyprus— 
significantly concludes that “[t]he international community should be on its guard for 
the mass destruction of a people when it sees the destruction of their cultural 
artefacts”.31 The combination of ethnic and cultural cleansing can indeed take genocidal 
proportions as it did during the Nazi Holocaust and the Great Calamity in Armenia, but 
from Bevan’s account one may deduce that the aim to annihilate a people and their 
culture can be found in slower and quantitatively less intimidating destruction 
processes, including the Israelis’ killings and house demolitions in Palestinian
32territories, to which Eyal Weizman has drawn scholarly attention.
1.1.4 JJrbicide
The destruction of towns and cities in former Yugoslavia gave rise to the theoretically 
powerful concept of urbicide, which couples urban destruction directly with genocide, 
and has since been applied to other cases of extreme urban destruction such as Grozny 
during the Chechen wars in the late 1990s. Genocide, which literally means the killing 
or destruction of life, is defined by the 1948 Geneva convention as the “intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group”.33 Martin 
Coward describes the concept of urbicide as
31 Robert Bevan, The Destruction o f  Memory. Architecture a t War (London: Reaktion Books, 2007).
32 See Eyal Weizman, Hollow Land: Israel’s  Architecture o f  Occupation  (London - New York: Verso, 
2007).
33General Assembly Resolution, “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f  the Crime o f  
Genocide,” (Geneva: 1948), Art. 2.
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“the destruction of urban fabric insofar as it comprises the conditions of 
possibility for urbanity. Urbanity is characterized by an agonistic heterogeneity 
in which identity is constituted in relation to difference. Urbicide, in destroying 
the conditions of possibility of urbanity, denies such heterogeneity.”34 
Coward has later reconsidered the concept, identifying other meanings of urbicide, 
while clarifying his own understanding of it. According to him, scholars have used the 
concept to refer to both “the endogenous potential for self-destructive violence 
inscribed within the dynamics of the modem city” (the effects of redevelopment, for 
example) as well as to “the posited relationship between the city, militarization and 
war” (the impact of surveillance, policing, and so on).35 However, he claims, his 
contribution is closer to “a phenomenology of the destruction of buildings”. Buildings 
are here taken to be public objects, which are shared with others, sharing always 
involving an encounter with difference.36 Hence, it is the elimination of this encounter 
with difference that constitutes the rationale of urbicide: like genocide, in certain 
contexts, the ultimate aim of selectively destroying the urban built environment is to 
achieve ethnic, social and/or cultural homogeneity.
Drawing from the Balkans’ experience directly, F rancis  Chaslin explains the 
phenomenon of urbicide as the reaction of an agonising illiterate rural world against the 
liberal ways o f life of the city.37 Chaslin recalls similar phenomena in the past, such as 
the Maoist strategies, which sought to have the cities encircled by the countryside, or 
the sustained attacks on cities by Latin American guerrillas. In all these cases, the city 
has been portrayed as a source of national decay and corruption, implying the need for 
cleaning and emptying it of all that embodies or symbolises urbanity, be it buildings or 
people. In this view, in the former Yugoslavia, the reaction against the city involved the 
distrust of the ethnic and religious heterogeneity that famously characterised many 
Balkan cities. Chaslin, an architect himself, uses the writings of local architects Ivan 
Straus and Bogdan Bogodanovic (who was the mayor of Belgrade between 1982 and 
1986) to confer more realism on his depiction of how feelings of mutual hostility and 
suspicion were fuelled between the urban and rural populations, and subsequently
34 Martin Coward, “Urbicide in Bosnia,” in Cities, War and Terrorism. Towards an Urban Geopolitics, 
ed. Stephen (ed.) Graham (Malden MA-Oxford-Victoria: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2004).
35 Martin Coward, “‘Urbicide’ Reconsidered,” Theory and Event 10, no. 2 (2007): Paragraphs 17, 24.
36 Ibid.: Paragraphs 34, 37.
37 Francois Chaslin, Une Haine Monumentale: Essai Sur La Destruction D es Villes En Ex-Yugoslavie 
(Paris: Descartes & Cie., 1997).
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among different ethnic and religious groups. Such an idealised divide between the 
urban and the rural is not unfamiliar to the Spanish Civil War and post-war period. The 
military rebels tended to portray cities as nests (nidos) of liberal or communist anti­
militarism and anti-clericalism.
With a distinct flavour of denunciation, Spanish writer Juan Goytisolo draws some 
historical parallels between besieged Sarajevo in 1996 and besieged Madrid in 1936, 
suggesting that both capital cities can be viewed as examples of
“heroic resistance of civilian populations [...], who managed to undo the plans 
of those who expected, in the 1990s as in the 1930s, a quick victory for the 
stronger force. In each case, stubborn opposition caused the war to drag on, 
creating terrible hardship but enabling the population to recognize those who 
had shared complicity in the barbarous aggression.”38 
Aside from the comparison between Sarajevo’s and Madrid’s endurance against the 
anti-urban forces of Serbian and Spanish nationalism, it is suggested that more could be 
said about the Spanish conflict to further document and illustrate the intimate 
connection between mass killings and mass destruction of material culture, including 
cities. The social revolution that took place in Madrid and Barcelona and other Spanish 
cities at the beginning of the war—during which members o f the aristocracy, 
bourgeoisie and clergy were systematically executed by popular militias, and almost 
every single church either destroyed or turned into a public or military facility—was in 
many ways a twentieth-century re-enactment of the ferocious, anti-clerical spirit of the 
French Revolution. The iconoclastic activities of Anarchists and Communists on the 
Republican side were not replicated by similar actions on the rebel side, but the 
systematic killings of civilians were, and tens of thousands of workers, peasants and 
also artists and intellectuals in the Red zones were killed. Franco’s brutal repression of 
the vanquished continued after the war and until the very end of his dictatorship. In this, 
one might say, ideological or class-based and also religious cleansing, hundreds of 
thousands of people were tried by military courts and ended up executed, or in prison or 
labour camps. A subtler way of humiliating the vanquished— which anticipates the 
following section on post-war reconstruction—was forcing them to redeem their
38 Juan Goytisolo, “Madrid 1936 — Sarajevo 1996,” Q ueen’s Quarterly 103, no. 1 (1996).
37
wrongdoings (their sins) by reconstructing the towns that they had lost after intense 
battles such as Brunete and Belchite.
1.2 Reconstruction
1.2.1 Reconstruction phases
In their examination of disaster relief and recovery in cities in the aftermath of natural 
catastrophes, mainly in the United States, J. Eugene Haas et al. make a potentially 
useful distinction between four different periods or stages of recovery, which are 
roughly chronological, but also likely to overlap. After an initial emergency response 
(1), they argue, cities go on to restore what is restorable (2). Following this, they 
reconstruct what has been destroyed “for functional replacement” (3). Finally, they 
undertake reconstruction “for commemoration, betterment and development” (4). Haas 
et al. claim that “the time required for each activity period (except for the last) is about 
ten times that of the previous one”, which suggests that rebuilding basic infrastructures 
and housing is the most time-consuming part of the process of recovery of a ruined 
city.39
In his study of Paris in the aftermath of the Second World War, geographer Hugh Clout 
identifies a similar chronology. Immediately after the “bombing raids a range of 
emergency services rescued the injured, removed victims, cleared debris, demolished 
dangerous structures, shored up what might be conserved and filled shell holes”.40 Clout 
maintains that “[djespite extreme difficulties, the effectiveness [of the emergency 
services] was remarkable”.41 By contrast, he argues, permanent reconstruction of 
housing in and around Paris proved extremely slow.42
Part of the explanation for municipal services’ wartime efficiency might lie in the spirit 
of discipline and solidarity that seems to take over in emergency situations, also often 
propelled by efficient war propaganda. Although a number of bureaucrats and private 
individuals might make profit out of the rationing o f food and other essential supplies, 
there are also many examples of wealthier individuals offering provisions and shelter to
39 John Eugene Haas, Robert W. Kates, and Martyn J. Bowden, Reconstruction Following D isaster, Mit 
Press Environmental Studies Series (Cambridge, Mass.; London: M.I.T. Press, 1977) 1.
40 Hugh Clout, “Ruins and Revival: Paris in the Aftermath o f  the Second World War,” Landscape 
Research 29, no. 2 (2004): 126.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.: 130.
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those in need (see Chapter 4 for how different companies offered to use their facilities 
as air-raid shelters in wartime Barcelona, for example).
But once the collective spirit of discipline and obedience stops being a necessary 
element for the city’s survival, it appears as if individual interests begin to take over 
again. Haas et al. claim that once the “drama of the emergency and restoration periods 
fades”, the same forces that shaped the characteristics of the city before the disaster 
“reemerge as the primary determinants of the city of the future”.43 Does this mean that 
cities are less affected by war than one would imagine?
1.2.2 Continuity and change in post-war urban reconstruction 
In 1954, Leo Grebler, a professor of urban land economics, had the opportunity of 
studying 28 European cities which had been severely damaged during the Second 
World War. Although many things had changed— for example, street patterns had been 
altered, new, less densely built city centres constructed, and even the architecture in 
some of the reconstructed areas looked different— Grebler affirmed that when focusing 
on the entire pattern of reconstruction, “a great deal of persistence [could] be 
detected”.44 War and destruction had brought “surprisingly small permanent changes in 
the economic base and growth patterns of cities”. Most city dwellers who spent the war 
as refugees in smaller towns and villages returned to the bombed cities as soon as the 
war ended. Surprisingly few considered not returning to their urban way of life, in spite 
of the apparently discouraging prospect of resettling in bombed-out cities.45 People 
returned to their old homes, businesses to their former premises, regardless of building 
conditions.
Fred Charles Ikle, who undertook a similar study to Grebler’s a few years earlier, 
between 1949 and 1950, argues that ownership of the land could explain the return of 
homeowners and shop proprietors from an economic perspective, but not that of 
tenants. Instead, “social ties, which still connect the bombed-out person with his former
43 Haas, Kates, and Bowden, Reconstruction Following D isaster 25.
44 Leo Grebler, “Continuity in the Rebuilding o f  Bombed Cities in Western Europe,” The American  
Journal o f  Sociology  61, no. 5 (1956): 463.
45 Ibid.: 464.
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neighbourhood” seemed to play a key role here.46 Ikle is nonetheless careful to point 
out that there is a limit to the repopulation and restoration of an area. Even though 
significantly lower than many people would have assumed prior to the Second World 
War, the limit exists when basic utilities and transportation have not or cannot be 
restored. In such cases, social ties are not enough to bring back residents and businesses 
to their former neighbourhoods.47
Ownership and social ties are perhaps two of the “determinants” of post-war cities, to 
use Haas et al.’s terminology. However, Grebler suggests that urban dwellers’ level of 
attachment to their city depends on the cultural context. In the case o f post-war Europe, 
he claims, it has to be understood against the backdrop of traditional European society, 
which, he argues, is more prone to the status quo than younger societies such as the 
United States.48
Be that as it may, indeed little of wartime planners’ ambition to use destruction as an 
opportunity to redesign European cities according to modernist planning ideals 
materialised in the aftermath of the conflict. Grebler gives several reasons for this “lost 
opportunity”, including that planners could not ignore the fact that large sections of the 
cities were still standing (90 per cent of the County of London remained intact, for 
example). Cities were also keen to restore taxable property and trade quickly. And even 
though municipalities owned the land in the reconstruction areas, they needed to attract 
private developers who were willing to build, and this often resulted in compromises, 
which did not benefit the implementation o f innovative, large-scale plans.49
In his detailed study of post-war reconstruction in Germany, historian Jeffry M. 
Diefendorf further elaborates on the reasons why ground-breaking planning concepts 
were seldom implemented in the wake of the Second World War. In the case of the 
German cities, the early administration and coordination of the reconstruction efforts 
took place under the auspices of the allied occupation. Until 1949, different visions and 
practical arrangements operated in the zones controlled by Britain, France, the United
46 Fred Charles Ikl6, “The Effect o f  War Destruction Upon the Ecology o f  Cities,” Social Forces 29, no. 
4(1951): 390.
47 Ibid.: 390 ,91 .
48 Grebler, “Continuity in the Rebuilding o f  Bombed Cities in Western Europe,” 469.
49 See Ibid.: 468, 69.
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States and the Soviet Union.50 This did not foster the design of an overarching, national 
programme for urban reconstruction with jointly agreed rules and practices. The fact 
that many of the planners and architects had worked during the Third Reich also set the 
tone of the reconstruction process: cautiousness and pragmatism were a safer recipe 
than boldness and ideology at this historic juncture.
Even though each city “experienced the process o f reconstruction uniquely”, they also 
underwent similar challenges.51 Aside from having to compromise with the real estate 
sector in exchange for financial backing, Diefendorf suggests that city planners in post­
war Germany were seldom successful in involving the public in their discussions, 
instead reproducing pre-war (and wartime) top-down planning procedures characterised 
by a significant amount of secrecy. One of the consequences of the public’s alienation 
was that a large volume of uncontrolled housing construction took place, both in the 
outer suburbs and the inner cities, further hindering the realisation of comprehensive 
urban plans. In view of the prolonged and extensive housing shortage, it is perhaps not 
surprising that urban dwellers chose to ignore larger planning concerns. In France, as 
historian Daniele Voldman explains, provisional housing complexes failed to be taken 
down within the timeframe originally envisioned, instead becoming the nuclei of the 
shantytowns that expanded at the margins of many French cities well into the mid- 
1970s.53
Nevertheless, it appears as if reconstruction in Germany and France, and possibly other 
European countries, was over all quite successful. In spite of the largely failed attempt 
at using destruction as an opportunity for rebuilding according to new urban models, 
Diefendorf concludes that “at least in a quantitative sense, and in terms of speed, 
reconstruction was a great success [in Germany]”. “Within a decade or so after the 
war,” he writes, “cities that had been reduced to rubble and ashes were again livable 
and lived in.”54 By 1954, in France too, according to Voldman, the replacement of the 
destroyed urban fabric had been accomplished and cities were back to normal
50 See Jeffry M. Diefendorf, In the Wake o f  War. The Reconstruction o f  Cities after World War II (N ew  
York - Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) 244-51.
51 Ibid. xviii.
52 Ibid. 218, 19.
53 Daniele Voldman, La Reconstruction Des Villes Frangaises De 1940 A 1954. Histoire D'une Politique 
(Paris: Editions L’Harmattan, 1997) 322.
54 Diefendorf, In the Wake o f  War. The Reconstruction o f  Cities after World W arll 276.
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(notwithstanding the housing problem that still affected many urban dwellers— a 
problem partly inherited from the pre-war period).55
In her examination of reconstruction in France, Voldman emphasises the political 
dimension of the rebuilding process.56 In the French case, she explains, the Ministere de 
Reconstruction et Urbanism (Ministry of Reconstruction and Urbanism, MRU), which 
the Provisional Constituting Assembly created in March 1945, took over several of the 
institutions previously created by the Vichy regime, and largely relied on the same 
interventionist approach that had characterised the latter’s undertakings during the 
war.57 Voldman suggests that it is important to acknowledge such practical continuities 
in the organisation and coordination of reconstruction between the authoritarian regime 
of Marshal Petain and the democratic governments that followed after 1944, as much of 
the present structure and dynamics of the French planning administration were set up
CO
during these transitory years. One would think that in cases of war (international or 
civil) followed by a change of political regime, new forces, ideas and practices, 
different from those that sustained the pre-war (and wartime) city, emerge. Post-war 
Spain, as will be discussed, is another case in point suggesting that even when a regime 
change is the outcome, the same forces— creative and economic—that shaped the pre­
war city are likely to resurface and ultimately take the lead in the reconstruction 
process.
Another controversial aspect of post-war reconstruction processes is the use of political 
prisoners and prisoners of war. Prisoners were used extensively as forced labour in Nazi 
Germany and, as will be explained in the following chapter, a scheme of cancellation of 
penalties by work was also designed in Franco’s Spain. The working conditions of the 
Nazi prisoners, which are sadly but fortunately well documented, were extreme, leading 
in most cases to death. In the aftermath of the Second World War, German prisoners of 
war were in turn used by the Allies and the Soviets for various reconstruction tasks. In 
an article published in November 1945, Nemeiah Robinson suggests that the use of 
German manpower was already implicitly considered part of the exaction of “reparation 
in kind for the destruction wrought by the Germans” that France, the United Kingdom
55 Voldman, La Reconstruction Des Villes Francoises D e 1940 A 1954. H istoire D'une Politique 12.
56 Ibid. 427.
57 Ibid. 145-48.
58 See Ibid. 7-13.
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and the United States proclaimed as “an inflexible purpose” in the Yalta Conference.59 
For historical and ideological reasons, perhaps, the experience of the 400,000 German 
prisoners of war that remained in Britain by the end of 1946,60 or the sometimes tragic 
fate of the tens of thousands of German prisoners that were deployed in France for 
cleaning mine fields after 1945, tend to be less known.61 It is a fact, however, that 
governments across the world have recurrently exploited political prisoners and 
prisoners of war in the past century, regardless of their political ideology and despite 
the existence of international agreements condemning such practice.
As indicated by the secondary literature cited previously, cities that were bombed or 
damaged during the Second World War have received significant attention, although 
usually in the form of case studies. Aside from French and German cities (Berlin, 
Dresden),62 Dutch (Rotterdam), British (London, Liverpool),63 Italian (Rome)64 and 
Japanese cities (Tokyo, Hiroshima)65 have elicited numerous institutional reports and 
academic pieces of research, which can only be included as references here. Some of 
them, like Fried’s book on Roman politics and planning since the Second World War or 
the reports by Holden et al. on London, are more technically and policy-oriented. Pieces 
like Fukui’s and Sinnai’s edition on post-war urban reconstruction in Japan, or Ladd’s 
account of the prolonged troubles faced first by a divided post-war Berlin and then by a
59 See Nehemiah Robinson, “Problems o f  European Reconstruction,” The Quarterly Journal o f  
Economics 60, no. 1 (1945): 25-28.
60 James Richards, Life in Britain fo r  German Prisoners o f  War (BBC, [cited 24 August 2008]); available 
from http://www.bbc.co.uk/historv/british/britain wwtwo/german pows Ol.shtml.
61 See George Bonisch, “Surviving German Pows Seek Compensation,” Spiegel Online International, 25 
August 2008, Hugh Clout, “The Reconstruction o f  Upper Normandy: A Tale o f  Two Cities,” Planning 
Perspectives 14, no. 2 (1999): 87, Daniele Voldman, Le Deminage D e La France Apres 1945 (Paris: 
Editions Odile Jacob, 1998).
62 Elizabeth A. Ten Dyke, Dresden : Paradoxes o f  Memory in History, Studies in Anthropology and  
H istory; V. 28  (London; New York: Routledge, 2001), Germany (Federal Republic.) Bundesministerium 
fur Gesamtdeutsche Fragen., The Palace o f  Berlin and Its D o w n fa ll: An Illustrated Report on the 
Destruction o f  Cultural Monuments in Berlin, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Tauber, 1951), Frederick Taylor, Dresden 
: Tuesday, 13 February 1945 (London: Bloomsbury, 2004).
63 Charles Henry Holden and William Graham Holford, Reconstruction in the City o f  London : Interim  
Report to the Improvements and Town Planning Committee by the Joint Consultants: (with Report o f  the 
Improvements ... Committee) (London ,: 1946), Charles Henry Holden et al., The City o f  London : A 
R ecord o f  Destruction and Survival: The Building D evelopm ent o f  the City, the Damage Suffered in the 
Years 1940-1945, and the Proposals fo r  Reconstruction  (London: Published on behalf o f  the Corporation 
by the Architectural Press, 1951), Charles Henry Holden, William Graham Holford, and London. 
Corporation. Improvements and Town Planning Committee., Reconstruction in the City o f  London : 
Final R eport to the Improvements and Town Planning Committee by the Joint Consultants (London: s.n., 
1947), Bryan Perrett, L iverpoo l: A City at War (London: Hale, 1990).
64 Robert C. Fried, Planning the Eternal City : Roman Politics and Planning since World War II (N ew  
Haven: Yale University Press, 1973).
65 N. Fukui and H. Jinnai, Destruction and Rebirth o f  Urban Environment (Tokyo: Sagami Shoba 
Publishing, 2000).
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unified post-division Berlin, offer deeper analyses o f the social and psychological 
implications of post-conflict and post-crisis recovery.66
More contemporary case studies of reconstruction can also be found for the war-torn 
cities of the Middle East and the Balkans. Beirut is one such example.67 Authors have 
focused on the more obvious challenge of rebuilding a city divided along religious 
lines, but also on the implications of the unusually prominent role in the reconstruction 
process of one specific individual: the businessman and twice prime minister Rafiq 
Hariri, assassinated in February 2005. Hariri, who financed large portions of the 
reconstruction of the city from his own pocket, has been both acclaimed for his vision 
and generosity, and accused of overseeing the real problems of Beirutees and favouring 
foreign business interests.68 Usually, as has been argued previously, the problem faced 
by the state and the local administrations when addressing post-war reconstruction is 
that they have to reach compromises with the private sector in order to rebuild. The 
confluence of political and economic leadership in the Lebanese case might therefore be 
viewed as facilitating the smoothness and efficiency o f the reconstruction process, but 
becomes problematic from the point of view of the democratic control o f the process 
and the accountability of the actors involved. Even though Hariri tried to distribute most 
of the shares of Solidere (the company that he created to address reconstruction in 
Beirut) among the public, while he was the prime minister, there was in principle 
nobody outside the government and Solidere to assess the decisions made on the 
rebuilding of the Lebanese capital city.
It is perhaps too early to evaluate the long-term results of the physical reconstruction of 
Afghan and Iraqi cities, but there are nonetheless numerous reports and much secondary 
literature available already.69 Sultan Barakat, an academic and professional expert on 
post-war reconstruction, argues that one of the fundamental problems of reconstruction 
in less developed countries is that “a disproportionate amount of aid is being absorbed
66 Brian Ladd, The Ghosts o f  Berlin (Chicago: The University o f  Chicago Press, 1997).
67 See, for example, “Recovering Beirut: Urban Design and Post-War Reconstruction,” Social, Economic 
and P olitical Studies o f  the Middle East 47 (1993), Dona J. Stewart, “Economic Recovery and 
Reconstruction in Postwar Beirut,” Geographical Review  86, no. 4 (1996).
68 See Stewart, “Economic Recovery and Reconstruction in Postwar Beirut,” 487-504.
69 See, for example, Sultan Barakat, ed., Third World Quarterly. Reconstructing War-Torn Societies: 
Afghanistan, vol. 23 (2002), B.A. Kazimee, “Sustainable Reconstruction and Planning Strategies for 
Afghan Cities: Conservation and Environmental Heritage,” in The Sustainable City Iv. Urban 
Regeneration and Sustainability (Southampton - Boston: WIT Press, 2006).
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by relief initiatives and repair of infrastructure for rapid delivery of services in the short
70term, without any strategic view of how they are to be sustained and by whom”. 
Vision is a fundamental ingredient for successfully conceiving and implementing 
reconstruction programmes. Yet vision in this context has often been understood as the 
capacity to conceive grand, epic, ultimately over-ambitious reconstruction projects such 
as architect Pedro Bidagor’s plan for post-war Madrid. But vision lies probably more in 
the capacity to match a city’s ambitions with the resources available to it at that very 
moment, without loosing sight of its future needs and resources. This is not necessarily 
an easy task.
1.3 Restore, replace or leave in ruins?
Art historians have long been concerned with how preservation and reconstruction 
efforts are actually carried out. Alois Riegl initiated the discussion in 1903 
distinguishing between the historic value and the age value of monuments in his 
famous essay The Modern Cult o f  Monuments. Its Character and Origins.7I Should 
buildings and monuments be restored to their original state or should later modifications 
and/or additions be respected? To put it boldly, what should be done with medieval 
cathedrals, for instance, some of which were built over hundreds of years spanning 
different architectural periods? There are seemingly no definite answers to these 
questions. It is suggested that most of the times it ends up being the institution or the 
restorers behind the specific reconstruction or restoration project who decide whether 
age or historic value should be given priority. In some cases, cities may decide not to 
touch the remnants of destroyed monuments as a way to immortalise the horrors of war. 
Examples of this are the A-bomb dome in Hiroshima or the Frauenkirche in Dresden 
after the Second World War, although the latter was eventually restored after the 
German reunification.72 In other cases, they may decide to build something different as 
in the case of Ground Zero in New York City.
Sooner or later, war-torn cities— and Barcelona, Bilbao and Madrid were no 
exception— are confronted with the choice between restoring, renewing or maintaining 
the ruins of specific sites. In these situations, theoretical arguments in favour of one or
70 Sultan Barakat, ed., After the Conflict. Reconstruction and D evelopm ent in the Aftermath o f  War 
(London - N ew  York: I.B. Tauris, 2005).
71 Alois Riegl, “The Modem Cult o f  Monuments. Its Character and Origins,” Oppositions, no. 25 (1982).
72 A British group was asked to lead the work, partly as a symbol o f  reconciliation between Germany and 
the former allied country. The restoration was completed in 2005.
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the other choice are often eagerly debated, and the experiences of other cities and 
countries used to back the arguments.
The restoration of Warsaw’s historic centre after the Second World War has become 
paradigmatic of a city’s decision to reproduce its built environment exactly as it looked 
like prior to destruction. But other Polish towns such as Gdansk were also restored, as 
much as possible, to their pre-war appearance by the new Communist authorities.73 In 
the case of Warsaw, it is usually argued that Poles felt the need to recover at least a 
portion of the capital city’s centuries-old cultural heritage for future generations. This 
was also an important act of national reassertion after Hitler’s systematic attempts at 
destroying Polish culture. Another arguably interesting example of restoration is the 
Brandenburg Gate in Berlin, which was damaged during the Second World War 
(although not as severely as the surrounding buildings on Pariserplatz). The decision of 
Berlin’s two post-war administrations— Western and Eastern—to restore the Gate 
jointly was exceptional. The Gate’s preservation as part of the Berlin Wall and apart 
from it illustrates the complex interplay between the disruptive effect of the post-war 
division of the city and the numerous historical continuities that operated despite such 
division.74
Within the year of the attack on the World Trade Center, and at the very beginning of 
the debates about how to reconstruct Ground Zero, a number of scholars explored how 
to turn the disaster, which from the point of view of the victims and their relatives was 
obviously irreversible, into an opportunity. The prospect of recovering some of the 
spaces and values that were lost in this area of Manhattan when it was redeveloped in 
the 1970s was enticing. For urbanists such as Michael Sorkin, if there was a lesson to 
draw from 9/11, it was that the financial district, the so-called heart of capitalism, had to 
be reshaped in such way that it in fact challenged the heartlessness of our contemporary
73 See Jerzy Stankiewicz, Les Monuments D e Gdansk. Histoire, Destruction Et Reconstruction  (Poznan: 
Instytut Zachodni, 1961).
74 See R. Partha Khan and Olivia Mufioz-Rojas, “The City o f  Traumas, the Trauma o f  Cities: Modes o f  
Preservation and Commemoration in Berlin, Hiroshima, and New York,” in Stadt Und Trauma/City and  
Trauma, ed. Bettina Fraisl and Monika Stromberger (Wurzburg: Koonigshausen & Neumann, 2004), 70- 
75.
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economic system. Moreover, being such a key area for the city, the destruction of the
7SWorld Trade Center was seen as an opportunity to rethink New York City as a whole.
In an attempt to gather inspiration from past cases of urban regeneration after 
destruction and reflect on the broader theoretical implications of these processes, Joan 
Ockman put together an interdisciplinary anthology of case studies, spanning the 
aftermaths of Lisbon’s 1755 earthquake, Chicago’s 1871 fire and the Balkan War in the 
1990s, among many others.76 The chronological sequence of cases of catastrophes 
followed by regeneration convey the sense of a long history of urban resilience and 
transformation. This observation becomes perhaps even more compelling when looking 
back at the history of ancient cities such as Sybaris, Cyrene and Salamis, which were 
resurrected from their ashes not just once, but several times.77
The initial quest for rethinking lower Manhattan and New York City as a whole in the 
aftermath o f 9/11 largely waned amidst the competing claims of redevelopers, state 
officials and victims’ associations. Between restoring the site to its earlier appearance, 
replacing it with a new design and leaving it in ruins, the second option was chosen. 
However, it is suggested that it is only in appearance that the Freedom Tower and the 
adjacent buildings that have been designed for Ground Zero are different from the Twin 
Towers: their function— finance and commerce—and purported meaning—US 
supremacy—have hardly changed.
Ruins have also been viewed as evidence of a people’s supremacy. Nazi architect 
Albert Speer’s theory of ruin value defended the idea that architects ought to conceive 
the buildings and monuments of the Third Reich with their ruins already in mind. Akin 
to the architectural legacy of the Roman empire, which over the millennia has turned 
into the wom-away, but overwhelming ruins we admire today, Speer (and Hitler) 
wanted the monuments of the Third Reich to be designed and built with materials that 
would produce aesthetic and powerful ruins, which would testify to the greatness of the 
German empire centuries later. Georg Simmel’s view of traditional ruins as the
75 See Michael & Zukin Sorkin, Sharon, (ed.), ed., After the World Trade Center: Rethinking New York 
City (N ew  York: Routledge, 2002).
76 Ockman, ed., Out o f  Ground Zero : Case Studies in Urban Reinvention.
77 William David Gordon, “The Destruction o f Cities in Mediterranean Lands” (paper presented at the 
The Sixth J.L. Myres Memorial Lecture, New College, Oxford, 1971).
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harmonious conciliation between the effect of natural decay and the resilient spirit of
7 0
man-made forms was hereby challenged by the aim to control decay. But before 
Speer, nineteenth-century English aristocracy had discovered “the pleasure of ruins”,79 
and got into the habit of placing artificial ancient ruins in the green, undulating 
landscapes of their estates. A distinction should perhaps be made between aesthetic and 
toxic ruins: in the celebration of ruins as magnificent and inspiring elements, Speer 
probably did not have in mind the contaminated ruins that were in evidence in British 
and German cities in the aftermath of the blanket bombing.
In The Arcades Project, Benjamin writes that “[demolition sites [are] sources for 
teaching the theory of construction”. He quotes Charles-Fran9ois Viel, who discusses 
the advantages architects had in his time because they were able to observe the 
foundations and first layers of the numerous churches and cloisters that were being 
demolished in Paris as part of the redevelopment of the city.80 The entrails of most 
cities conceal layers of groundwork, demolished buildings and scattered artefacts, like 
forgotten, sometimes repressed memories, which may be randomly or selectively 
retrieved. Both wartime destruction and urban redevelopment may violently open up 
these hidden entrails, bringing them to daylight. This was the case of the Roman 
military belt of Barcelona, fragments of which first appeared when Via Layetana was 
opened in the early twentieth century, and then later when the bombings during the 
Spanish Civil War led to the demolition of many old houses attached to the ancient 
wall. Barcelona city councils at the time decided to retrieve the city’s Roman past by 
bringing out its ruins.
The improvement of photographic techniques in the second part of nineteenth century 
proved an invaluable tool for archaeologists such as Fox Talbot, who specialised in 
taking photos of Egyptian monuments, or Desire Chamay who shot some of the first 
pictures o f Mayan ruins in Mexico. These aesthetically pleasing and instructive images 
of ancient monuments and ruins were soon reproduced for commercial purposes in the 
form of picture cards and illustrated books. These became immensely popular amidst
78 Georg Simmel, “The Ruin,” in Essays in Sociology, Philosophy and Aesthetics, ed. Kurt H. W olff 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1965).
79 See Rose Dame D. B. E. Macaulay, Pleasure o f  Ruins. Reprinted E d  (London: Thames & Hudson, 
1966).
80 Benjamin, The A rcades Project.
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the educated middle classes, who could now travel to distant lands without abandoning 
the comfort of their armchairs.
There is also a long tradition that views ruins as evocative of the frailty of man-made 
creations and the brevity of human life. Michael Perlman suggests that images, and 
ruins in particular, constitute powerful mnemonic devices and transmitters of concepts
o  1
and experiences that may lie beyond the reach of language. Perlman is here thinking 
of Hiroshima and the unprecedented, possibly ungraspable, experience of total 
annihilation. The question remains whether the ruins of the A-bomb dome (former 
Hiroshima Prefectural Industrial Promotional Hall), the only remaining pre-war 
structure in Hiroshima, can indeed transmit the meaning of absolute destruction. On the 
other hand, as suggested in Chapter 6, the post-war ruins of the Cuartel de la Montana 
in Madrid might have been intuitively left untouched for many years because they 
conveyed the contradictory sentiments of defeat, martyrdom and victory that the rebels 
had towards Madrid—the city where they had been initially subdued, which took them 
three years to seize, and which they attempted to turn into the epitome of the New 
Spain.
French photographer Charles Soulier was able to document the damaged Parisian 
quarters during the Paris Commune in the 1870s. This is one of the first urban conflicts 
of which there is photographic evidence. Over time, the live documentation of wartime 
destruction has proved a useful propaganda tool. To Franco’s supporters, the ruined 
bridges that the Basque-Republican troops left behind in Bilbao during the Spanish 
Civil War bore witness to the Reds’ “destructive barbarism”. Not surprisingly, the 
enemy’s destructive acts always appear worse than one’s own, and are therefore often 
used to discredit the enemy. Pictures of war-torn cities, displaying accusatory sentences 
against the enemy, circulated in many national media during the Second World War and 
the same kind of propaganda has been present in international media during more recent 
conflicts such as the Balkan War. There is, however, a difficult balance to keep between 
denouncing the enemy’s atrocities and maintaining the morale o f the population, who 
might not want to be reminded of the horrors of the war in this way.
81 See Michael Perlman, Imaginal Memory and the P lace o f  Hiroshima (N ew  York: State University o f  
N ew  York Press, 1988).
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If most o f the above suggests a historical weakness for ruins, some scholars argue that 
such sentiment may have shifted during the second half of the twentieth century in 
view, precisely, of the unprecedented levels of destruction caused by two world wars 
and the increasing threat of environmental catastrophes. However, much 
contemporary art, including cinema, suggests that the fascination with ruins and decay 
is very much alive. And such fascination will probably always remain alive, whether 
sustained on metaphysical, archaeological, aesthetical or political preoccupations.
Destruction itself exerts a similar attraction. Urban apocalypses continue to elicit the 
imagination of writers, film-directors and their audiences. It would seem as if  the 
menace o f mass destruction— whether real or perceived— is more and more 
contributing to shaping the perceptions and conceptions of the world of contemporary 
urban dwellers. But then again the fear of divine punishment through wars, plagues and 
natural catastrophes has populated the minds of city dwellers across the globe for 
millennia. And so has the myth of the Phoenix bird—death and destruction are the 
prospect for resurrection and reconstruction.
1. Conclusion
Many cities were historically designed with war in mind. City-walls were erected to 
close them off from potential attacks by land or sea. In the nineteenth century, city- 
walls were tom down as the urban population began to grow dramatically. The enemy 
was no longer expected to arrive from outside the city—the enemy was now inside the 
city. Radicalised workers and the masses of poor, homeless or unemployed migrants 
from the countryside were seen as a constant threat to the good order of the city. The 
1830 and 1848 revolutions and the Paris Commune were an anticipation of large-scale 
violent urban confrontation. In the following century, cities were again exposed to 
warfare in the traditional sense (two or more fighting armies), only this time, the attacks 
would come from the air. The arrival of aerial warfare techniques in the early twentieth 
century effectively turned cities— even cities that were not at the forefront of battle— 
into targets, and civilians into passive victims of war. The scale of destruction caused 
by air raids was unprecedented, and more importantly perhaps, the relation between the 
number of casualties and damage inflicted on cities from the air and the number of
82 See Brigitte Desrochers, “Ruins Revisited: Modernist Conceptions o f  Heritage,” The Journal o f  
Architecture 5 (2000).
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casualties among the pilots conducting the attacks was exceptionally disproportionate. 
From now on, death and destruction on the enemy’s side could be carried out at 
relatively little human cost on the attackers’ side. Air raids were conducted during the 
First World War, but it was during the Second World War that control of the air became 
of paramount importance. The significance o f the German and Italian air forces’ 
intervention in the Spanish Civil War for the outcome of that conflict was already an 
indication of this.
The turn of the twenty-first century witnessed the end of a short period of post-Cold 
War optimism. With the 9/11 terrorist attacks, some would argue, a new kind of warfare 
was inaugurated, in which sporadic yet massive terror attacks on cities are fought with 
conventional means of war often far away from the originally targeted city. Global 
capitalist cities such as New York and London may attract the wrath of trans-national 
religious fundamentalists, but cities in ethnically and culturally diverse nations such as 
the Balkans and Chechnya have become victims of urbicide—the systematic destruction 
of city life and its physical habitat. The loathing among certain groups for the tolerant, 
diverse and unpredictable nature of the city is probably as old as the city itself, but takes 
on new dimensions with the development of the modem metropolis. Often associated 
with economic, social and cultural progress, the modem metropolis is also identified 
with material and moral decay. All this is in stark contrast with the rural environment, 
which appears to certain groups as an idealised location of authenticity, purity and 
virtue. Ultimately, the contrast (and conflict) between idealised notions of the urban and 
the rural lies at the heart of most modem ideologies.
Twentieth-century wartime cities have generally demonstrated a surprising capacity to 
devise emergency measures and undertake temporary reconstruction work in the face of 
death and destruction. A spirit of discipline and solidarity, aided by effective war 
propaganda, seems to take over in cities that are threatened by air raids (or other forms 
of attacks). However, it is often argued that this sort of spirit vanishes once the danger 
is over, and cities gradually return to normal. Thus, when reconstruction proper begins, 
pre-war institutional arrangements and compromises, as well as social and economic 
patterns, tend to resurface, gradually determining the dynamics of the rebuilding 
process. The opportunity for change that a destroyed city provides from the point of 
view o f many planners and architects might therefore be challenged by the
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administrative inertia and property arrangements of bureaucrats and politicians, and city 
dwellers’ emotional attachment to the pre-war city. It has been suggested by scholars 
examining European post-war reconstruction that continuity was clearly more in 
evidence than change in the rebuilding of the European cities after 1945. Despite the 
enthusiasm and the work that a number of modernist planners put into redesigning the 
post-war cities, such designs seldom advanced beyond the drawing-board.
Decisions on whether to restore a site, replace it or leave it in ruins are usually the result 
o f both practical and symbolic considerations, and one may find examples of the three 
in reconstructed cities. There exist some examples of cities that have followed the first 
two approaches more consistently such as Warsaw (restoration) and Rotterdam 
(replacement). Although there are no modem and contemporary cities that have been 
completely left in ruins in the aftermath of war, there are villages such as Oradour-sur- 
Glane in France or Belchite in Spain which were never repopulated and left as a symbol 
of the inhumanity of the attackers or humans in general. On the other hand, one may 
find prominent urban wartime ruins which have deliberately been left unrestored for 
similar purposes, for example the A-bomb dome in Hiroshima or St Michael’s 
Cathedral in Coventry. The immortalisation of the destruction of a site is probably best 
captured in its ruins, but it might not always be economically viable to keep them in this 
state. Moreover, as the replacement of the World Trade Center in New York City 
demonstrates, there is not necessarily a shared desire to preserve the memory of death 
and destruction as a visible scar in the urban fabric. Eventually, memorialisation is 
subject to cultural and religious habits, political motivations and economic interest. And 
these different forces might concur or be at odds with each other when determining the 
fate of a particular site.
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Chapter 2 
The challenges of archival research
2. Introduction
In certain circumstances, it is less the benefit o f  retrospection that is relevant to the 
historical researcher, and more the possibility o f  actually undertaking the particular 
research. It is suggested that the study o f  wartim e destruction and post-war 
reconstruction in the context o f the Spanish Civil W ar and the Franco regime, 
specifically between 1939 and 1959, would have been more difficult to undertake 
during the decades within which the two processes developed. As potential research 
fields, wartime and dictatorial regimes prove generally more challenging because o f the 
physical dangers involved— especially in the first case— and the restrictions on the 
circulation of, and accessibility to, official inform ation in such circumstances. Military 
and administrative secrecy constitute fundamental obstacles to a more comprehensive 
and rigorous investigation o f the activities o f  wartim e and dictatorial political systems, 
and it is often not until there is a change o f regim e or the release o f  state secrets that 
researchers have access to sufficient inform ation as to produce informed analyses—  
unless, o f  course, the information has been accidentally or deliberately destroyed.
In the case o f contemporary Spain, it is only after the transition to democracy in the late 
1970s that national, regional, municipal and other archives, libraries and public 
institutes have gradually begun to organise and operate according to the standards o f 
open and democratic societies. Bearing in mind that few if  any o f  the individuals 
directly involved in the destruction and rebuilding o f  the three sites examined in this 
thesis are still alive, it seemed sensible to base the investigation o f  the two processes 
mainly on archival material. Moreover, for the purposes o f studying the technical and 
symbolic dimensions o f the destruction and reconstruction processes in the three cities, 
official documents and publications together with photographs, drawings, press 
material, fiction and other literary genres seemed to be adequate sources. Finally, the 
abundance and availability o f such materials in the archives identified as relevant in the 
three cities made this a viable and fruitful research option.
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By describing how the archival material used was selected, systematised and finally 
analysed, the aim of this chapter is to justify the choice of archival research as the most 
adequate approach to the study of wartime destruction and post-war reconstruction in 
the context of the Spanish Civil War and the Franco regime. One of the purposes of 
discussing the research methodology in an interdisciplinary, but fundamentally 
historical-sociological dissertation, as the present one aims to be, is to allow the reader 
the possibility of replicating the investigation by revealing where the author found her 
data. This is possibly the only way for other scholars to be able to examine rigorously 
the author’s selection and interpretation of such data.
The chapter commences with a brief elucidation of why the analysis of archival 
material is seen to be the most suitable way of substantiating the three propositions 
made in this thesis. Following this, it considers the kind of materials the author was 
interested in examining and the preliminary classification used for organising the 
information that was subsequently collected during the different stages of fieldwork. 
Then there is a brief discussion about the challenges met during archival work. This is 
followed by a section that goes through the main archives visited in Barcelona, Bilbao 
and Madrid, and gives representative examples of the kind of information that the 
author was able to collect in each of them. The following section attempts to explain 
how the different materials were approached and used at the stage of analysis. Finally, a 
note on terminology has been included to clarify the way in which certain key terms 
and designations are used in the subsequent chapters. The conclusion summarises the 
main aspects discussed in the preceding sections.
2.1 Why archival research?
Archival research is extensively practised by historical sociologists, but it is not the 
only methodological tool available in the discipline. Practitioners of retrospective 
ethnography,83 for example, might rely on community and family accounts to 
reconstruct past events. Very few, if any, o f the individuals that were directly involved 
in the Spanish Civil War and the post-war reconstruction of the sites and cities 
examined in this thesis are still alive, and it would therefore have been difficult to base
83 Charles Tilly distinguished between two main currents in recent historical sociology: retrospective 
ethnography and critical comparison. See Charles Tilly, “History o f  and in Sociology. Introduction to the 
Didactic Seminar on Methodologies o f  the History o f Sociology” (paper presented at the American 
Sociological Association Annual Meeting, Montreal, 2006).
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the research on direct interviews.84 On the other hand, these people’s descendants could 
have been interviewed had the aim of the thesis been to examine the individual choices 
and motivations informing decisions on destruction and reconstruction policies. Yet, as 
already indicated, the emphasis of this investigation has been on the facts and technical 
details of the destruction and reconstruction processes (type of destruction, type of 
works, funding, etc.) and the official rhetoric underlying them. For both purposes, 
official documents and publications seemed to be more adequate sources than second­
hand accounts. Moreover, press material, fiction and other kinds of literature written 
during the period under consideration have also been considered as a way of 
complementing the administrative voices found in the official documentation. In the 
context of a dictatorship, complementing often means reinforcing. However, it turned 
out that, despite the censorship affecting publications under Franco’s rule, some groups 
found ways of ignoring or even challenging the dominant official voices.
This was a significant finding, which somehow challenged the commonly shared 
understanding that the Spanish Civil War and the establishment of Franco’s dictatorship 
entailed a complete break with the recent past (the Second Republic) and the absolute 
disappearance of any dissenting voices. As discussed in the introductory chapter, the 
political and discursive discontinuities that resulted from the Civil War and the change 
of regime were accompanied by continuities at other levels in the realm of planning and 
architecture. It is the tensions or contradictions that are to be found in the official 
documentation—between administrative documents and political pamphlets, for 
example—which largely sustain the main arguments of this thesis: that wartime 
destruction can act as a catalyst for urban redevelopment, that urban reconstruction may 
constitute a marker of a violent regime change, and that ambitious reconstruction plans 
can sometimes result in modest and fragmented post-war city rebuilding processes.
2.2 Materials sought
In December 2005 the author had the opportunity to explore and preliminarily assess 
the availability and scope of archival material on the destruction and reconstruction of 
Barcelona, Bilbao and Madrid. Such preliminary exploration suggested that the
84 Nevertheless, when the opportunity exceptionally came up, the author did not hesitate to share informal 
conversations with an old lady who witnessed the transformations o f  the Barri de la Catedral in 
Barcelona, the first o f  three cases examined.
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documents and sources to be collected could be divided into three groups according to 
their nature. Such a division was subsequently maintained throughout the research 
process for practical purposes:
Primary textual sources:
• Military reports
• Administrative reports and documentation
• Official publications and legislation
Secondary textual sources:
• Newspaper articles
• Articles in magazines and architectural publications
• Political literature (speeches, pamphlets, leaflets, etc.)
• Academic literature
• Technical literature
• Fiction
Primary visual sources:
• Maps and plans of the cities and neighbourhoods
• Aerial photographs of the sites
• Photographs of the sites at different moments
• Reconstruction plans with a special emphasis on the selected sites
• Architectural drawings
After the first round of archival fieldwork in summer 2006, the materials were classified 
thematically as well. First, the documents were divided into two main sections, one on 
destruction and another on reconstruction. It was soon obvious that the bulk of the 
material would go under the second section, and also that the distinction between the 
two was not always as clear-cut as originally expected. However, the division was 
maintained and the material on destruction was organised in three subsections, one for 
each city. The same was done with the material on reconstruction, except that in this 
case a sub-section containing material on post-war reconstruction in Spain in general 
was included. Furthermore, within each sub-section the materials were grouped 
according to the classification outlined above (military reports, administrative reports
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and documentation, etc). Except for the fiction, all these materials can be considered as 
archival.
The way the materials were organised at this early stage of the research process was not 
only useful for managing practically what gradually became a vast amount of 
paperwork, but has also informed the structure of the thesis and the final presentation of 
findings and arguments. As will be discussed later, the primary textual and visual 
sources were used mainly for reconstructing the facts and events associated with the 
destruction and reconstruction of the particular sites, whereas the secondary textual 
sources allowed for examining the official and public discourses that emerged around 
these events.
Between September 2006 and February 2007, while in Mexico City, the author 
examined the material collected, and began to write a first draft o f the section on 
Barcelona. In March 2007, a second round of fieldwork was completed. This time only 
a few specific archives and libraries in Barcelona and Madrid were visited with the aim 
of covering some of the gaps identified during the first stage of analysis and writing. 
Between summer 2007 and spring 2008, the drafts of the three empirical chapters were 
finalised.
2.3 The experience in the archives
Archives are problematic from many points of view. Most of them are managed by 
official or public institutions and hence subject to the existing government’s decisions. 
Under certain political circumstances, this might affect the availability and accessibility 
of the information stored in them. Under extreme situations, it might lead to the 
destruction of particular documents. But archives are also problematic in themselves. 
What information is stored in the first place, and how it is stored, is not a 
straightforward matter. Not everything can be stored. Conventional archives are almost 
intrinsically biased towards written and printed materials, especially those produced by 
official bodies. This means that the past experiences of what are considered subordinate 
social groups (be they children, women, colonial subjects or workers)—who have little 
or no access to the public sphere and little possibility of generating printed matter—are 
significantly underrepresented in the world of archives.
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Furthermore, individual archivists can have considerable responsibility when it comes 
to deciding which documents and files are kept in an archive for public access, and 
which ones are left unrecorded and hidden in the basement. Though unsystematic and 
disorderly archives constitute a challenge for the researcher, overly tidy archives should 
raise her suspicions. After all, somebody must have taken on the task of organising the 
materials according to a specific logic, and in the process may have been tempted to 
discard items that they could not place under any of the pre-established categories or 
which seemed irrelevant.
When the author started this particular research, she expected to find that materials in 
the different archives that she visited in Spain were equally acessible. Broadly speaking, 
it was easier to find and gain access to municipal archival material for the period under 
consideration in Barcelona and Bilbao than in Madrid. Barcelona and Bilbao are of 
course smaller than Madrid, and probably have produced fewer administrative 
documents over the years than the capital city. But it also seemed plausible to think that 
the fact that Barcelona and Bilbao are located in, and even constitute, the centres of 
regions under autonomous governments probably also explains why their historical 
records are better administered. Small governments informed by nationalist ideologies 
may be more prone to take good care of their historical records. In the case of Catalonia 
and the Basque Country, the political and linguistic repression experienced by the 
Catalan and Basque populations under Franco’s four-decade dictatorial regime has 
probably reinforced the predisposition of their now autonomous governments to set up 
accessible and efficient regional and local archives. After all, researching the history 
and particularities of a specific territory is a way of fostering and reinforcing a national 
identity.
The municipal archives in Barcelona (Arxiu Muncipal Administratiu de Barcelona, 
Arxiu Historic de la Ciutat and Arxiu Fotografic) are particularly well organised and 
their materials easy to access. The buildings, usually historic buildings, have modem 
and functional interior facilities. Most archival material on Bilbao and its environs is 
accessible at the municipal archive (Archivo Municipal de Bilbao), which is located in 
one of the floors of the city hall. The research rooms were undergoing refurbishment 
while the author was there, and it is likely they have gained a more pleasant and 
functional appearance after the work was finished. Most of the files that the author was
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interested in were stored elsewhere (in the nearby town o f Mungia), but the author was 
encouraged to ask for the materials to be brought on site. They usually arrived within a 
day or two.
In contrast, the location of and access to relevant archival data in Madrid involved more 
challenges. The municipality of Madrid was partly administered by the central 
government during the Civil War and its post-war reconstruction was also coordinated 
by a governmental body, the Junta de Reconstruccion de Madrid (Madrid 
Reconstruction Board). As a result, the documentation relating to the reconstruction of 
the capital city during the period under consideration is scattered among various 
national, regional and municipal archives in the city and the town of Alcala de Henares, 
about 50 kilometres away. Unfortunately, there is no systematic inventory detailing 
what can be found where, which means that researchers (at least freelance researchers) 
are forced to visit each potentially relevant archive and ask the staff on site for 
information. Apart from the dispersal of materials, the vastness and fairly chaotic nature 
of the national administrative archive, the Archivo General de la Administracion, in 
Alcala de Henares, also contributed to the author finding the Madrilenian archives 
somewhat dispiriting.
From a more prosaic point of view, visiting archives is not always a satisfying and 
productive experience. For example, the fact that most archives only opened in the 
mornings was sometimes challenging. If, additionally, they had a daily limit on the 
number of items researchers were allowed to request, the experience became all the 
more discouraging. If none of the items asked for on a particular morning was of any 
relevance (and this happened relatively often), the author had to wait until the next day 
to make any progress. Fortunately, libraries and other institutions where press material 
and secondary literature could be found were open in the afternoons and evenings, 
which meant that the second half of the day was not necessarily wasted.
It is important for reseachers to be allowed to make photocopies or scans of the 
documents as many of them do not have limitless time to spend in the archives. Often it 
is not possible to read through all the material on site, but only to browse through it, 
make notes and copy sections of the text by typing it down on a laptop or similar 
device. But the most preferable working method is to make photocopies. Fortunately,
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the archives that ended up being the most important for this research had fairly 
generous photocopying policies, and the author was able to take significant amounts of 
paperwork with her for a later, more careful analysis.
2.4 Archives visited, materials collected
This section introduces briefly the archives visited that proved relevant for the research. 
First, the national archives and libraries in the capital city are introduced, then the 
section moves on to the local archives and libraries in Barcelona, Bilbao and Madrid. 
Some of the most representative materials collected in each of the archives will also be 
described.
2.4.1 National archives and libraries
The aim of visiting the Archivo General Histdrico Militar (General Historic Military 
Archive) in Madrid was to find information on the destruction o f the three cities, 
including details on the military tactics deployed, types o f bombs and artillery 
ammunition dropped, etc. The author spent a number of days, or rather mornings, there 
(the archive opened from 9:30 a.m. to 1:30 p.m.), but was not entirely successful in 
finding the specific information she sought. There were massive inventories of 
microfilm rolls, which the author had to browse through with hardly any guidance, in 
trying to find the rolls detailing the activity of the rebel troops in the three cities. A 
number of reports on the wartime situation of the three cities with regard to food 
supplies, evacuations, refuges, etc. were identified, but very little about their 
destruction. The reports on the bombings of Barcelona, for example, were usually about 
specific strikes on the port and factories outside the city, but never on any downtown 
areas. A few months later, Prof. Joan Villarroya—who has written various books on the 
bombing campaigns in Spain and is cited on several occasions in this thesis—told the 
author in an informal telephone conversation that there is hardly any information about 
the attacks on civilian targets in the military records from the Civil War. In almost all 
the reports, these were identified as military targets.
At the Archivo General de la Administration in Alcala de Henares, which has been 
referred to already as a particularly challenging place but where most of the material on 
Regiones Devastadas (the Devastated Areas Department, which Franco created in 
1938) is kept, the author was nonetheless able to locate a set o f files detailing the
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successive projects for the ruins of the Cuartel de la Montana in Madrid. The 
information found on the Comite de Reconstruction, Reforma y  Saneamiento (the 
Reconstruction, Reform and Sanitisation Committee), which led the emergency 
reconstruction measures in the capital city during the war, was, on the other hand, not 
very useful in the end, consisting mainly of pay-rolls and a few, random projects for 
disinfection facilities. The author also paid several visits to the archive and library of 
the Ministerio de Fomento (Public Works Ministry), situated in the labyrinthine Nuevos 
Ministerios complex on Paseo de la Castellana, where several official documents on the 
post-war reconstruction of Spain as well as more recent articles reviewing the 
reconstruction process— especially in relation to Regiones Devastadas— were to be 
found. At the Biblioteca and Hemeroteca Nacionales (National Library and Newspaper 
Library), founded in 1712 and located next to Plaza de Colon, some attention-grabbing 
documents on Spain’s economic reconstruction were identified. But what was more 
interesting for the purposes of this investigation was the presence of press material on 
the reconstruction of Madrid, its new aesthetics, and particularly a few articles 
commenting on the project for Falange’s headquarters on the ruins of the Cuartel de la 
Montana.
2.4.2 Archives in Barcelona
The Arxiu Municipal Administratiu de Barcelona (Barcelona Municipal Admnistrative 
Archive) was one of the first archives visited, in December 2005. The author then went 
back twice, first during the first round of fieldwork in summer 2006 and subsequently 
in spring 2007. The staff were quite helpful in advising as to which files could be 
potentially interesting to the author. There is a vast amount of material in the archive 
under the label Junta de Defensa Pasiva, which includes information about the wartime 
activities of the Barcelona Passive Defence Board and the fire department, maps and 
drawings indicating the exact impact of the bombs in the city as well as extensive 
information about the municipal construction of anti-air raid shelters. Furthermore, 
several files contained general information about reconstruction in Barcelona, including 
demolition and clearance undertakings as well as a detailed account of the funding 
procedure that allowed the city council to finance reconstruction after the war. Another 
group of files provided specific, and surprisingly abundant, information on the 
reconstruction of the area in front of the Cathedral. Most of the information about the 
area during the period covering the pre-war project for Gran Via C to the various post­
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war works that eventually led to the opening of Avinguda de la Catedral/Avenida de la 
Catedral was available.
The Arxiu Histdric de Barcelona (Barcelona Historic Archive) is located in the ancient 
Archdeacon’s House, besides the Cathedral, and allows its users a privileged view of 
Avinguda de la Catedral. Here, it was possible to access a considerable amount of 
newspaper and magazine articles about the streets that were part of the Barri de la 
Catedral (Corribia, Pla?a Nova, Bou de la Pla?a Nova, Boters, Tapineria, etc.) and the 
transformations that the area underwent after the Civil War. What made it relatively 
easy to identify the relevant documents was the existence of annotated lists of the 
articles that have been published on specific streets of Barcelona for the past hundred 
years. Although probably not exhaustive, the lists seemed nevertheless to be almost 
complete, and except for the years that the Civil War lasted, the articles spanned about a 
hundred years. Another helpful aspect of this archive was that it was open the whole 
day, which made it possible to review administrative files at the Arxiu Municipal 
Administratiu in the morning and press materials in the afternoon. Some pertinent 
literature on Barcelona written during the period under consideration and documents 
relating to the funding of post-war reconstruction were available at the library of the 
Col-legi de Arquitectes de Catalunya i Balears (Catalonia and the Balears Architects’ 
Association), which also has a privileged view of Avinguda de la Catedral. The author 
took several pictures of the area from their premises. At the Arxiu Fotografic 
(Photographic Archive), digital pictures of the same area in the 1940s and 1950s could 
be requested. Here, too, the material was classified according to street names, which 
made it easy to locate the relevant photographs.
2.4.3 Archives in Bilbao
As already intimated, the Archivo Municipal de Bilbao contained most of the necessary 
administrative information on the reconstruction of the bridges (and construction of the 
two drawbridges immediately before the war). The contents o f the 36 box-files that the 
author requested were not all equally relevant, and much of the paperwork was 
somewhat repetitive. But, on the other hand, this possibly indicates that the greater part 
of the original documentation has been retained. At the Biblioteca de la Diputacion 
Foral de Vizcaya (Biscay Provincial Deputyship Library) the author looked up a 
number o f articles in newspapers and magazines, mostly local press, that referred to
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Bilbao’s bridges, including the inaugurations of the rebuilt bridges. Thanks to a 
literature review on the bridges, which was available at the Biblioteca Municipal de 
Bidebarrieta (Bidebarrieta Municipal Library) and contained references to various 
pieces of news, it became relatively easy to locate the relevant articles at the library of 
the Diputacion. The author was further helped by a member of the staff who seemed to 
know the content of some of the old Basque magazines by heart! At the Archivo Foral 
de Vizcaya (Biscay Provincial Archive), in turn, it was possible to request digital copies 
of photographs of the bridges before the war and of their ruins immediately after they 
were dynamited in June 1937. The Archivo Foral keeps historical documents on Biscay, 
including Bilbao, and this is also where the earliest documented references to the 
bridges were found.
2.4.4 Archives in Madrid
The first municipal archive visited in Madrid was the Archivo de Villa de Madrid 
(Madrid Municipal Archive), which is located on the former military premises of the 
Cuartel del Conde Duque, a vast and beautiful building not far from Plaza de Espana. 
The process of locating information was rather time consuming here. The archival 
index contained call numbers that referred to microfilm rolls, which in turn contained 
different call numbers indicating the location of the actual files or documents with 
information about specific streets. The author was looking for information on the 
reconstruction of buildings on Paseo del Pintor Rosales and Ferraz in the environs of 
the Cuartel de la Montana. Some of the files identified in the microfilm rolls were 
missing, but the ones that could be checked were arguably enough to give a sense of the 
situation o f the area after the war. The author paid a couple of visits to the Hemeroteca 
Municipal de Madrid (Madrid Newspaper Library), which, like the Archivo de Villa, is 
located in the Cuartel del Conde Duque. Unlike the Arxiu Historic de Barcelona with its 
annotated lists of articles on specific streets, the Hemeroteca featured thematic lists. 
Unfortunately, these were fairly unsystematic, and seemed to include articles published 
mainly in the early 1970s, and thus beyond the general time-frame of this thesis. 
Nevertheless, a few articles about the ruins of the Cuartel de la Montana, the park that 
eventually replaced them at the end of the 1960s, the temple of Debod and the memorial 
that was inaugurated in 1972 seemed highly pertinent, making the author eventually 
reconsider the original time-frame (1939-1959) she was to study for the case of Madrid.
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The visits to the library of the Colegio de Arquitectos de Madrid (Madrid Architectural 
Association) proved particularly fruitful as the library keeps copies of all the issues of 
Reconstruction, the monthly magazine of Regiones Devastadas (the post-war 
reconstruction department), and the Revista National de Arquitectura. It also holds 
copies of the conference proceedings of the various Asambleas Nacionales de 
Arquitectos (National Architects’ Assemblies), which were organised throughout the 
1940s and 1950s. Moreover, some of Falange’s technical reports on town planning and 
architecture can be found here.
The Cartoteca de la Consejerla de Obras Publicas de Madrid (Madrid Public Works 
Regional Council Map Library) holds some aerial photographs of Madrid and the area 
of interest for this research taken in 1943 and 1955, which proved very helpful for 
identifying the state of the ruins of the Cuartel at different points in time. Finally, the 
Archivo Regional de la Comunidad de Madrid (Madrid Regional Archive), situated in 
the old, beautifully remodelled El Aguila beer factory, has a wonderful collection of 
photographs of the capital city during the post-war period, most of which pertain to the 
Santos Yubero series. Visitors are allowed to borrow slides of the pictures for free, and 
make digital copies of them if necessary. The dramatic pictures of the masses celebrated 
in the ruins of the Cuartel included in the chapter on Madrid are part of the Santos 
Yubero collection.
Aside from the archives and libraries just mentioned, the author visited a few public 
libraries from where she borrowed fiction about the Spanish Civil War and other pieces 
that seemed relevant or simply inspiring for the research. It ought to be noted, finally, 
that some of the institutions visited have been omitted either because they did not have 
the material expected or because it turned out to be of marginal importance in the end. 
Finally, the author would like to mention the British Library as the first place in which 
she became familiar with official publications of the Franco regime and the Archivo de 
la Palabra in Mexico City, where she had the opportunity to read a few interviews 
made with Republican exiles.
2.5 Using the archival material
Archival research cannot be considered a method in itself, and is more accurately 
described as “[the use of] a particular type of data—data generated in the past, stored in
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archives—which can be researched using a variety o f  methods” (emphasis added). 
Hence, archival material can be used in many different ways. It is generally argued that 
archival material can be approached from a realist or an idealist/social constructionist 
viewpoint. In the first case, historical documents are taken at face value and used to 
reconstruct the past, whereas in the second researchers are more concerned with 
archives and historical documents as a topic itself. Social constructionist researchers 
presuppose archival material is in many ways flawed, having problems of authenticity,
9>f\credibility, representativeness and meaning. They look instead at the organisation and 
content of the documents in order to trace the social and political meanings embedded 
in them and ultimately map out the social and cultural context in which they were
0 7
produced. The “use of historical sources to discover the reality of which these sources
00
are traces” suggests that archival material cannot be regarded as self-supporting 
evidence, but needs an interpretive framework, which may in turn be the result of 
earlier interpretations of archival material.
In practice, the distinction between the two approaches seems more blurred, and it is 
suggested that the analysis undertaken in this thesis is based on a more intuitive 
approach that combines elements of the two. Most of the materials gathered belonged to 
the group that was defined as primary textual sources. As already noted, it was 
particularly difficult to identify relevant military reports, and those which the author 
had the opportunity of examining might have problems of credibility and 
representativeness.89 The same can be said of the largest proportion in this group, the 
administrative documents and official publications detailing the impact of destruction, 
the wartime and post-war reconstruction plans, the projects and budgets, and the 
implementation procedures followed in the three cities and, more specifically, in the 
selected sites. These documents were initially analysed as sources of descriptive 
information, taking dates, figures and so on “at face value”, thus using a realist 
approach. Official publications and some of the secondary textual sources—essentially 
newspaper and magazine articles—were also used as descriptive sources of information
85 Ben Gidley, “Doing Historical and Archival Research,” in Researching Society and Culture, ed. Clive 
Seale (London-Thousand Oaks-New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2004), 250.
86 See John Scott, A M atter o f  R eco rd : Documentary Sources in Social Research  (Cambridge: Polity, 
1990).
87 Gidley, “Doing Historical and Archival Research,” 254.
88 Mitchell Dean, Critical and Effective H istories : F oucault’s Methods and H istorical Sociology 
(London ; N ew  York: Routledge, 1994) 14.
89 See Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods, 2nd ed ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 391.
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at first. By triangulating and contrasting the information from the primary sources with 
the secondary sources, the author was trying to compensate for some of the potential 
flaws of the administrative material.
While continually aware of the incompleteness and potentially problematic nature of 
the archival information she was working with, the author still aimed to reconstruct the 
sequences of events—the facts and technical details—that led to the destruction and 
subsequent rebuilding of the three selected sites. In the writing process, the aim was to 
generate as smooth accounts of the events as possible, but it is also explicitly 
acknowledged in the text when archival information is missing. So, little by little, based 
on the primary textual sources, the outlines of the three destruction and reconstruction 
processes emerged. The secondary textual sources, including newspaper and magazine 
articles, speeches, fiction and other literature, provided samples of the rhetoric and the 
discourses that fuelled the destruction of the three cities and later sustained their 
reconstruction. Both the stylistic conventions (form) and the themes and ideas (content) 
that appeared to mould the various materials gathered became relevant to the author. 
The analysis was now moving closer to the social constructionist approach.
Even though the stylistic conventions and the language employed in Spanish official 
documents, especially at the municipal level, did not change dramatically between the 
Second Republic and the Franco regime (a number of bureaucrats remained in the new 
administration), some remarkably ornate formulas were introduced under the latter. For 
instance, rhetorical phrases celebrating the New Spain and deriding the “barbarous 
Reds” can be found in the first paragraphs of otherwise purely technical reports, and set 
phrases of adherence to Franco and the Movimiento National (National Movement) 
appear at the end of all official documents almost without exception. The bold 
coexistence of conventional technical language and expressions of ideological 
allegiance and patriotic flourish is perhaps the most striking feature of the 
administrative documents produced under the Franco regime. Such formal combination 
of practice and rhetoric is only matched— as far as the archival material examined here 
is concerned—by some of the technical documents that labour unions and leftist 
associations generated in the social-revolutionary atmosphere that followed the 
outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. The difference is that these did not have the time to
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mutate into the arguably weary and empty expressions that the dictatorship’s formulas 
turned into over time.
The stylistic conventions and language employed in the secondary textual sources, that 
is, the post-war newspaper and magazine articles, academic writings and other kinds of 
literature that are part of the archival material here examined, are more varied. A 
number of journalists, writers and scholars seemed to prefer the use of more neutral and 
discreet styles, which did not attract the author’s attention for being particularly 
representative of the values of the New Spain, but probably did not attract the regime’s 
censors’ attention either. And this was obviously an advantage for many writers who 
were not particularly sympathetic to Franco, and simply wished to be left in peace. 
Other writers did not hesitate to include overblown expressions of praise for the 
Caudillo and the new political regime, especially during the first years of the 
dictatorship. Falange’s publications contain by far the most extravagant style and 
language, echoing the Party’s early aspirations to become a spiritual and aesthetic 
movement. The competing source for spiritual inspiration, the Catholic Church, 
influenced writing conventions too, yet differently. Unlike the often radical and 
sometimes even poetic Falangist expressions, the prudish, overindulgent conventions 
that shaped the sermons of a predominantly conservative priesthood also ended up 
shaping the paternalist, purportedly naive and unimaginative style that underpinned 
much of the regime’s discourse and propaganda.
At a relatively early stage of the analysis, certain recurrent themes could be identified in 
the various materials collected, which are not necessarily new to the established 
scholarship on the Spanish Civil War and the Franco regime: the rebels’ denunciations 
of the barbarism of the Red-Marxists, their emphasis on patriotism, family and 
masculinity, the new regime’s loathing for the city as the incarnation of the evil forces 
of Liberalism and Communism, its idealisation of the Spanish Empire and Roman 
Spain, its particular melange of modem and reactionary ideas, and so on. Together, 
these themes helped to constitute a loose interpretative framework, which allowed the 
author to situate the post-war reconstruction of the three selected sites, and of Spain 
more generally, within the larger context of the nation’s post-war recovery and the 
establishment of Franco’s dictatorial regime. Some of the themes proved more 
persistent than others in the fields of architecture, urbanism and public works policies,
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to which most of the archival material gathered relate. The distrust of the city and the 
idealisation of the Spanish Empire were particularly important ideological elements 
within these fields.
Dealing with visual sources— in this case, maps, plans, drawings and photographs—is 
in many ways not unlike dealing with texts. The emphasis on the distinction between 
the content of an image and the context within which it was produced is applicable here, 
too, and also “the subjectivities through which images are viewed”.90 For the purposes 
of this research, maps, plans and drawings were used to complement and illustrate the 
information that was extracted from the textual sources. In exceptional cases, such as 
the Cuartel de la Montana in Madrid, for which it proved more difficult to find textual 
information initially, street maps were helpful to establish a simple chronology of the 
transformations of the site.
Photographs of the three sites were used mostly as illustrations and only exceptionally 
as objects of deeper analysis and interpretation. Unlike the plans and the drawings of 
the sites, which are merely projections on paper, the available photographs arguably 
constitute the most accurate testimony of the transformations of these three areas. In 
spite of potential issues of representativeness and credibility, the photographic material 
has been key for visualising and verifying the information obtained from the textual and 
other visual sources. As already suggested, only in the exceptional case of the 
photographs of the commemorations that were celebrated among the ruins of the 
Cuartel de la Montana in the 1940s does the author provide a deeper interpretation (see 
Chapter 6, pp. 268-269). The fact that these pictures appeared as particularly striking to 
the author might have to do with the author’s subjective experience of them, to use 
Pink’s terminology. The photographs are here interpreted as representative of a very 
Spanish (Castilian), Catholic aesthetics before which the author feels an odd mixture of 
familiarity, curiosity, scepticism and respect.91
90 Sarah Pink, “Interdisciplinary Agendas in Visual Research: Re-Situating Visual Anthropology,” Visual 
Studies 18, no. 2 (2003): 187.
91 The Spanish Civil War and the Franco regime continue to carry a significant weight for most 
Spaniards— albeit different weights— and Spanish politics is still very much tainted by references to the 
country’s relatively immediate past. In spite o f  having completed a five-year undergraduate programme 
in politics at Madrid’s Universidad Complutense, the author was little acquainted with the Franco regime 
as a political system before undertaking this research. Undergraduate courses in Spanish political history 
ended with the Spanish Civil War in 1939, and courses in Spanish contemporary politics began in 1975 
with Franco’s death and the transition to democracy. There was thus a gap in the curriculum o f  almost
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2.6 Note on terminology
Some clarification with respect to the terminology used in the subsequent chapters 
seems pertinent here. First, the two sides confronted during the Spanish Civil War are 
referred to in various terms throughout the text. The Republican side appears as 
Republicans, Reds or loyalists, and the rebel side is identified as rebels, Nacionales or 
Francoists. The terms rebels and Nacionales are generally used to designate the 
supporters of the military coup during the war, whereas the latter refers to the 
supporters of Franco’s dictatorship after the war. Second, in the sections that examine 
the case of Barcelona, both the Catalan and Spanish (Castilian) names of streets, 
institutions and other entities are usually included when discussing the pre-war and 
wartime periods, whereas only the Spanish names are mentioned when Franco’s post­
war dictatorship is discussed, thus reflecting the fact that Catalan was banned during 
this time. The Catalan designation is generally used when the text is not considering 
any of these periods in particular. Third, in the section on Bilbao, the different names 
that the bridges of the city received over time appear in the text depending on which 
time period is being discussed, yet an effort has been made to clarify which bridge 
infrastructure is ultimately being referred to. Finally, in each chapter the original 
Spanish (or Catalan) names of institutions, titles and so on appear in italics 
accompanied by their English translation in brackets the first time that they are 
mentioned. Subsequently, the Spanish name and the English translation are used
forty years o f  Spain’s twentieth-century political history. University professors’ implicit argument that 
there was no need to waste time on the Franco regime since too much time had already been wasted by 
those who had to live through the four decades o f  dictatorship seemed natural to the author and her peer 
students in the 1990s. It is perhaps difficult to say how representative this experience is o f  Spanish public 
universities at large. But it is suggested that this predominant attitude among the academic staff was 
characteristic o f—and possibly understandable in— the ideologically progressive members o f  the 
generations bom during the Civil War, or a little later, who spent their youth with the sense o f  being 
deprived o f  their freedom and basic rights.
In view  o f  the above, at first it was almost inevitable for the author not to approach the literature 
and materials collected with the assumption that the years o f  the dictatorship was above all a repressive 
and uninteresting period, during which everything was so tightly controlled that nothing interesting could 
really happen. However, as she collected more and more information on the three sites and began 
examining it, the author’s image o f  the regime as slightly stiff and one-dimensional changed, and she was 
able to appreciate a more complex, contradictory and rich image. Another important aspect o f  the 
author’s research experience has been the fact o f  reading and thinking about Spain in a different national 
context, the British, and writing for an audience which is not necessarily familiar with the empirical cases 
examined here. It is suggested that this might have contributed further to freeing the author from pre- 
established assumptions and expectations.
92 Nacionales is often translated into English as ‘Nationalists’, but the author prefers to maintain the 
Spanish designation, which is different from nacionalista , the Spanish word for nationalist.
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indistinctly throughout the chapter, although generally the Spanish designation is 
preferred.
2. Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to explain why archival research was deemed the most 
suitable approach to the topic of this thesis and how the archival material that 
constitutes its empirical basis was collected and analysed. It has been argued that 
historical research is sometimes the only way of carrying out scholarly investigation of 
certain contexts when these contexts are difficult to study in real time because of 
physical constrictions and limitations on the availability of consistent and reliable 
information. Wars and dictatorships, including the Spanish Civil War and Franco’s 
dictatorship, were introduced as examples of these potentially more challenging 
research environments, which might therefore be better examined retrospectively.
There are different ways of carrying out historical research, and archival research is one 
of them. Archival research was deemed the most suitable mode of enquiry for 
developing and illustrating the three propositions that structure this thesis. After 
discussing the advantages and disadvantages o f this approach, the different materials 
that were looked for in the archives (primary and secondary textual sources, primary 
visual sources) were described. Following this, details were given about how the notes 
and paperwork that was gradually collected was organised according to the nature of 
the material (administrative documents, newspaper articles, etc.) and some main themes 
(destruction, reconstruction, etc.) The author’s experience in the different archives 
visited in the three cities was also addressed, stressing the fact that accessibility to and 
availability of materials in Barcelona and Bilbao posed fewer challenges than in 
Madrid, where the materials were more scattered and generally less well organised. At 
the same time, the potentially problematic nature of overly tidy archives was pointed 
out.
The archives visited and some of the documents collected in each of them were 
subsequently introduced with the aim of facilitating the possibility of replicating this 
investigation. The next section discussed how the materials were analysed. It was 
suggested that the author’s approach to the archival material lay somewhere between 
realism and social-constructionism. Although the author was interested in the facts and
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technical details of the processes of destruction and reconstruction, she was also keen 
on tracing the discourses and rhetoric underpinning the two processes. Bearing in mind 
the issues of authenticity, representativeness, credibility and meaning that might affect 
the validity o f archival material, details were provided on the stylistic conventions and 
the recurrent themes found in, for example, the Francoist documents such as the 
profusion of patriotic flourish and the constant opposition between the orderly nature of 
the New Spain and the barbarism of the Republicans. By identifying certain recurrent 
themes an interpretive framework gradually emerged. This framework helped 
reinforcing the three propositions presented on the relationship between destruction and 
reconstruction or, more generally, between history, political discourse and the built 
environment in the particular context of the Spanish Civil War and the Franco regime. 
Finally, a few remarks were made on how certain key terminology has been used— 
particularly when Catalan and Spanish designations exist— and the conventions 
followed for translated terms from Spanish into English,,
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Chapter 3
The Spanish Civil War and its aftermath (1936-1959)
“There are lots of true stories about the Spanish Civil War that remain to be told 
by the historians of future generations. Only they will be able to sift the wheat 
from the chaff, the true from the false, to weigh the good and the bad, to lay the 
blame or mete out the praise. We are too close to it. Many facts are not 
available, and those we have are clouded by our emotions.”
Herbert L. Matthews, reporter for the The New York Times during the war93
3. Introduction
Journalist Herbert L. Matthews’ appreciation continues to be relevant today. Seventy 
years after the end of the Spanish Civil War, some would argue that we are still too 
close to it. And although more facts are available, they are still often clouded by our 
emotions. How many generations have to pass before a historical period can be 
reviewed dispassionately? Is it ever possible? The intention of this introduction is not to 
delve into a discussion on the limits of historiography, but to suggest that it is a 
challenge to write, if only superficially, about a period—the Civil War and the 
dictatorship that followed— that has strongly marked the hearts and minds of several 
generations of Spaniards, including the author’s.
The aim of this chapter is to provide some context for the three empirical cases of 
wartime destruction and post-war reconstruction in Barcelona, Bilbao and Madrid 
examined in this thesis. The period under consideration spans the years 1936 to 1959, 
and encompasses the Civil War (1936-1939) and the first two decades of General 
Franco’s dictatorship, usually known as the autarchy (1939-1959). The chapter starts by 
giving a brief overview of the outbreak of the war and commenting on the key 
participation of the German and Italian air forces in the conflict, and more specifically 
in the destruction of a number of Spanish towns and cities, including Barcelona, Bilbao 
and Madrid. It then goes on to discuss each city’s role in and experiences of the
93 Cited in Alberto Reig Tapia, “Guernica Como Simbolo,” in La Guerra Civil En El Pais Vasco. 50Anos 
Despues, ed. Carmelo Garitaonandia Gamacho and Jose Luis de la Granja (Bilbao: Servicio Editorial de 
la Universidad del Pais Vasco, 1987), 153.
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conflict. These, it will be argued, depended significantly on the particular city’s 
geographical location and relationship with the Republican government as the war 
unfolded. Subsequently, the chapter moves to the reconstruction efforts that both sides 
undertook during the conflict and the new regime continued on its own once the war 
ended. Since reconstruction proper is generally of more interest to the overall argument 
of this thesis, the chapter spends more time on how reconstruction was organised by the 
Franco regime than on the two sides’ wartime emergency measures. Fundamentally, it 
looks at which institutions were created to address reconstruction after the war, what 
their priorities were, how reconstruction works were organised by the new regime, and 
what planning and architectural guidelines were devised for what was perceived as an 
immense and unprecedented national task.
3.1 The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War
From a broader perspective, the Spanish Civil War can be viewed as the outcome of the 
orchestrated repression by Spain’s reactionary forces of yet another attempt to bring the 
country onto the path of secular modernisation. It is often argued that the nineteenth- 
century liberal bourgeois revolution failed in Spain despite early indications of the 
contrary such as the proclamation of the Cadiz Constitution in 1812—in fact, one of the 
first liberal monarchic constitutions in the world. The Cadiz Constitution was in force 
only briefly. Subsequent attempts throughout the nineteenth century to consolidate the 
rule of liberal governments and achieve economic and cultural liberalisation came up 
against the institutional power of the monarchy and the Church, and the dominant 
position of the landed nobility. Spain remained backward in the eyes of its more 
developed northern neighbours, but also in the eyes of many Spaniards. The sense of 
national failure culminated with the loss of the country’s last colonial possessions in 
1898. From a closer point of view, the Spanish Civil War can be seen as the result of 
the increasing social and political tensions faced by the Republican regime since its 
establishment in 1931, following Primo de Rivera’s conservative dictatorship under the 
reign of Alfonso XIII. Spain’s political climate grew increasingly tense in 1934 after the 
triumph of the rightist coalition, the Confederation Espanola de Derechas Autonomas 
(CEDA), in the general elections held that year. The CEDA’s victory was a major 
backlash for the governing leftist coalition. The electoral swing to the right could be 
seen as an indication that substantial sectors of the population did not approve of the 
leftist government’s approach towards some of the most sensitive issues in Spanish
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political culture: the status of religion (and the Church), the role of the military and the 
political-territorial organisation of the state.
The result of the 1934 elections triggered major social unrest among workers and leftist 
activists, and— fearing conservatives would move Spain backwards—they engaged in 
systematic riots and strikes, which made it difficult for the newly appointed government 
to rule. Labour unions and leftist associations organised demonstrations and revolts, and 
were increasingly met by armed groups of young men with Fascist and Spanish- 
Nationalist ideas, who saw it as their mission to reinstate public order and defend the 
nation from International Socialism. The two groups constantly clashed, and there were 
killings almost daily during certain periods.
The critical situation led to early elections in February 1936. A large coalition of leftist 
and liberal Republican parties and factions joined in a Popular Front to run in the 
general elections. The rightist groups tried to join together in a similar front, but 
unsuccessfully. The Frente Popular won the elections, and power was back in the 
hands of the left. But the new leftist government faced the same difficulties as its 
conservative predecessor. The clashes between workers and rightist groups continued, 
especially in Catalonia. Violent anti-clerical actions began to take place. The general 
sense of unrest persisted, and grew worse after the elections in February. Within the 
military, rightist officers more or less overtly conspired against the government, 
convinced of its inability to handle the perceived threat of an imminent socialist 
revolution and the partition of Spain as a result of Catalan and Basque Nationalist 
demands. They were backed by a number of aristocrats, landowners and financiers, as 
well as the now illegal Falange party,94 including their proto-militias, and the Carlists95 
in northern Spain. Several frustrated attempts at a military coup to remove the leftist 
government from power followed. Ideological discrepancies and personal rivalries 
among the potential leaders of the conspiracy made it difficult to act jointly.
94 Membership o f  Falange was made illegal in March 1936 after a spiral o f  killings amongst leftists and 
Falangists, which culminated with the attempted assassination o f  the Socialist Law Professor Luis 
Jimenez de Asua. For a detailed history o f  Falange see Stanley Payne, Fascism in Spain 1923-1977  
(Madison: University o f  Wisconsin Press, 2000), Stanley G. Payne, Falange. A History o f  Spanish 
Fascism  (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1961), Jose Luis Rodriguez Jimenez, H istoria De 
Falange Espahola D e Las JONS  (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2000).
95 The Carlists had defended the right to the Spanish throne o f  an alternative branch o f  the Bourbons 
since the nineteenth century. They constituted the most reactionary political force o f  1930s Spain.
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It was not until the 18th of July 1936 that the military conspirators managed to 
coordinate a national coup. Initially, the aim of the rebel generals was to overthrow the 
government, but not necessarily eliminate the Republican regime. There was a vague 
idea of establishing some kind of authoritarian transitory government to restore order 
and discipline in the nation’s affairs. But the insurrection did not succeed in all of 
Spain. The military in Catalonia, Valencia, Madrid, Asturias and Biscay remained loyal 
to the Republican government, and a civil war commenced. From the beginning, the 
Republican government received pressure to distribute weapons among the population. 
Armed popular militias and committees emerged under the auspices of trade unions and 
other leftist associations, becoming a fundamental part of the Republican government’s 
resistance movement against what was now perceived as a common enemy: Fascism. 
However, these groups often turned out to have their own agendas, which went beyond, 
or even against, the defence of the Republican institutions. Many saw the collapse of 
the Second Republic’s formal political institutions as an unprecedented opportunity for 
social revolution. A similar radicalisation of aims took place on the rebel side, which 
gradually abandoned the idea of establishing a moderate authoritarian government for 
more totalitarian concepts of power, ultimately based on the single authority of the man 
who manoeuvred to become the Caudillo: General Franco. The internationalisation of 
the war further contributed to casting the conflict as a clash between Liberty and 
Fascism. Few people, including the conspirators, had imagined that the military coup of 
the 18th o f July 1936 would lead to a three-year-long civil war, anticipating the 
ideological confrontation and the horrors that other nations in Europe and elsewhere in 
the world would endure between 1939 and 1945.
The war shook the everyday life of the Spanish population both at the front and the 
rearguard. Towns and villages, quite randomly, finished up on one of the two sides, 
Republicans or Nacionales, and entire families had to flee for their lives. Neighbours 
gave one another away, and the so-calledpaseos (literally, walks), by which the alleged 
supporters of the opposite side were individually walked with their hands up to the 
outskirts of their locality and shot from behind, became a common practice on both 
sides. As in most fratricide confrontations, the darkest impulses surfaced. But, at the 
same time, attitudes of civic courage and solidarity were equally notable.
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3.2 The role of Italian Aviazione Legionaria and the German Luftwaffe
Hitler’s and Mussolini’s assistance to the rebels proved key for making the coup happen 
and ensuring the rebels’ eventual victory. Both leaders sent thousands of men to fight 
on the rebel side, and it has been suggested that “the Italian ground forces came to 
constitute the hard core of the rebel army”.96 But it was probably the contribution of the 
German and Italian air forces that produced the most spectacular results. In August 
1936, the Republicans attempted to recover the Balearic Islands from the rebels, but 
failed. Mallorca, where the rebels had installed their aero-naval base, could not be 
regained, and the squadrons of the Italian Aviazone Legionaria would continue using 
the island as their base throughout the rest of the conflict, carrying out increasingly 
systematic bombings of the coastal areas, especially the port cities. Barcelona, 
Tarragona, Valencia, Alicante and Cartagena were among the most affected with 
several hundreds of victims (in some cases, thousands), and another several hundred 
destroyed buildings and sunk boats.
Possibly the most dramatic instance of the Aviazione Legionaria’s involvement in the 
Spanish Civil War occurred on the 16th of March 1938 when Mussolini gave the order 
to raze Barcelona to the ground: “Iniziare da stanotte azione violenta su Barcelona con 
martellamento diluito nel tempo” (“Begin violent action on Barcelona tonight through 
unremitting hammering”). Historians speculate on the reasons for// Duce's sudden urge 
to destroy the port city, and see it as a response to Hitler’s annexation of Austria, or 
maybe a signal to France as it was about to sell weapons to the Spanish Republican 
army.97 Franco, who at that point was not in the same hurry as Mussolini to finish the 
war, realised that the international reaction to the bombings would be exceptionally 
negative, unnecessarily harming his image and undermining the cause of the military 
insurrection. Consequently, he ordered a cessation of the bombings two days later, on 
18th of March, although much death and destruction had already been caused by then.98
The German Luftwaffe was particularly significant for the occupation of the Basque 
Country. In March 1937, Franco instructed all the rebel forces to concentrate on one 
target: the northern front. The Basque Country, Cantabria and Asturias had to be
96 Dante A. Puzzo, Spain and the Great Powers 1936-1939  (New York - London: Columbia University 
Press, 1962) 242.
97 Sole i Sabate and Villarroya, Espaha En Llamas: La Guerra Civil D esde El Aire 171.
98 Ibid.
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conquered. Some of the country’s most important metallurgy and mining industries 
were to be found here, and the Germans shared a vested interest in occupying this area. 
Gradually, the German air force and the rebel ground forces developed an efficient 
tactic of air-land cooperation. The air raids crushed, terrorised and scattered the 
Basque-Republican battalions, which in their weakened state became easy preys to the 
rebel infantry. Much has been written on the German Luftwaffe’s sadly famous
thbombing of the Basque town of Gemika on the 26 of April 1937, and there continues 
to be significant controversy with regard to the motivations behind the attack and the 
final number of victims. What historians seem to agree on, however, is that the 
Luftwaffe was successful in breaching the iron ring of Bilbao, the fortified system that 
enveloped the Basque capital city. As a result of the intense bombing campaign that 
finally led to the seizure of Bilbao, nearby towns Amorebieta, Durango and Eibar were 
left almost completely in ruins.
The bombing of Madrid increased as Franco realised the difficulty of taking over the 
capital city by land." He is said to have exclaimed that he would “destroy Madrid 
rather than leaving it to the Marxists”.100 The equally stem determination of the 
Republican authorities and a majority of Madrilenians to resist the occupation—which 
is often celebrated as a paradigmatic example of popular resistance against 
Fascism101—helped delay Franco’s victory.
Some accounts suggest that Madrilenians initially reacted with humour to the bombs, 
joking about their size and giving them funny nicknames. But sometimes humour 
turned into sheer irresponsibility and the Republican authorities had to put up signs to 
remind the population of the real danger of the air raids. Unlike Bilbao and Barcelona, 
Madrid came to enjoy the privilege of having a security zone from November 1936. 
The rebels agreed to not attack this particular area and civilians were voluntarily 
evacuated to those neighbourhoods. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, the area largely coincided 
with the district of Salamanca, the nineteenth-century extension of the city, a 
traditionally conservative, bourgeois area.
99 Cf. G.J. Ashworth’s observation in Chapter 1, p.30, that Madrid during the Spanish Civil War proves 
that urban environments can work as good defensive terrain
100 Sole i Sabate and Villarroya, Espafia En Llamas: La Guerra Civil D esde El A ire 47.
101 Michael Seidman, “Individualisms in Madrid During the Spanish Civil War,” The Journal o f  M odem  
History 68, no. 1 (1996): 63.
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3.3 The role of the three cities in the conflict and their different experiences of the 
war
Although the three cities had very different experiences of the war, their fates were 
linked by the cut and thrust that characterised the relationship among the Catalan, 
Basque and central governments almost from the start of the conflict. It is sometimes 
argued that reciprocal suspicions and recriminations came to obstruct the inter­
governmental flows of information and communication, complicating the joint efforts 
to resist the military insurrection.
Barcelona’s wartime experience was largely characterised by the initial failure of the 
coup in Catalonia, and the social revolutionary frenzy that broke out and spread across 
the city once the rebels were subdued. The city also suffered systematic aerial bombing 
from the sea, and the arrival en masse of war refugees from the rest of Spain. Moreover, 
the growing tensions between Communists, Socialists and Anarchists led to violent 
clashes among the political groups running the Catalan capital city after the start of the 
conflict.
Despite its industrial tradition and the fact that it remained loyal to the Republic, Bilbao 
did not witness the same kind of social turmoil that Barcelona did. Instead, it saw the 
approval of the Basque autonomy a few months into the war, followed by the 
establishment of the Basque government in the city. As the rebels made their way into 
Biscay, Bilbaoans lived under the terrifying threat of massive air raids akin to the one 
that had flattened Gemika.
Finally, Madrid’s experience of the war was determined by its capital-city status and its 
three-year long resistance against the rebels’ seizure. As in the case of Barcelona, the 
rebel military was initially subdued, and trade unions and popular committees took over 
public life. Their social-revolutionary principles and activities often challenged the 
Republican government’s control of Madrid, and ultimately of Republican Spain as a 
whole.
Even though the Republican government did not represent any particular region of 
Spain but Spain as a whole, the discourses at the time largely identified the
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geographical seat of the government, Madrid, with the government itself. When the 
government moved to Valencia in winter 1936, the Republican general military staff 
remained in the capital city, issuing orders from there. The constant exercise of this 
metonymical slip in wartime discourses allows for Barcelona, Bilbao and Madrid to be 
seen as competitors and rivals, but also as equals and accomplices in the troublesome 
years that followed the military coup. Both Catalans and Basques and their 
governments systematically complained about not receiving the necessary support from 
the central government and staff in terms of military and material aid. At the same time, 
the two autonomous governments shared the feeling that as soon as they attempted to 
organise their own resistance, they were immediately admonished and constrained by 
the Republican central authorities.
From the central government’s perspective, in turn, the challenge posed by the tangle of 
radical political parties and unions in Catalonia and the conservative and religious taint 
of the Basque Nationalists could not be ignored. If resistance against the rebels was, in 
the end, a state affair, the Republican government had to ensure that the numerous 
leftist factions attempting to gain influence and control over the military organisation in 
Catalonia were kept at bay. The balance between conciliatory and firm attitudes was not 
easy. Furthermore, it has been argued that the Soviet Union expected the predominance 
of the Communist Party not to be challenged in exchange for the support it was lending 
to the Republican troops. The crushing of the Anarchists in Barcelona in May 1937 is 
often used as an example of the Republican government’s Communist allegiance.
In the Basque Country, the problem was almost the opposite: there, the lack of 
revolutionary zeal was regarded as almost synonymous with a lack of identification 
with the Republican cause. The Basque region’s strong conservative tradition, very 
influenced by the Catholic church, was entirely incompatible with any attempt at social- 
revolutionary experimentation. The Basques’ fundamental reason for supporting the 
Republic was that the central government approved the region’s political autonomy in 
October 1936. And the Basque leadership was acutely aware that were the rebels to win 
it would terminate their new political status. There was continuous tension between the 
central and Basque governments.
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Meanwhile, the central government and military staff tried to respond to the outbursts 
of revolutionary violence in Madrid, although very soon their main concern was 
holding back the rebel forces who approached the city from various directions. From 
the winter of 1936, the rebels’ siege of Madrid began to consume much of the 
Republican government’s energy, and it seems fair to say that it grew more inattentive 
to the other war fronts. The fate of the capital city never ceased to be a top priority for 
the Republican government, even after its move to Valencia.
Many wonder whether things would have ended differently had the alliance between 
Republicans and Basque Nationalists worked better and, more importantly, continued 
until a potential victory by the Republicans. Basque industry constituted a substantial 
asset that significantly improved the Nacionales’ war machinery once they conquered 
Biscay. But the same question emerges with regard to Catalonia and Madrid. In what 
seems like a bizarre exercise of narcissism, each of these regions, especially their 
capital cities, perceived their role as the key determinant of the outcome of the war.
Spain, in general, was badly prepared for a war. The Republican army, and especially 
the militias, were poorly equipped. The government was unable to provide its troops 
with the same quantity and quality of materials that the rebels soon received from 
Germany and Italy, having ignored the international embargo imposed on both sides. 
The assistance that the Republicans obtained from the Soviet Union, France, Mexico 
and other countries came later, partly because of the international embargo; it was in 
any case not as substantial as that received by the rebels. Moreover, the coexistence of a 
highly centralist administration and the strong, but fairly recent, Catalan and Basque 
autonomist administrations was perhaps bound to trigger conflict. Reluctantly, the 
autonomous governments relied extensively on the instructions and supplies delivered 
by the central government and military staff. And, in spite o f the autonomist fervour of 
their discussions, they somehow ended up acknowledging their dependency by 
presenting themselves as victims of the central government’s abandonment when their 
expectations were not met. At the same time, the aid that Catalonia and the Basque 
Country sent to Madrid cannot be underestimated, nor the important role of port cities 
like Barcelona and Bilbao in receiving refugees from the rest o f Spain, many o f whom 
continued into exile by boat.
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O f the three cities, Madrid was in the worst shape when the war ended. Three years of 
bombings and persistent artillery fire had left many of its neighbourhoods in complete 
ruins. Barcelona came second with the port and significant portions of its downtown 
urban fabric severely damaged by the rebel bombings. Bilbao was the least destroyed, 
and considering the ruins left by the rebel bombing raids in some of the nearby 
industrial towns, it is somehow surprising that the Basque capital city was spared more 
destruction.
3.4 Emergency reconstruction efforts
Both sides were quick to create emergency heritage protection services within their 
zones. In the Republican zone, the Junta de Incautacion y  Proteccion del Tesoro 
Artistico (Heritage Confiscation and Protection Committee) was created merely five 
days after the start of the war.102 The Junta was responsible for provisionally 
confiscating any piece o f real estate or art in danger. In the early stages of the conflict, 
religious buildings and art were particularly at risk in the Republican zone because of 
popular anti-clerical outbursts, which led to the destruction of thousands of religious 
buildings and art works. The Republican government strongly condemned this violence 
and tried to do its best to avoid it through the enforcement of legal measures and the 
organisation of educational campaigns to raise the population’s awareness of the 
historic and artistic value of religious heritage.103
In the rebel zone, the Junta Conservadora del Tesoro Artistico de Sevilla (Seville Art 
Treasure Conservation Board) was formed after the rebels seized Seville at the very 
beginning of the conflict. Some time later, in January 1937, the Servicio Artistico de 
Vanguardia (Avant-garde Artistic Service) was created. The Servicio General de 
Regiones Devastadas (Devastated Areas General Service) was approved in January 
1938 to address reconstruction proper. The Servicio de Defens a del Patrimonio 
Artistico Nacional (SDPAN\ National Artistic Heritage Defence Service), the equivalent 
of the Republican Junta de Incautacion, was established in July 1938 under the
102 Ministerio de Instruction Publica y Bellas Artes, “Decreto Disponiendo Que La Junta Creada Por 
Decreto De 23 De Julio Del Presente Ano Se Denominar£ De Incautacion Y Proteccion Del Patrimonio 
Artistico,” in Gaceta de M adrid  (1936).
103 See Josd Lino Vaamonde V., Salvamento Y Proteccion D el Tesoro Artistico Espanol Durante La 
Guerra, 1936-1939  (Caracas, Venezuela: 1973).
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leadership of architect Pedro Muguruza.104 One of the fundamental goals o f these 
highly militarised bodies was to restore religious buildings that had suffered the impact 
of anti-clerical violence and/or bombings. Among the rebels’ first measures when they 
took over a locality was to rebuild the churches and reinstate the Catholic cult. Unlike 
its Republican counterpart, the SDPAN often didn’t have access to the original plans 
and technical details of the buildings.105 In spite of this, rebel authorities restored a 
number of churches during the conflict, relying on technicians’ on-site assessments and 
local craftsmanship.
When the bombing campaigns— especially those carried out by the rebels— became 
more systematic, the Juntas de Defensa Pasiva (Passive Defence Boards) that were 
created in most localities in order to organise the protection of the population and their 
physical environment from the conflict soon found out that they had little or no 
previous experience to fall back on when it came to safeguarding people and buildings 
from the bombs. The few designs for protective devices and refuges that were available 
were not conceived to resist the impact of the size of the bombs dropped. Moreover, the 
local Passive Defence Boards often lacked adequate construction material, and could 
only accomplish more modest protection works. Some of the most eye-catching 
shielding structures (or at least most photographed) were built in Madrid, and included 
the protective structures for the Prado Museum and the nearby fountains La Cibeles and 
Neptuno, which were buried beneath layers of sand and brick in what looked like small 
hills. As will be explained in Chapter 6, the government created a special committee to 
address the wartime problems of the capital city. These were simply too substantial for 
the local administration to deal with on its own. In Barcelona, on the other hand, the 
local passive defence board worked in close collaboration with the fire brigades and the 
numerous voluntary associations that took on the responsibility of constructing air-raid 
shelters. Bilbao’s local emergency services were spared from designing the kind of 
sophisticated protective structures and refuges found in Madrid and Barcelona. One
104 Ministerio de Education Nacional, “Jefatura Del Servicio Nacional De Bellas Artes.- Circular 
Disponiendo Quede Constituido El Servicio De Defensa Del Patrimonio Artistico Nacional En La Forma 
Que Se Determina,” in BOE  (1938).
105 For a closer examination o f wartime heritage protection on both sides, see the Rosa Bustamante 
Montoro, “Salvaguardia Y Trabajos De Emergencia Durante La Guerra Civil (1936-1939),” in Tratado 
D e Rehabilitacion. Tomo I. Teoria E Historia D e La Rehabilitacion  (Madrid: UPM, Editorial 
Munillaleria, 1999).
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should also bear in mind that Bilbao was taken over much earlier in the conflict than the 
two other cities.
3.5 Post-war reconstruction
“Our aim is to build a new order that takes up the securities of the old.” 
Antonio Tovar (Press Subsecretary of the Falange), 1941106
3.5.1 A new order
Between 1937 and 1939, two governments were virtually running Spain: the 
Republican and the rebel. While Franco and his military aids concentrated on winning 
the war, his civilian collaborators, notably Ramon Serrano Suner, were gradually setting 
up the bases for the new legal and political order that would fully supplant the Second 
Republic after a rebel victory. This was not necessarily an easy task. Even though 
Franco had gradually enforced unity and discipline on the rebel movement by removing 
the most dissenting voices and making increasingly clear that both his person and will 
were utterly indisputable, his supporters’ diverse ideological pedigrees could not be 
ignored.107 How could the more radical socio-economic claims of Falange be merged 
with the reactionary demands of the traditional financial aristocracy? How could the 
Carlists, who defended an alternative branch of the Bourbon dynasty, be reconciled 
with the traditional monarchists? How could the military’s straightforward notions of 
order be made compatible with the more sophisticated legal arrangements propounded 
by rightist jurists and intellectuals?
The only thing these different groups agreed on was the unity of Spain. The patria was 
sacred and had to be protected from internal autonomist and independence claims as 
well as foreign powers’ excessive influence, be they Fascist, Liberal or Communist. 
There was also a shared sense of pride for Spain’s imperial past. A strongly patriotic 
rhetoric of national regeneration evolved from these elements, solidifying in the state 
party-like Movimiento Nacional (National Movement). The Movimiento borrowed 
some of the spirit of the late nineteenth-century regeneracionista movement, and mixed 
Falange’s national-syndicalist revolutionary rhetoric, the Catholic Church’s family and
106 Cited in Carlos Moya, El Poder Economico En Espana (1939-1970). Un Analisis Sociologico  
(Madrid: Tucar Ediciones, S.A., 1975) 146.
107 For an exhaustive account o f  Franco’s rise to and permanence in power see Paul Preston, Franco. 
"Caudillo D e Espana"  (Barcelona: Grijalbo, 2002) or Paul Preston, Franco. A Biography (London: 
Fontana Press, 1995).
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charity-based principles, and the conservatives’ stem defence of the virtues of a 
traditional, socially stratified Spain.
National reconstruction was understood as physical rebuilding, moral regeneration and 
economic renewal. In this view, physical rebuilding and moral regeneration went hand 
in hand. It was deemed that one of the reasons for the spread o f “bolshevism” in Spain 
and the outbreak of the Civil War had been the increasing class resentment experienced 
in the cities, where workers, often recent migrants from the countryside, were 
concentrated in marginal, poor and unhealthy districts. It was thought that the 
construction of clean, ampler homes for workers in socially mixed neighbourhoods, 
adequately serviced by the municipality and the Church, would prevent the danger of 
these workers becoming class conscious and ensure the harmonious yet hierarchical 
coexistence of Spaniards of different social backgrounds in the cities. Simultaneously, it 
was expected that the construction of modem, rational agricultural units in the 
countryside would anchor potential new migrants in non-urban environments, thus 
reinforcing the traditionally more conservative values and aspirations of rural Spain.
Economic renewal would build on agricultural modernisation and state-sponsored 
industrialisation.108 Spain lacked a significant entrepreneurial, capitalist class to which 
industrialisation could be entrusted. Moreover, during the Second World War, foreign 
investment was almost absent, and continued to be so subsequently for some time as a 
result o f Spain’s diplomatic isolation. At this early stage, the regime’s only choice 
seemed to be to continue relying on the traditional financial oligarchy, which after all 
had backed the coup and financed the Nacionales throughout the war. This financial 
aristocracy (as it has also been called) was largely made up of nobles, conservative 
landowners and private bankers, who were hardly bent on risk-taking and much more 
concerned with preserving (and recovering) their long-standing properties. The group 
was nonetheless ready to place money in state-sponsored industrialising ventures in 
exchange for the regime’s protection of social privilege and traditional values.
From 1941, the Institute Nacional de Industria (National Industry Institute), led by 
members of the military, coordinated the regime’s industrialisation programme. The
108 See, for example, Pedro Muguruza Otafio, “Sistematizacion Tecnica En Un Plan Nacional De 
Resurgimiento,” in Instituto Tecnico de la C onstructiony Edification  (1940), 3.
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leaders’ military discipline and love for the patria ensured there was a considerable 
level of professional commitment, but their attempt to carry through a strict, autarchic 
development scheme largely failed, and an inefficient form of protectionist state 
capitalism emerged. Aside from the fact that Spain’s resources were exhausted after the 
war, and that it was probably not in a position to build an autarchic economy, the 
rigorous and impartial attitudes required for such an economic programme were far 
removed from the kind of particularistic, family and surname-based relationships that 
the financial oligarchy was used to, and imposed on the organisation of the public 
companies it helped f(o)unding.109
In the end, the securities of the old world proved incompatible with any kind of new 
order. Towards the end of the 1950s, the autarchic programme and the National- 
Syndicalist doctrine were little more than hollow rhetoric, and the nation was plunged 
into economic stagnation, which no longer favoured even the financial aristocracy. 
Only a few arrivistes, who thrived on the black market, felt comfortable in this 
situation. The regime was forced to catch up with reality. Dogmatic discourses and 
heavy bureaucracy were eventually transmuted into technocratic language and 
managerial practices. This was the beginning of Spain’s economic boom. At this point, 
the physical reconstruction of the country was deemed accomplished. But how was the 
reconstruction of Spanish cities, towns and villages carried out during the two decades 
of autarchy?
3.5.2 Organisation o f reconstruction 
3.5.2.1 Regiones Devastadas
Various reconstruction efforts took place during the war, and urban planning continued 
despite the conflict. The Servicio Nacional de Regiones Devastadas y  Reparaciones 
(Devastated Areas Department), which Franco’s wartime government in Burgos created 
in early 193 8, initially depended on the Ministry of the Interior. Joaquin Benjumea was 
appointed head of the Service. It aimed to supervise and coordinate reconstruction in 
the rebel zone, which by then encompassed a considerable portion of the Spanish
109 For a detailed explanation o f  the structure o f  economic power in post-war Spain, see Moya, El Poder 
Economico En Espana (1939-1970). Un Analisis Socioldgico , Ramon Tamames, La Oligarquia 
Financiera En Espana (Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1977). For how the Spanish economy worked 
during the war, see Pablo Martin Acena and Elena Martinez Ruiz, eds., La Economia D e La Guerra Civil 
(Madrid: Marcial Pons, Ediciones de Historia, S.A., 2006).
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territory. Every reconstruction project, regardless of its volume and cost, had to receive 
the approval of Regiones Devastadas. According to Eugenia Llanos, this rule was 
applied to the letter.110 After the war, in August 1939, the Service became the Direction 
General de Regiones Devastadas under the wing o f Serrano Suner’s powerful 
Ministerio de Gobernacion (Governance Ministry), and Jose Moreno Torres replaced 
Benjumea. It has been estimated that 1,327 million euros were spent by Regiones 
Devastadas on reconstruction between 1939 and 1957.111 More than 150 technicians, 
108 architects, 46 engineers and 180 experts worked for the Department across 30 
regional offices112 with the “essential mission” of
“orientating, facilitating, and in certain cases, directly implementing the 
reconstruction of the damage suffered in the villages and towns that were the 
bloody scenario of the holy and victorious liberation Crusade, or irrefutable 
witnesses to the barbarous and merciless violence deployed by the hordes, who 
instructed by Russia, showed all their hatred towards everything representing
1 I T
the basic and secular principles of the Christian and Spanish spirit.”
Two things were made clear in this paragraph: first, destruction was deemed an 
unfortunate result of the liberation Crusade, when it was not viewed as the direct 
outcome of the Reds’ violence. Second, the Department’s fundamental commitment 
was to orientate and facilitate the reconstruction process, and only in certain cases, 
which will be discussed later, would it be responsible for carrying out the works. In all 
other cases, the initiative was left to local authorities and private owners, who still had 
to comply with Regiones Devastadas’ regulations. They were also granted the 
possibility of applying for state funding to undertake their works.
1,0 Eugenia Llanos, “La Direccion General De Regiones Devastadas: Su Organizacion Administrativa,” 
in Arquitectura En Regiones D evastadas (Madrid: MOPU, 1987), 43.
111 This is the updated (August 2008) equivalent o f  the figure that Gloria Otero gave in 1987 (96,000  
million pesetas) in Gloria Otero, “La Reconstruccion De Regiones Devastadas, En La Sala De 
Exposiciones Del M.O.P.U. Arquitectura Para Despues De Una Guerra,” Revista MOPU, no. 340 (1987). 
The new equivalent was calculated on the webpage o f  the Instituo Nacional de Estadistica, see 
http://www.ine.es/calcula/calcula.do.
112 Ibid.: 93.
113 “Entres los organismos estatales de nueva creation figura la Direccion General de Regiones 
Devastadas y Reparaciones, cuya mision esencial es la de orientar y facilitar y, en ciertos casos, llevar a 
la practica directamente la reconstruccion de los danos sufridos en los pueblos y ciudades que fiieron 
sangriento escenario de la santa y victoriosa Cruzada de liberation o testigos irrefutables del bdrbaro y 
cruel ensanamiento de las hordas que, aleccionadas por Rusia, mostraron su odio hacia todo lo que 
significaba representation real de los principios b&sicols y seculares del espiritu cristiano y espanol.” 
“Organismos Del Nuevo Estado. La Direccion General De Regiones Devastadas Y Reparaciones,” 
Reconstruccion 1940.
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5.2.2 The Institute Nacional de Credito
In March 1939, the regime created the financial branch of Regiones Devastadas, the 
Institute de Credito para la Reconstruccion Nacional (ICRN-, Credit Institute for 
National Reconstruction), drawing on the ostensibly successful experience of the 
Italian administration after the First World War. In a booklet published at the time, Jose 
Moreno Torres, head of Regiones Devastadas, explains how, unlike France and 
Belgium—which had relied on unsuccessful compensation laws— Italy had established 
a system of public loans coordinated by the Istituto Nazionale di Credito per la 
Cooperazione after the end of the Great War. Moreno Torres points out that a 
compensation law would in any event not have been possible in post-civil-war Spain 
since there was no other nation from which to exact reparations.114
The ICRN’s funds would be extracted from exclusively “national sources” since “all 
the flattering offers from foreign companies, who saw in the material destruction of 
[Spain] a spring of easily obtainable benefits, ha[d] been systematically rejected”.115 
That the regime boasted about having turned down several investment offers was 
congruent with the autarchic economic line it aimed to follow. It is also likely that the 
offers diminished in any case once the Second World War had started. Various national 
sources, on the other hand, were specified in the law that gave birth to the ICRN. 
Among the less orthodox ones were the income brought by the confiscations and 
economic sanctions imposed on individuals who had remained on the Republican side 
during the war and were now being summarily tried for their political responsibilities, 
and the revenues that private companies would pay the state for hiring war and political 
prisoners to be employed in construction work (including, of course, reconstruction 
works).116 The term prestaciones personales or payment in kind was used
117euphemistically to refer to these exceptional sources. In the end, reparations were 
exacted, not from another nation, but from the other half of the Spanish nation.
114 Jose Moreno Torres, La Reconstruccion Urbana En Espana/Urban Reconstruction in Spain (Madrid: 
1948).
1.5 “Organismos Del Nuevo Estado. La Direccion General De Regiones Devastadas Y Reparaciones.”
1.6 See Jefatura del Estado, “Ley Creando El Instituto De Credito Para La Reconstruccion Nacional,” in 
B O E ( 1939).
117 “Organismos Del Nuevo Estado. La Direccidn General De Regiones Devastadas Y Reparaciones.”
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5.2.3 The “scheme o f cancellation o f  penalties by work”
Republican prisoners of war were engaged in forced labour for the first time in the 
Biscayan mines.118 This was during the war, and it was merely the beginning of what 
became an extensive and well-developed officially coordinated practice after the war. 
The Ley de Responsabilidades Politicos (Political Responsibilities Law) that Franco 
passed in February 1939 gave the regime free hand to detain and try—and subsequently 
incarcerate or execute—any individual suspected o f belonging or having belonged to 
any of the political groups that had been loyal to the Republican side or were against the 
new regime. It is estimated that 280,000 individuals were sent to prison. The use of 
prisoners as forced labour was given a legal and even charitable fa?ade through the so- 
called scheme of cancellation of penalties by work. As suggested earlier (see Chapter 1, 
pages 37-38), political imprisonment and forced labour were presented as an 
opportunity for the Red convicts to redeem their sins and become good Catholics. The 
Church contributed to the scheme by placing priests in the detachments where the 
prisoners resided. In a document on urban reconstruction in Spain that circulated in both 
Spanish and English in 1945, Moreno Torres introduced the scheme as a “humanitarian 
law—the first of its kind in penal legislation anywhere”.119 According to Moreno 
Torres, the convict was allowed to cancel two days of his term of imprisonment by one
day’s work “in addition to which there were extra cancellations for good conduct,
120overtime, and outstanding proficiency”. In reality, the pace of cancellation of 
penalties changed over time depending on the number of prisoners and the demand for 
labour.121
The accounts of those who “benefited” from the scheme suggest that it was not as 
humane as the regime allegedly pretended. The prisoners lived and worked in extremely 
difficult conditions, usually isolated from their families, who received a minimal 
pension from the authorities. But the arrangement proved extremely efficient for the 
state from an economic point of view. The authorities were greatly satisfied with the 
results, openly arguing that the construction of many of the dams, for example, would
118 Isaias Lafuente, Esclavos P or La Patria. La Explotacion D e Los Presos Bajo El Franquismo (Madrid: 
Ediciones Temas de Hoy, S.A., 2002) 42.
119 Moreno Torres, La Reconstruccion Urbana En Espana/Urban Reconstruction in Spain.
120 Ibid.
121 Lafuente, Esclavos P or La Patria. La Explotacion De Los Presos Bajo El Franquismo 44.
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have been almost impossible without the scheme.122 Private companies would soon be 
allowed, if not encouraged, to hire prisoners of war and political prisoners, mainly for 
construction works. Companies paid the state the equivalent of a free worker’s salary 
for each prisoner (of which the prisoner only received a minor proportion), but in 
exchange they had an exceptionally disciplined, efficient and submissive workforce at 
their disposal. Many companies benefited from the scheme, among them Babcock & 
Wilcox and Constructora Naval, two of the companies that were involved in the 
reconstruction of the bridges in Bilbao, as will be explained in Chapter 5.123 However, it 
does not seem as if they employed prisoners for these particular works.
3.5.2.4 The "adoption law "
Through its loans system, the ICRN guaranteed at least partial funding to sympathetic 
“entities, companies or private individuals” wishing to reconstruct their property. It was 
then decided that Regiones Devastadas would step in directly and carry out 
reconstruction works in those towns and villages that had lost more than 60 per cent of 
their built-up area’24 or more than 75 per cent, according to earlier sources.125 The so- 
called “adoption law” of 23rd of September 1939 established that “the State w[ould] 
fully take charge of the reestablishment of public services belonging to the State, the 
Church, the Province and the Municipality” in exceptionally damaged localities.126
A precedent to Franco’s adoption law existed in the 1919 Belgian legislation, which 
had also envisioned a special administrative and financial status for the communities 
that had been most severely damaged during the Great War. Similarly, these could be 
“adopted” by the Belgian state authorities.127 The adoption of towns and villages 
proved an excellent propaganda tool for the regime. Franco eagerly attended the 
inaugurations of the reconstructed adopted villages, ceremoniously handing over the 
keys o f the new or rebuilt homes to their owners, and pictures of the ceremonies were 
circulated in the media, notably the Noticiarios y  Documentales {NO-DOs), produced 
by the regime’s “news and documentaries” broadcasting service and religiously shown
m  Ibid. 77, 78.
123 Ibid. 311.
124 Jose Moreno Torres, La Reconstruccion Urbana En Espana (Madrid: [s.n.], 1945).
125 “Organismos Del Nuevo Estado. La Direccion General De Regiones Devastadas Y Reparaciones.”
'26 Ministerio de la Gobemacion, “Decreto Regulando La Adoption Por El Jefe De Estado De 
Localidades Danadas Por La Guerra En Determinadas Condiciones,” in BOE  (1939).
127 Andre de Naeyer, “La Reconstruction D es Monuments Et Des Sites En Belgique Apres La Premiere 
Guerre Mondiale,” Monumentum (UNESCO-ICOMOS) XX-XXI-XXII (1982).
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in cinemas across Spain (and Spanish-speaking America). However, very often the 
adopted villages were inaugurated without having been finished, and sometimes they 
would never be. But there was little movement and exchange within Spain at the time 
and, arguably, few people, other than those who lived in these particular villages, had 
reasons to doubt the optimistic reports shown on the NO-DO or circulated in the press.
5.2.5 Other institutions involved in reconstruction
Parallel to Regiones Devastadas, at least another three key institutions were involved in 
the national reconstruction process: the Instituto Nacional de la Vivienda (.INV; 
National Housing Institute), the Instituto de Colonizacion y  Desarrollo Rural {INCDR\ 
Colonisation and Rural Development Institute) and the Direccion General de 
Arquitectura (DGA; Architecture Department). The INV was created in 1939 within the 
Ministry of Labour with the aim of attending to the increasingly unmanageable housing 
demand. A pressing need for housing already existed before the war in most larger 
cities, notably Madrid, but had of course worsened as a result of the destruction brought 
about by the conflict. There was also an ideological purpose behind the INV’s activity: 
fomenting worthy, proper, Christian households in which class resentment would not 
take root. The INV collaborated with Regiones Devastadas in rebuilding and 
constructing new homes in the adopted villages, which included some of the suburbs of 
Madrid. Over time, the projects for viviendaprotegida or “protected housing” extended 
to areas that had not necessarily been damaged by the war.
The Instituto de Colonizacion was an immediate result of the regime’s early autarchic 
economic programme, but bore some continuity with Republican initiatives such as the 
national plan for water works.128 Franco’s early ideologues were convinced that Spain 
was an eminently agrarian nation and that her industrialisation had to start by radically 
modernising agriculture. Efficient irrigation systems and rational agricultural 
production units were to be built across the country. This would also prevent the vast 
numbers of rural inhabitants uprooted by the war from migrating to the cities, which 
were allegedly already overwhelmed by homeless and unemployed peasants. The 
designers of the new colonisation programme looked back with a certain nostalgia to 
Spain’s colonisation of America in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but their
128 Eduardo Delgado Orusco, “La Experiencia Del INC - Una Colonizacion De La Modemidad” (paper 
presented at the Arquitectura, ciudad e ideologia antiurbana, Pamplona, 14-15 March 2002), 86.
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programme was probably closer to the enlightened Bourbon monarchs’ eighteenth- 
century rural colonisation projects in southern Spain (when towns like La Carolina and 
La Carlota were founded).
Finally, the Direccion General de Arquitectura (DGA) was set up to oversee and 
coordinate planning and architecture. It was entrusted to Falange, the state party, and 
architect and academic Pedro Muguruza, who had earlier been appointed head of the 
SDPAN, was assigned the task of leading the new department. The DGA spent its first 
years trying to pin down the genuine architectural style of the New Spain. As shall be 
discussed later, the result of this quest was not particularly fruitful, but the process in 
itself is arguably interesting.
Finally, it has been said that the creation of multiple institutes to which different aspects 
of the national (re)building task were assigned frustrated the aim o f producing unified 
town-planning policies, and possibly hindered a more effective reconstruction
1 9Qprocess. This is probably true. As a means of ensuring his absolute leadership, Franco 
fomented institutional fragmentation by distributing small portions of power among the 
different ideological members of the Movimiento Nacional.
3.5.3 Cities in the reconstruction process
The priority of Regiones Devastadas was the restoration of town halls, casas cuartel
(the civil guard’s barracks), religious buildings and houses in smaller towns and
villages. A report published in 1942 indicates that more than 4,600 new housing units
were projected during the first two years of which 776 were finished by the time the
report was published and another 1,600 were under construction. The plans for 23 new
town halls had been approved of which five were finished and fifteen were under
construction. The works for building 77 temples were approved, of which 48 were
finished and 97 under construction (some of the works must have been initiated prior to 
1101939). Emulating Spain’s colonial town-planning principles, reconstruction started 
by setting up the urban core: the town hall, the church, and the police or military
129 Victor Perez Escolano, “Guerra Civil Y Regiones Devastadas,” in Arquitectura En Regiones 
D evastadas (Madrid: MOPU, 1987), 140.
130 See Ministerio de la Gobemacion (Direccion General de Regiones Devastadas y Reparaciones), “La 
Reconstruccion De Espana. Resumen De Dos Anos De Labor, [with Illustrations.],” (Madrid: Ministerio 
de la Gobemacion, Direccion General de Regiones Devastadas y Reparaciones, 1942).
91
quarters. The regime’s preference for rural environments, religious buildings and 
traditional architecture is apparent in Reconstruccion, the monthly magazine that 
Regiones Devastadas published between 1940 and 1953 as well as in the series of 
projects that Moreno Torres reported as accomplished works in the first illustrated 
summary of reconstruction achievements published by Regiones Devastadas in 1946.131
Most larger cities remained loyal to the Republic, as we know, and not prioritising their 
reconstruction was in some ways a means to punish them. There existed an open 
contempt for the city among some of the regime’s early ideologues, who saw the 
“liberal” metropolis as the nest of anti-clericalism, anti-militarism and other sinful 
activities, usually ascribed to the left. In the typical Falangist rhetoric, radical and 
poetic, Vertice, one of Falange’s cultural magazines, claimed:
“The city gobbles up man and, with the mashed remains of him, raises those 
immense houses, builds those vast avenues, grows blind, squeezes out the air. It 
is the great sin to be fought; the babels will remain as the souvenirs of a great
• ™ 132crime.
The “great crime” was the “modem betrayal” that the “honest peasants” had committed 
when they fled to the city, only to end up living in filthy quarters where they had been 
“engendering degeneration and anomaly”. But these sceptics of the city predicted that 
the countryside would rise once more and “destroy he who builds concrete over poppies 
and tall wheat”133 (poppies and tall wheat, red and yellow, might also be seen as 
metaphors for the Spanish nation as represented by the Spanish monarchic flag, which 
the regime appropriated).
A compromise between the values of the city and the countryside was promoted by less 
visceral Falangist voices, who coined the expression “countryside urbanism and city
131 Jose Moreno Torres, El Estado En La Reconstruccion D e Las Ciudades YPueblos Espanoles (Madrid: 
Instituto de Estudios de Administration Local, 1946).
132 “La ciudad devora al hombre y con lo que ha triturado levanta esas casas inmensas, construye esas 
grandes avenidas, se ciega, aprieta el aire. Es el gran pecado que hay que combatir; quedar£n las babeles 
como recuerdo de un gran crimen.” “Babel O La Ciudad,” Vertice, July 1939. In Gabriel Urena, 
Arquitectura Y Urbanistica C ivil Y M ilitar En El Periodo De La Autarquia (1936-1945): Analisis, 
Cronologia Y Textos (Madrid: Istmo, 1979) 269.
133 “Y aquellos que tuvieron en su sangre labriegos honrados que huyreon hacia la ciudad y se quedaron 
en sus arrabales sucios, engendrando degeneration y anomalia, se lamentaran en las ruinas de tanta 
ciudad por culpa de aquella traicion modema. ( . . . )  [OJtra vez la mano del hombre se manchara de sangre 
y arruinara al que levanta cemento contra la amapola y los altos trigos.” “Babel O La Ciudad.”
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ruralism”.134 This group wanted to believe that peasants still possessed the honesty, 
good faith and attachment to tradition that the inhabitants of the city had allegedly lost. 
At the same time, they acknowledged that urban dwellers were more sensitive to 
progress and civilised practices. Therefore, Falangist intellectual Victor D ’Ors 
advocated that, ideally, the countryside and the city ought to merge into a higher 
entity.135
Moreover, D’Ors and other Falangists saw the devastation brought by the war as a 
unique opportunity to change the course of urban development dramatically.136 In their 
Plan Nacional de Ordenaciony Reconstruccion (National Plan for Urban Planning and 
Reconstruction), the Falange proclaimed:
“Cities, the most authentic monuments, everlasting and representative of the 
ways of being and acting of different peoples— developed in chaos under the 
liberal principles—have now the opportunity to unfold naturally, scientifically, 
orderly, under organic principles. These principles vibrate everywhere in nature 
and with increasing perfection in man as the direct fruit of divine creation.” 137 
When looking back to the past, urbanism revealed itself as “one of the most eminent 
glories of Spanish science”, “the eight centuries of reconquista and the American 
colonisation [having been] accompanied by first-class town-planning activities”.138 
While the “realist, integrating and hierarchical” Spanish genius with its capacity “to 
impose total visions” was celebrated, “the French and English rationalist unilateralism 
or opportunism” was vehemently rejected. The authors pointed to the city of London as 
“the greatest monstrosity ever known to world art”, rhetorically asking if  this was all 
that liberal theories and English hegemony were able to produce. Acknowledging 
Spain’s present backwardness, they urged the regime to turn the fact that everything
134 Jose Gascon y Marin, “Discurso” (paper presented at the Congreso de la Federacion de Urbanismo y 
Vivienda, Madrid, 11-18 October 1940). In Urena, Arquitectura Y Urbanistica C ivil Y M ilitar En El 
Periodo D e La Autarquia (1936-1945): Analisis, Cronologla Y Textos 293.
135 Victor D ’Ors, “Hacia La Reconstruccion De Las Ciudades De Espafia,” Vertice, June 1937. In Urena, 
Arquitectura Y Urbanistica Civil Y M ilitar En E l Periodo D e La Autarquia (1936-1945): Analisis, 
Cronologla Y Textos 249.
136 D ’Ors, “Hacia La Reconstruccion De Las Ciudades De Espana.” In Urena, Arquitectura Y Urbanistica 
Civil Y M ilitar En El Periodo D e La Autarquia (1936-1945): Analisis, Cronologia Y Textos 249.
137 “Las ciudades, monumento el m&s autentico, representativo y perdurable de la manera de ser y ade 
actuar de los pueblos— desarrolladas caoticamente bajo los principios liberales— adquieren hoy la 
posibilidad de un desenvolvimiento natural, cientifico, ordenado bajo principios organicos. Estos 
principios son los que laten en toda la naturaleza, y en maxima perfeccion en el hombre, como fruto 
directo de la creacion divina.” Servicios Tecnicos de F. E. T. y de las J. O. N. S., “Ideas Generales Sobre 
El Plan Nacional De Ordenacion Y Reconstruccion,” 8.
138 Ibid. 9.
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remained to be done into an opportunity to produce something different, ultimately 
surpassing the other (European) countries.
Some of these aspirations crystallised in the plan for Madrid, the “Imperial capital city”, 
which the special reconstruction board that was formed to address reconstruction in the 
capital city designed. Madrid, in spite of its fierce resistance against the rebels, was 
granted a special role in the new order. It stood above the country’s other regions, it was 
the nation’s head, and was treated accordingly. Centralism was by no means new in 
Spain’s political tradition, but the Franco regime made it into one of its banners, 
categorically propounding its virtues. Details of the plans for Madrid are not considered 
here, as they will be discussed in Chapter 6, but it is worth pointing out here the 
implications of Madrid’s status, especially in comparison to the positions of Barcelona 
and Bilbao in the new order. The two cities no longer enjoyed the privilege of being the 
capitals of the Catalan and Basque autonomist regions. They had no more political 
status than Valencia or Seville in the new scheme of things, and initially even carried 
the stigma of having been the seats of nationalist governments, which had allegedly put 
at risk the integrity of the patria. But both Barcelona and Bilbao had enjoyed significant 
economic power since the turn of the century and would maintain it after the war. 
Barcelonan and Bilbaoan industrialists and financiers, even those who had sympathised 
with the autonomist governments and the Republican regime, were quite successful in 
transforming themselves into supporters of the dictatorship.139
Under Franco, Barcelona was predominantly viewed as a city for business, a place to 
host commercial fairs and negotiate trade agreements. It was stripped of its pre-war aura 
of political progressiveness and artistic avant-garde, and, of course, Catalan was 
banned. Bilbao continued to be seen as an industrial port city, but more significantly as 
the seat of Spanish finance. Several important private banks, originally founded by 
Basque financiers, maintained and expanded their headquarters in the city. The Basque 
language was banned, too, although it had not been as extensively spoken in urban areas 
as had Catalan before the war. Catalans and Basques were acknowledged to have made 
a specific contribution to Spain as a whole, including through their particularities 
(which mostly had to do with their industriousness and entrepreneurship), as had
139 See, for example, Rafael Abella, Finales D e Enero 1939. Barcelona Cambia D e P iel (Barcelona: 
Editorial Planeta, 1992).
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Andalusians and Extremadurans. Every comer of Spain was part o f an organic whole, 
hierarchically subjected to the centre: Madrid. Ultimately, it could be argued that 
Madrid’s recent past, her stem resistance against the rebels, was almost deliberately 
repressed under the weight of the symbolic and political significance that the new 
regime imposed on the city. Meanwhile, Barcelona and Bilbao were distracted from 
their past autonomist aspirations by allowing their elites to indulge in the apolitical 
accumulation of money.
Partly as a result of the regime’s initial mistrust of cities, they did not receive the same 
attention from Regiones Devastadas, and were more or less left to design and fund their 
own reconstruction projects when needed. Some cities, like Barcelona, resumed pre-war 
plans as part of their reconstruction programmes. And when it came to funding, city 
councils found different strategies to meet their ends. They sought loans from Banco de 
Espana, the national bank, and private banks, and devised new local taxes to cash in 
gradually the amounts they needed to pay back the loans. Franco’s adoption law did not 
initially include cities, but when city councils, including Barcelona and Bilbao, claimed 
that it should be applied to those of their districts that had suffered most damage 
(which, they argued, should be considered equivalent to the smaller localities specified 
by the law), the regime often ended up granting them subsidies and loans through the 
Instituto de Credito. Bearing in mind the intimate relationship between the state and the 
private banking system, the difference between receiving money from the Instituto de 
Credito, Banco de Espana or any of the private banks rested perhaps more on the 
application procedure and the conditions of the loan than on the ultimate source of the 
funds.
3.5.4 The national style(s): sources and influences
Discussions about which architectural style should be the specific brand of the new 
regime were intense during the initial post-war years among the most enthusiastic 
believers in the New Spain. Over the years, this aesthetic quest was abandoned for more 
pragmatic responses to the nation’s building needs and parallel lack of resources. But 
until the 1950s various stylistic practices coexisted and sometimes overlapped; 
fundamentally, fachadismo (facadism), classical monumentalism, folkloric 
traditionalism and rationalism.
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Fachadismo, or the early rebel propaganda architecture, consisted o f the vast settings in 
wood and papier mache that were installed in squares and open places for military 
parades and mass gatherings around the Caudillo. Conceptually similar to the scenarios 
from where Hitler and M ussolini captivated their audiences, the Spanish settings took 
inspiration from the Baroque Catholic liturgy tradition, offering an all the more eclectic 
appearance. Unfortunately, there is little if nothing left o f  these ephemeral pieces o f 
architecture.140
Fig. 3.1 Inauguration o f  Ciudad Universitaria (the university campus), 
Madrid, /  943 (adapted from the web).
Falange’s preference for sober, classical monum entalism  is most visible in the largely 
unaccom plished projects for Imperial Madrid. In the search for a new style, Diego de 
Reina, one o f the most eager defenders o f a neo-imperial capital city, suggested that 
such style should
“truthfully reflect the national philosophy ( . ..)  with a contemporary, yet not 
modernist character, ( . ..)  it should aim at a unified expression without being 
monotonous, it should be sober but not poor, austere but not dry, static but not 
heavy, genuine and conceived in a human scale ( . ..)  and, above all, it should be 
universal, a quality that does not imply de-nationalisation ( . . . ) ” .141
140 Carlos Sambricio, “ .. .’’jQue Coman Republica!” Introduccion a Un Estudio Sobre La Reconstruccion 
En La Espana De La Postguerra,” Cuadernos de Arquitectura y  Urbanismo Arquitectura para despues de 
una guerra, no. 121 (1977): 28.
141 “Debe ser reflejo fiel de la filosofta nacional ( . . .)  con un caracter de acusada actualidad sin ser 
modernista (. . .) ha de ser unitario sin monotonia, sobrio sin pobreza, austero sin sequedad, estatico sin 
pesadez, verdadero y concebido a escala humana ( .. .)  y sobre todo ha de ser universal, cualidad que no
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After putting forward these vague or perhaps overly ambitious requirements, Reina 
concluded that Spanish neoclassicism, notably represented by Juan de Herrera, ought to 
be the reference point for the new style. Juan de Herrera and his masterpiece El 
Escorial — commissioned in the sixteenth century by Philip II, son of the German 
Emperor Charles V—was henceforth acclaimed as the culminating point of Spanish 
architecture by the leading group of Falangist architects. The symbolic value of El 
Escorial was exploited in interesting ways. Not only was it presented as a product of the 
Renaissance and, hence, indirectly of Greece and Rome, but German purity and 
rectitude were said to be impregnated in its solid granite walls by way of its royal 
commissioner—maybe a convenient nod to the Third Reich.142
quiere decir desnacionalizacion Diego de Reina de la Muela, Ensayo Sobre Las D irectrices
Arquitectonicas De Un Estilo Imperial (Madrid: Ediciones Verdad, 1944) 133, 34.
142 Rafael Sanchez Mazas, “Herrera Viviente,” 4^rr/Z»a, 2 July 1939. In Urena, Arquitectura Y Urbanistica 
Civil Y M ilitar En El Periodo De La Autarquia (1936-1945): Analisis, Cronologia Y Textos 263.
Fig. 3.2 Johannes Blau, drawing o f  El Escorial, 16th century (adapted from a postcard).
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Arquitectura).
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It was in many ways natural for the architects of the New Spain to turn to Nazi 
Germany for inspiration. Not only because of the supposed ideological affinities 
between the two political regimes, but also because there existed a much earlier, well- 
established tradition of cultural and intellectual dialogue between Spain and 
Germany.143 A touring exhibition of German contemporary architecture arrived in 
Madrid in 1940. Albert Speer, who had recently visited Spain and manifested his 
admiration for El Escorial, was expected at the opening, but was unable to come at the 
last minute, and the mayor of Nuremberg and architect Wilhelm Kreis were sent 
instead.144 Nevertheless, it was hard to ignore the fact that the nascent Spanish regime 
lacked both the ideological hegemony that characterised the Third Reich and the 
economic resources that would have enabled it to engage in the kind of ambitious 
projects that the Germans were designing at the time.145
One of the few official buildings that was erected in the “new” monumentalist style was 
architect Jose Gutierrez Soto’s Air Ministry in Madrid’s Moncloa district. Both Speer 
and Paul Bonatz, who also visited Spain in these years, encouraged Gutierrez-Soto to 
make explicit references to El Escorial in the design. As will be explained in Chapter 6, 
a similarly monumental edifice for Falange’s headquarters was planned on the plot on 
which the ruins of the Montana military barracks lay, but was never accomplished.
For the admirers of El Escorial and Nazi architecture, Fascist Italian architecture 
appeared more difficult to grasp. It seemed excessively diverse and inclined on radical, 
overly innovative propositions. Nonetheless, some of the younger architects like 
Francisco Cabrero went to Italy and found the kind of stimulation they sought. 
Cabrero’s design proposal for the Cruz de los Caidos (Cross of the Fallen), the key 
element of Franco’s megalomaniac project for a burial and memorial complex north of 
Madrid, testifies to his Italian experience and his encounter with Giorgio de Chirico. 
His design was not selected, however. Instead, Pedro Muguruza’s more classic 
academic proposal was. In 1949, however, Cabrero’s competition entry for the Casa 
Sindical (Syndical House) on Paseo del Prado, opposite the Prado Museum, was
143 See Joaquin Medina Warmburg, “Irredentos Y Conversos. Presencias E Influencias Alemanas: De La 
Neutralidad a La Postguerra Espanola (1914-1943)” (paper presented at the Modelos alemanes e italianos 
para Espana en los anos de la postguerra, Pamplona, 25-26 March 2004).
144 Ibid. 36.
145 Perez Escolano, “Guerra Civil Y Regiones Devastadas,” 12.
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selected. The large and rather prominent building is arguably one o f  the few official 
examples o f Spanish m odem, some would argue Fascist-inspired, architecture o f the 
1940s. Nevertheless, scholars seem to agree increasingly that the rom ance between 
Spanish architects and Nazi and Fascist Italian architecture was never as simple and 
straightforward as it has often been depicted. It spanned a relatively short time, and its 
real impact on Spanish architecture was less profound than the regim e’s rhetoric made 
it seem.
Fig. 3.4 Francisco Cabrero, project fo r  the Fig. 3.5 Francisco Cabrero's Casa Sindical (today's
Cruz de los Cai'dos, 1941 (adapted from the Ministry o f  Health and Consumption), constructed
web). 1949-1955  (adapted from the web).
If, initially, classical monumentalism was reserved for the capital city— official 
buildings and com memorative crosses and arches, without forgetting the Valle de los 
Caidos (Valley o f the Fallen)— folkloric traditionalism  and regionalism were to inspire 
the reconstruction o f the adopted towns and villages. In most cases, it was impossible to 
restore the villages to their exact former appearance since there were no plans and 
drawings available.146 The architects o f Regiones Devastadas tried to find a balance 
between the supposedly national style, ultimately based on a generic understanding o f 
Spanish sixteenth and seventeenth-century architecture, and local and regional
146 See Manuel Blanco Lage, “La Gran Reconstruccion,” Revista MOPU, no. 310 (1984): 68, 69.
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specificities. Traditional, often hand-crafted m aterials were used, especially in the first 
years, and simple and sober lines predominated in the new constructions.147 Despite the 
emphasis on regional diversity and the actual incorporation o f local elem ents in the 
designs, the buildings that Regiones Devastadas erected across Spain have a common,
148distinct flavour, which makes them easily recognisable. Their straightforward, almost 
naive and sometimes cheerful, but sim ultaneously unpretentious, quality is indeed 
reminiscent o f the colonial constructions in former Spanish America, for example, in 
Mexico.
Fig. 3.6 Brunete, street photographed by J. Salgado (private collection).
147 Fernando Perez Rodriguez-Urrutia, “Las Nuevas Formas De Colonizacion De La Arquitectura De 
Postguerra En La Obra De Fernando De Urrutia Usaola: Arquitectura Para Regiones Devastadas, Los 
Poblados Hidroelectricos Y Ciudades-Jardin En La Periferia” (paper presented at the Arquitectura, ciudad 
e ideologia antiurbana, Pamplona, 2002), 160.
148 See Otero, “La Reconstruccion De Regiones Devastadas, En La Sala De Exposiciones Del M.O.P.U. 
Arquitectura Para Despues De Una Guerra,” 94.
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Fig. 3.7 Brunete, main square (private collection).
It has been argued that the architects o f Regiones Devastadas proved quite successful at 
adapting to the ideological requirements o f  the regime while dealing with the severe 
scarcity o f  materials that Spain suffered at the time. The architects had probably little 
choice but to optimise the resources available. As it turns out, behind the traditionalist 
fa9ades o f  the buildings often hid surprisingly rationalist solutions. Some o f the 
architects were familiar with rationalism from before the war, and the commonsense of 
those who were not led them to avoid unnecessary ornamentation, structures and space 
divisions. It could be argued that the post-war circumstances favoured an undeclared 
rationalist response to the building needs in many o f  the devastated towns and villages. 
Over time, more explicit examples o f rationalist architecture would become part o f the 
accom plishm ents o f Regiones Devastadas and the Instituto de C olonization such as 
architect Jose Luis Fernandez del A m o’s design for the small village o f  Vegaviana in 
Extremadura.
From the 1950s, more and more architects deemed the national, m onum entalist style 
obsolete and unrealistic. And the folkloric traditionalism  fostered by Regiones 
Devastadas, notwithstanding its proto-rationalist elements, was not so apt for the urban 
context. M any architects refused to continue to ignore foreign m odernist architecture.
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Although still conditioned by post-war Spain’s material scarceness, a more eclectic 
architectural panorama started to take shape.149 Gradually Spain began to have access to 
the pre-fabricated construction materials used in Europe and the United States in the 
aftermath of the Second World War. These materials opened up new possibilities, 
especially for housing construction. In 1957, reconstruction proper officially ended. 
Regiones Devastadas was dismantled, and its remaining functions were absorbed by the 
new Ministry of Housing.
3. Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to tie the wartime experiences of Barcelona, Bilbao and 
Madrid to their fate under Franco’s new post-war order. It has also offered a broad 
overview of the national reconstruction process, in which the new position of Bilbao, 
Barcelona and Madrid, and cities in general, is reflected accordingly.
Until they were seized by the rebels, Barcelona and Bilbao more or less systematically 
complained about not receiving adequate military and material support from the 
Republican government to face the challenges posed by aerial bombings and incoming 
waves o f refugees. Although the two cities remained at the rearguard until well into the 
conflict, Barcelonans and Bilbaoans shared the sense of having been abandoned to an 
uncertain fate. In contrast, Madrid, as the capital city of Spain, besieged by the rebels as 
early as in winter 1936, occupied much of the Republican government’s political and 
military activity. Barcelona’s and Bilbao’s sense of abandonment during the war was 
partly related to their otherwise prominent role as the seats of Catalan and Basque 
autonomous governments. And indeed, while the Catalan and Basque governments 
needed the support of the central government, the reverse was equally true.
After the war, Catalonia and the Basque Country were deprived of their autonomy, and 
their nationalist parties banned. This meant that Barcelona and Bilbao lost their status as 
political centres. They preserved, nonetheless, their economic position. In spite of 
Madrid’s fierce resistance until the end of the war, the regime turned her into the 
absolute head of the New Spain, imposing its centralist and totalitarian logic on the city.
149 There has recently been significant interest in the Spanish architecture o f  the 1950s, which includes 
the work (mostly public projects) o f  architects Luis Cubillo, Rafael de la Hoz, Jose Luis Romany and 
many others. See Josd Manuel Pozo, ed., Los Brillantes 50: 35 Proyectos (Pamplona: T6, 2004).
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Soon, few people would remember that Madrid had appeared as a paradigm of anti­
fascist resistance to the world.
The Franco regime’s initial aim was to turn Spain into an autarchic economy, based on 
rationalised agricultural production from which, it was thought, industrialisation would 
gradually take off. Because of these early plans, rural reconstruction was considered of 
more importance than urban reconstruction, and except for Madrid, cities were 
considered less of a priority. Furthermore, the regime regarded cities as ideologically 
and politically unreliable. Largely populated by industrial workers, artists and 
intellectuals, they were seen as prone to liberal and revolutionary ideas and behaviours, 
which challenged the traditional notions of discipline and hierarchy that the regime 
wanted to (re)instil into Spanish society.
Reconstruction was organised around five institutions, which complemented but also 
competed with each other. The Direccion General de Regiones Devastadas was 
specifically created to address reconstruction nationally, but its activity would mainly 
focus on the exceptionally damaged towns and villages “adopted” by Franco. The 
Instituto de Credito para la Reconstruction Nacional was established to distribute funds 
among public and private entities seeking to reconstruct their property through a more 
or less efficient system of loans. The Instituto Nacional de la Vivienda became 
responsible for reconstructing housing and constructing protected housing units. The 
lack of housing was already a major problem before the war, but became far worse in 
the post-war years. The regime was far from successful in meeting the demand, but 
ensured its propaganda machine conveyed a different image. The aim of the Instituto 
Nacional de Colonization, in turn, was creating colonies or small villages attached to 
rational agricultural production units in order to alleviate rural migration and foster 
hygienic life-styles and traditional community values. The Direccion General de 
Arquitectura, finally, was expected to set up architectural and town-planning principles 
and supervise the building activity across the Spanish territory. Its early attempts to 
create a homogenous, national style based on what was allegedly the most glorious 
period in Spanish architecture, the seventeenth century, were largely frustrated, except 
perhaps for Regiones Devastadas’ reconstructed villages, many of which bore some 
resemblance to the first colonial towns in Spanish America.
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In spite of the attempts at homogenisation, several stylistic tendencies coexisted 
throughout the 1940s (from fa9adism and classical monumentalism to folkloric 
traditionalism and rationalism). Scholars seem to agree that the influence of Nazi and 
Italian Fascist architecture, on the other hand, was never as strong in practice as it 
seems to have been in theory in the early 1940s. From the 1950s, Spain’s architecture 
became even more eclectic. Foreign magazines were again allowed and Spanish 
architects began to look at northern Europe and the United States for inspiration.
The early period of isolated experimentation during which the regime’s architects 
sought to produce a genuine, uncorrupted Spanish style was extremely short, but it is 
interesting because of its very contradictory nature. It was modem in its aim to develop 
a national architectural programme, but reactionary in the kind of aesthetics it sought to 
establish. The period possibly fits the label reactionary modernism, which has been 
used by some authors to describe similarly paradoxical situations in both Weimar 
Germany and the Third Reich.150
The dictatorship’s resources were scarcer than its ambitions. Many of its projects, 
including the reconstruction of the adopted villages, were not carried out or at least not 
to their full extent. At the same time, some of the architects who worked during the 
immediate post-war period have pointed to the scarcity of materials as a challenge, 
which forced them to be innovative regardless of the aesthetic principles that the regime 
tried to impose from above.
Despite the modest intellectual achievements and the gap between theoretical aims and 
tangible results of the first decade of physical reconstruction in Spain, the head of 
Regiones Devastadas, Moreno Torres, seemed keen to disseminate the Franco regime’s 
reconstruction programme. His report on urban reconstruction in Spain was translated 
into English in 1945 and circulated abroad.151 Unfortunately, it is difficult to know how 
much attention it received. Pedro Muguruza Otano, head of the Direccion General de 
Arquitectura, on the other hand, was invited to deliver a lecture on recent developments
150 See Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary Modernism. Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third 
Reich (Cambridge - N ew  York - Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
151 Jose Moreno Torres, Urban Reconstruction in Spain (Madrid: Direccion General de Regiones 
Devastadas, 1945).
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in Spanish architecture at the Royal Institute of British Architects in London in 1946.152 
These are perhaps anecdotal instances, and could be indicative of the Franco regime’s 
wish to realign itself with the victors of the Second World War, but they could also 
stem from a genuine belief that the lessons from post-war Spain could be useful to other 
nations.
152 Pedro Muguruza Otano, Recent Developm ents on Architecture in Spain. Lecture D elivered in the 
Royal Institute o f  British Architects, Etc. [with P lates.] (Madrid: Ediciones y Publicaciones Espanolas, 
1946).
Chapter 4
Wartime destruction as a catalyst for 
urban redevelopment: the opening of Barcelona’s 
Avenida de la Catedral after the Spanish Civil War
4. Introduction
The destruction and reconstruction of the area in front of the Cathedral of Barcelona 
during and after the Spanish Civil War illustrates how wartime destruction might work 
as a catalyst for urban redevelopment. Since the mid-nineteenth century there had 
existed the idea of opening up a broad, transversal avenue across the old district of 
Barcelona as a means of improving circulation, and facilitating communication with 
other districts. The project for the avenue, eventually referred to by planners as Gran 
Via C or Avenue C, was modified several times during the following decades. By the 
mid-1930s it seemed as if the works for the section between Antonio Maura and Plaga 
Nova/Plaza Nueva, in front of the Cathedral, where the Barri de la Catedral (the 
Cathedral neighbourhood) stood, were finally going to commence despite the protests 
of residents and a number of architects, who questioned the need to redevelop such an 
historically significant area. Then the Civil War broke out, and the project was abruptly 
interrupted.
Barcelona was regularly bombed during the conflict, especially in 1938, and several 
parts of the old district were seriously damaged, among them the blocks around the 
Cathedral. The Italian Aviazione Legionaria, which assisted the rebel troops, was able 
to set up an aerial base on Mallorca at a fairly early stage of the conflict from where it 
carried out regular raids over the Catalan and Valencian coasts. The systematic use of 
aerial bombings on downtown areas was unprecedented in military history. The 
inhabitants of Barcelona and other bombed cities were forced to improvise measures of 
passive defence, among them the construction of anti-air raid shelters. These 
constructive reactions to destruction were coordinated by local political and social 
organisations, and were largely possible thanks to the solidarity and camaraderie that 
emerged among the population that stayed in the cities—mainly women, children and 
the elderly.
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After the war, and in spite of the drastic political and ideological change that followed, 
the project for Avenue C was resumed, and the already ruined blocks in front of the 
Cathedral were finally razed to the ground. Not only had the bombings facilitated the 
task of the pickaxes by destroying the houses that stood in the way of the projected 
avenue, they had also forced many residents to abandon the area, thus making it easier 
for the new municipal authorities to justify the expropriation and demolition of the 
buildings in which they had previously lived. The opening made it possible to continue 
the archaeological works aimed at unveiling the ancient Roman city-wall. This provided 
the post-war city council with a suitable argument with which to legitimise the opening 
of the avenue. Retrieving Roman Barcelona fitted the new Francoist authorities’ 
rhetoric on the supremacy of the Roman and Hapsburg empires within Spain’s 
historical trajectory. The project for Avenue C was never fully implemented, however. 
The city council ended up constructing only the section called Avenida de la Catedral, a 
large, open, rectangular square, which runs in front of the Cathedral, towards Plaga 
Nova—that is, where the Barri de la Catedral once stood—and a section running north­
east towards Santa Catalina market place. This chapter focuses on Avenida de la 
Catedral.
The opening of Avenida de la Catedral was hence the result o f an exceptional 
interaction between the kind of lengthy negotiation processes that urban interventions 
usually involve, and the abrupt interruption of an unrelated event, the Civil War, which 
incidentally changed the urban fabric, improving the prospects for carrying out the 
planned intervention—notwithstanding the controversies the project stirred both before 
and after the war. It is argued that such congruence between pre-war and post-war city 
planning, combined with the destruction caused by the war and the use of destruction to 
help the implementation of the project for Avenue C, along with the changing official 
rhetoric used to legitimise the opening, reflect an interesting tension between historical 
and practical continuities in the urban development of Barcelona and the material and 
ideological discontinuities resulting from the Civil War.
The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part commences with a succinct 
exploration of the historical evolution of the area in front of the Cathedral and the old 
western city-gate from Roman times to 1939, when the Civil War ended. This is 
followed by a summary of the successive plans that were designed for Avenue C from
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the mid-nineteenth century. The third section looks at the destruction of Barcelona 
during the Civil War. The passive defence, especially the construction of anti-air-raid 
shelters, is examined in this section, where details of the specific raids that caused 
damage to the Barri de la Catedral are offered too. The section concludes with an 
attempt to grasp the emotional and visual experience of the ruined streets through the 
reflections of a famous writer and journalist in his wanderings across bombed 
Barcelona.
The second part of the chapter addresses the reconstruction and redevelopment of the 
area in front of the Cathedral. The first section in this part illustrates the challenges 
faced by the city council as it tried to put together the necessary funding for carrying 
out the various reconstruction projects. The following section discusses the different 
stages of the reconstruction works in the Barri de la Catedral as well as some of the 
public reactions to the transformations in this area, particularly the unveiling of the 
Roman city-wall. The third section seeks to identify the main discourses among both 
supporters and challengers of the opening of Avenida de la Catedral in the particular 
ideological context of the Franco regime.
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Fig. 4.1 Plan showing the o ld  centre o f  Barcelona before the war. The dark circle shows the area that 
concerns this research (Arxiu Municipal Administratiu de Barcelona).
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Fig. 4.2 Bird's eye view o f  the area taken by photographer J. Gaspar in March 1925. The white circle 
shows the area o f  concern in this chapter (Arxiu Historic de la Ciutat, Arxiu Fotografic).
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F/g. 4.3 Contemporary map o f  Barcelona. The black circle encompasses old Barcelona and the environs o f  the Cathedral (adapted from the web).
Part I
4.1 A brief history of the area opposite the Cathedral and the western city-gate
4.1.1 The emergence o f  Els Arcs outside the Roman city-wall
The enclosed Roman city of Barcino was built between 15 and 13BC on the small hill 
called Mont Taber facing the Mediterranean. Outside the western gate of the city-wall 
one of the oldest suburbs, or vilanoves (in Catalan), began to flourish from the fourth 
century. The suburb became known as Els Arcs (The Arches), most likely in reference
1 STto the old aquaduct that ran above it. The population gradually outgrew the walled 
city, in particular after the destruction of Tarraco (Tarragona) at the hands of the Goths 
in the 460s. Many Tarraconan families left the imperial city then, seeking refuge in 
nearby cities like Barcino, which could not absorb all the newcomers, pushing them to 
settle down in the emerging suburbs.154 Both the aquaduct and the city-wall were 
incorporated by the new dwellers into the structure of their houses. This way, the old 
Roman stones were little by little embedded in the extramural neighbourhoods.
4.1.2 The formation o f  Plaga Nova/Plaza Nueva
The area outside the western gate became an increasingly vibrant marketplace, reaching 
its high point in the Middle Ages. A number of streets leading to the market square 
itself evolved, among them, Corribia, Palla/Paja, Bou de la Pla?a Nova/Bou de la Plaza 
Nueva, Ripoll and Vigatans.155 Workshops and guild houses, such as the shoemakers’ 
and the inn-keepers’, established themselves on these streets. By the fourteenth century, 
the neighbourhood had become a commercially flourishing district and the city council 
felt it was time to enlarge the square outside Porta del Bisbe (the Bishop’s gate), as the 
western gate had become known. Some local urban historians suggest that the creation 
of Pla?a Nova/Plaza Nueva, the New Square, in 1355 constitutes the first city-planning 
endeavour in Barcelona’s history. An agreement was reached with the bishopric 
according to which the city council was granted a section of the bishop’s garden in
153 Josep Maria Garrut, 600 Anys D e Plaga Nova  (Barcelona: 1955) 19, 20.
154 Ramon Aliberch, “Reforma Interior En Barcelona. Prosigue La Avenida De La Catedral,” Hoja del 
Lunes, 8 January 1945, 11.
155 Ajuntament de Barcelona, L'Avinguda D e La Catedral: D e L 'ager D e La Colonia Barcino a La 
Vilanova D els Arcs (Barcelona: Ajuntament de Barcelona, Regidoria d ’Edicions i Publicacions DL, 
1992) 156, Agustin Duran y Sanpere, “En Visperas De Reforma. La Plaza Nueva,” La Vanguardia, 
October 20 1935.
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order to enlarge the square in exchange for bringing water as far as the cathedral 
cloister.156
Failed crops in the fifteenth century led to extensive rural migration in Catalonia. In the 
suddenly overcrowded cities growing social tensions eventually resulted in a civil war 
between 1462 and 1472. Overcrowding also brought epidemics to cities like Barcelona, 
and a strong devotion to Sant Roque (Saint Roch)— who according to the legend had 
once saved Barcelonans from a terrible plague— emerged among the residents of Pla9a 
Nova. In 1589, a special Sant Roque confraternity was instituted, although, as Duran y 
Sanpere ironically points out,
“the rise and decline of the confraternity ran parallel to the proximity or 
remoteness of the epidemic, and such fluctuations were followed by the image 
of the saint, whose location often changed, from the comer of Boters to the 
tower of the Casa del Arcediano [the Archdeacon’s House]”.157
4.1.3 Continued transformations in El Barri de la Catedral
The area around Plaza Nueva and in front of the Cathedral continued to expand in the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, while undergoing some changes. A chapter house was 
built beside the cathedral in 1450 to accommodate the PiaAlmonia, a charity institution 
that was already more than four hundred years old at the time. The building was 
subsequently enlarged in the 1540s at the expense of a number of houses on Corribia, 
which were demolished. The innkeepers’ guild renovated their fa?ade in 1556, as did 
the shoemakers’ guild in 1565.158 A Renaissance-inspired porticoed galleryjoining the 
two towers that made up the western gate was constructed in 1614 to hide a water pipe 
that stretched between the two buildings. Towards the end of the century, the Episcopal 
Palace was refurbished, its fa9ade gaining a more sober appearance. The building was 
only restored in the twentieth century, when its original Romanesque elements were 
revealed.159 Along the same lines, the two Roman towers were plastered, and an equally
156 Ajuntament de Barcelona, L'Avinguda D e La Catedral: D e L ’ager D e La Coldnia Barcino a  La 
Vilanova D els Arcs 157, Aliberch, “Reforma Interior En Barcelona. Prosigue La Avenida De La 
Catedral.”, Duran y Sanpere, “En Visperas De Reforma. La Plaza Nueva.”
157 Duran y Sanpere, “En Visperas De Reforma. La Plaza Nueva.”
158 Ajuntament de Barcelona, L'Avinguda De La Catedral: D e L 'ager De La Coldnia Barcino a La 
Vilanova D els Arcs 159.
159 Aliberch, “Reforma Interior En Barcelona. Prosigue La Avenida De La Catedral,” 11.
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smooth and sober result was obtained, matching the taste of early eighteenth-century 
neo-classicists.160
Large-scale urban planning became a fundamental concern in the nineteenth century. 
Several plans were designed throughout the century and a real construction boom took 
place between 1870 and 1910 in Barcelona, during which most of the new extended 
city, the Eixample/Ensanche (literally, the Extension), was built.161 One of the first 
initiatives taken with regard to the Barri de la Catedral was the removal in 1820 of the 
porticoed gallery that connected the two Roman towers in order to give the area a more 
airy look. For the same reason, several of the streets such as Corribia, Arcs, Riera de 
Sant Joan and Bou de la Pla9a Nova/Bou de la Plaza Nueva were straightened and 
widened and subsequently paved. A number of houses on these streets were rebuilt, 
often by renowned master builders like Jaume Brossa and architects such as Josep Oriol 
Mestres, Josep Fontsere and Antoni Rovira.162
In spite of these modem transformations and the increasing competition from malls and 
their products for mass consumption, the extraordinarily dynamic merchant activity that 
characterised the Barri de la Catedral since its early beginnings never waned. By the 
time the Civil War broke out in 1936, a multiplicity of businesses and workshops 
continued to exist in the neighbourhood. Corribia, for example, featured a print shop, a 
moving agency, a pharmacist, a linen-draper’s shop, an antiquary and a beer-house 
oddly named Celler Catala (Catalan wine-shop).163 On Pla9a Nova/Plaza Nueva one 
could still find Puig i Alfonso’s legendary bookshop and Roura’s sausage business with 
a sign on the fa9ade that said “Supplier of the Royal House”. Famous pharmacy De 
Balvey had been replaced by a new pharmacy store, and traditional drug-store Sagarro 
was now a pastry shop. Lathe-hand Baque, whose latten-toys enticed young boys and 
girls, competed with the knick-knacks of another popular shop, called dels rodolins, on 
Bou de la Pla9a Nova/Bou de la Plaza Nueva. Because of the closeness of various 
religious institutions, there were also numerous workshops related to religious activities
160 See Garrut, 600 Anys D e Plaga Nova 24.
161 Robert Hughes, Barcelona (Barcelona: Editorial Anagrama, 1992) 20.
162 Ajuntament de Barcelona, L ’Avinguda D e La Catedral: D e L ’ager D e La Coldnia Barcino a La 
Vilanova D els Arcs.
163 Francisco Curet, “La Calle ‘Corribia’,” Diario de Barcelona, March 23 1956.
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such as makers o f  sacred images and clerical clothing tailors. The offices o f the 
Christian magazine La Familia were also located on Pla<?a Nova/Plaza N ueva.164
Fig. 4.4 Plaza Nueva and the Roman gate in a pjg  4 5  a  closer view o f  the Roman gate. The white circle
photograph token by Perez de Rozas in 1933 indicates the position o f  the image o f  Saint Roque in the
(Arxiu Historic de la Ciutat, Arxiu iep  tower (March 2007) (photographed by the author).
Fotografic).
4.2 The plans for a transversal avenue across old Barcelona
4.2.1 Cerda's plan
Several urban plans were designed for Barcelona during the second half o f  the 
nineteenth century in response to the city’s growing population. In summer 1854, the 
city-wall was demolished after years o f controversy, and while some argue that the 
disappearance o f the wall is what finally allowed planners to rethink Barcelona as a 
large, m odem  city, others contend that there was no need to remove the wall in order to 
create a m odem  Barcelona. Engineer Ildefonso C erda’s extension plan, approved in 
1859, was the first comprehensive urban reform plan for the city. Although its main 
goal was the extension o f the city through the construction o f rationally designed 
districts, the plan also envisioned some changes in the old town. There, Cerda suggested
164 “Recuerdos De La Vieja Plaza Nueva,” Destino, 21 December 1946. This description o f the existing 
shops coincides with what Mrs Assumptio Planelles (age 94), who has lived her whole life in the area, 
told me in an informal conversation on 11 March 2007.
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opening up three broad streets or avenues as extensions o f  the avenues that he projected 
for the new Eixample/Ensanche.
. -j ■ ; 
'
Fig. 4.6 Cerda's 1859 plan fo r  Barcelona, which included a straight avenue across the old district 
(dotted black line). The black circle shows the area o f  concern o f  this chapter (adapted from the web).
Two o f  them, today’s Layetana and M untaner, would cross the old city in the direction 
from the mountains to the sea, and a transversal avenue would connect Campo Sagrado 
and Pallars running through the old town, perpendicular to the other two. The avenues 
would be 20 metres wide and 30 metres wide at their entrances and crossings, 
respectively. Some scholars suggest that the different widths were a means to break the 
inevitable monotony that Cerda admitted was a characteristic o f  his grid-design.165 Only 
one o f  C erda’s planned extensions, today’s Layetana, was fully accomplished, though 
not quite immediately, and not entirely according to his original plan.
4.2.2 Baixeras' plan
Nowadays, it is often argued that C erda’s inner-city reform plan showed little 
sensitivity towards the compact and densely built old town, cutting mercilessly through 
it, ignoring religious edifices, palaces and other historical buildings. The disdain for the
165 Adolfo Florensa Ferrer, “M emorias De La Real Academia De Ciencias Y Artes De Barcelona. 
Cartografia Local. Pianos De Reforma Interior De Barcelona,” (Barcelona: Real Academia de Ciencias y 
Artes de Barcelona, 1961), 525.
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irrational layout o f the pre-Enlightenment city inspired the canon o f urban reformers all 
over Europe at that moment, and it is perhaps not surprising that engineer Cerda, a man 
o f  his time, felt the same. So did Angel Baixeras, an amateur urbanist who passionately 
worked on a reform plan for inner Barcelona for several years until it was finally 
approved in 1889, the works commencing in 1908.
Fig. 4.7 Baixeras 'plan fo r  Gran Via C. The black dotted line follows Gran Via C. The area in front o f  
the Cathedral lies within the black circle (adapted from the web).
Baixeras took up C erda’s main idea o f opening up three avenues through the old town 
to improve com munication within and across the area, calling them avenues A, B and 
C. W hile maintaining the course o f  avenues A and C, he changed the route o f avenue B, 
drawing it from Plaza de Universidad downwards, towards the port, instead o f planning 
it as an extension o f  M untaner as Cerda had done. The main reason for this change was 
to avoid the demolition o f recently built apartment buildings, which did not exist when 
Cerda designed his plan. As a result o f the pressure from private property owners and 
developers, new residential buildings were considered o f m ore value than many o f  the 
ancient, historical structures, which very few individuals tried to defend at the tim e.166
4.2.3 D arder’s plan
This attitude started to change as the works for Gran Via B or via Layetana progressed 
in the 191 Os. The destruction o f large sections o f  traditional neighbourhoods such as La
166 Ibid. 527.
117
Ribera and the area around the market o f Santa Catalina began to touch on the hearts o f 
many Barcelonans who realised that the loss o f these genuine pieces o f  history was 
irreparable.
Fig. 4.8 Darder 's plan fo r  Gran Via C. The black dotted line follows the new course o f  Gran Via C. The 
black circle shows where the Barri de la Catedral was located (scanned copy from Florensa’s 
Memorias...).
While people increasingly rejected the kind o f  drastic urban interventions that the 
opening o f  via Layetana epitomised, nobody really considered abandoning the inner- 
city reform plans. Instead, new attempts were made to soften the incursions into the 
dense, but also delicate urban fabric o f the old district. M unicipal architect Antonio 
Darder was commissioned to design a m odified version o f the previous plans (by Cerda 
and Baixeras) that would respect the most significant or representative buildings which 
stood in the way o f  the half-accomplished Avenue B and the projected Avenue C. 
Unlike Cerda and Baixeras, who had drawn the avenues as straight lines, Darder 
designed them by widening existing streets and following their course as much as 
possib le.167 D arder’s project was approved by the city council in Novem ber 1918, and
IARwas well received by the public.
167 To the west, Gran Via C would be formed by the existing streets o f  Puertaferrisa, Carmen and San 
Antonio Abad, which would simply be widened. To the east, towards Santa Catalina marketplace, Gran 
Via C branched o ff into two broad streets, the main one reaching Arc de Triomf/Arco del Triunfo and the 
other paseo Pujadas.
168 See Antonio Darder, “Reforma Interior De Barcelona. Gran Via C.,” (Barcelona: Ayuntamiento de 
Barcelona, Oficina Facultativa de Reforma, 1918).
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4.2.4 Vilaseca's plan
Years passed and little progress was made towards the implementation of Darder’s 
plan. In 1929, at the end of Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship, the city council decided to 
organise a competition to gather new inspiration. The ideas that emerged from the 
competition became the basis on which municipal architect Joaquin Vilaseca designed a 
new plan, which he entitled Plano de reforma y  urbanizacion y  de enlace entre los 
puntos singulares del Casco-Antiguo de la Ciudad (Plan to redevelop, urbanise and 
connect singular sites within the old district). The zone of Ataranzas'69 was the main 
target of Vilaseca’s plan, and Vilaseca had taken account of Cerda’s and Baixeras’ 
plans in his design.170 His main concern was not to touch commercial zones, drawing 
the streets across areas that involved as little loss of wealth as possible, and trying to 
circumvent significant buildings—in other words, attempting to overcome the flaws of 
previous the plans.
Avenue C was now to run along Palla/Paja, Cardenal Casanas and Sant Pau/San Pablo, 
which were not significant commercial streets and therefore less problematic to 
appropriate. On the other hand, it was acknowledged that some historical buildings, 
such as the house of the shoemakers’ guild in front of the Cathedral on Corribia, would 
be affected by the opening of Avenue C and Vilaseca suggested the building be 
reconstructed elsewhere. (One possible location, he argued, could be the new alignment 
that resulted from the projected transformation of Piedad street behind the apse of the 
Cathedral.) In Vilaseca’s design, Avenue C was 25 metres wide, allegedly enough for 
two lines of vehicles to pass in both directions and another three pathways for the cars 
to stop— one pathway on each side of the avenue and one in the middle for cabs. The 
plan was not approved definitely by the city council plenum before the 28th of May 
1934, and did not receive state authorisation until the 16 o f March 1935.
169 The zone o f  Ataranzas encompasses Ramblas, Ronda de San Pau/Ronda de San Pablo, Ronda de San 
Antonio, Pelayo, and the street called Marques del Duero  at the time.
170 See Actuation Patrimonial/Caja 045962/Expedientes 1185-1186/Afio 1949, “Plano De Reforma Y De 
Urbanizacion Y Enlace De Los Puntos Singulares Del Casco-Antiguo De La Ciudad. Memoria. 
Barcelona, -- De Enero 1930.,” (Arxiu Municipal Administratiu de Barcelona).
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Fig. 4.9 Vilaseca‘s plan fo r  Gran Via C. The black dotted line shows the changed course o f  Gran Via C 
and the black circle indicates the area in front o f  the Cathedral (scanned copy from Florensa’s 
Memorias...
4.2.5 Residents' objections to Vilaseca’s plan171
V ilaseca’s plan generated a number o f public protests. As soon as the plan was 
approved for the first time at the beginning o f  1930 by the Comision Municipal 
Permanente (Permanent Municipal Com mission), the Associacio de Veins afectatsper 
la Reforma Gran Via C (Association o f Local Residents affected by the Redevelopment 
o f  Avenue C) tried to stop it being im plemented m ainly because o f  the expropriations it 
involved, but also because o f  its allegedly negative impact on historic Barcelona. But 
instead o f  focusing on the content o f  the plan, the Associacio attacked the procedures 
by which it had been approved. According to the Associacio, the C om ision’s consent 
had been merely “testim onial” as it had taken place on the 28th o f  January 1930, on the 
very same evening dictator Primo de Rivera announced his resignation, forcing an 
abrupt national political change. It is possible that the members o f  the Comision met to 
approve the plan quickly in the face o f  Primo de R ivera’s resignation, thus ensuring it 
was approved before they themselves had to resign. Be that as it may, the plan was 
subsequently passed to the provisional city council plenum, which briefly succeeded the
171 This section is based on the information contained in Urbanizacion y Reforma 2-D-3/Caja 15655/Caja 
215/Expediente 1/Ano 1934, “Expediente Promogut Per L’asociacio De Veins Afectats Per a La 
Reforma, Gran Via C ,” (Arxiu Municipal Administratiu de Barcelona).
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plenum of the dictatorship. The plan was approved by the plenum and from there it 
went to the central government for authorisation. Meanwhile, the project was publicly 
exhibited and private and public organisations— among them, the Associacio de 
Veins—handed in a number reports and revisions to it. But, according to the Associacio 
de Veins, these were ignored by the local authorities, and by January 1931 the 
Associacio filed a plea requesting the provisional city council to publicise all the 
reports. This did not happen, and the Associacio decided to publish and circulate its 
own report summarising their various concerns.
With the advent of the Second Republic in April 1931, the Associacio saw a new 
opportunity to make its voice heard. Playing on the sensitivity of the new Republican 
city council, the Associacio claimed that Vilaseca’s plan should be made available to 
the public so that it could be assessed again,
“both because of its impure origins [it was approved under the rule o f dictator 
Primo de Rivera] and the former city council’s suspicious refusal to publicise 
the reports which different organisations and associations had prepared [when 
the plan was made public in 1930]”.
It appears as if the Republican city council’s intention was indeed to submit the plan to 
the plenum’s consideration for a second time, thus acknowledging, in some way the 
plan’s “impure origins” or that it had been approved under dubious circumstances. 
However, the city council did not appear to have contemplated going through the 
process of receiving public feedback for a second time. The Comissio Municipal de 
Govern172 rejected the Associacio’s request in May 1934, arguing that Vilaseca’s plan 
had already been publicised once and that all the reports received, including that of the 
Associacio de Veins, had been adequately examined and relevant suggestions 
incorporated in it.
But Josep Cardus i Arque, president of the Associacio, did not give up. On the 24th of 
May 1934, barely four days before the plan was definitely approved by the Republican 
city council plenum, he wrote another letter of complaint, insisting on the same issues.
thHis plea was once again declined, and on the 28 of May the plan was approved. After 
that, Josep Cardus filed an appeal (recurso de reposicion) before the city council, which
172 This was the Catalan name for the Comision Municipal Permanente, and became the official name 
under the Second Republic.
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was unsuccessful. It remains unclear whether the Associacio went any further, bringing 
the case to the administrative court {Tribunal contencioso-administrativo), but if it did, 
it must have been unsuccessful again, because Vilaseca’s plan moved forward and the 
works for Gran Via C were about to commence in early 1936.
4.2.6 Architects ’ criticisms o f Vilaseca’s plan
In a slightly different vein, less personally involved perhaps than the Associacio de 
Veins, the GATCPAC,173 a CIRPAC-affiliated association that grouped modernist 
Catalan architects since 1930, also voiced their views on the planned transformations in 
the old district. In the name of the GATCPAC, architect Josep Lluis Sert sent a letter to 
the town council dated 27th of May 1934, the day before the Plano de Reforma was 
approved.174 Sert showed surprise at the announcement of the imminent commencement 
of the works. He wrote that, in view of the sudden decision, the members of the 
GATCPAC felt the urge to at least make a few observations on the plan. These related 
to sanitation, circulation, historical monuments, cost-effectiveness and the need for a 
more comprehensive urban plan for Barcelona.
To the GATCPAC, the main flaw of Vilaseca’s plan was that it did not address the 
unhealthy living conditions in the old district. Broadening streets and creating new 
avenues without improving the existing housing blocks, Sert contended, would simply 
mean that the sanitation problems affecting the area continued. As an alternative, he 
proposed creating abundant green zones in between the housing blocks to generate a 
healthier atmosphere. While Sert and his colleagues agreed that improving circulation 
“from the mountains to the sea” by creating broad avenues was extremely important, 
they were not convinced by the opening of a transversal avenue across the old town. 
They believed this would simply attract traffic to an already congested area, and argued 
it would be better instead to direct traffic through transversal avenues further uptown.
The construction of Avenue C was partly driven by the principle of disencumbering. 
The idea was that the avenue would connect the main monuments of the old district, 
providing an orderly and comfortable view of the historical setting. Sert rejected the
173 Acronym for Grup d’Arquitectes i Teenies Catalans per el Progres de l’Arquitectura Contemporania.
174 Urbanizacion y Reforma 2-D-3/Caj a 15655/Caja 215/Expediente 1/Afio 1934, “Expediente Promogut 
Per L’asociacio De Veins Afectats Per a La Reforma, Gran Via C.”
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principle of disencumbering and the plans to demolish many of the blocks that 
surrounded historical buildings like the Cathedral. The spirit of reconstruction (or 
perhaps recreation) of neat, stylistically homogeneous urban settings, which had 
permeated nineteenth-century inner-city reforms in Europe and Spain “had been 
universally abandoned”, Sert argued, claiming that it was preferable “to accept the 
current setting with its superposition of styles of different periods” than to destroy the
1 7Sgenuine architectural milieu surrounding single historical buildings.
Sert also had recommendations on how to make Vilaseca’s plan more cost-effective. 
For example, he argued that widening already existing streets was old-fashioned 
because it implied costly expropriations. Current urban theory, he wrote, recommended 
opening new streets “across large plots where the land is cheaper”; also, because these 
“new, previously inexistent routes” help in sanitising the urban fabric. Sert also 
emphasised the need to define different implementation stages on the basis of the 
available resources in order not to repeat the experience of the numerous plans 
approved by the city council in the past decades, which had suffered constant 
modifications over time and had never been fully carried out. But Sert also argued that 
the Plano de Reforma was only a partial plan and that Barcelona, on the contrary, 
needed a comprehensive urban reform plan to meet the requirements of the new era 
(“machinism, new speeds, etc.”).
Sert’s letter illustrates the tension between more creative understandings of urban 
planning and the institutional approach to the matter during the Second Republic, 
which, on the other hand, is often branded as one of the most open and avant-garde 
periods in Spanish history. The outcome o f the debate around Vilaseca’s plan, and 
particularly the opening of Avenue C, reinforces the idea that there are significant 
continuities in urban planning over time, which transcend different political regimes.
Although “repeatedly brought back and forth and filtered to reduce its causticity”, as 
Duran y Sanpere wrote in October 1935, Vilaseca’s plan made its way through three
175 Ibid.
176 r u :  j
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distinctively different political regimes (not governments).177 First approved in 1930 by 
the city council under Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship and approved for a second time by 
the Republican city council in 1934, neither the fierce opposition of the residents 
affected by the transformations nor the recommendations of a renowned professional 
body in the field such as the GATCPAC were able to change the course of the plan. 
Perhaps some people thought that the outbreak of the war in 1936 would prevent its 
implementation. As it turned out, the war would simply assist the pickaxes by leaving in 
ruins a significant portion of the housing blocks that stood in the way of Avenue C. The 
rebel forces’ systematic bombing of Barcelona—especially from 1938—would have a 
strong material and moral impact on the city. As will be explained in the next section, 
the air raids were justified by the rebels with the argument that the port city was an 
important recipient of military supplies by rail (via France) and sea.
4.3. The bombings
4.3.1 Barcelona bombed
“Barcelona, bombed. The city, ripped open on its four flanks at the will of the 
tragic hazardousness of the Italian bombers, spread out over the slopes of 
Tibidabo, plain towards San Andres. Festooned by the treacherous sea, which 
does not allow for distinguishing the planes until they are within sight. The 
walls remain alone across the blue sky. A lonesome wall with windows of air in 
the air, balconies of nothingness; emptiness at the front and the back”.178
The following note was circulated among the officers at the rebels’ headquarters in 
Burgos in December 1937:
“General Headquarters o f  the Generallsimo 
Staff—Second Information Section 
Document n. 8
177 “Se avecina la realizaci6n de una nueva reforma en el nucleo antiguo de la ciudad. El proyecto ha sido 
trasegado y filtrado repetidas veces para quitarle causticidad, pero no por eso va a dejar de causar sus 
victimas entre las pobres calles y plazas comprendidas en su campo de accion, algunas veces con harto 
dolor de los ciudadanos sensibles que veran desaparecer esos rincones tan evocativos que se llaman calle 
de la Corribia, plaza Nueva o plaza del Pino.” Dur&n y Sanpere, “En Visperas De Reforma. La Plaza 
Nueva.”
178 “Barcelona bombardeada. La ciudad abierta por los cuatro costados, el azar tragico de los aviones 
italianos, esparrancada en las laderas del Tibidabo y Montjuich, liana hacia San Andres. Festoneada del 
mar traidor que no deja distinguir los aviones hasta que se avistan. Las paredes quedan solas al traves del 
cielo azul. Una pared sola con las ventanas de aire al aire, balcones de nada; vacio por delante y por 
detras.” Max Aub, Campo D e Sangre (Madrid: Santillana S.A.-Alfaguara, 1998 [1945]) 478, 80.
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Aragon Front
Deposits and Storage-rooms and other targets 
Barcelona
It is needless to underscore the importance of this garrison due to the number of 
targets of military interest to be found there such as factories, depots, official 
headquarters, military barracks, etc... Our Section is in possession of a detailed 
plan with the location of all these targets and a similar one has been forwarded 
to the Air Marshall. A great amount of material arriving from France is stored in 
this garrison and there is news that the trains departing towards the Aragon 
Front are not loaded at the train-station but at sheds numbers 2 and 7 by the 
pier.” '79
This was a sad prelude to the intense bombing campaigns on Barcelona that began on 
New Year’s Day 1938. The city was deemed an important recipient of military material 
and other essential supplies from France and the rest of Europe. The material arrived in 
the city by train or sea. There it was stored and subsequently distributed to other 
garrisons, mainly the Aragon front. It became a priority for the rebels to stop this flow. 
Even though the city had been bombed prior to 1938, it was not until then that the 
Mediterranean flank and Barcelona gained a more prominent role in the war.
The first time the bombing of Barcelona resulted in deaths was on the 13th of February 
1937, when the Italian warship Eugenio di Savoia bombed the city. The environs of the 
Elizalde factory, which made war equipment, were hit by various howitzers and 
seventeen people died. At the same time, the first Italian bombers, Savoia S-79s, were 
sent to Mallorca, and immediately used in various operations on the mainland. During 
the following months, more Savoia S-79s and now also S-81s arrived. These bombers 
were originally designed as passenger aircraft by engineer Alessandro Marchetti in
179 “ Cuartel General del Generalisimo 
Estado M ayor - Segunda Seccion Informacion 
Documento no. 8 
Frente de Aragon
Depositos v Almacenes v otros objetivos 
Plaza de Barcelona
No hace falta resaltar la importancia de esta Plaza por la cantidad de objetivos de interns militar que en 
ella existen, como fabricas, depdsitos, centros oficiales, Cuarteles, etc... En la Seccion existe un piano 
detallado con la situation de todos estos objetivos y otro igual ha sido remitido a la Jefatura del Aire. En 
esta plaza se almacena gran cantidad de material procedente de Francia y se tiene noticias que los trenes 
que salen con direction al Frente de Aragon, no se cargan en la Estacion de f.c. sino en los tinglados 2 y 7 
del muelle.” Tomo I Ejercito del Centro/Rollo microfilmado 19/Legajo 13/Carpeta 17, “Informacion Del 
Enemigo. Boletines Ejercito Del Aire. Diciembre 1937.,” (Archivo General Histdrico Militar de Madrid).
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1934, but his design was quickly and successfully adapted for military use. The
bombers were equipped with three Piaggio P.XI RC 40 engines, enabling them to reach
475 kilometres per hour and a height o f 8,500 metres. They could fly fully laden as far
as 2,000 kilometres with a load of 1,250 kilograms of bombs. In addition, the bombers
were equipped with three 12mm Breda-SAFAT machine guns and one 7.7mm Lewis
1 80gun to give them effective protection from enemy aviation.
The port and adjacent industrial and storage facilities such as the fuel and gas depots of
|  Q 1
CAMPSA became the rebel Savoias’ main targets. CAMPSA, for example, was
182repeatedly bombed, although not always successfully. Aside from these quite obvious 
military targets, the rebels claimed that part of the loyalists’ war supplies were stored in 
the basements of regular downtown residential buildings, as the note cited earlier 
indicates. Therefore, the city centre—both the old district and the Eixample—not just 
the port area, became the target of aerial strikes, especially from January 1938. In total, 
2,500 people were killed in Barcelona.183 The Italian air force rehearsed the 
martellamento diluito nel tempo tactic on the city. This simply meant that the bomb 
raids were so continuous and systematic that the alarm systems were useless. As a 
result, the population could not figure out whether the sirens sounded to alert the 
beginning or the end of an air raid, and were therefore increasingly exposed to the peril 
o f the bombings.
The bombing of civilians and residential neighbourhoods was justified militarily by the 
rebels with the argument that the Republicans hid military supplies in ordinary housing 
blocks. At the same time, there seems to exist sufficient evidence to claim that a large 
number—if not most—of the aerial attacks on downtown Barcelona aimed to cause 
more destruction and deaths among civilians than was strictly necessary to dismantle 
the Republicans’ military infrastructure and destroy their supplies. The rebels’ Italian
180 Nassaes, La A viation Legionaria En La Guerra Espanola 223.
181 CAMPSA stands for Compania Arrendataria del Monopolio de Petrdleos, Sociedad Andnima, and was 
the Spanish national energy company between 1927 and 1992, when it was dissolved under the EU anti- 
monopoly regulations. The name is still used as one o f  Repsol’s (Spanish oil company) commercial 
brands.
182 See, for example, a confidential note from Cuerpo Ejercito Urgel (Urgel military corps) to the General 
Jefe del Ejercito del Norte (Northern Army Chief-General) informing about the semi-successful bombing 
o f  the CAMPSA depots in June 1938 when the fuel depots were destroyed, but not those filled with 
petrol. In Tomo I Ejercito del Norte/Rollo microfilmado 20/Legajo 15/Carpeta 19, “Informe Del 
Enemigo. Bombardeos Enemigos. Diciembre 1938.,” (Archivo General Historico Militar de Madrid).
183 Sole i Sabate and Villarroya i Font, Catalunya S o taL es Bombes (1936-1939) 234, 35.
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supporters were enthusiastic believers in the demoralising effects of bombing raids on 
civilian populations. And there was also possibly the urge to punish fervently resistant 
civilians. In the end, the resilience of key cities such as Barcelona and Madrid seriously 
obstructed an earlier victory by Franco. It is therefore suggested that the aim of 
demoralising and punishing the population was more prominent in the rebels’ air war 
strategy than any strictly military goal. Moreover, Barcelona, unlike Madrid, was never 
on the front line. This reinforces the idea that the systematic and intense bombing of 
downtown residential areas was not a means to move forward the front line, nor 
exclusively a way to crack down on the Republican wartime supply chain, but primarily 
a means to demoralise Barcelonans, forcing them to put pressure on the Republican 
leadership.
While Mussolini’s view on Aviazione Legionaria’s role in the Spanish Civil War 
perhaps emerges from his aggressive declaration in March 1938 about razing Barcelona 
to the ground, the rebels’ position appears more ambivalent. Numerous foreign and 
international committees reported on the bombing of civilian populations in Spanish 
cities throughout the war. These reports were most of the time ignored and did not 
produce any practical outcome: the bombing raids on rearguard cities simply continued. 
However, occasionally, the rebels showed some concern for the image they were 
projecting to the international community. In early 1938, for example, a British 
Investigation Committee reported that one of the bombing raids carried out on 
Barcelona on the 1st of January had deliberately targeted civilian constructions. The 
British allegation was apparently taken seriously by the rebels, who tried to obtain 
information internally from the staff involved in that specific air strike with which to 
prove that the civilian constructions had not been intentionally hit. The night raid had 
been carried out by a squadron at 6:15 in the evening, and the alleged targets had been 
the pier and adjacent facilities. However, the chief of the squadron admitted that, “due 
to diminished visibility and the height from which the bombs were dropped, some of 
the bombs might have fallen outside the port area”. In the same report, his superior, the 
Jefe de la Region Aerea de Baleares (Chief of the Aerial Region of the Balears), 
acknowledged that the potential strikes on civilian constructions was a “sensitive issue”,
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but argued that this was almost “inevitable when the targets are located as close to the 
city as in this case”.184
The rebels’ apparently ambiguous position perhaps resulted from how the raids 
operated in practice. They were mainly carried out by Italian and German bombers, 
flown by Italian, German and Spanish pilots, but it is not entirely clear how the chain of 
command linking the Italian Aviazione Legionaria, the German Luftwaffe and the 
Nacionales’ troops worked. Sometimes it is argued that the German and Italian air force 
had considerable freedom of manoeuvre, others contend that Franco and the rebel 
generals had to authorise the attacks, and yet others argue that it was precisely this 
apparent confusion about who was ultimately behind the raids that allowed the rebels to 
benefit from the results of the strikes, while blaming the foreign military forces 
whenever the popular or international reaction against the bombings was exceptionally 
negative.
4.3.2 The construction o f anti-air-raid shelters
Most Spanish cities that underwent regular aerial attacks during the Civil War soon 
organised passive defence boards to address the immediate consequences of the 
destruction and organise preventive tasks such as the construction of air-raid shelters, 
the protection of monuments, and the erection of supporting structures for damaged 
buildings that risked collapsing. The municipal authorities began to alert Barcelonans of 
the threat of aerial attacks well before the rebels started their systematic raids. As early 
as September 1936, the Servicio de Defensa Pasiva (Passive Defence Service) was 
created to this end. On the 9th of June 1937—as the aerial strikes became more 
frequent—the Catalan autonomous government created the Junta de Defensa Pasiva de 
Catalunya (Catalonia Passive Defence Board), a regional board that coordinated all the 
local passive defence boards in Catalonia.185
184 “Segun informes del Jefe de la escuadrilla, gran parte de las bombas cayeron en el puerto, si bien se 
considera posible que debido a la dispersion natural de las bombas, a la altura a que se estaban llevando a 
cabo el servicio y a las malas condiciones de visibilidad, por ser de noche, cayeran algunas en zona no 
portuaria, cosa aunque sensible, inevitable cuando se trata, como en este caso, de objetivos tan proximos 
al casco urbano.” Tomo I Ejercito del Norte/Rollo microfilmado 20/Legajo 15/Carpeta45, “Informacion 
Bombardeos Nacionales. Enero 1939.,” (Archivo General Historico Militar de Madrid).
185 Andreu Besoli Martin, “Los Refugios Antiaereos De Barcelona: Pasado Y Presente De Un Patrimonio 
Arcano,” Ebre 38: revista internacional de la Guerra Civil, 1936-1939, no. 2 (2004): 183, 84.
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The efforts of the Junta de Defensa Pasiva de Barcelona (Barcelona Passive Defence 
Board) are particularly well documented and there has recently been significant interest 
in detailing the construction of the approximately 1,400 shelters that existed in the city 
at the end of the war. Most of these, around 1,300, were built throughout the conflict by 
residents and volunteers organised by residents’ associations, trade unions and political 
parties. Thus, the extensive infrastructure of shelters was mainly constructed by 
volunteers, and their work is often portrayed as an example of the strong sense of 
community and solidarity that emerged in Barcelona (and other Spanish cities) after the 
outbreak of the war. Moreover, as most men were sent off to the front, the works 
mainly relied on the voluntary labour of women, children and the elderly.
Most shelters were not built from scratch, however. Basements and underground 
stations were turned into refuges, and any existing subterranean hollow space could 
potentially be adapted for the same purpose. Institutions, private companies and urban 
estate owners wrote to the municipal authorities offering their buildings as public air­
raid shelters, or asking for permission to accommodate shelters for their own workers or 
tenants.186 A specifically created body, the Agrupacio Col-lectiva de la Construccio de 
Barcelona (Barcelona Collective Construction Group), became responsible for 
coordinating the various municipal branches and other services involved in the 
inspection o f potential refuges, delivery of construction materials, and employment of 
workers for the construction of about one hundred public shelters. The latter were larger 
and better equipped installations for general public use and built by non-voluntary 
workers.
Soon it became compulsory for residents to notify the authorities of any existing 
basements in their buildings. This was part o f the requisition policy practised in 
wartime, revolutionary Barcelona. The Ritz Hotel, for example, was requisitioned and
186 For example, in November 1936, the General Consul o f  France offered to use the Consulate’s building 
on Plaza Cataluna as a public air-raid shelter. In December, the director o f  the French company, Societe 
Laniere Barcelonaise requested municipal permission to use one o f  its factory buildings as a shelter, and 
i f  the building proved unsuitable for this, to construct a new one. Junta Local de Defensa Pasiva M- 
101/1936-1959/Caixa 50764, “3.2 Solicituts De Ciutadans I Institucions,” (Arxiu Municipal 
Administratiu de Barcelona).
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transformed into a public canteen, which became very popular— perhaps
187unsurprisingly— while its basement was converted into a public refuge.
Fig. 4.10 Views o f  the anti-air raid shelter under Plapa del Diamant, now open to the public (adapted 
from the web).
The building o f shelters was most intense during the spring and summer o f 1937. As the 
war progressed, the Agrupacio was increasingly unable to provide the voluntary teams 
with construction materials. The war made it difficult to renew the municipal stocks 
even if  the debris caused by the bombings was recycled and reused as construction 
material. The available stocks were carefully rationed among paid workers and 
voluntary teams. From July 1938, the paid teams had to submit weekly reports detailing 
the progress o f the works, possibly also as a means to control their adequate use o f  the 
materials. The reports reveal that some o f the building works were interrupted for 
weeks because the local authorities could not pay the workers. Some o f the shelters 
were never finished before the rebels took over the city at the end o f  January 1939.188
Each shelter was guarded by several individuals, usually residents in the area, who 
worked in shifts. If there was an alarm, the guard on duty had to “quickly, but calm ly” 
open the doors to the shelter, light the oil lamps, and let people in in an “orderly 
way” .189 During the intense bombing campaigns o f  1938, the alarms went o ff almost
187 There is a letter dated 23 February 1937 from the Committee o f the Federacion Obrera de los 
Sindicatos de la Industria Gatronomica (Gastronomic Industry Labour Unions’ Federation) claiming that 
the windows o f the basement o f the hotel should be protected according to the passive defence 
regulations in order for the basement to function as a public shelter. Ibid.
188 Junta Local de Defensa Pasiva M -101/1936-1959/Caixa 50764, “3.3.5 Nota Setmanal Dels 
Treballadors Ocupats En Les Obres De Construccio De Refugis (1938-1939),” (Arxiu Municipal 
Administratiu de Barcelona).
189 These detailed instructions can be found in a leaflet dated 21 November 1936 that was probably 
distributed among the guards and possibly also the population. Junta Local de Defensa Pasiva M-
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daily, but were not always followed by an actual bomb-raid. Sometimes, on the other 
hand, they were triggered with little notice, people barely making it to the refuges 
before the raid began. One of the reasons for the short notice was that the Italian 
bombers sometimes accessed the main land a few kilometres south of Barcelona, 
approaching the city from the mountains. This made it more difficult to catch sight of 
the planes and use the anti-aircraft batteries against them because it meant shooting at 
the planes over the city instead of the sea.190
With the advent of aerial warfare, the levels of danger faced at the rearguard and the 
front became increasingly similar. On the battlefield, each man took essentially care of 
himself, whereas women at the rearguard had to watch over children and the elderly, 
making sure everybody made it to the closest shelter at the sound of the alarm, not to 
mention the often hard, physical work involved in building the shelters.
4.3.3 Destruction in the Barri de la Catedral
During the intense bombing campaigns that followed the raids on the 1st o f January 
1938, the Barri de la Catedral was hit on at least three occasions. The bombing raids on 
the 30th of January, 12th of November and 23rd of November 1938 resulted in an 
unknown number of victims191 and diverse damage to the buildings and streets in the 
area comprising the blocks opposite the Cathedral and around Plafa Nova/Plaza Nueva. 
The bombing on the 19th of August 1938, when one of the Cathedral domes was hit, but 
not irreparably damaged, should probably also be included in this account.
On the 30th of January 1938, the alarms went off at 9:01 a.m., going silent again about 
an hour later, at 10:11 a.m. At 11:22 a.m., they went off again for another hour, until
1 0912:25 p.m. Barcelonans were in suspense for two hours, and yet, according to Count 
Ciano, Mussolini’s son-in-law and foreign minister as well as chief of the Italian
101/1936-1959/Caixa 50764, “3.5.1 Instructions Personal De Vigilancia,” (Arxiu Municipal 
Administratiu de Barcelona).
190 Besoli Martin, “Los Refugios Antiaereos De Barcelona: Pasado Y Presente De Un Patrimonio 
Arcano,” 184.
191 The information available suggests that there were only reports o f  the total number o f  victims caused 
by each bombing raid; they didn’t distinguish where exactly in the city each victim was killed. 
Consequently, it is not possible to give an exact figure for the people who died in the area in front o f  the 
Cathedral.
192 Junta Local de Defensa Pasiva M -l01/1936-1959/Caixa 50763, “2.4 Relacio De Bombardejos 
26/12/1936 a 25/1/1939,” (Arxiu Municipal Administratiu de Barcelona).
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Aviazione Legionaria in Spain, only nine bom bers participated in the raids that day.
The raids themselves did not last more than one and a half minutes in total.
Fig. 4.11 Impact o f  the bombing raids o f  3(fh January 1938 (Arxiu Municipal Administratiu de 
Barcelona).
This was apparently sufficient for the rebel aircraft to drop 44 bombs, killing 210 
people and wounding 125.194 A third o f the victim s were children in the infant school 
San Felipe Neri, not very far from Pla9a N ova.195 A total o f 87 buildings were hit, out 
o f  which 21 were com pletely destroyed, 26 were partially destroyed and 40 suffered 
m inor damage. The bombs fell in the port, on Barceloneta— the maritime 
neighbourhood— the old district and the E ixam ple.196 Several houses in the Barri de la 
Catedral were affected.197 On 10 Palla/Paja, for example, there was an air-raid shelter in 
the basement where a large group o f people had sought refuge. A num ber o f them were
I Oft
killed as the house partly collapsed.
193 Villarroya i Font, Els Bombardeigs De Barcelona Durant La Guerra Civil (1936-1939) 53.
194 Junta Local de Defensa Pasiva M -101/1936-1959/Caixa 50763, “2.4 Relacio De Bombardejos 
26/12/1936 a 25/1/1939.”
195 Sole i Sabate and Villarroya, Espaha En Llamas: La Guerra Civil Desde El Aire 152.
196 Junta Local de Defensa Pasiva M -101/1936-1959/Caixa 50763, “2.4 Relacio De Bombardejos 
26/12/1936 a 25/1/1939.”
,97 Junta Local de Defensa Pasiva/M -101 /1936-1959/Caixa 50763, “2.1 Relacio De Finques Afectades 
Per Bombardejos Del 13 De Febrer De 1937 a 28 D ’agost De 1938,” (Arxiu Municipal Administratiu de 
Barcelona).
198 Sole i Sabate and Villarroya, Espaha En Llamas: La Guerra Civil Desde El Aire 153.
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The bombing raids on the 30th of January 1938 were the most serious attacks suffered 
by Barcelona throughout the war, aside from the exceptionally harsh raids that took 
place in March the same year under the direct and explicit orders of Mussolini. Scholars 
like Villarroya argue that the 30th of January bombings were a response to the 
Republicans’ attacks on rebel cities in the previous days, but also to their subsequent 
attempt to negotiate a halting of the bombings on rear-guard locations.199 The 
Republican National Defence Minister explained in a note made public on the 29th of 
January that the Republican army had been forced to respond to the rebels’ persistent 
aerial strikes on innocent civilians by bombing Salamanca, Valladolid and Sevilla. 
However, he claimed, this was not in line with the principles of war the Republicans 
wished to follow, and he aimed to negotiate an agreement with the rebel military by 
which both sides would abstain from bombing rearguard civilian positions in the future. 
By attacking Barcelona with redoubled intensity on the very day after the publication of 
the Defence Minister’s note, Franco’s supporters made clear that they had no intention 
of changing their strategy. Any hope among civilians on both sides that there would 
soon be an end to the constant threat of enemy aerial attacks vanished.
The bombing raids in November 1938 were not as bloody as the ones in January, but 
nevertheless caused significant destruction.200 Several houses on Boters and Palla/Paja 
were hit on the 12th of November.201 One of the houses on Boters was so badly 
damaged that it was immediately pulled down by fire-fighters.202 On the 23rd of 
November, the alarms went off in the morning at 10:45 a.m. and continued for almost 
an hour, until 11:50 a.m.203 The raid affected several houses in the northern section of 
the Barri de la Catedral, sometimes for the second time.204 There were another three 
alarms throughout that day. None of the accompanying raids damaged the Barri de la 
Cateral and its environs, however.205
199 Villarroya i Font, Els Bombardeigs D e Barcelona Durant La Guerra Civil (1936-1939) 47, 49.
200 Sole i Sabate and Villarroya, Espaha En Llamas: La Guerra Civil D esde El Aire 222.
201 Junta Local de Defensa Pasiva M -l 01/1936-1959/ Caixa 50763, “2.3.1 Relacio De Bombardejos Del 4 
De Setembre 1938 a 16 De Gener 1939,” (Arxiu Municipal Administratiu de Barcelona).
202 Villarroya i Font, Els Bombardeigs D e Barcelona Durant La Guerra Civil (1936-1939) 68.
203 Junta Local de Defensa Pasiva M -l 01/1936-1959/Caixa 50763, “2.2 Relacio De Bombardejos Segons 
El Dietari Del Cos De Bombers 13 De Febrer 1937 a 25 De Gener 1939,” (Arxiu Municipal 
Administratiu de Barcelona).
204 Junta Local de Defensa Pasiva M -101/1936-1959/Caixa 50763, “2.5 Ubicacio Impactes D els 
Bombardeigs Del 23 De Novembre De 1938.,” (Arxiu Municipal Administratiu de Barcelona).
205 Junta Local de Defensa Pasiva/M -101/1936-1959/Caixa 50763, “2.1 Relacio De Finques Afectades 
Per Bombardejos Del 13 De Febrer De 1937 a 28 D ’agost De 1938.”
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Fig. 4.12 Impact o f  the air raids o f23rd November 1938 (Arxiu M unicipal Administratiu de Barcelona).
One o f  the bombs dropped on the 19th o f  August 1938 struck one o f  the cupolas o f the 
Cathedral, the Santa Eulalia dome, which protects the tomb o f  Santa Eulalia, 
B arcelona’s patron saint.206 Initially, the Republican press used the event to underscore 
the aggressors’ insensitivity. How could the rebels, who portrayed themselves as 
Catholic crusaders, the most Catholic o f Catholics, destroy the tomb o f  Santa Eulalia? 
Potentially, the damage to the Cathedral was a unique opportunity for the Republicans 
to launch some effective anti-rebel propaganda. However, according to the individuals 
who actually inspected the site after the attack, even though the dome had collapsed and 
severely damaged the interior o f  the temple, the tomb itself was intact and nothing was 
irreparably destroyed.207
Nonetheless, the picture o f  the collapsed Santa Eulalia dom e circulated in the local 
press, contributing to the imaginary o f  a ruined Barcelona. Between the first and the last 
o f  the three raids that affected the Cathedral neighbourhood a whole year went by. 
M any residents abandoned the area as soon as they had the opportunity, especially after 
the devastating bombings o f the 30th o f January 1938. Mrs Assum pcio Planelles, 96, is 
an example. Today, 70 years later, she sits in the same living room on number 33
206 Ibid.
207 For a more detailed discussion on this event, see Villarroya i Font, Els Bombardeigs De Barcelona 
Durant La Guerra Civil (1936-1939) 63, 65.
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Palla/Paja from where she and her family heard the recurrent whining sound of the 
alarms, and once saw a bomb pass through the floors of the building opposite to theirs. 
Even though she cannot recall on what date that particular bomb fell, she remembers 
the fatal winter morning of the 30th of January 1938 very well. In particular, she recalls 
how her father and other neighbours went to the nearby school Sant Felipe Neri after 
the air strike to assist the children who were injured and bury the dead. After that, her 
father decided that the whole family should leave the neighbourhood and move to a 
village in the countryside until the attacks were over.208
Other residents, possibly the more modest ones, were less lucky and had to stay. The 
usually lively Barri de la Catedral, now suddenly sparsely populated, must have had a 
strange appearance, almost daunting at times, like that o f a ghost city or a cemetery of 
half-ruined houses. As journalist Sempronio suggests when speaking of the old Jewish 
neighbourhood, south of the Cathedral,
“life has deserted [this place]. The ruins have transcended the dramatic stage of 
the day after the bombings; no screams of pain, no exclamations of indignation; 
they are frozen now [imbued by] the quietness of perfect things.”209
To our unusual flaneur, the ruins might certainly have appeared as exemplars of quiet 
perfection, as powerful expressions of the vanity of life and the precariousness of a 
man-made world. He might have been struck by the pungent contrast between the latent 
threat of new instances of pain and destruction and the quietness of places which had 
already suffered the impact of the bombs and simply could not die again. For the empty 
and half-ruined buildings, another bomb, two, three or ten more bombs could hardly be 
compared to the first strike. It was the first bomb that suddenly turned the buildings’ 
safe, cosy interiors into potential traps, forcing their occupants to leave and seek less 
dangerous dwellings. Human life fled from the bombed buildings and their suddenly 
menacing structures: loose stones, columns, beams and tiles had been turned into deadly 
weapons. At the feet of these devastated edifices, however, life took other shapes, 
reminding our wanderer of the invincible forces of nature. In Sempronio’s walks across
208 Based on an informal conversation with Mrs Assumpcio Planelles on 11 March 2007 at her home on 
Palla/Paja 33.
209 “[...] n ’ha desertat la vida. Aquestes ruines han superat ja 1’etapa dram£tica de I’endema del 
bombardeig; ni crits de dolor, ni clams indignats; ara estan ja g r a d e s  en la serenitat de les coses 
perfectes.” Andreu A vellis  Artis “Sempronio”, L 'accent D e Barcelona  (Barcelona: Edicions 62 ,1985)  
48.
135
the war-torn old city, he finally arrived at the Cathedral and Pla?a Nova/Plaza Nueva, 
where he observed the following:
“Around the ancient temples, the Cathedral and Santa Anna, at the feet of the 
towers on Pla?a Nova, grass has grown in the crevices between the pavement 
stones after a few months of no human foot stepping on them. The chaotic 
forces that push from underneath the city take advantage of the smallest crack to 
surface, in the shape of a grass-straw, just skin-deep.”210 
Sempronio’s observation could also be interpreted as a metaphor for the will of 
survival. On the 26th of January 1939, Franco’s troops entered Barcelona. Two months 
later the war ended. For many Barcelonans, the imminent seizure of the city meant that 
they had to leave for an uncertain exile. For many of those who had sought refuge in the 
countryside during the conflict, on the other hand, the arrival of the Nacionales in 
Barcelona meant that the bombing ceased and they could return to the city. Peace did 
not immediately lead to prosperity. Everything was scarce, rationed and some families 
had lost their homes because of the bombings. While ordinary Barcelonans struggled to 
resume their daily living, the new city council appointed by the Nacionales began to 
work on a reconstruction plan and sought the means to fund it in the face of the 
destruction caused by their own military forces.
2,0 “Al voltant dels temples antics, de la Catedral i de Santa Anna, al peu de les torres de la Plafa Nova, 
l’herba ha crescut a les juntures de les llambordes, al cap d’uns mesos de no haver-se posat al seu damunt 
la petja humana. Les forces caotiques empenyen sota la ciutat, el seu mes petit oblit per a sortit-Ii, en 
forma d’herba, a flor de pell.” Ibid. 76.
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Part II
2114.1 Funding the reconstruction of Barcelona
4.1.1 The extraordinary budget
The three-year-long conflict, including the extensive construction of air-raid shelters, 
left the municipal treasury in bad shape. In October 1939, while overtly—and possibly 
contemptuously—blaming the preceding “Marxist” administration for the lack of 
resources, the new Barcelona city council approved an extraordinary budget for the 
reconstruction, urbanisation and improvement of the areas devastated by the war. The 
Presupuesto Extraordinario para la Reconstruccion del Patrimonio Municipal 
Perjudicado por la Guerra y  Nueva Urbanizacion y  Mejora de las Zonas Devastadas 
en la Ciudad was not extraordinary in that most Spanish cities passed this kind of 
special budget immediately after the war. The budget received the central government’s 
authorisation at the end of February 1940. The city council aimed to cover the 
exceptionally costly clearing and building works it had to face as a direct result of the 
conflict, and more specifically the aerial bombing. At the same time, the opportunity 
was taken to address some pending projects and improvements in the affected areas. 
Reconstruction and redevelopment projects were sometimes indistinguishable as in the 
case of the opening of the transversal avenue, Avenue C, between Via Layetana and 
Plaza Nueva, in an area that had suffered particularly badly from the bombings. The 
project was one of the city council’s priorities in the old district and was seen as part of 
the pending inner-city reform. Once the budget had received the various mandatory 
authorisations, the city council had to find its own way to fund the works. Three 
possibilities for obtaining financial backing were explored: state subsidies, state loans 
and private loans.
4.1.2 State subsidies
In November 1939 the president of Barcelona city council and alcalde accidental 
(provisional mayor), Jose Bonet del Rio, began the negotiation of a state subsidy to 
cover the cost of the reconstruction works. First, he addressed the Director of the 
Servicio General de Regiones Devastadas y  Reparaciones (Devastated Areas General
2,1 This section— which addresses funding— is based on the documents contained in: Gestion 
Urbanistica/Expediente 1972 (Areas devastadas)/Ano 1939, “Expediente Relativo Al Presupuesto 
Extraordinario Para La Reconstruccion Del Patrimonio Municipal Danado Por La Guerra, Y Nueva 
Urbanizacion Y Mejora De Las Zonas Devastadas De La Ciudad.,” (Arxiu Municipal Administratiu de 
Barcelona).
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Service) requesting the restitution of the city council for the damages caused by the war 
to the municipal infrastructure. Second, he wrote to the Director of the Instituto de 
Credito para la Reconstruccion Nacional (National Reconstruction Credit Institute) 
reporting that Barcelona city council had approved an extraordinary budget for the 
reconstruction of the city, which needed the Instituto de Credito’s financial assistance in 
the form of a subsidy and/or a loan. The letter was accompanied by abundant 
explanatory documentation, according to which the total cost of the projects was 
29,978,970 pesetas (excluding the cost of the expropriations that several of the projects 
involved). The 29,978,970 pesetas were broken down into two amounts: one for 
basic tidying-up and clearing tasks and the other, larger, sum for redevelopment 
projects. The provisional mayor requested that the 6,210,000 pesetas allocated to 
cleaning-up and repairing streets and other public spaces, including the sealing of 
refuges, should be fully subsidised by the state. To justify such a claim, Bonet del Rio 
referred to Franco’s “adoption law”. On the 23rd of September 1939, Franco’s 
government had passed a decree according to which the Caudillo was committed to 
adopt those towns and villages that had been particularly damaged during the war. In 
these cases, the state would fully sponsor reconstruction. But article 10 in the decree 
also determined that:
“Without attaining the full condition of adoption, the state may determine to 
financially assist a municipality, following a resolution of the Council of 
Ministers, when the damage caused to the buildings of the municipality is
71 ^extraordinary in relation to [the municipality’s] economic capacity.” 
Barcelona city council aimed to be considered under this specific article. To 
complement and underscore Bonet del Rfo’s request, a few weeks later, the mayor- 
president of the city council, Miguel Mateu y Pla, addressed the Minister of 
Government exposing the delicate situation of the city and the urgency of its 
reconstruction. Mateu y Pla contended that some of the districts of Barcelona could 
actually be viewed as separate, smaller, units, comparable in most aspects to any of the 
devastated small towns or villages that were contemplated by the “adoption law”.
2,2 As a reference with which to compare the figures in this chapter it may be worth considering Spain’s 
total budget during these years. In 1943, for example, the ordinary budget was 9.5 billion pesetas together 
with an additional extraordinary budget o f  4.2 billion pesetas. Although the ordinary budget increased 
slightly in 1944 and 1945, the extraordinary budget decreased substantially (to 2.6 billion pesetas in 
1945). See Resumen general de los Presupuestos del Estado. Ejercicios economicos de 1943, 1944 y  
1945 at http://www.ine.es/inebaseweb/search.do?os=25. accessed on 28 January 2009.
213 Ministerio de la Gobemacion, “Decreto Regulando La Adoption Por El Jefe De Estado De 
Localidades Dafiadas Por La Guerra En Determinadas Condiciones,” Art. 10.
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Eventually, it seems, the mayors’ negotiations bore fruit. On the 15th of December, 
Franco’s government issued a decree which recognised the right of Barcelona city 
council to receive the special treatment foreseen by article 10, granting it 6,200,000 
pesetas to clean up the city.
4.1.3 State loans
As for the larger sum of 23,778,970 pesetas for redevelopment projects, Bonet del Rio 
had asked if this sum could be granted by the Instituto de Credito as a loan at low 
interest rates and convenient mortgage conditions. A formal loan proposal was prepared 
and submitted to the Instituto. Among other things, it was suggested that the city 
council’s guarantee for the loan could be, on the one hand, the revenues from the sale of 
municipal ground plots, and, on the other, the income from a special tax applied to 
residents of the devastated areas in indirect payment for the improvements resulting 
from the reconstruction works. The Instituto granted the loan in March 1940 under 
several conditions, among them that the money was only to be spent on the repair of 
areas damaged by the war, excluding projects Co-funded by other public entities, and 
the Instituto would only make payments retrospectively, once the works were finished 
and officially recognised as such. Furthermore, the sole acceptable guarantee for the 
loan were the lands that the city council would gradually acquire as it carried out the 
works (through expropriations) and the public services it might set up on the plots.
These conditions differed from the ones proposed by the city council, especially as 
regards the guarantee for the loan. Apparently, the Instituto preferred the guarantee of 
fixed assets over the monetary revenues from sales and taxes, which the city council 
had suggested. Moreover, it seems as if the Instituto was determined to exert firm 
control over the projects it financed, not leaving much room for public funding 
deviation— on paper at least. The administrative process by which the details of the loan 
were agreed and each document received the mandatory endorsements was fairly long 
and tedious. Several state departments, branches, sections and so on were involved, and 
the state loan did not become effective until August 1941.
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4.1.4 Private loans
Parallel to the above process, the negotiation of a loan with Banco de Espana, the 
national bank, got under way. In January 1940, Mateu y Pla formally asked the 
governor of Banco de Espana for a loan of 48 million pesetas, carefully explaining the 
city council’s precarious economic situation and its need for additional funding to 
support the various urban redevelopment projects. The mayor offered Banco de Espana 
a different kind of guarantee for the loan based on the revenues from a particular 
municipal tax, which land and factory owners had to pay in municipalities with 
exceptionally high unemployment rates. Barcelona city council had recently been 
granted such fiscal privilege by the central government for the twelve years to come, 
beginning in January 1940, and Mateu y Pla was confident that the additional income 
would allow the city council to return the loan, including interests, while carrying out 
the projected reconstruction works. A long series of bureaucratic procedures and 
exchanges, similar to the ones described earlier, commenced, and in the process, the 
loan was increased to 50 million pesetas.
It has been argued that Banco de Espana’s immediate willingness to back the 
reconstruction works in Barcelona was partly motivated by the bank’s vested interest in 
the opening of Avenue C. As it happened, Banco de Espana’s new headquarters in 
Barcelona were built between 1930 and 1939 on the north-western comer of plaza 
Antonio Maura, almost opposite the Cathedral.214
4.1.5 Urban estate owners complain
The Camara Oficial de la Propiedad Urbana de Barcelona, Barcelona Urban Property 
Official Chamber, formally expressed its disagreement with the expropriations and 
supplementary property taxes proposed by the city council as a means of funding 
reconstruction. President Juan A. Mas Yebra and secretary Carlos Cardelus addressed a 
written complaint in November 1939 where they demanded that the extraordinary 
budget only include reparation and reconstruction works, excluding any other works for 
which the city council would be forced to collect supplementary taxes. Mas Yebra and 
Cardelus had in mind the proposed new tax for residents o f devastated neighbourhoods 
benefiting from urban improvements. They argued that Barcelonans were already
214 See Aliberch, “Reforma Interior En Barcelona. Prosigue La Avenida De La Catedral.”
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paying significant amounts in taxes, especially considering their struggle to overcome 
the shortages caused by the war. Moreover, they claimed, the demolition of low-rent 
dwellings, which several of the budgeted projects involved, would suddenly leave 
hundreds, maybe thousands, of small traders and citizens of more modest means in the 
street. In their view, the immediate post-war period was clearly not the right moment 
for embarking on ambitious redevelopment projects such as the opening of Avenue C.
The city council responded that the redevelopment projects affected the neighbourhoods 
that had been most damaged by the war and were therefore fully justifiable. Moreover, 
it was argued that the circumstances were unusually good for carrying out 
expropriations since many of the buildings affected by the projects had been destroyed 
during the war and were often already deserted. The Camara’s demand to revise the 
extraordinary budget was rejected, but Mas Yebra and Cardelus had already prepared 
an administrative appeal (recurso de alzada), which circulated as a twenty-page, 
pamphlet-like publication summarising their concerns.215 Essentially, they maintained, 
the application of the urban improvement tax and the supplementary unemployment tax 
meant that the most substantial part of the budget for the reconstruction o f Barcelona 
(48 million out of 71 million, according to their figures) would come from the pockets 
of real estate owners. Once again, they complained, the city council was fundamentally 
relying on private property to meet its ends. Nothing new, they declared in a slightly 
dramatic tone, pointing to the spirit of “animosity against private property” that had 
permeated the different city councils for the past 25 years, thus implying that, in this 
respect, there existed little difference between the city councils under Primo de Rivera, 
the Second Republic and now Franco.
4.2 Reconstruction and redevelopment in the Barri de la Catedral
4.2.1 Clearing the area
During the conflict, the Junta de Defensa Pasiva removed part of the rubble resulting 
from the bombings, but it was not until after the war that more systematic clearing 
initiatives could take place. Debris was carried away, dumped or recycled, damaged 
facades were supported, and buildings threatening to collapse were pulled down. Most
215 See C&mara Oficial de la Propiedad Urbana de Barcelona, “Recurso De Alzada (Redactado Por La 
Comision Especial Nombrada) Contra Ordenanza Del Impuesto De Mejoras Formulado Por El 
Ayuntamiento De Barcelona Para Que Rijan En El Presupuesto Extraordinario De Reconstruccion Y 
Nueva Urbanizacion Y Mejora De Las Zonas Devastadas Por La Guerra,” (1940).
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of these clearing works took place between April and July 1939. Private contractors
216were hired and paid by assignment, usually under 1,000 pesetas for each job.
As explained earlier, the housing blocks facing Plaza Nueva and the Cathedral had been 
hit on at least three occasions during the war (30th of January, and 12th and 23rd of 
November 1938). Number 15 on Corribia, which hosted the association of bar and 
tavern owners, for example, was in particularly bad shape at the end of the war. In 
October 1939, the Negociado de Reconstruccion (Municipal Reconstruction 
Department) reported that the upper part o f the facade was in “a state of imminent 
ruin”, which made it “most pertinent to order either its demolition or consolidation”, 
and to inspect the remainder of the building to ensure that no other parts were at risk. A 
protective fence around the building was also recommended.217
Several other buildings in the area were ruined. But a municipal regulation established 
that house owners in areas encompassed by the reconstruction plans were not allowed 
to carry out works “leading to [the] permanent consolidation [of their houses] and 
inappropriately delaying the completion of the planned improvements”. In other words, 
since the buildings would be realigned or expropriated sooner or later as part of the 
reconstruction and redevelopment plans, it was argued they should remain untouched, 
and definitely not rebuilt if they had been totally destroyed by the bombs. The logic was 
that if reparations were made to the buildings, the projected reconstruction works would 
be slowed down, partly because the reparations potentially increased the value of the 
buildings, forcing the city council to pay larger indemnification sums.
In the eyes of some officials, the measure seemed excessively restrictive. The Ponencia 
de Reconstruccion (Reconstruction Assembly Committee) prepared a plea arguing that 
owners of buildings that were not going to be realigned or expropriated immediately 
should have the right to repair them provisionally, making them habitable. To neutralise 
the argument that improvements would increase the value of the buildings, they
216 Actuacion Patrimonial/Caja 46143/Expediente 6195/Ano 1939, “Cases Afectades Per La Guerra 
(Cuentas De Derribos Y Descombros),” (Arxiu Municipal Administratiu de Barcelona).
217 Junta Local de Defensa Pasiva M -l01/1936-1959/Caixa 50764, “Nota SobreDerriboDelN° 15 Calle 
Corribia, 19 Octubre 1939,” (Arxiu Municipal Administratiu de Barcelona).
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suggested that the potential value increase resulting from reparations should not be
218included later in the indemnification price paid to the owners.
Expropriations became a prominent issue after the war in most Spanish cities, but 
Barcelona’s mayor Mateu y Pla showed unusual interest in the matter. As early as June
1939, he began to lobby in support of more straightforward regulations for forced 
expropriations, partly as a means to speed up the rhythm of reconstruction. Essentially, 
he argued, the public administration aimed at the common good, and should therefore 
follow different legal procedures than those provided for private citizens. Mateu y Pla’s 
ideas seemingly coincided with those of the regime, and a few months later, in October
1940, a law for urgent expropriations was passed by the government. The law 
established that the Council of Ministers should determine whether a particular 
expropriation was urgent or not. The Council of Ministers was expected to ensure that 
private property rights were respected. On paper, the law seemed committed to both 
speeding up the expropriation procedures and protecting owners and tenants. The fact 
that the Council of Ministers had to determine the urgency of expropriations, on the 
other hand, did not seem to make the process particularly effective, and was more likely 
aimed at reinforcing the central government’s supervision of local administrations’ 
activities.
In spite of the state law and the various municipal regulations, years passed and many 
tenants of expropriated buildings refused to abandon their dwellings, forcing Barcelona 
city council to devise new measures ensuring that the occupants of the expropriated 
buildings left before the pickaxe team arrived on site to undertake the demolition. Some 
of these measures— like directly charging defiant occupants for water, electricity and
9 I Q
other utilities— seem surprisingly bland in the repressive context of the dictatorship.
2,8 Gestion Urbanistica/Caja/Expediente 68/Ano 1939, “Reparacio Cases,” (Arxiu Municipal 
Administratiu de Barcelona).
219 Gestion Urbanistica 2-D-3/15709/Ano 1941, “Expediente [320] Relativo a Una Proposicion 
Acordando Que Se Requiera a Los Municipios De Las Fincas Expropiadas Con Motivo De Los Proyectos 
Contenidos En El Presupuesto Extraordinario De Reconstruccion Para Que Dentro De Tres M eses a 
Contar De Dicho Requerimiento Procedan a Desocupo De Las Expresadas Viviendas,” (Arxiu Municipal 
Administratiu de Barcelona).
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Fig. 4.13 View o f  Corribia street from the Cathedral entrance before the war. Anonymous photograph (Arxiu 
Historic de la Ciutat, Arxiu Fotografic).
Fig. 4.14 Same view o f  Corribia street after the war with damagedfacades and hollow interior. Anonymous 
photograph (Arxiu Historic de la Ciutat, Arxiu Fotografic).
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4.2.2 The works on Avenida de la Catedral220
A small but sym bolically significant event took place in M ay 1939, blessing in its own 
way the com m encem ent o f the reconstruction and redevelopm ent works in the Barri de 
la Catedral. A pious lady had donated a “beautiful image o f  San Roque to replace the 
one which the red barbarism [sic] had destroyed on Plaza N ueva” .221 (The image was 
probably removed during the anti-religious outbursts in the months preceding the war or 
during the conflict itself.) The residents o f the square, the bishop and the local 
authorities met to discuss the necessary arrangements for the transfer o f  the patron saint 
“to the little chapel in which it ha[d] been venerated since olden tim es” .222 Bearing in 
mind Duran y Sanpere’s observation that the saint’s location on the square during the 
M iddle Ages reflected the proxim ity or remoteness o f  the epidemics, the solemn act o f 
returning the image to its prominent location in one o f the Roman towers possibly 
conveyed the m essage that although peace finally reigned in Barcelona, the experience 
o f  the war was still very close.
Fig. 4.15 Ruined and half-demolished houses in the Barrio de la Catedral. between Corribia andBou de 
la Plaza Nueva. Photographed by Ramirez in August 1942 (Arxiu Historic de la Ciutat, Arxiu 
Fotografic).
220 The documents that constitute the basis for this sub-section stem from various files found under the 
keywords “Avenida Catedral” and “M aura” and were part o f  the section Gestio Urbanistica, years 1942, 
1943 and 1944.
221 “Barcelona Tradicional Y Religiosa. Nueva Imagen De San Roque En La Plaza Nueva,” El Correo
Catalan, 14 May 1939.
222 Ib id .
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Fig. 4.16 View o f  the area from above after the complete demolition o f  the ruined houses. Photographed 
by Ramirez in November 1944 (Arxiu Historic de la Ciutat, Arxiu Fotografic).
W hen the urbanisation works in the area commenced in June 1939, under the 
protective, yet distant gaze o f San Roque, the city council was praised for its 
determ ination to be quick to resume the opening o f Avenue C:
“Not even four months have passed since the triumphal liberation o f Barcelona, 
to whose beautiful urban body [...]  the anarcho-separatists caused deep and 
wide wounds, and we already see something m iraculous and surprising 
happening; the work, undoubtedly, o f  the renovating and creative spirit o f the 
New Spain. [ ...]  The disintegrating ideas and the destruction [that spread 
across] those parts o f Spain that were dom inated by the M arxists, begin to rub 
out, quickly disappearing. In addition, renovating construction initiatives are 
taking place [...]  [such as] the Redevelopment [sic] o f  Avenue C in the section 
running from Via Layetana to Plaza Nueva. It will be necessary to pull down a 
num ber o f buildings— old buildings for the most part. And the demolition works 
have already started on Plaza Nueva and the street o f  ‘els A rcs’ (.. .).”223
223 “Apenas van transcurridos cuatro meses de la triunfal liberacion de Barcelona, a la que tan profundas 
y extensas heridas causaron los anarcoseparatistas en su maravilloso cuerpo urbanistico y en el de sus 
habitantes, y vemos ya en ella algo milagroso y sorprendente, obra, sin duda alguna, del espiritu 
renovador y creador de la Nueva Espana. [...] Las ideas disolventes y las destrucciones de la parte de
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Journalist Manuel Ballester Ferrer openly contrasts the destructiveness of the Red- 
Marxists with the New Spain’s constructive spirit, evoking the anti-clerical raids that 
took place in Barcelona at the beginning of the war, which resulted in the destruction of 
numerous churches and convents. However, few Barcelonans would question that most 
o f the destruction caused to the city during the war was the result of the rebel bombings. 
Beyond this fairly blunt rhetorical exercise, what is perhaps more interesting in 
Ballester’s quote is his emphasis on renovation and creation at the expense o f that 
which is old—the old houses that had to be pulled down. At this early stage, there 
seemed to be a genuine expectation that regeneration, even the creation of something 
new, would be the outcome of the war and Franco’s victory. Such expectation waned 
over time, but should probably not be underestimated when attempting to understand 
the enthusiasm with which many reconstruction works were planned and commenced.
By the beginning of 1943, the section of Avenida de la Catedral, as Avenue C was now 
called, between plaza Antonio Maura and Doctor Joaquin Pou, was finished, paving 
included. The 115-metre-long section between Doctor Pou and Plaza Nueva, which had 
a particularly irregular incline, remained unfinished. The works continued on the 30- 
metre-wide avenue (the width Cerda’s and Darder’s plans had envisaged): a 17-metre- 
wide central lane flanked by two 6-metre-wide sidewalks. A more spacious section was 
created in front o f Plaza de la Catedral to locate a small parking lot surrounded by 
gardens. Different paving stones were used in different sections of the avenue, the aim 
being to use up existing materials still in the municipal warehouse. The masonry of 
better quality was reserved for the sidewalk along the Cathedral. Thirteen street lamps 
of centrifuged mortar topped by American “globes” with 200-watt lamps were soon set 
up on the sidewalks.
Espana, dominada por los marxistas, se van borrando, desapareciendo rapidamente. Y por anadidura se 
ejecuta tambien obra renovadora en lo que se refiere a la construction. Aqui mismo, en Barcelona aparte 
las obras de reparation que se estan haciendo— , se ha emprendido por nuestro Ayuntamiento una 
importantisima mejora urbana. Se trata de la Reforma de la Via C, trozo comprendido desde la Via 
Layetana hasta la Plaza Nueva. Sera preciso derribar muchos edificios— viejos edificios en su casi 
totalidad— . Y los trabajos de derribo empezaron ya en la Plaza Nueva y la calle ‘dels Archs’ [...].” 
Manuel Ballester Ferrer, “Desde La Via Layetana Hasta La Puerta De Don Quijote,” El Correo Catalan, 
4 June 1939.
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4.2.2.1 Homogeneous faqades224
At the beginning of 1944, the city council’s interest shifted from the pavement to the 
fa9ades of Avenida de la Catedral. It was suggested that the fa9ades facing the avenue, 
opposite the Cathedral, should harmonise with the neighbourhood’s older architecture. 
The fa9ade of the nineteenth-century house encompassing numbers 9 and 11 of former 
Bou de la Plaza Nueva—the only building left intact by both the war and the pickaxe— 
was subsequently replicated in the houses facing the avenue. Although it was not 
deemed “exceptionally remarkable”, the fa9ade had nonetheless a “profoundly 
nineteenth-century-ish [‘ochocentista'\ appearance”, which Barcelonans associated 
with “a certain restraint”. Such restraint was much welcomed by those who, like the 
Catalan chronicler and writer Ramon Aliberch, feared the irruption of some “Le 
Corbusier emulator” who would design “a malfeasance opposite the most venerable 
stones Barcelonans possess[ed]”.227 The post-war project for homogenous fa9ades was 
in many ways what the GATCPAC had feared before the war when it opposed the 
attempt to recreate stylistically homogenous neighbourhoods.
4.2.2.2 Past and present on display
Little by little, the Avenue came closer to its current appearance, although at the cost, 
many thought, o f the disappearance of the Barrio de la Catedral. In 1946, a “sentimental 
exhibition” in one of the Roman towers explained the history of vanishing Plaza 
Nueva. Drawings, paintings, old architectural plans and a few photographs were 
exhibited along old and new writings describing the life and characters of the beloved 
old “New Square”. “Nobody understands the need to disencumber the surroundings of 
our Basilica”, the editors of Destino wrote on the occasion of the exhibition, claiming 
that “on the contrary, clothed by the old, large houses, [the Basilica] gained in charm 
and proportion”. To them, “Plaza Nueva was an incomparable entrance hall to the so- 
called “Barrio Gotico” [Gothic neighbourhood]”, creating the right, secluded
224 This sub-section is based on the information contained in Gestion Urbanistica/Expediente 323/Ano 
1944, “Facades Nova Urbanitzacio,” (Arxiu Municipal de Barcelona).
225 “[...] y esto en atencion al valor decorativo de su fachada, la cual, sin ser excepcionalmente notable, es 
una forma de principios del siglo XIX, de cierta singularidad”. “Estilo Arquitectonico De Las Casas Que 
Sean Construidas En Frente a La Catedral Estard En Armonia Con El De Los Edificios Cercanos,” 
S olidaridadN ational, 19 January 1944.
226 “Se va a la formation de un lienzo de casas desde la calle Ripoll a la de Capellans, que tenga un aire 
profundamente ochocentista, ya que precisamente el siglo XIX fue para Barcelona, en arquitectura, de 
una cierta contention.” Ramon Aliberch, “La Unidad Arquitectonica Frente a La Catedral,” Hoja del 
Lunes, 28 February 1944.
227 Ibid.
228 “Recuerdos De La Vieja Plaza Nueva.”
148
atmosphere for the visitor before she or he went in to admire the “magnificent
99Qcompound of temples and palaces” on the other side of the gate.
While some Barcelonans wept for the irretrievable loss o f Plaza Nueva, the city council 
found it timely to let Franco visit the area. In early June 1947, the head of state 
officially visited the Cathedral, where significant restoration works had just been 
accomplished. Franco was escorted by “a retinue of horses of the mounted police, 
motor-dri vers, and the Moorish Guard in its spectacular garments”, something 
impossible before the war when the only means to reach the main entrance of the 
Cathedral was the narrow street of Corribia. The new, broad avenue seemed to 
provide an exceptional architectural framework for hosting official receptions in 
Barcelona. A month later, Eva Peron, the Argentinean first lady, visited Barcelona and 
was also invited to admire the restored Cathedral. She too arrived at the temple by 
car.231 The editors of Destino claimed the disappearance of Plaza Nueva meant the loss 
of a unique “entrance hall” to the Barrio Gotico, but allegedly, a monumental 
“reception hall”, Avenida de la Catedral, was created in its place, possibly better suiting
9^9the ceremonial needs of the Franco regime.
4.2.3 The disclosure o f  the remains o f the Roman city-wall233 
When Via Layetana was opened in the early twentieth century and several blocks that 
were once built outside the Roman stronghold were demolished, the remains of a 75- 
metre-long section of the ancient city-wall emerged along Tapineria street. It took 
several decades to clean and restore the Roman ashlars, which were buried almost two 
metres beneath the ground, but this was merely the beginning of what became a long­
term project to reveal the ancient military belt. In 1952, municipal head of excavations 
Agustin Duran y Sanpere and municipal architects Adolfo Florensa Ferrer and Joaquin
229 “Si unas reformas urbanisticas han tenido poco ambiente popular, son las practicadas en la Plaza 
Nueva. Nadie ha comprendido la necesidad de despejar los alrededores de nuestra Basilica, que arropada, 
en cambio, en los viejos caserones, ganaba en encanto y  en proporciones. La Plaza Nueva ere 
incomparable antesala del llamado ‘barrio gotico’ y su portal, sin puertas, proporcionaba no obstante al 
visitante la sensation de autentico umbral, que daba paso al magnifico conjunto formado por los templos 
y palacios. Hoy, el ‘barrio gotico’, en su frente septentrional, puede asaltarse de cualquier modo, sin la 
preparation ambiental que eran las estrategicas brechas de la Plaza Nueva y de la calle de la Corribia.” 
Ibid.
230 For a description o f  Franco’s visit, see, Hoja Diocesana, 1 June 1947.
231 See Ibid., and Hoja Diocesana July 1947.
232 See “En La Avenida De La Catedral,” La Vanguardia Espanola, 28 November 1956.
233 The information in this sub-section can be found in Gestion Urbanistica/Expediente 3320/Afio 1954, 
“Excavaciones Arqueologicas (Cerca De La Catedral),” (Arxiu Municipal Administratiu de Barcelona).
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Vilaseca found fragments of the Roman city-wall and towers (as well as the older 
cathedral and primitive Christian burials) under Plaza de la Catedral, where works 
aiming at lowering the square to reduce the gradient with Avenida de la Catedral were 
taking place. Additional funding was put into protecting the archaeological findings by 
relocating the sewage system in this area and creating a subterranean gallery running 
parallel to the Roman foundations.234
4.2.3.1 The chapter house and the archdeaconry
Before the street disappeared, the chapter house stood where Tapineria met Corribia. 
The building was originally L-shaped, partly following the course of the city-wall, 
which makes a turn left here, further marked by the presence of a polygonal tower. For 
centuries a block of houses stood in front of the chapter house, hiding as it were the 
building’s L-shape and the remains of the Roman wall that were part of the houses’ 
inner wall. This block was also demolished as part o f the project for recovering the 
ancient city-wall. In its place, a small garden was created to complement the view of yet 
another ffeed-up section of the wall.
There was particular interest in freeing up the wall section that ran from the Cathedral 
towards the two Roman towers on Plaza Nueva, where rows of houses concealed the 
north-eastern fa<?ade of the archdeaconry, built in the twelfth century and subsequently 
remodelled in the early sixteenth century. Numbers 2 ,4  and 6 on Corribia and numbers 
10 to 13 on Plaza Nueva were directly attached to the Roman wall, the solid, massive 
stonework having been turned into part of the houses’ inner wall. The city council 
ordered the demolition of the three houses on Corribia in early January 19 5 5,235 while 
numbers 10 to 13 on Plaza Nueva remained for another year and a half, until October 
1957, when they too were removed.
234 For a summary o f  the works aimed at restoring this part o f  the city’s ancient legacy, see Florensa’s 
two articles in Revista Nacional de Arquitectura: Adolfo Florensa, “Murallas Romanas En Barcelona,” 
Revista Nacional de Arquitectura, no. 132 (1953), Adolfo Florensa, “Restauraciones Recientes En 
Barcelona,” Revista Nacional de Arquitectura, no. 161 (1955).
235 Gestio Urbanistica, Expediente 8245, 1955, ‘‘Enderroc cases C. Corribia”, Arxiii Municipal de 
Barcelona.
236 “Derribos en la Plaza Nueva”, D iario de Barcelona, October 13, 1957.
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Fig. 4.17 View o f the last remains o f  the houses on Corribia-Plaza Nueva that were attached to the 
facade o f  the House o f the Archdeacon. The unveiledfacade includes sections o f  the ancient city wall and 
two polygonal towers. Unknown photographer, photo dated 1958 (Arxiu Historic de la Ciutat, Arxiu 
Fotografic).
Fig. 4.18 The same view in 2006 (photographed by the author).
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The disclosure o f  the archdeaconry’s Renaissance fa9ade simultaneously revealed the 
remains o f  the ancient military belt, which had been incorporated in the building when 
it was originally constructed. Moreover, the removal o f  the houses on Plaza Nueva, and 
the virtual disappearance o f the square, significantly improved the view o f  the Roman 
gate. At the feet o f  the left tower, the base o f  one o f  the pillars that once upheld the 
aquaduct which brought water to ancient Barcino was found.237 As a means o f further 
recreating Roman Barcelona, the municipal team o f architects decided to reconstruct the 
first arch o f  the aquaduct.238 The reconstructed arch, surrounded by a small gravel 
garden, still stands by the towers today.
1
Fig. 4.19 Reconstruction o f  the first arch o f  the 
Roman aquaduct. Unknown photographer, 
picture dated 1958 (Arxiu Histdric de la Ciutat, 
Arxiu Fotografic).
Fig. 4.20 The same arch in March 2007 
(photographed by the author).
4.2.3.2 Resurrecting Roman Barcelona
In February 1958, when the disclosure works were alm ost finished, the weekly 
magazine Revista de Actualidades, Artes y  Letras praised the result o f  the project, 
celebrating that
237 “Un Pilar Del Acueducto Romano De La Calle De Los Arcs,” Diario de Barcelona, 18 February 1958.
238 tlgj p rjmer Arco p)e | Acueducto,” Diario de Barcelona, 29 April 1958.
152
“the beautiful house of the Archdeacon, where the Historical Archive of the 
City is located, shows a new fa9ade, which was previously confined behind less 
noble elements o f concrete and brick?’ (italics added).239 
The reference to the “less noble elements of concrete and brick” is interesting when 
placed against the writings of one of the first ideologues of the regime, Ernesto 
Gimenez Caballero, who suggested that
“[s]tone, in Spanish architecture, is the essential and traditional element: Roman 
(...) [and] brick: earth, mud, grime, dust, the soil itself, the people itself, the 
lowest people o f Spain, in their secular fight against the stone, dominating and 
Arian. The fight between stone and brick ([between] Christian and infidels, 
Nacionales and Reds) lasted for several long, medieval centuries in the 
architectural front of Spain without reaching a settlement (.. .).”240 
In the stone and brick metaphor, Gimenez-Caballero conceives the nation’s history as a 
permanent civil war between the genuine Spain—always Christian, now supportive of 
Franco— and the false Spain, invasive, foreign—once the Moors, now the Communists. 
From this point of view, it was thus legitimate to demolish the brick houses in the 
environs of the Cathedral, regardless of their age, in order to bring out the eternal stone.
When Revista de Actualidades, ArtesyLetras several years later explained that the aim 
of the restoration works was to “discover Roman Barcelona’s fourth-century walls, in 
order to present them anew to our time’s busy Barcelonans, with the straightened pride 
of its towers and strongholds” (italics added),241 the implication seemed to be that the 
visual presence of the ancient fortification would help contemporary Barcelonans to 
identify with the city’s respectable Roman past, and perhaps also associate the 
sentiment of pride with the regime which had made the disclosure of the “glorious”
239 “[...] la bella casa del Arcediano, donde se encuentra instalado el Archivo de Historia de la Ciudad, 
descubria una nueva fachada, encerrada antes por elementos poco nobles de argamasa y ladrillos”. M., 
“Pulso De La Ciudad. Plaza Nueva Y Torres Viejas,” Revista de Actualidades, Artes y  Letras, 1-7 
February 1958.
240 “La piedra, en la arquitectura espanola, es el elemento matriz y tradicional: romano [...] [y] el 
ladrillo— : tierra, barro, marga, polvo, suelo mismo, pueblo mismo e infimo de Espana, en su lucha 
secular contra la piedra, dominadora y aria. La lucha entre piedra y ladrillo (cristianos e infieles, 
nacionales y rojos) duro largos siglos medievales sin resolverse en el frente arquitectonico de Espana 
[...].” Excerpt from Ernesto Gimenez Caballero, M adridnuestro  (Madrid: Ediciones de la Vicesecretaria 
de Educacion Popular, 1944) cited in Urefia, Arquitectura Y Urbanistica C ivil Y M ilitarE n El Periodo  
D e La Autarquia (1936-1945): Analisis, Cronologia Y Textos.
241 “[Los trabajos se orientaron] al descubrimiento de las murallas del siglo IV de la Barcelona romana 
para presentarlas de nuevo, con el orgullo de sus torres y baluartes, a los apresurados barceloneses de 
nuestros dias.” M. “Pulso De La Ciudad. Plaza Nueva Y Torres Viejas.”
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remains possible. Moreover, the association of the Roman stone with military 
masculine qualities— such as straightness, pride and hierarchy—can be detected in 
other descriptions of the area such as Destino's depiction of “the sinuous Paja street”, as 
not only “a festoon of the Roman wall”, but as a place that had recovered its declining 
“prestige with a g ility  and “where antiquity” was “hierarchically organised” (italics 
added).242 Here, the association becomes even more evident as the masculine attributes 
are set against potentially feminine qualities such as sinuousness and ornamentation— 
Paja is seen as a garland that follows the course of the wall.
In a similar vein, the two Roman towers were metaphorically depicted as guardians of 
the city and educators of the citizenry by El Noticiero Universal:
“[I]n a clearly civic spirit, [the towers] have formed around them devote and 
prudent citizens who in the stones that surround them love the past glories of 
Barcelona, which had on its Plaza Nueva a gracious centre of faith and hope and 
a place of extraordinary urban vitality.”243 
By ascribing moral values to the Roman stones, their preservation became almost 
unquestionable. In contrast, the preservation of the remains of the medieval vilanoves or 
suburbs, often associated with flourishing commerce, and possibly with Jewish and 
Phoenician traditions, was arguably less favoured by the Francoist city council. 
However, as already intimated, the project to unveil the ancient Roman city-wall 
preceded the war and Franco’s dictatorship. Two of the key figures behind the 
excavation works, Adolfo Florensa and Agustin Duran y Sanpere, served both the 
Republican and Francoist city councils. After the war, they essentially resumed the 
excavations and demolitions aimed at gradually disencumbering the military belt. As it 
turned out, in this particular section of the Roman precinct, the works were significantly 
facilitated by the opening of Avenida de la Catedral.
As already suggested, such continuities in urban planning between the two regimes 
coexisted with the ideological discontinuities that resulted from the Civil War and the
242 “La sinuosa calle de la Paja, feston del muro romano, recobra agilmente su prestigio un tanto alicaldo 
en los ultimos anos.” “La Calle De La Paja. Donde La Antigtiedad Est& Jerarquizada,” Destino, 22 April 
1944.
243 “Las torres formativas de la ciudad romana de nuestra ciudad, con un claro espiritu civico, han sabido 
formar a su vera, devotos y prudentes, a unos ciudadanos que aman en las piedras que les rodean las 
glorias pasadas de esta Barcelona que tuvo en la Plaza Nueva un centro entranable de fe y esperanza y un 
lugar de vitalidad urbana extraordinaria.” Sempronio, “60 Anos De Plaza Nueva,” D iario de Barcelona , 
29 October 1955.
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advent of the dictatorship. The Francoist rhetoric which celebrated the disencumbering 
of the city-wall as a resurrection of Roman Barcelona for its connotations with empire 
and historical supremacy was significantly different from the Republican discourses 
that celebrated the excavations for their historical and archaeological interest.
4.2.4 A "functional ” building fo r  Plaza Nueva
In 1958, the Colegio de Arquitectos de Catalunay Baleares (Association of Architects 
of Catalonia and the Balearics) organised a competition for their new facilities opposite 
the recently unveiled archdeaconry, at the confluence of Archs and Plaza Nueva. After 
a first round, in which some candidates ignored the city council’s new street 
realignments, the jury, including Dutch architect Johannes Hendrik Van den Broek and 
Italian architect Gio Ponti, made a second call where the criteria were clearly 
established.244 Joaquin Busquets won the final competition with a project that was 
deemed daring and innovative. It was described as “most beautiful” and “contemporary 
“functional” by Joaquin Folch y Torres, renowned Catalan writer and intellectual at the 
time, who admitted that there were those who felt enthusiastic and those who felt 
scandalised by the emergence of the “functional” in the Gothic neighbourhood.245 
Would the eagerly sought aesthetic harmony of Avenida de la Catedral be disturbed by 
this new architectural creation?
244 “Edificio Social Del Colegio De Catalufia,” Revista Nacional de Arquitectura, no. 200 (1958): 6, 7.
245 “Y el proyecto premiado (a mi juicio bellisimo) corresponde, por su estilo, como es normal, a la 
Uamada arquitectura funcional de nuestros dias. Romano, gdtico, barroco-neoclasico, neoclasico- 
ochocentista y finalmente lo ‘funcional’ de ahora. Y ante la aparicion de lo ‘funcional’ y en el ‘Barri 
gotic’ se entusiasman unos, se escandalizan otros, y otros ponen a las cuestiones que la cosa plantea 
varios interrogantes reflexivos.” Joaquin Folch y Torres, “Los Viejos Edificios De La Plaza Nueva Y El 
Edificio N uevo En La Vieja Plaza,” Destino, 29 November 1958. See also Paolo Sustersic, “Entre 
America Y El Mediterr£neo. Arquitecturas D e La Eficiencia En La Barcelona De Los 50” (paper 
presented at the Arquitectura, ciudad e ideologia urbana, Pamplona, 2002).
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Fig. 4.21 View o f  Plaza Nueva (western section o f  A venida de la Catedral) with Busquet's building to the 
right. Photographed from the windows o f  the Arxiu Historic de la Ciutat in the former Archdeacon's 
House in March 2007 (photographed by the author).
Twelve years earlier, when the project for homogenous fa9ades was approved and 
readily supported by influential com m entators such as Ramon Aliberch, it would 
probably have been more difficult to convince the municipal authorities o f the adequacy 
o f  Busquets’ project. But things were different at the end o f the 1950s. The regime had 
begun to show increasing openness and a certain keenness on modernising Spain, and 
young architects in particular were gaining prom inence in the public sphere. One o f the 
original aims with the construction o f Avenida de la Catedral had been to create a 
m odem  avenue, and Busquets’ building seemed to do justice to such motivation. It was 
not finished until 1961, and by then it included friezes by Norwegian artist Carl Nesjar 
based on designs by Picasso (who Busquets knew). The so-called Mediterranean friezes 
covered the building’s three fa9ades (towards Plaza Nueva, Arcs, and Capellans), each 
representing children, giants and the Catalan flag. Two were placed indoors, depicting 
sardana246 dancers and the wall o f Arcs, that is, the remains o f the Roman aquaduct. 
The fact that such potentially nationalist elements as the Catalan flag (the senyera) and
246 Sardana is a traditional Catalan dance.
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the sardana dancers were allowed in an institutional building might seem surprising at 
first. It is likely, however, that the regime viewed these more as regional, folkloric 
representations than as subversive, nationalist symbols. The dictatorship’s arguably 
patronising and stereotypical celebration of Spain’s regional diversity over the decades 
was far removed from any recognition of autonomous political rights for historic 
political entities like Catalonia.
4.3 Reactions to the opening of Avenida de la Catedral
4.3.1 Praising progress
The transformations in the area in front of the Cathedral were well received among 
those who, like Ramon Aliberch—who recurrently published in the newsletter of the 
Barcelona Urban Property Chamber—believed that urban economic development 
would follow. In one of his articles, Aliberch tells the story o f Francisco Puig y 
Alfonso, the owner of the bookshop on Plaza Nueva and several other buildings in the 
area as well as the author of a book on the Barri de la Catedral, who in the midst of a 
bomb raid which destroyed one of his buildings exclaimed: “What an opportunity to 
improve the city!”247 Aliberch praises Puig y Alfonso for his vision, but also for his 
rejection of any attachments to the past. His family had lived in the neighbourhood for 
generations, and yet, Aliberch argued, “beyond the fact that he was a proprietor, and 
certainly because he was one, [Puig y Alfonso] saw the greatness of the city and its 
need for expansion”.248
To some observers, the opening of Avenida de la Catedral, including the disappearance 
of Plaza Nueva, indeed meant that “a phase of Barcelona’s history in which closed and 
protected spaces predominated was solemnly conclude[d], and a [new] phase, which 
welcomefd] broad and cleared out avenues, should be seen as triumphant”.249 Hence, 
the opening of Avenida de la Catedral was conceived as a radical, if not historical,
247 Ramon Aliberch, “La Vieja Plaza Nueva. Su Pasado, Su Presente Y Su Porvenir,” Boletin de la 
Camara Oficial de la Propiedad Urbana, January 1945, Aliberch, “Reforma Interior En Barcelona. 
Prosigue La Avenida De La Catedral.”
248 ‘TSfo veia sus edificios, ni el establecimiento que habia sido suyo y de su padre en la Plaza Nueva, ni la 
casa en que habia nacido, ni el recuerdo de las viejas calles de Barcelona. Por encima del propietario y 
seguramente por serlo veia la grandeza de la urbe y su necesidad de crecimiento.” Aliberch, “Reforma 
Interior En Barcelona. Prosigue La Avenida De La Catedral.”
249 “( . . . )  se dara entonces por solemnemente conclusa una etapa de la historia de Barcelona en que 
predominaron los espacios cerrados y recogidos, y por triunfante, la etapa presente, propicia a las anchas 
y despejadas avenidas”. “En La Avenida De La Catedral.”
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change of urban paradigms in old Barcelona. Yet the opening of Via Layetana in the 
early twentieth century had already brought radical change to old Barcelona, and from 
this point of view it seems a slight exaggeration to present the opening of Avenida de la 
Catedral as the inauguration of a new phase in Barcelona’s urban history. However, it is 
still significant that the opening was introduced as a groundbreaking project. On the one 
hand, this might have to do with the fact that the area affected by the present works was 
more easily identified with the heart of Barcelona than were the blocks which Via 
Layetana cut through a few decades earlier. Hence, the change might have seemed more 
fundamental. On the other hand, it might reflect the desire to maintain the regime’s 
illusion of progress and modernity at a moment, the mid-1950s, when the effects of the 
economic autarchy had proved quite damaging for Spain, and the 1960s economic 
boom had not yet commenced.
When Via Layetana was under construction during the first part of the twentieth 
century, many prominent institutions and private businesses were drawn to the 
emergent avenue. When the small section o f Avenue C or Avenida de la Catedral was 
opened after the war, and the area was subsequently embellished and enhanced with 
monuments, investors saw in it a similar economic potential. As intimated earlier, 
Banco de Espana was perhaps one of the main supporters as well as beneficiaries of the 
redevelopment works in the Barrio de la Catedral.250 Its new Barcelona headquarters on 
the comer of Via Layetana and Avenida de la Catedral opened in 1939, the same year 
the war ended. Designed by Madrid-based architects Jose Yamoz Larrosa and Luis 
Menendez Pidal Alvarez in a monumental style, combining historicist and classical 
traits, Caja de Cataluna (Catalonia savings bank) moved into the building in 1955. In 
1951, one of Barcelona’s most famous hotels, Hotel Colon, relocated its facilities from 
Plaza Cataluna to Avenida de la Catedral, where it is today. The particular advantage of 
Avenida de la Catedral with respect to Via Layetana was of course that it offered a 
privileged view of the Cathedral and the Gothic neighbourhood.
In an article published in 1955, journalist Federico Ulsamer referred to the numerous 
buses that arrived and parked on the new avenue, dropping off hundreds of tourists that
250 Aliberch, “La Unidad Arquitectonica Frente a La Catedral.”
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dispersed in the area.251 Tourism in Spain was barely emerging in the 1950s, and 
Barcelona in particular was not launched as a tourist city until much later, but 
Ulsamer’s comment points to the huge potential of the vast, empty space of the avenue. 
The space had proved useful for political-representative purposes, as noted earlier, but 
over time it also proved functional for receiving tourists, who could now comfortably 
stroll along the avenue, viewing the Cathedral and adjoining monuments, and 
sometimes also watch the sardana dancers who used to perform here.
4.3.2 Mourning the Barrio de la Catedral
As is often the case, the notions of vision, progress, urban development, embellishment 
and so on were challenged by those who feared that the disappearance of the Barrio de 
la Catedral would do away with an essential piece of Barcelona. As early as 1935, when 
the threat of the pickaxe seemed imminent, Duran y Sanpere had suggested that the 
only remaining thing to do was to capture the images and the spirit of the Barri de la 
Catedral, its genius loci,252 before it disappeared forever. He took on the task himself 
and offered, among others, detailed descriptions of the yearly celebrations of Sant 
Roque and the Feria de Belenes in December during which nativity cribs were sold.253 
He also referred to Tomas Padro’s illustrations for El Quijote (Don Quixote) where the 
illustrator imagines the arrival of the celebrated knight-errant and his faithful esquire 
through the Roman gate on Plaza Nueva.254 While Cervantes never wrote where exactly 
the renowned couple entered the city, the image of Don Quijote and Sancho Panza in 
front of the two Roman towers helped to immortalise Plaza Nueva in Spanish literary 
imagination.
In 1955, on the occasion of the 600th anniversary of Plaza Nueva, journalist and 
chronicler Sempronio interviewed the oldest resident on the square, Senor Estruch, the 
owner o f the tavern that bore his and his father’s name (his father having started the
251 Federico Ulsamer, “La Puerta Del Barrio Gotico Debe Terminarse Urgentemente,” Solidaridad  
Nacional, 27 September 1955.
252 Architectural historian Christian Norberg-Schulz (1927-2000) recovered the ancient Greek concept o f  
genius loci for architectural theory. Drawing on Heidegger, he suggests that a place is experienced as 
meaningful to its inhabitants, as an authentic dwelling, when it is perceived as having a particular 
character or identity, which allows things to “take place” in a certain way. See Christian Norberg-Schulz, 
Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology o f  Architecture (New York: Rizzoli, 1980).
253 The Feria de Belenes has outlived the market square on Plaza Nueva. It continues to be organised in 
December every year on Avenida de la Catedral.
254 Duran y Sanpere, “En Visperas De Reforma. La Plaza Nueva.”
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business).255 Senor Estruch was around 60 years old at the time, and Sempronio played 
with the figures, claiming the square was only as old as its oldest resident and not 600 
years old as everybody else thought. Sempronio argued that what really mattered in 
this case were the real men and women who had founded and re-founded the square 
over the centuries, implying that a new square was bom with each generation. 
According to Sempronio’s interview, Senor Estruch nonetheless admitted that in his 
heart, “the attachment to the old square battle[d] with the enthusiasm [that he felt] about 
the opportunity to see the result of the magnificent redevelopment works [...]”.257 
Sempronio’s laconic verdict to Estruch’s words read: “[h]e is a philosopher and knows 
that life is, essentially, transformation”. But when Senor Estruch explained that every 
time he went out on the street he would glance at “the little hole where [he] used to play 
with [his] marbles” by the house door, the tavem-owner’s affection for the square took 
on a very tangible meaning.259
The ambivalence contained in Senor Estruch’s feelings was branded by journalists and 
writers as a battle between “urbanism and history”, between the present and the past. El 
Correo Catalan suggested that, regardless of the outcome, the spirit o f the square, its 
genius loci, would survive under the protective shadow of the two Roman towers, 
where the image of San Roque also found shelter.260 This suggests that the Roman gate, 
which once marked the point of contact between the city and the suburb, yet with the 
potential, as it were, of closing or excluding the suburb and its residents in order to 
protect the city, was incorporated over time into the suburb, and its protective qualities 
symbolically appropriated. From the point of view of the inhabitants of the suburb, the 
once ominous and menacing towers that made up the Roman gate thus gradually 
became a treasured and comforting presence.
255 Estruch’s tavern, by the way, reopened on Avenida de la Catedral after it was removed from its 
original location on Plaza Nueva, and seems to be a thriving business.
256 Sempronio, “60 Anos De Plaza Nueva.”
257 “En mi corazon, el apego a la vieja plaza lucha con la ilusion de poder ver un dia realizada esta gran 
obra que tanto embellecerd el barrio gotico.” Ibid.
258 “Es un filosofo y sabe que la vida es, esencialmente, transformation.” Ibid.
259 “Mientras esto no ocurra, me aprovecho saboreando los recuerdos que la plaza guarda para mi. Frente 
al portal de mi casa, en el empedrado, subsiste aun el ‘ou’ de nuesro juego de bolitas. Todos los dias, al 
salir de casa, le doy una mirada.” Ibid.
260 “Por la perduracion de[l] espiritu [de la Plaza Nueva] velan las dos torres de las murallas romanas, a 
cuya sombra es venerada la imagen de San Roque.” “Mirador De La Ciudad,” D iario de Barcelona, 26 
October 1955.
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In a language with potentially interesting sexual connotations, Ana Nadal Sanjuan 
evoked the “humble, humid and extremely narrow streets, so modestly prudent, and 
even forgotten”, praising their ability “silently and faithfully” to preserve their ancestral
Of* 1residents ’ customs and traditions. Nadal de Sanjuan’s description of the disappearing 
streets of the Barrio de la Catedral suggests that the spatial disposition of the area had 
long played the role of a vessel of old practices and traditions, akin to that of a 
nourishing, maternal womb. While critical of transformations in the neighbourhood, if 
extended further, Nadal de Sanjuan’s argument might be interpreted as an allegory for 
the traditional distribution of gender roles according to which women stand for tradition 
and men for progress. In this view, the role of the Barrio de la Catedral could 
potentially be kept alive and performed by women once the neighbourhood was 
modernised— by men.
The emphasis these writings placed on the role of the residents could be interpreted as 
playing down the impact of space and architecture on the everyday life o f urban 
dwellers. If each generation re-appropriates space in its own terms, it does not really 
matter if the urban fabric is drastically altered, and there is hence no need to mourn the 
loss of particular streets and buildings. On the other hand, the emphasis on the spirit, or 
the genius loci, of the Barrio de la Catedral could be viewed as an attempt by the 
Catalan-speaking, populace classes to preserve their language and traditions despite the 
regime’s ban on them. Such an attempt was readily supported by writers and 
intellectuals such as Ricardo Sune, who could not afford to appear as Catalan 
nationalists. Yet they found a subtler—perhaps even comfortable— way of celebrating 
the Catalan nation by depicting the Barrio de la Catedral and its residents as the 
quintessential Barcelona.
The ways in which these authors clung almost passionately to Barcelonan customs and 
traditions becomes apparent when Ricardo Sune challenges
“those who affirm that Barcelonan ochocentismo [nineteenth-century-ism]— our 
popular customs, which naturally originated in the second half of the nineteenth 
century—are only found in books and museums” 
arguing,
261 Ana Nacjal de Sanjuan, “Fragmentos De Historia Barcelonesa Que Desaparecen,” La Vanguardia 
Espahola , 16 November 1943.
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“[he could] categorically convince them of the falsehood of these ideas by 
urging them to attend the festivities of Plaza Nueva.. 
and, finally, describing the old neighbourhood as a
“reliquary of military and trading Barcelona, thanks to which—we ought not to 
forget—urban Barcelona developed, with its vast avenues along which torpedo- 
automobiles slide away as if on a race-track”.262
The reference to Barcelona’s dual essence, military and trading evokes the suburb’s 
initially liminal position—being part of the Roman military belt, while being located 
outside it—and the evolution of Barcelona from a defensive castrum to a commercial 
port city. In this case, therefore, liminality could be understood as a spatially and 
chronologically overlapping term. The suburb emerged outside the ancient city-wall— 
thus transcending a spatial boundary—as a result of Barcelona’s transition from a 
Roman colony to a medieval city—a transition in time. In the debates about the opening 
of Avenida de la Catedral and the unveiling of the Roman city-wall such liminal quality 
of the Barrio de la Catedral seemed to nurture the dialectic between resurrecting the 
city’s austere, monumental legacy (the stone) and preserving its popular, plebeian, 
qualities (the brick). In the end, Sune implicitly suggests that modem and contemporary 
Barcelona owes as much to the Roman military structures as it does to the medieval 
market squares. Although his acknowledgement of the dual essence of the city and the 
liminal position of the Barrio de la Catedral seems conceptually appropriate, it does not 
necessarily solve the practical problem of what ought to be done about the Roman 
stones and the medieval brickwork which covered them.
4.3.3 By way o f  epilogue: the 60(fh anniversary o f Plaza Nueva 
In late October 1955, the 600 anniversary of Plaza Nueva was commemorated in the 
midst of its dismantling. Through a popular celebration, Barcelonans were vividly 
reminded of the birth of the old “New Square” six centuries earlier. Most local 
newspapers referred to the event, providing some historical background and detailed
262 “[...] a esos que afirman que el ochocentismo barcelonista— esas costumbres populares nuestras que 
tuvieron su natural asiento en la segunda mitad del siglo XIX— solo se encuentra ya en los libros y en los 
museos, podria desmentirles en estos dias de una manera rotunda diciendoles id a las fiestas de la Plaza 
Nueva...” and “[...] aquel barrio, relicario de una Barcelona luchadora y menestrala, gracias a la cual— no 
lo olvidemos— pudo hacerse la Barcelona urbe de las grandes avenidas por las cuales los automoviles- 
torpedo se deslizan cual en una pista.” Ricardo Sune, “Recuerdos Del Barrio De La Plaza Nueva,” El 
Correo Catalan , 16 August 1947.
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descriptions of the celebrations, which were organised by the Comision de Fiestas de 
San Roque (San Roque Party Committee). The programme of events started with a 
mass in the church of Santa Maria del Pino on the morning of the 30th of October, 
followed by a performance of Sardanas on the square, against the backdrop of 
scaffolding and half-demolished buildings. Jose Maria Garrut’s 600 anys de PlagaNova 
and Francisco Puig y Alfonso’s El meu barri, two recently published books, which 
delved into the history and curiosities of Plaza Nueva and the Barri de la Catedral, were 
for sale. Both were written in Catalan, which is perhaps again surprising, considering 
the regime’s prohibition on Catalan. Some possible explanations could be that the 
distribution was going to be very small, aimed only at the residents of the 
neighbourhood, or that the publishers had the support o f some influential local leader, 
who, if necessary, could justify the publication before the central authorities— or both.
In the early afternoon of the 30th of October, the Comision de Fiestas paid archbishop- 
bishop Modrego, “the most important resident of the square”, a visit in the 
archiepiscopal palace. The commemorative festivities culminated on the evening of 
the 31st of October with a special dinner that was organised for the residents o f Plaza 
Nueva at Hotel Colon, which as noted earlier had recently opened its doors on Avenida 
de la Catedral.
The anniversary became an opportunity to pause and examine the recent history of the 
square as the heart of the Barrio de la Catedral. It was an intense history to look back 
on, including the lingering threat of various redevelopment plans before the Civil War; 
the traumatic experience of the war and the ruthless rebel aerial attacks; the application 
of Vilaseca’s plan after the conflict, followed by demolitions; the elimination of streets; 
the disappearance of Plaza Nueva; the subsequent emergence of a short, vast avenue, 
which probably looked more like a rectangular square; and the simultaneous revelation 
of antique fragments of urban fabric: sections of the Roman city-wall and several of the 
ancient military towers.
263 “Barcelona Al Dla. Seiscientos Anos De Plaza Nueva,” El Noticiero Universal, October 26 1955.
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Fig. 4.22 View o f  the central section ofA venida de la Catedralfrom the windows o f  the A rxiu Historic de 
la Ciutat (March 2007) (photographed by the author).
Hence, by October 1955, urbanism seemed indeed to have trium phed over history. A 
num ber o f  writers and chroniclers insisted, nonetheless, on the indestructible spirit o f 
the Barrio de la Catedral. Apparently its residents continued to meet every fifteen days 
in a small tavern, perhaps more o f a cafe, to discuss the future o f  the square and 
organise the yearly festivities o f  San Roque. The residents seemed resigned to accept 
the transform ations o f  the neighbourhood as part o f “the city ’s needs” . They simply 
asked “the vaulted niche o f San Roque [not to be] removed and that a plaque [would] 
remind future generations that the city’s oldest square was once located there” .264
264 “Ante las necesidades de la ciudad, nosotros solo podemos pedir una cosa: que no desaparezca la 
hornacina de San Roque y que una placa recuerde a las proximas generaciones que alii existio la plaza 
mas antigua de la ciudad.” “Una Plaza Barcelonesa Cumple Seis Siglos. Sus Vecinos Afirman: ‘Este 
Centenario Ser& El U ltim o’,” El Correo Catalan, 1 November 1955.
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Fig. 4.23 View o f  Avenida de la Catedral, looking Fig. 4.24 Opposite view o f  Avenida de la Catedral,
east, towards Plat; a Antonio Maura (July 2006) looking west towards Plat; a Nova (March 2007)
(photographed by the author). (photographed by the author).
Fig. 4.25 View o f  A venida de la Catedral from  the Cathedral entrance (July 2006) (photographed by the 
author). Compare with figures 4.13 and 4.14.
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4. Conclusion
By looking at the opening of Avenida de la Catedral in old Barcelona after the Civil 
War, the aim of this chapter has been to show how wartime destruction can act as a 
catalyst for urban redevelopment. The chapter began with a brief overview of the 
history of this part of the old city, which started out as the medieval suburb Els Arcs 
and gradually gained prominence as a place for commerce. Following this, the series of 
redevelopment plans that sought to modernise inner Barcelona from the mid-nineteenth 
century were examined, specifically the plans to open a transversal avenue across the 
old city. The idea of a transversal avenue to improve communication across Barcelona 
and sanitise the dense urban fabric of the old city was never abandoned in subsequent 
redevelopment plans. But the traumatic experience of the opening of Via Layetana, one 
of the vertical avenues projected by Cerda, in the 1910s made both the population and 
the city council increasingly aware of the implications of this kind of urban 
intervention. Accordingly, the project for Avenue C, as the transversal avenue became 
known, was significantly softened. Nonetheless, when Joaquin Vilaseca’s softer version 
of the inner-city reform was approved in 1930, the residents affected by the 
redevelopment works vigorously complained.
Arguably, residents affected by redevelopment projects usually complain, especially 
when they feel threatened by demolitions and expropriations. What is interesting in this 
case is that the Associacio de Veins chose to focus more on how Vilaseca’s plan was 
approved, denouncing its dubious legality, and less on its actual content. The critiques 
the project received from the group of modernist architects GATCPAC under the 
leadership of Josep Lluis Sert, on the other hand, exclusively referred to its content. 
Both residents and architects agreed, nevertheless, that the opening of Avenue C was 
unnecessary and that it would do little good to Barcelona’s historic centre.
The redevelopment works were about to commence when the Civil War broke out in 
July 1936 followed by a social revolution in Barcelona. It is impossible to know what 
would have happened in the long run had the Republicans remained in power and the 
then Barcelona city council continued with its plans. The Republican city council had 
not shown particular sensitivity towards the complaints of either residents or architects. 
At the same time, it is likely that the demolitions in the Barri de la Catedral (and other 
parts o f old Barcelona, had the full avenue been opened) would have caused further and
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more serious controversy once they were to take place de facto. The war put Vilaseca’s 
plan on hold for three years during which Barcelona was systematically bombed by the 
rebel air force and their Italian and German allies. The city’s planning activities 
continued though through the unexpected construction of 1,300 anti-air-raid shelters, in 
which Barcelonans sought refuge each time the alarms went off. The construction of 
such an extensive refuge network was undoubtedly a huge accomplishment, in light of 
the fact that it was mostly carried out voluntarily by women, children, and the elderly, 
who stayed in the city while men went off to fight on the front.
The city council’s funding shortages during the conflict are evidenced in its difficulties 
in purchasing construction materials and paying for the construction of public anti-air­
raid shelters. At the end of the war, the municipal treasury was in even worse shape. 
The new city council appointed by Franco’s supporters faced the challenge of 
reconstructing significant portions of the city, while it also aimed to take advantage of 
the destruction and address some of the pending redevelopment projects such as the 
opening of Avenue C. Like Bilbao and other cities, Barcelona was largely left on its 
own by the government, which—at least initially—did not offer any clear instructions 
on how to secure the necessary funding for reconstruction. Gradually, it became clear 
that city councils could apply for state subsidies and loans, which were only partial and 
worked retrospectively. Notwithstanding these restrictions, Barcelona city council 
negotiated a state subsidy for the most urgent clearing tasks and a state loan for 
reconstruction projects. The most substantial part of the funding, however, was 
negotiated with Banco de Espana, which, in the end was also a public entity. Both the 
state and the bank loan had to be returned, and the city council was forced to devise 
new fiscal strategies to cash in the necessary amounts. These supplementary taxes 
stirred the anger of urban estate owners who officially complained against the 
municipal budget, arguing that the reconstruction and redevelopment projects drew 
directly from their pockets and were also excessively ambitious. Their complaints were 
unsuccessful.
The project for Avenue C or Avenida de la Catedral, as it was now known, unfolded in 
various stages over two decades (between 1939 and the late 1950s). An essential, yet 
perhaps unexpected part of the works was the disencumbering of the ancient Roman 
military belt, largely accomplished with the unveiling of the archdeaconry’s fa9ade in
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1958. This allowed for some curious comparisons between the Roman city and the 
medieval suburbs, between military and trading Barcelona, which took on particular 
meaning in the ideological context of Franco’s dictatorship. As Gimenez-Caballero’s 
stone and brick metaphor suggests, the comparison sought to link the regime with the 
Roman empire, while playing down other historical periods, more closely associated 
with the presence of Jews and Moors, commerce, and brick as a construction material. 
This way, the demolition of the old houses that were attached to the Roman city-wall 
seemed perhaps more acceptable.
The neo-imperial and traditionalist connotations of these discourses contrasted with the 
arguments favouring the construction of Javier Busquets’ winning project for the new 
facilities of the Architectural Association on Plaza Nueva in 1959. A functionalist 
project, featuring friezes with Picasso designs, the building did seem to challenge 
previous concepts of the avenue, which, among other things, had sought to create 
homogeneous and fairly discreet fa9ades along the block opposite the Cathedral. It is 
usually argued that the regime’s increasing openness from the late 1950s made 
modernist architectural projects possible again. But the argument could also be made 
that this kind of eclecticism, the exaltation of both the old and the new, the coexistence 
of discreet and eye-catching elements, can be found all along in the regime’s aesthetic 
manifestations, initially highlighting Falange’s conscious aim to synthesise modem 
technique and traditional values, and later reflecting the regime’s pragmatism and the 
diverse ideological bases on which it sustained its legitimacy.
Moreover, the reactions to the opening o f Avenida de la Catedral could perhaps serve as 
an example of how the preservation of the past and the celebration of the future were 
negotiated under Franco. When the works commenced in summer 1939, there were 
those who praised them as a sign o f progress, an indication o f the new era inaugurated 
by Franco’s victory. But soon there were those who mourned the loss of the Barrio de la 
Catedral, which allegedly had meant so much to the evolution of Barcelonan customs 
and traditions. Moreover, to many, the disappearance of the Barrio de la Catedral might 
have symbolised the repression of the Catalan language and certain Catalan traditions. 
It is suggested that the defence of the Barrio de la Catedral was hence a reaction against 
both the future and the past, a subversive gesture in opposition to the culturally 
homogenising trend imposed by the city council’s redevelopment projects, but also
168
against the regime’s overemphatic celebration of Barcelona’s Roman past. While the 
regime tried to anchor itself in the Roman Empire and envision the future from there—a 
wide, modem avenue, full of cars, flanked by a pristine ancient military belt—the 
mourners of the Barrio de la Catedral struggled to keep the popular, Barcelonan “spirit” 
of the former suburb alive. Over time, they forcibly accepted the material outcome of 
the redevelopment works, eventually changing their grief for nostalgia.
Today, half a century later, few Barcelonans— except perhaps the oldest residents like 
Mrs Planelles— are aware of either the regime’s archaic-futurist vision or the nostalgic 
sentiments that the disappearance of the Barrio de la Catedral generated in its former 
residents. The conjunction of existing redevelopment plans and the destruction caused 
by the Civil War led to the replacement of the age-old neighbourhood with Avenida de 
la Catedral. Yet one may wonder if Sempronio was right when he argued that the 
“spirit” of the Barrio de la Catedral would survive the neighbourhood’s demise. What is 
certain is that Sant Roque, the neighbourhood’s genius loci in the perhaps most literal 
sense, can still be found in the left Roman tower.
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Chapter 5
Reconstruction as a marker of a regime change: 
Bilbao’s post-war bridges
5. Introduction
The destruction of the bridges of Bilbao by the Basque-Republican troops during the 
Spanish Civil War and their reconstruction by the newly appointed rebel city council 
illustrates how reconstruction can be used to mark a regime change physically and 
symbolically. The marking of Bilbao through the reconstruction of its bridges 
poignantly highlights the ideological discontinuities that resulted from the political 
change brought about by the Civil War. Such ideological discontinuities were in turn 
possible while, in practice, part of the administrative staff and practices involved in the 
reconstruction process were fairly congruent with the previous Republican regime. It is 
the fundamental tension between the rebels’ use of the destruction and reconstruction of 
the bridges to mark an ideological break with the recent past, and the administrative 
continuities involved in the reconstruction process as such that constitutes the main 
argument o f this chapter. Finally, while the extent of the destruction to the bridges 
during the Civil War was unprecedented, the eventful history of Bilbao’s bridges 
reveals a long sequence of destructions by wars and natural catastrophes dating back to 
the foundation of the city in 1300, which might be identified as historical continuities in 
contrast with the above-mentioned practical continuities and ideological discontinuities.
From being essentially conceived as structures that secured communication between the 
two riverbanks, the bridges became part of a broader urban plan of accesses and 
thoroughfares in the early twentieth century. Around that time, too, the increasing 
availability of modem technical means called for the construction of drawbridges to 
improve the connection between the two riverbanks— including the recently annexed 
municipalities of Abando, Deusto and Begona—without hindering navigation on the 
Ria as the Bilbao estuary is usually referred to. By the time the Civil War broke out in 
1936, two drawbridges were under construction in Bilbao. As the largest industrial port 
city in the region, Bilbao was a busy city during the conflict, and the contractors o f the 
drawbridges were urged to finalise the works as quickly as possible to alleviate 
circulation. The unfinished drawbridges were also used to hide military supplies and, in
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so doing, became potential military targets of rebel air attacks. In the end, though, it 
was the Basque-Republican military who ordered the blowing up of the bridges on the 
19th of June 1937 as the last troops left Bilbao in the face of the rebels’ imminent 
seizure of the city. Communication between the two riverbanks was effectively broken.
The seemingly unnecessary destruction of the bridges from a military point of view 
gave Franco’s supporters the opportunity to create a rhetoric of denunciation of the 
barbarism of the Republican and Basque-Nationalist troops while promoting their own 
efficiency as the re-constructors of the bridges in the unusually difficult circumstances 
posed by the war. Even though most part of the reconstruction of the bridges took place 
before the war finished and prior to Franco’s complete take-over of the Spanish 
administration, the process already reflected the regime’s approach to post-war 
reconstruction, whereby the central administration would rely on the local 
administration to undertake the reconstruction works, offering financial support, often 
retrospectively, through a scheme of loans and partial subsidies.
The use of reconstruction as a means of marking a change of political regime in post­
war situations is perhaps easier to identify in the context of an emergent dictatorship 
such as Franco’s, but can be found in other, not necessarily authoritarian, post-war
265reconstruction contexts such as the Italian in the aftermath of the Second World War. 
The same applies to the specific organisational challenges faced by the rebels in Bilbao 
and other Spanish cities. New regimes replacing pre-war and wartime governments 
have the need to dissociate themselves from the preceding, vanquished regime, but 
often cannot afford to do away entirely with previous organisational structures. In the 
case of the reconstruction of Bilbao’s bridges, the continuities observed in several 
administrative and corporate practices reinforce the hypothesis that neither the 
structures nor the staff of the local Republican administration were completely replaced 
after the rebels’ take-over of the city. Examination of the discourse of the local leaders 
appointed by the rebels suggests, however, that considerable effort was made to convey 
the idea that a break had taken place and a new political era had been inaugurated.
265 One may think, for example, o f  the famous Pirelli Tower— designed by Gio Ponti— which was erected 
in post-war Milan in the early 1950s as a marker o f  the beginning o f  the new democratic, economically 
dynamic Italian Republic.
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The new, more homogenised and sober ensemble of bridges that resulted from the 
relatively rapid reconstruction process—the bridges were rebuilt within approximately 
two years—had little aesthetic connection with the earlier bridges, several of which 
were built in typically eclectic nineteenth-century styles. Arguably, the new aesthetics 
contributed to mark the Ria, and Bilbao more generally, with the spirit of a new era, 
that of the Nacionales’ triumphant New Spain, even though the design of the bridges 
was as much the outcome of the engineers’ belief in rationalism, which they had been 
practising before the war, as their way o f providing the most economic design solution 
for the works entrusted to them.
Something ought to be said about the case of Bilbao in relation to the selected sites in 
Barcelona and Madrid. Within the logic of this thesis, the bridges of Bilbao provide a 
contrasting case to the sites examined in Barcelona and Madrid because, unlike them, 
their destruction was caused by the Republican side only and in one single operation. 
The swiftness with which the bridges were reconstructed also contrasts with the much 
lengthier reconstruction processes encountered in the contexts of Barcelona’s Avinguda 
de la Catedral and Madrid’s Cuartel de la Montana.
The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part seeks to contextualise the events of 
the 19th of June 1937 within the pre-war history o f the bridges and Bilbao’s role as a 
port city during the war. Following a section which briefly reviews the history of the 
fixed bridges, the construction of the two drawbridges— Begona and Deusto— in the 
1930s, before the outbreak of the war, is discussed. The impact of the war on the 
bridges, specifically on the drawbridges under construction, is explored in some detail 
in the third section. The final section discusses the Republicans’ motivations for 
destroying the bridges and the practical and symbolic consequences of their destruction 
for the rebels: the initial challenges of managing a city divided in two, and the 
opportunity of condemning the Republicans’ allegedly inexplicable destructiveness for 
propaganda purposes.
The second part of the chapter tries to elucidate the practical and symbolic impact of the 
immediate reconstruction of the bridges for post-war Bilbao and the post-war 
reconstruction process in Spain at large. In order to reflect the administrative separation 
between the reconstruction of the fixed bridges and the drawbridges, respectively, the
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two reconstruction processes are examined in separate sections, underlining the 
different challenges posed by these two groups o f bridge infrastructures. The final 
section considers the inauguration of the Generalisimo Franco’s bridge, formerly 
Deusto bridge, to illustrate further the tensions between the new authorities’ need to 
emphasise symbolically the change of regime and their need to rely on previously 
existing staff and organisational arrangements for the administration of Bilbao.
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Part I
5.1 Some historical background to the bridges in Bilbao
The bridges are essential for the understanding o f  the urban history o f Bilbao. They are 
part o f  the city ’s distinctiveness and reflect many o f  the events, political and other, that 
have forged it throughout the centuries. For a long time, the aim o f  the bridges was 
simply to connect the two riverbanks o f old Bilbao. In the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, however, the new goal was to connect the formerly autonomous 
m unicipalities which had been gradually annexed to old Bilbao. Finally, from the 
1930s, the bridges became part o f  an extensive road network, and were no longer seen 
as independent infrastructures with the sole function o f  linking the two riverbanks.
Natural catastrophes, wars and urban redevelopm ent have decided the fate o f B ilbao’s 
bridges for centuries, and the city has had both fewer and more bridges than the ones it 
has today. However, while such historical continuities are significant, the scope o f the 
destruction caused to the bridges on the 19th o f June 1937 was unprecedented. 
M oreover, it was the first time the acts o f  destroying and reconstructing the bridges 
were appropriated to mark an ideological break with the recent past and the 
inauguration o f a new political era. As a means o f em phasising the unprecedented 
nature o f such appropriation, but also providing some relevant historical background to 
the events o f  the Civil War, the following sections briefly examine the history o f  
B ilbao’s bridges.
Fig. 5.1 Old Bilbao and the San Anton bridge seen from the left riverbank, 1544. By Frans 
Hogenberg fo r  Braun's and Hogenberg's atlas Civitates orbes terrarum (1575) (Institut 
Cartografic de Catalunya).
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Fig. 5.2 Bilbao's bridges. From right to left, the six Jixed bridges with their changing names followed by the two drawbridges Begoha and 
Deusto. The dotted circle shows old Bilbao (AGS. Cartografia Bilbao 2006).
Begona/Ei Ayuntam^rifo/ 
Buenos Aires/Genera) Mola
Deusto/ ^La Merced/
General Sanjurjo 1isimo
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Victoria
San Anton
5.1.1 San Anton, San Francsico and La Merced.
The bridge of San Anton existed before Bilbao was officially founded by Don Diego de 
Haro in 1300. For centuries, the stone bridge of San Anton was the only existing bridge 
in town. In 1506, the monks of San Francisco sought permission to build a bridge to 
link their convent directly to the city centre, but the Franciscan monks met strong 
opposition from the city council, which was probably keen on preserving the 
exclusiveness of the bridge of San Anton, and the commencement of the works was 
continuously postponed. It was not until 1732 that the monks were able to start the 
works. It took them three years to finish the first single-arch stone bridge of Bilbao. The 
nuns of the convent of La Merced, who were also keen on having a more convenient 
route downtown, erected a wooden bridge that connected the two riversides at the level 
o f their convent. This bridge was substituted for a proper stone and brick bridge 
designed by engineer Ernesto Hoffmeyer ini 888.266
5.1.1.1 Destruction by floods and wars
The early bridges of Bilbao went through a number of devastating natural catastrophes, 
essentially floods and unexpected rises of the tide. The bridge of San Anton was 
destroyed several times throughout the Middle Ages. According to municipal records, 
high waters either partially or fully destroyed the bridge at least eight times between 
1380 and 1650.267 Reconstruction immediately followed on each occasion. After the 
last of these catastrophes, Master Juan de Setien proposed to add a third arch to San 
Anton as a means to avoid the consequences of the floods. On the 1st of November 
1737, the bridge of San Francisco was destroyed by high waters that burst the 
riverbanks. The Franciscan monks and their bridge were blamed for the disastrous 
consequences of the flood, and once again it took several decades, more than three this 
time, before the city council authorised the monks to reconstruct the bridge.269 The 
works commenced in 1792 under the direction of the renowned Basque architect Alejo
266 Ministerio de Fomento Signatura [15414] “Expediente De Autorizacion Para Sustituir El Puente De 
Madera De La Merced Por Otro De Fabrica. Solicita El Ayuntamiento De La Villa De Bilbao,” (Archivo 
del Ministerio de Fomento).
267 Bilboko Zubiak/Puentes De Bilbao/Bridges o f  Bilbao, (Bilbao: Ayuntamiento de Bilbao, Area de 
Obras y Servicios, 2002).
268 Ibid.
269 Seccion Municipal/Fecha inicial 1741 /Signatura Bilbao Seccion Antigua 0058/002/001, “Puente De 
San Francisco,” (Archivo Foral de Bizkaia).
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de Miranda,270 who designed a single-arch wooden bridge. The beautiful wooden bridge 
would not survive very long.
Like many other Spanish cities, Bilbao suffered the siege o f Napoleon’s troops in the 
early nineteenth century, and the Franciscans’ wooden bridge was burnt down in 1813. 
For ten years, a pontoon bridge substituted for the disappeared wooden bridge, until 
Antonio de Goikoetxea’s design for a bridge suspended by chains was completed in 
1828. However, the maintenance of the new iron bridge in the damp climate of the Ria 
proved more challenging than expected. The increasingly rusty structure became more 
and more unreliable, and the city council decided to remove it in 1852.271 A similar 
structure was erected, but collapsed during the trial period. In 1855, a new design, a 
suspension bridge was assembled instead. This bridge would last until 1874, when the 
Carlist troops272 occupied Bilbao once again and destroyed the bridge. Six years later, 
the city council asked the royal administration for authorisation to construct an iron 
footbridge. Pablo Alzola, the designer, preferred to call his bridge a pasadera, hereby 
emphasising that the 42-metre iron bridge was intended only for pedestrians.273 Alzola’s 
was an ornamental and at the same time functional bridge that connected the newly 
formed working-class district of San Francisco with the old city centre.
The wooden bridge that connected La Merced with the right riverbank before 
Hoffmeyer’s stone-and-brick bridge was built in 1891 was also destroyed during the 
Carlist siege of the city in 1874.274
270 Alejo de Miranda later collaborated in the design o f  the reconstruction o f  the city o f  San Sebasti&n— in 
the Basque province o f  Guipuzcoa— which was devastated during the French invasion in the early 
nineteenth century.
271 The disastrous fate that similar bridges had met, such as the one in Angers (France), which suddenly 
collapsed in 1850 killing more than 200 people, made the city council wary o f  the iron bridge. See 
“Recuerdos De Bilbao. El Puente Colgante,” La Baskonia. La revista decenal ilustrada 1933.
272 The Carlists constituted a loose reactionary political group based in Navarra and the Basque Country, 
who defended the right to the Spanish throne o f  an alternative branch o f  the Bourbons. The Carlists 
started three wars during the nineteenth century. Prior to the 1936-39 Civil War, these were known as the 
Spanish Civil Wars.
2 Ministerio de Fomento Signatura [15414], “Expediente Sobre Construccion De Un Puente En El 
Interior De Bilbao Sobre La Ria, Solicitado Por El Ayuntamiento De Dicha Villa.,” (Archivo del 
Ministerio de Fomento).
274 Juan Carlos de Gortazar, Ignacio de Gortazar, and Manuel Maria de Smith Ibarra, Bajo Los Puentes 
D e Bilbao { 1951).
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Fig. 5.3 Alzola's San Francisco iron footbridge (1880) and Hoffmeyer's La Merced stone-and-brick bridge 
(1891) in the background (Archivo Foral de Bizkaia).
Fig. 5.4 La Merced bridge and San Francisco iron footbridge in the background (1893) (Archivo Foral de 
Bizkaia).
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5.1.2 Isabel II
The Isabel II bridge, which linked the two dock areas known as El Arenal, literally the 
sandpit, and the Ripa was also damaged during the second Carlist War (1846-1849).275 
The Isabel II bridge, also called Arenal bridge, was commissioned in 1844, apparently 
to commemorate Queen Isabel’s victory in the first Carlist War (1833-1840), her 
acceptance of the validity of the Basque legal codes, and her decision to permit the 
railway connecting Madrid with the French border to go through Bilbao.276 However, to 
the inhabitants of the then independent republic277 of Abando on the southern side of 
the bridge, the construction of a proper bridge infrastructure, partly designed as a 
drawbridge, also reflected Bilbao’s annexionist aspirations. After the bridge was badly 
damaged during the third Carlist War (1872-1876), a new, fixed stone bridge, designed 
by Adolfo Ibarreta, was constructed on the exact same spot, and inaugurated in 1878. 
The idea of having a drawbridge in this particular area of the river was not deemed 
workable any more. It became more important to ensure good and comfortable access to 
and from the new railway station on the left bank, and therefore a fixed structure
778seemed more convenient. As a consequence, ships were no longer able to go any 
further up the Ria beyond the Arenal docks. In this way, the old city, which more or less 
ended at the Arenal bridge, was definitely sealed off from the Ria’s industrious and 
dynamic, but also unhealthy and dirty, port life.
5.1.3 Perro Chico
The increasingly advanced engineering expertise permitted and even called for the 
construction of swing bridges and drawbridges in the Ria. In 1892, British engineer 
Hector Brahon was commissioned to design a swing bridge with a horizontally rotating 
span in front of the new city hall, which had been moved downstream to El Arenal 
docks from its primitive location in the area of San Anton. The Puente Giratorio 
(literally, swing bridge), as it was officially named, soon became known as El Perro 
Chico (literally, the little dog) because of the toll— five cents—that pedestrians had to
275 Adolfo de Ibarreta, “Proyecto De Reconstruccion Del Puente De Isabel II En Bilbao. Memoria,” 
Revista de Obras Publicas 1 (19), no. 24 (1876).
276 See Fernando de la Quadra Salcedo, “Calles De Bilbao. Puente De Isabel II,” P ropiedad  y  
Construccion  1934.
277 Villages in Biscay have historically been referred to as republicas or republics because they used to 
enjoy representation rights in the Gemika assembly. This made them politically equal to larger localities.
278 Ibarreta, “Proyecto De Reconstruccion Del Puente De Isabel II En Bilbao. Memoria.”
179
pay. Five cents was the smallest existing currency unit at the time, and was popularly 
called a perra chica.
Both new constructions, the bridge and the spectacular neo-baroque city hall, mirrored 
B ilbao’s increasing economic power and geographical scope o f  influence. As the 
inhabitants o f Abando had feared when the Isabel II bridge was constructed in the 
1840s, Bilbao eventually succeeded in annexing the historically independent republic. 
This occurred in 1872. H alf a century later, in 1924, the anteiglesias279 o f Begona and 
Deusto followed the same fate, becoming part o f  m odem  Bilbao. The plans for an 
extension o f the city on the left bank, across the former republic o f A bando’s domains, 
began to materialise, as did the project for a more secure iron drawbridge with which to 
replace the swing bridge Perro Chico, and another project for a new drawbridge 
between Abando and Deusto.
#
Fig. 5.5 The Perro Chico with the city hall in the background (1894) (Archivo Foral de Bizkaia).
279 Anteiglesia, literally “ante-church”, is another term traditionally used in the Basque Country to refer to 
a village or municipal district that used to enjoy representation rights. The term suggests that these nuclei 
once emerged close to or around rural churches.
180
5.2 Building modern Bilbao— the construction of two new drawbridges
5.2.1 Urban plans
The bridges played a significant role in the design of modern and contemporary Bilbao 
as soon as they became key sections of the major thoroughfares or axes that structured 
the layout of the city. Furthermore, the exact location of the drawbridges had to be 
planned in accordance with the new extension proposals. A brief chronological review 
of the most relevant urban plans brings us back to July 1872, when the city council 
approved the first plan for the extension of Bilbao in the recently annexed fields of 
Abando. The project, which built on earlier plans that never materialised, was designed
by architect Severino Achucarro and engineers Pablo de Alzola and Ernesto
280Hoffmeyer. This was merely the beginning of a series of planning initiatives that 
picked up in the 1920s. In 1921, Secundino Zuazo designed a new partial street plan for 
Bilbao in response to the need to incorporate the traditional street grid of old Bilbao 
into the new grid of the extended city. Zuazo’s much praised Reforma viaria parcial del 
interior de Bilbao (Partial inner street-grid reorganisation) was based on creating a 
broad axis across El Arenal bridge. The plan was never implemented, but remained a 
guiding principle for future projects. Ricardo Bastida’s Plano de Enlaces de Bilbao 
(Road Connection Plan) followed in 1923. To the architect, Bilbao encompassed more 
than what strictly belonged to its municipal boundaries. Bastida anticipated Bilbao’s 
transformation into a metropolitan area in need of well-designed, large-scale 
urbanisation and road plans. He is often regarded as a visionary, and even though his
plan was never carried out, it allegedly inspired later interventions. After the urban
} 0  1
planning competition that was held in 1926, municipal technicians, notably 
Estanislao Segurola, took over the development of a definitive proposal, using some of 
the ideas presented in the competition. In the summer of 1929, a comprehensive urban 
plan for Bilbao and the newly annexed areas was officially presented and approved.
280 As noted earlier, Alzola was the designer o f  the new San Francisco bridge, and Hoffmeyer had 
designed the stone and brick version o f  La Merced bridge.
281 Among the entries was a much commented avant-garde contribution by German architect Otto Biinz 
and Spanish Fernando Garcia Mercadal, a member o f  the GATEPAC— the Spanish branch o f  the 
CIRPAC. International urban planning competitions became more and more common in Spain after 1924 
when a law was passed officially regulating their terms and conditions.
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fVg. 5.6 Bilbao ca / 900, showing (he old city on the right bank and the gradually growing extension on the 
left bank across the fields o f  Abando. The black lines show the rail system (Institut Cartografic de Catalunya).
Fig. 5.7 Section o f  Zuazo's 1921 Plan, showing the plan to develop the Arenal bridge (to the right) into a key 
axis communicating Abando and old Bilbao (Ayuntamiento de Bilbao).
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UJ Fig. 5.8 Secundino Zuazo. Reforma viaria parcial del interior de Bilbao (1923) (Ayuntamiento de Bilbao).
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Fig. 5.9 Ricardo Bastida. Plano de Enlaces de Bilbao con los pueblos colindantes (1923) (Ayuntamiento de Bilbao).
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5.2.2 The drawbridges
The debate around the construction of the drawbridges ran parallel to the urban 
planning discussions and went on for several years, sometimes becoming quite 
controversial. The bridges were costly projects, and not everyone was convinced of 
their necessity. Those who defended their construction—among them Ramon de la Mar, 
a professor at the Nautical School of Bilbao— pointed to foreign examples such as the 
Madison bridge in Chicago, emphasising that ship traffic in the Ria had to remain 
dynamic and that these were the best bridge infrastructures available to ensure that the 
river was not sealed off further downstream by additional fixed bridges.282
Eventually, in June 1928, engineers Jose Ortiz de Artinano and Ignacio de Rotaetxe 
were commissioned for the definitive projects for the two new drawbridges, the 
Ayuntamiento (Council) bridge and the Deusto bridge. O f the two, the Ayuntamiento 
bridge, in front of the city hall, was deemed the most urgent.283
5.2.2.1 The project fo r  the Ayuntamiento or Begoha bridge
Less than a year later, on the 1st of April 1929, the engineers handed in the project for
284the Ayuntamiento bridge, and the construction works soon commenced. At the time, 
probably few people expected that it would take more than a decade to complete the 
new drawbridge, which in the meantime became known as the Begona bridge and also 
the Buenos Aires bridge. In a way, each of the three names highlighted the different 
motivations behind its construction. It was the Ayuntamiento bridge because it was 
built in front of the city hall with the aim of creating a direct link between the new 
administrative centre of Bilbao and the modem extension of the city in Abando. In fact, 
the new location of the city hall itself seemed to be the result of a compromise between 
not abandoning the right riverbank, where old Bilbao was founded, and moving as close 
as possible to what gradually had become the residential headquarters of the industrial 
bourgeoisie, and soon the actual city centre. Furthermore, it was the Begona bridge, 
because it ensured that the annexed district of Begona effectively became part of the
282 Ram6n de la Mar, “Del Bilbao Futuro. El Puente De La Calle De Buenos Aires,” Vida Vasca 1927.
283 Apparently, recent floods had badly affected the docks at La Ribera and part o f  the foundations o f  El 
Arenal bridge. It therefore seemed sensible to construct a supplementary bridge to secure road traffic 
communication between the two riverbanks in case El Arenal (Isabel II) failed. See Ibid.
284 Fomento Ano 1948/Seccion XIV/Legajo 765/Numero 1292, “Proyecto De Construction Del Puente 
De Deusto,” (Archivo Municipal de Bilbao).
185
new Bilbao. Finally, it became known as the Buenos Aires bridge because it was the 
continuation of Buenos Aires street. The two latter denominations point to the 
increasing importance of city planning and traffic regulation. As already implied, when 
conceiving of the new bridges and deciding on their location, these were seen less as 
independent infrastructures with the sole aim of securing communication between the 
two riverbanks, and more as elements of a general plan of streets and accesses.
A special office, the Oficina Municipal Tecnica de Puentes Moviles (OMTPM’, 
Drawbridges Municipal Technical Office), was created to manage the construction of 
the two bridges and the contract for the works was awarded to Sociedad Espahola de 
Construcciones Babcock & Wilcox, the Spanish branch of a renowned company from 
the United States that specialised in the design of steam boilers for power supply.285 It 
was agreed that the Ayuntamiento bridge would be financed at three governmental 
levels: the city council (50 per cent), the Biscay provincial deputyship (25 per cent) and
•JQf.
the central administration (25 per cent). The municipal records suggest that the works 
suffered several delays from the start probably because of the alterations that were 
introduced to the original design as the works progressed and the sometimes difficult 
relations between the city council and the contractor.287
5.2.2.2 The project fo r  the Deusto bridge
The project for the Deusto bridge took longer to design, partly because its location was 
not as clear to the city council as that of the Begona bridge. The Junta de Obras del 
Puerto, the port authority, had recently approved a plan to exploit commercially the San 
Mames lowland on the left riverbank, which the new bridge was purportedly going to 
cross, hence forcing the OMTPM to adapt the bridge to this earlier plan.288 The city 
council requested that the Biscay provincial council sponsor 50 per cent of the works 
since, it was argued, the Deusto bridge was in the interest of the provincial council as it
285 Babcock & W ilcox, today a large multinational company, was founded in 1867 by two partners in 
Rhode Island. In 1902, the company powered the first underground in N ew  York City.
286 Fomento Ano 1948/Seccion XIV/Legajo 718/Numero 3, “Construccion Del Puente D e Begona 
(Continuacion) (Ejecucion De Obras),” (Archivo Municipal de Bilbao).
287 See Ibid.
288 Fomento Ano 1948/Seccion XIV/Legajo 765/Numero 1292, “Proyecto De Construccion Del Puente 
De Deusto.” See also, Fomento Ano 1948/Secci6n XIV/Legajo 766/Numero 1294, “Estudio De La 
Reforma De Proyecto Del Puente De Deusto En Relation Con La Utilization De Los Terrenos De La 
Vega De San Mames Por La Junta De Obras Del Puerto Zona Maritima,” (Archivo Municipal de Bilbao).
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980would become part o f Biscay’s wider provincial road network.“ In early February 
1931, the city council organised the bid for the works. The project presented by 
Babcock & W ilcox for the construction o f  the metallic parts, internal m echanisms and 
electric equipm ent in the moving section was selected and approved, while Compahia 
Anonima Basconia was commissioned to construct the foundations, the viaduct and the 
pillars. Thus, the responsibilities for the fixed and the m oving parts o f the drawbridge 
were clearly separated. As the works progressed, several other companies became 
involved such as Sociedad Espahola de Construccion Naval, Construcciones Gamboay 
Domingo, Sociedad Retolaza y Compahia Limitada and Sociedad Anonima 
Entrecanales y  Tavora, which had all taken part in the initial bidding. However, 
Basconia continued to act as the leading company.
Fig. 5.10 The San Mames lowland (within the dotted line) and the 
projected bridge in Zuazo's Plan (Ayuntamiento de Bilbao).
Significantly, perhaps, the works commenced on the 14th o f April 1932, which was the 
first anniversary o f the proclamation o f the Second Republic. Engineers Roatetxe and 
Otriz de Artinano, who designed the original projects, were hired to direct the works, 
which developed in clearly differentiated stages. The initial stage entailed a num ber o f 
expropriations, which resulted in the accumulation o f  large amounts o f  materials from 
the expropriated and dem olished buildings and constructions. M ost o f  these were
289 There had long been plans for a tunnel north o f  the city, through Artxanda. The Deusto bridge would 
lead incoming traffic directly to the centre o f  modem Bilbao.
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recycled.290 The total time for completion of the bridge had been estimated at 30 
months, and this was apparently the duration officially agreed on. Thus, the Deusto 
drawbridge should have been ready for use by mid-October 1934.
5.3 The war and the bridges
By mid-July 1936, when the military coup took place, the drawbridges remained 
unfinished. The conflict that spread across the Spanish territory forced port cities like 
Bilbao into exceptionally challenging political and administrative situations. Although 
shipping traffic continued to use the port of Bilbao after the outbreak of the war, it 
became more and more threatened by the close presence of rebel ships and by the 
hundreds of mines that the rebels, mainly their German allies, placed in the immediate 
area of the port. In view of these challenges, and to complement the efforts of the 
Republican naval force, the Basque government created its own military fleet. The aims 
were to protect merchant ships carrying food and (military) supplies and foreign ships 
trading with other loyalist port cities in northern Spain, to obstruct the traffic to and 
from the rebel ports in the north-west, to clear the coast-line from mines and, finally, to 
secure maritime communication with France. The latter became indispensable for the 
Basque government as the northern fringe was soon cut off from the main Republican 
zone and the only possible route to reach the Republican central government was 
through France.291 The relevance of the port of Bilbao was further manifested during 
the spring of 1937 when, as the rebel troops progressively advanced into Biscay, a 
number o f ships—many of them British— left the port carrying thousands o f refugees, 
mostly children, to other countries in Europe and America.292
5.3.1 Material shortages and pressure to finish the drawbridges 
When the war commenced, the teams responsible for the works on the drawbridges 
faced sudden shortages of materials, while at the same time they were being pressurised 
by the city council to accelerate the completion of the bridges. As early as August 1936,
290 Fomento Ano 1948/Seccion XIV/Legajo 766/Numero 1299, “Dem olition Y Aprovechamiento De 
Materiales De Los Edificios Expropriados Para La Construccion Del Puente De Deusto,” (Archivo 
Municipal de Bilbao).
291 Jose Antonio Aguirre, El Informe D el Presidente Aguirre A l G obiem o D e La Republica. Sobre Los 
Hechos Que Determinaron El Derrumbamiento D el Norte (1937) (Bilbao: Editorial La Gran 
Enciclopedia Vasca, 1978).
292 For a detailed account o f  the British Royal N avy’s role involvement in the transportation o f  Basque 
refugees, see James Cable, The Royal Navy and the Siege o f  Bilbao (Cambdrige, London, New York, 
N ew  Rochelle, Melbourne, Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
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Babcock & Wilcox called for a three-month extension to complete the works on the 
Begona bridge, alleging it was impossible to receive the materials required on time 
because o f the growing insecurity on the roads. Some essential building parts were kept 
in Barcelona and others in Germany. Moreover, the Basque Defence Committee had 
imposed restrictions on the consumption of electric power, which had a direct impact on 
the rhythm of the works, as had the reduced availability of staff since many workers had 
been called to the front. By early December 1936 the situation had not improved. 
Babcock & Wilcox now tried to request an indefinite extension of the contract for as 
long as the “circumstances that had caused the military uprising” lasted. But Spanish 
administrative law did not permit such a possibility, and the company was left to ask for 
the maximum extension once more—another three months. The city council was keen 
on opening the bridge as soon as possible, even if only for pedestrians at first.294 
According to secondary sources, the Begona bridge was provisionally opened on the 
12th of December 1936.295
Basconia and partners, the contractors for the Deusto bridge, also encountered problems 
in getting materials delivered from other cities in Spain.296 And other difficulties 
emerged too. A particularly dramatic letter from the Sociedad Espanola de 
Construccion Naval, one of the subsidiary companies involved in the works, arrived at 
Basconia’s offices in August 1936. In the letter, the director of the Bilbao branch of 
Construccion Naval explained that the factory had been completely cut off from its 
headquarters in Madrid (no mail, telegraph or telephone communications were any 
longer possible). As a result, the local office ran out o f funds to pay its 1,500 
employees. The director feared that the workers would eventually find the situation 
unsustainable and organise a protest, something which, he argued, could have 
unpredictable consequences in an already politically critical situation. He therefore 
urged the city council to disburse part of the payment for the works carried out on the 
Deusto bridge to enable the company’s staff to be paid.297 In the early days of the war in
293 Fomento Ano 1948/Seccion XIV/Legajo 718/Numero 3, “Construccion Del Puente De Begona 
(Continuation) (Ejecucion De Obras).”
294 Ibid.
295 See Ifiaki Uriarte, “Los Puentes Levadizos D e Bilbao,” Periodico B ilbao , December 2006, 39.
296 Fomento Ano 1940/Seccion XIV/Legajo 360/Numero 848, “Apertura Provisional A1 Trafico Del 
Puente De Deusto,” (Archivo Municipal de Bilbao).
297 Fomento Afio 1943/Secci6n XIV/Legajo 493/Numero 679, “Relaciones Valoradas De Las Obras De 
Construccion Del Puente De Deusto,” (Archivo Municipal de Bilbao).
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the Basque Country, the threat of social upheaval was something that both the Basque 
industrialists and Bilbao’s municipal administration took seriously.
5.3.2 Provisional opening o f the Deusto bridge
There was also significant pressure from the city council on the contractors working on 
the Deusto bridge. In mid-September 1936, the city council requested that Basconia and 
partners promptly devise a plan to open the almost finished drawbridge, even if it had to 
be on provisional terms and subject to restrictions. Along with increased port activity, 
the war had brought growing car traffic to Bilbao, which particularly burdened the 
environs of the railway station, the Arenal bridge and other nodal points in the city, and 
the Deusto bridge was expected to alleviate such burden.
By late November, the conditions for a premature opening of the Deusto bridge were 
agreed. The bridge would be open to vehicles and pedestrians only during daytime, 
from seven in the morning to five in the afternoon. Measures were also taken to ensure 
that the circulation of cars and pedestrians were not to obstruct the works that would 
continue to take place on the unfinished parts of the bridge.298
As the military line moved closer to Bilbao, new problems in relation to the Deusto 
bridge arose. In May 1937, the municipal guard, who had been responsible for the 
surveillance and provisional operation of the drawbridge, was apparently no longer able 
to take up his post. Without somebody supervising the opening and closing of the 
drawbridge, there was a high risk of accidents, and the engineers overseeing the works 
on the bridge advised the city council to find a solution to this problem quickly. Almost 
at the same time, the mayor received a communication from the Basque Defence 
Department requesting the council to authorise the use and accommodation of a section 
of the substructure of the bridge to locate a group of military vehicles. The Defence 
Department contended that the substructure of the bridge was a particularly adequate 
location because it could not be seen from the air, in other words, by the enemy aircraft.
298 Fomento Ano 1940/Seccion XIV/Legajo 360/Numero 848, “Apertura Provisional A1 Trafico Del 
Puente De Deusto.”
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5.3.3 The use o f  the Deusto bridge to hide military supplies
The city council had probably little option to refuse the Defence Department’s demand 
and issued the requested authorisation. However, it soon turned out that the military’s 
use of the Deusto bridge was not limited to the storage of vehicles. The mayor received 
a number of reports that indicated that various workshops (mechanical, metallurgical, 
electric and carpentry), a general storage room and 60 vehicles were being installed 
under the left section of the bridge. Towards the end of May, the mayor wrote to the 
Defence Department claiming that the city council’s authorisation had not envisaged 
the kind of facilities that were being put into place. According to the mayor, these 
“turned the Deusto bridge into a war objective, creating a serious risk for such an 
important and costly public work”.299 He offered alternative accommodation in the 
basements of various new buildings downtown, which he deemed safer and better 
located. Finally, he requested that building to accommodate the workshops and other 
facilities under the bridge be put on hold.
Either the Defence Department did not change its orders or the troops in Bilbao ignored 
the new orders, but new reports reached the city council stating that the installation 
works were continuing. In early June, not even two weeks before the rebel occupation 
of Bilbao and the loyalists’ destruction of the bridges, the city council agreed to refer 
the issue to the Defence Department for a second time. The council members were 
particularly concerned about the military staffs use of the transversal beams for 
hanging utensils and machinery since this could potentially damage the general 
structure of the bridge. In their appeal to the Defence Department, the city council 
demanded that if the use of the bridge for other purposes than the ones it had initially 
authorised was indispensable, the military should at least allow the presence o f a 
municipal technician to supervise the works in order to avoid any potential harm to the 
structure.300
This kind of misunderstanding and recrimination was not uncommon during the war in 
the interactions between, on the one hand, military and civilian authorities, and on the 
other, central, regional and local authorities. In times of war, the logic of exception that
299 Fomento Ano 1948/Seccion XIV/Legajo 718/Numero 3, “Construccion Del Puente De Begona 
(Continuation) (Ejecucion De Obras).”
300 Ibid.
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underpins much decision-making, especially military decisions, seems to coexist with 
the logic of normality, which civilian institutions continue to apply in their attempt to 
carry on with things as usual for as much and as long as possible.
5.4 The offensive against Bilbao and the destruction of the bridges
5.4.1 The dynamiting o f the bridges
While the city council tried to stop the military’s hazardous appropriation of the Deusto 
bridge, the rebel troops approached Bilbao at a rapid pace, thanks to their successful 
air-land cooperation strategy. In the second week of June 1937, they were able to break 
through the fortification system that the Basque-Republican troops had built in the 
mountains around the city, the so-called cinturon de hierro or iron ring of Bilbao. The 
loyalist troops began to retreat from the hilltops in increasingly chaotic formations. The 
Basque government decided to evacuate civilians, and soon the city was under direct 
attack from the rebel artillery. The rebels drew near the city from the south, advancing 
from the hills Malmasin and Pasagarri, and the few loyalist troops that remained in 
Bilbao desperately tried to resist the artillery fire and the air-raids throughout the 17th 
and 18th of June, soon realising they were powerless against the rebels’ numerical
1  A  1
advantage and the superiority of their technical means. A last move to prevent the 
enemy from taking over the city was attempted by blowing up the bridges over the Ria. 
Although it is somewhat unclear who exactly gave the order to dynamite the bridges, 
some sources point to Jesus Maria de Leizaola, a member of both the Basque 
government and Bilbao’s Defence Committee. Hence, on the eve of the 19th, the 
remnants of the Basque and loyalist troops abandoned the city and moved westward, 
leaving behind them the smoking ruins of San Anton, La Merced, San Francisco, El 
Arenal, Begona, Perro Chico, Deusto and Vizcaya. Eight bridges in total were wrecked.
301 See Luis Maria and Juan Carlos Jimenez de Aberasturi, La Guerra En Euskadi (Barcelona: Plaza y 
Janes, 1978 )5 0 ,9 1 .
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Fig. 5.11 View o f  the Begona bridge destroyed, seen from  the right riverbank (July 1937) (Archivo Foral de 
Bizkaia).
Fig. 5.12 The Deusto br dge destroyed (1937) (Archivo Foral de Bizkaia).
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5.4.2 Motivations fo r  the destruction o f the bridges
The destruction of the bridges across the Nervion river was a standard military 
procedure aimed at obstructing the occupation of localities regardless of whether, in this 
case, the formula would effectively hinder the rebels’ seizure of Bilbao. There are other, 
similar, instances of last-minute, militarily pointless destructions of bridges such as the 
Nazis dynamiting Heidelberg’s bridge at the end of March 1945, one day before the 
Allies took over the German city. Like most acts of war, the interpretation of these 
instances of destruction seems to depend on the perspective from which they are looked 
at.
5.4.2.1 A Basque-Republican perspective
From a perspective that is sensitive to the situation of the Basque-Republicans, it is 
suggested that the destruction of the bridges of Bilbao can be interpreted by considering 
three factors. First, the wartime debate within the Basque-Republican leadership on the 
rationality of destroying Bilbao’s factories before they were taken over by the rebels. 
Second, the Basque population’s sense of abandonment, their perception that the central 
government had not adequately supported them, especially as they had not sent them 
more aerial support. And third, the defection of a number of Basque-Republican 
officers towards the end of the campaign in Biscay.
In his 1937 report to the Republican government, Jose Antonio Aguirre, the Basque 
president, explained why the northern front had fallen, and claimed that the total 
destruction of Bilbao’s factories—mainly metallurgical factories and shipyards—was 
never contemplated by the Basque authorities. Instead, the aim had been to render the 
industrial machinery useless by removing or destroying small but key parts. According 
to Aguirre, the Basque-Republican leadership envisioned their possible return to Bilbao 
and “did not want to recall their own barbarism represented in the destruction of the 
work of various generations”, adding that “this might seem quite romantic from the 
outside, [b]ut this is what our people thought”.302 But, as Aguirre himself noted, there 
were also many who had argued against the preservation of the Bilbaoan industries,
302 “[••■] y no quisieramos recordar nuestra propia barbarie representada en la destruccion del trabajo de 
varias generaciones. Esto desde fuera podr& parecer un tanto romantico. Pero as! pensaba el pueblo.” 
Aguirre, El Informe D el Presidente Aguirre Al Gobierno D e La Republica. Sobre Los Hechos Que 
Determinaron El Derrumbamiento D el Norte (1937) 186.
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claiming that the factories would notably improve the rebels’ war capacity if they came 
into their hands.
Furthermore, many Basques shared the feeling that the Republican central government 
had held an ambivalent attitude about defending the Basque Country as this involved 
defending Basque autonomy too. As explained earlier, the autonomy was granted three 
months after the conflict broke out. Thus, the central government’s apparent 
unwillingness to send air support to resist the Luftwaffe’s relentless raids was 
interpreted by some Basques as a sign of the Republican leadership’s half-hearted 
acceptance of the Basques’ new political status. Aguirre’s report included a compelling 
series of official notes exchanged between members of the central government and the 
Basque government which point to these underlying tensions.303
If abandonment was an increasingly recurrent sentiment among the Basque-loyalist 
troops in the weeks prior to the fall of Bilbao, defection was soon added to the picture. 
The number of Basque-Republican officers who fled or changed sides increased as the 
prospects of a Republican victory declined. Among them was military engineer 
Alejandro Goicoechea, the main designer and coordinator of the construction of the iron 
ring of Bilbao and two of his aides, who were caught in flagranti passing the plans of 
the ring to rebel officials. While his aides were arrested and executed by the 
Republicans, Goicoechea managed to cross to the rebels’ side, taking all the plans with 
him. He was hence able to inform the rebel commanders about the weakest points of the 
unfinished ring, which, it has been argued by officers who fought defending Bilbao, 
was in any case not as solid and unbreakable as it had been made to seem. Ultimately, 
the Basque-Republican troops’ excessive trust in the defensive iron ring might even 
have contributed to their defeat, stopping them from devising alternative defensive 
strategies which might have been more effective.304
In view of all the above, the decision to dynamite the bridges might also have been a 
more or less conscious reaction to the cautious approach taken to the Bilbaoan industry. 
Since the factories were essentially spared, the destruction of the bridges was possibly
303 Many years later, Aguirre him self acknowledged that the shortage o f  air support had probably been 
the result o f  the central government’s practical inability to assist the Basques— having to attend various 
fronts at the same time— rather than any premeditated unwillingness to do so.
304 Jimenez de Aberasturi, La Guerra En Euskadi 190.
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seen as a last opportunity to undermine the rebels’ victory. Moreover, among the few 
Basque-loyalist leaders and troops that remained in Bilbao until its fall, the sentiment of 
abandonment and despair must have been strong. These men might have felt little 
incentive to ponder the consequences of the destruction of the bridges, even if they 
possibly contemplated a Republican re-conquest of the city. Ultimately, the dynamiting 
o f the bridges constituted a standard military procedure aimed at leaving havoc behind, 
and making reconstruction difficult for the enemy.
5.4.2.2 From the Nacionales ’ perspective
The rebels or Nacionales’ accounts of the fall of Bilbao coincide with the appreciation 
that the iron ring was not as strong as it had been made to seem, its technical
o n e
weaknesses soon detected by their troops. There was probably a need to exaggerate 
the military incompetence of the Republicans in these accounts, but what seems 
unquestionable is that the Bilbaoan fortification system lacked second and third defence 
lines to which the loyalist troops could have retreated. So, once the first defence line 
was breached there was nothing else stopping the rebels from progressing into the city.
While the iron ring was retrospectively mocked by the rebels as a kind of a giant with 
mud feet, the destruction of the bridges was dramatically condemned. Franco’s 
supporters were keen on underscoring that there was absolutely no military reasoning 
behind the Republicans’ destruction of the bridges, since the city was completely 
surrounded when the latter were blown up and it served little purpose to cut off the two 
riverbanks. According to the rebels, the destructive act could only be attributed to the 
barbarous and soulless behaviour of the Basque-Republican troops as they fled Bilbao.
Indeed, the image of half-sunk decks, twisted iron frames and massive chunks of debris 
in the midst of the smoking waterscape left by the explosions o f the bridges must have 
constituted a spectacular and disturbing scene. The rebels quickly turned the situation in 
their favour. The expression “Red-Marxist and separatist barbarism” as the motivation 
for these destructive acts was soon coined, and would appear with slight variations in 
most post-war discourses portraying the events of the 19th of June. Aside from this 
relatively successful propaganda exercise aimed at discrediting the Basque-
305 See, for example, Spectator, “Bilbao Y El Famoso Cinturon De Hierro, Meta De La Campana De 
Vizcaya,” Reconstruccion, November 1940, 15.
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Republicans, the rebels turned the destruction of the bridges into an opportunity for 
providing the Ria with an early marker of what they saw as the triumphant New Spain. 
The new bridges would be introduced to the public as one of the first great 
reconstruction achievements of the new regime. Moreover, in emphasising “the Red- 
Marxists’ barbarous destruction” against the new regime’s efficient reconstruction 
process, an image of construction from scratch rather than reconstruction of what was 
already there was implicitly transmitted to Bilbaoans.
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fFig. 5.13 View o f  the destroyed Perro Chico in the foreground and the Begona bridge in the background 
(July 1937) (Archivo Foral de Bizkaia).
Fig. 5.14 Provisional gangway supported on the destroyed San Francisco bridge (Archivo Foral de Bizkaia).
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Part II
5.1 The reconstruction of the fixed bridges: shaping the New Spain
5.1.1 Commander Arbex ’s pontoon bridge
Provisional bridges were set up during the first days after the explosions. Some years 
later, m ayor Zuazagoitia referred to the "‘alm ost magical em ergence o f Com m ander 
A rbex’s pontoon bridge” in the days immediately after the Nacionales took over 
B ilbao.306 It may be worth noting that com m ander Arbex was in charge o f  part o f the 
Basque-loyalist battalions but defected to the rebels shortly after their seizure o f Bilbao. 
In 1951, the brothers Gortazar and Smith Ibarra dedicated one o f  the verses in their long 
“poem ” on the history o f the bridges to the pontoon bridge, which was provisionally 
laid out close to the ruins o f El Arenal. The bridge was improved as days went by and 
remained for months before it was removed. A num ber o f photographs show soldiers 
and ordinary Bilbaoans crossing the structure as if  it were a regular bridge. Today, a 
plaque by the river reminds passers-by o f  the bridge’s ephemeral, yet notable 
existence.307
Fig. 5.15 The pontoon bridge next to the destroyed Arenal bridge (1937) (Archivo Foral de Bizkaia).
306 Fomento Ano 1940/Seccion XIV/Legajo 277/Numero 109, “Inauguration Del Puente Del 
Generallsimo Franco Y Demas Actos Que Se Celebraran El 25 De Octubre De 1939. Ano De La Victoria 
Y Monumento a Churruca.,” (Archivo Municipal de Bilbao).
307 Gortazar, Gortazar, and Smith Ibarra, Bajo Los Puentes De Bilbao.
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On the 24th of June, five days after the rebels’ entry in Bilbao, the newly appointed city 
council decided to “immediately and definitely reconstruct the six bridges that had been
IrtO
totally or partially destroyed by the red-separatist [sic] barbarism”. In order to 
finance these works, the city council initially set up an exceptional credit account, 
which it regularly credited with the funds from the Presupuesto Extraordinario 
(Extraordinary Budget) that had been approved for 1937. Later on, the city council 
would seek the support of other administrative entities, but the main priority was to 
begin the reconstruction of the bridges as quickly as possible.309 Unsurprisingly, 
perhaps, the names of the bridges were changed to honour the rebels’ victory and their 
war heroes, except that of San Anton bridge, which was allowed to keep its name 
because of its importance in Bilbaoan tradition. It was probably not in the interest of the 
Nacionales to upset traditionalist Bilbaoans, whose support was, of course, welcomed. 
The San Francisco footbridge became Colonel Ortiz de Zarate’s bridge; La Merced, 
General Sanjurjo’s; and El Arenal became La Victoria (The Victory) bridge. The most 
important names were reserved for the drawbridges: Begona was named after General 
Mola,310 and Deusto after Generalisimo Franco.
By mid-August, barely two months after the explosions, the city council agreed to 
organise a public exhibition of the projects for the fixed bridges.311 There is no evidence 
of when and where the exhibition was held, nor what the public’s response to it was. 
What seems clear, however, is that the municipality was keen to accelerate the 
reconstruction process as much as possible by avoiding unnecessary internal 
negotiations and paperwork. In October, the Comision de Fomento, the municipal 
Public Works Committee, decided to hand over full responsibility for the reconstruction 
of the fixed bridges to the Oficina Municipal Tecnica de Puentes Fijos (OMTPF), the
308 Fomento Ano 1941/Seccion XIV/Legajo 411/Numero 6, “Fomento. Subvencion Del Estado Por 
Reconstruction De Puentes Fijos,” (Archivo Municipal de Bilbao).
309 It is important to note that the reconstruction o f  the four fixed bridges was funded and coordinated 
separately from that o f  the two drawbridges (and the hanging bridge at the end o f  the Ria) from the 
start— such division is also implicit in the historical examination o f  the bridges carried out in the previous 
sections.
310 General Mola had been one o f  the leaders o f  the coup, more prominent than Franco initially, and was 
particularly involved in the northern campaign until he died in an air crash shortly before the seizure o f  
Bilbao.
311 Fomento Ano 1937/Seccion XIV/Legajo 241/Numero 375, “Exposicidn De Proyectos De Puentes 
Fijos,” (Archivo Municipal de Bilbao).
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Fixed Bridges Municipal Technical Office, in order to prevent “the administrative kick- 
about” .312
5.1.2 "A severe and acceptable ensemble ”
The demolition of the remains still standing and the clearance of the scattered debris ran 
parallel to the actual reconstruction works. Andres Yurrita was commissioned to 
demolish El Arenal bridge in mid-August 1937.313 By mid-October, shortly after the 
OMTPF took over full responsibility for the works, San Francisco bridge had been 
demolished, and demolition of the San Anton, La Merced and El Arenal bridges was 
almost completed. The metallic parts of the fixed bridges were recycled, and there is 
evidence of how portions of them were used to manufacture war supplies. Several 
companies showed an interest in the metal structures as scrap.314
Reconstruction works took place almost continuously (workers resting only on 
Sundays) on those elements that were deemed most urgent, such as the compressed air 
caissons.3]S The sinking of the caissons into the Ria proved exceptionally laborious as 
broken pieces of ashlar blocks from the destroyed bridges were hit in doing so, and had 
to be removed before it was possible to continue the sinking. As the demolition works 
and the gradual reconstruction of the foundations proceeded, the new metallic frames 
for the spans were assembled at different workshops such as the famous Altos Homos 
de Vizcaya. The Altos Homos, like most of the Biscayan industries, had been spared 
from destruction during the Biscay war campaign. The spans were in most cases close 
to completion and ready to be brought on site by November 1937.
312 “[P]ara evitar el peloteo administrative)”. Fomento Afio 1940/Seccion XIV/Legajo 332/Numero 9, 
“Proyectos Completos De Los Cuatro Puentes Fijos,” (Archivo Municipal de Bilbao).
3.3 Fomento Ano 1940/Seccion XIV/Legajo 354/Numero 741, “Desguace Y Enajenacion De Chatarra 
Procedente Del Derruido Puente De Isabel II,” (Archivo Municipal de Bilbao).
3.4 M aquinariay Metalurgia Aragonesa, Sociedad Anonima Echevarria de Siderurgia y  Metalurgia, 
Torre Aspiazu y  Compahia, and Sociedad Espahola de Construction Naval. Construction Naval, for 
example, returned a shipment in November 1937 on the basis that it was o f  bad quality, but then accepted 
a 12-ton load o f  wrought iron in March 1938. That same month, Torre Aspiazu accepted a load o f  150 
kilos o f  bronze.
315 These are the watertight structures that have to be sunk into the water for workers to be able to lay or 
repair the foundations o f  a bridge.
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The OMTPF handed in bimonthly reports detailing the progress made on each bridge, 
but it was not until late April 1938 that the director, Jose Entrecanales Ibarra,316 
delivered the full description and plans for the four bridges to the mayor. By then the
 ^1 7
works were at a fairly advanced stage. In his report, Entrecanales began by thanking 
the city council, the Jefatura de Obras Publicas and the Junta de Obras del Puerto for 
having facilitated things for the Office, trusting its judgement and allowing it to carry 
on with the projects without requesting any information. Entrecanales then went on to 
explain the “fundamental ideas” that had inspired the drafting of the projects, ideas 
which, he added,
“will soon be forgotten because of the normality the city has fortunately 
achieved under the new city council of the Nacionales, and to which the 
reconstruction of the bridges has significantly contributed”.318
The first idea had been to accomplish the works within the shortest possible timeframe 
by taking advantage of the existing foundations. This had been feasible in all four cases, 
with the exception of the General Sanjurjo bridge. Second, the engineers had sought to 
serve different aesthetic purposes with each of the bridges. The San Anton bridge had 
been reconstructed in a deliberately non-modem style, thereby respecting the city’s coat 
of arms, which depicts the San Anton church and the bridge. The Colonel Ortiz de 
Zarate footbridge, former San Francisco, and the General Sanjurjo bridge, former La 
Merced, had been designed with road planning in mind and with the goal of devising 
practical solutions to car traffic on the right riverbank. Finally, in the case of La 
Victoria bridge, the former Arenal bridge, priority had been given to the perspective of 
the bridge itself from the foreshortening points of view on each riverbank. Furthermore, 
the choice of “predominantly vertical elements” in the design of the bridge had been 
carefully explained and justified in an earlier, internal report, which argued that vertical
1  I Q
bars would emphasise the contrast with the other bridges. The appearance of the
316 Jose Entrecanales Ibarra, a prestigious Basque civil engineer, and Manuel T£vora, from Seville, 
founded the construction company Entrecanales y Tavora in 1931, which gradually grew into one o f  the 
largest and most influential Spanish companies at present. It recently changed its name to Acciona.
317 Fomento Afio 1940/Seccion XIV/Legajo 332/Numero 9, “Proyectos Completos De Los Cuatro 
Puentes Fijos.”
318 “las ideas fundam entals [...] hoy prontas a olvidarse por la normalidad que la Villa afortunadamente 
ha conseguido bajo el Ayuntamiento Nacional de su Presidencia, y a la que ha contribuido en parte 
importante la reconstruction de los puentes” . Ibid.
319 Another reason was that vertical bars were deemed more economical since only two horizontal 
elements were then necessary to create a parapet. Finally, the vertical bars would harmonise with the 
stone elements better, the edges o f  which were also vertical, with no horizontal mouldings.
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bridge, its “personality” , was in this case more important than its function “as a street 
over the river” .320 It was after all the bridge that commemorated the Nacionales’ victory 
in Bilbao. Entrecanales also noted that a platform  on top o f  the Portugalete rail station 
was being constructed, the old one having been demolished. Since the platform  would 
probably come to affect the overall perspective o f  the Victory bridge, the Office had 
taken the precaution to design the bridge so that it would m eet the future platform at the 
same level, creating a harmonious view o f  the embankment.
Fig. 5.16 La Victoria, formerly Arenal bridge, meets the platform over the Portugalete station (undated) 
(scan o f a vintage postcard, adapted from the web).
On the whole, the head o f the OM TPF foresaw that the completion o f  the works in the 
near future would do full justice to the technical solutions applied by the engineers. 
Nevertheless, he em phasised that
“the bridges, because o f [the size of] their spans and budget— the latter being 
the result o f  the former and also o f  the concept that [had] animated the projects 
altogether— are very economical, that is, the bridges are, in general, modest 
works, as they ought to be in the circumstances the country is going through, the
320 Fomento Ano 1940/Seccion XIV/Legajo 332/Numero 9, “Proyectos Completos De Los Cuatro 
Puentes Fijos.”
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aim has been only to achieve, through simplicity and plain lines a severe 
and acceptable ensemble” (italics added).
A booklet for public distribution with the title Nuevos Puentes de Bilbao (Bilbao’s New 
Bridges) was subsequently published by the city council, introducing the “new” bridges 
one by one, more or less replicating Entrecanales’ descriptions. The booklet ended with 
a “message about the new bridges” in which mayor Zuazagoitia took the opportunity to 
divulge the story of their destruction, passionately elaborating on the infrahuman 
qualities of the demolishers. “Demented allies” in their “grotesque” love for a “non­
existent nation” (the Basque nation) and their “hypothetical defence of the privileges of 
a class” (the working class), managed to “shatter Bilbaoan life”:
“From that date, the tom stumps of broken stone and twisted iron reminded us 
that the Basque separatist with the fuse lit in his hand and the Red worker with 
the dynamite prepared in his hand had made their way over the bridges.”323
5.1.3 Markers o f the change o f regime
The early attempts at organising an exhibition of the designs for the new bridges and 
the subsequent publication of the projects seem indicative of the city council’s resolve 
to communicate with Bilbaoans, or at least communicate certain ideas to them. It is easy 
to identify the Nacionales’ intention to undermine the Basque-loyalists’ reputation by 
emphasising their allegedly barbarous and destructive nature, while exalting the change, 
order and efficiency brought about by themselves. One has to bear in mind that the 
conflict was still going on in other parts of Spain and that each side constantly sought to 
create as powerful propaganda discourses as possible. However, aside from nurturing 
the rebels’ wartime propaganda discourse, the promise of the coming of a new era, the 
birth of a New Spain, had actually materialised in this case in the design of the 
reconstructed fixed bridges, which bore none or little resemblance to the structures of 
the destroyed ones.
321 “[...] los puentes por sus luces y por su presupuesto— hijo de ellas y tambten del concepto que ha 
presidido los proyectos— es muy economico, es decir, los puentes son en general obras modestas como 
corresponde a las circunstancias actuales de la Patria, y se ha tratado unicamente de conseguir, mediante 
sencillez y Ilneas simples [...], un conjunto severo y aceptable”. Ibid.
322 Nuevos Puentes De Bilbao, (Bilbao: Ayuntamiento de Bilbao, 1938).
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The new concrete bridges, with their simple and straight lines, had indeed little in 
com m on with their predecessors and their typically nineteenth- and early twentieth- 
century display o f  sinuous curves and abundant decoration. The scarcity o f  materials 
and the harsh and austere atmosphere o f  wartim e Spain seemed to justify  the rationalist 
if  not minim alist aesthetic preference o f Entrecanales, Bastida and the other engineers 
and architects involved in the projects for the fixed bridges. Even though manifestations 
o f  the emergent regim e’s symbolic equipment such as the imperial eagle, “the yoke and 
the arrow s” (the Falangist symbol), and traditional Catholic motifs were subsequently 
added in the form o f sculptures and wrought iron; the fundamentally rationalist scheme 
o f  the bridges, their clearly m odem  and functional character, was not altered. Thus, 
while condem ning Basque workers and Basque Nationalists for their destructiveness, 
Zuizagoitia and other public voices on the rebel side must have implicitly 
acknowledged to themselves the opportunity that they had been left with in Bilbao to 
m ark physically the birth o f a New Spain.
Fig. 5.17 Photograph o f  stone ornamentation with 
"the yoke and the arrows ” taken in contemporary 
Valencia (adapted from the web).
The transition to a new order was further signalled by celebrating the official 
inauguration o f  the fixed bridges on the 19th o f  June 1938, the first anniversary o f  the 
rebels’ entry in Bilbao. None o f the four bridges was fully com pleted on that date, but 
one o f  the purposes o f this early inauguration was to indicate to Bilbaoans the 
efficiency o f  the new city council, and by extension, the Francoist government, as well
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as feeding the idea that the Nacionales had restored order and stability to Bilbao. Even 
though the bridges were opened to the public only provisionally and with several 
elements missing, the OMTPF had indeed proved fairly efficient in reconstructing their 
basic structures, all within the year of their destruction and while the war was still going 
on. The symbolic relevance of the new structures should probably not be 
underestimated, either. Bilbaoans who crossed the bridges daily were inevitably 
reminded of the war and the political change that had taken place in their city.324
In late January 1939, six months after the June inauguration, there were a number of 
pending works on the bridges. Some structural details had to be dealt with, but most 
unresolved issues had to do with ornamentation, such as decorating the buttresses of the 
San Anton bridge with the Falangist “yoke and arrows” emblem and adding sculptures 
of the wolves, Santiago and San Anton, finishing the handrail on the Colonel Ortiz de 
Zarate footbridge, and painting the four bridges.
324 It is sometimes argued that the everyday built environment constitutes a powerful medium through 
which populations internalise social and political codes. The codes are not necessarily inscribed in the 
built structures p e rs e ,  although one could say, for example, that monumental structures tend to produce 
feelings o f  distance and gravity. However, it is suggested that only when buildings and streets are able to 
evoke the history and sometimes explicit purpose o f  their construction (or destruction) in the viewer’s or 
user’s mind are they effectively transmitting or reinforcing particular codes.
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Fig. 5.18 San Anton (2006) (photographed by the author).
Fig. 5.19 La Merced/General Sanjurjo (2006) (photographed by the author).
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Fig. 5.20 San Francisco/Coronel Ortiz de Zarate (2006) (photographed by the author).
Fig. 5.21 Isabel ll/E l Arenal/La Victoria (2006) (photographed by the author).
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5.1.4 Funding the reconstruction process
While the OMTPF was busy resolving the final details of the reconstruction of the fixed 
bridges, the city council tried to work out the finances. As noted earlier, the 
reconstruction works were initially funded through the 1937 extraordinary municipal 
budget. But soon the city council became aware of the Burgos government’s 
reconstruction policies in other Spanish cities, and realised it could be entitled to state 
funding. In March 1939, close to the end of the war, the council discussed the 
possibility of applying for funding from the Junta de Obras del Puerto, the Biscay 
provincial deputyship and Franco’s administration. Eventually it addressed an official 
request to the Ministry of Public Works, explaining the exceptional challenges it had 
faced because o f the destruction of the bridges and cited several of the Burgos 
government’s regulations on reconstruction and financial aid for reconstruction.
The war was officially ended on the 1st of April 1939, after which the Burgos 
administration fully took over Spain’s government apparatus. More laws and decrees on 
reconstruction were issued in the following months, among them the Decree of 23rd 
September 1939, which governed the Head of State’s “adoption” of towns and villages 
that had been particularly damaged by the war. The mayor of Bilbao addressed a letter 
to the Minister of Governance (who was ultimately responsible for national 
reconstruction efforts) “pleading” that article 10 in the Decree of 23 September be 
applied to Bilbao. As noted in the previous chapter, Barcelona’s city council supported 
its claim for financial aid from the state on the same article. Article 10 opened up the 
possibility for city councils across Spain to seek partial financial assistance for 
reconstruction from the state even if  they did not qualify as “adoptable” localities. The 
article essentially stated that, without attaining the full condition of adoption, the 
municipalities that had suffered significant losses of their public infrastructures could 
receive state subsidies if  the Council of Ministers decided accordingly.325 No specific 
conditions were fixed as to what the level of losses ought to be in order for the Council 
of Ministers to consider them. It appears as if the only way for city councils to be
325 Ministerio de Gobemacion, “Decreto De 27 De Abril De 1940 Por El Que Se Concede A1
Ayuntamiento De Bilbao La Subvention Del 50 Por Ciento De Los Gastos D e Reconstruction De Los 
Puentes Que Se Indican,” (BOE, 1940).
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granted funds was to present their case as convincingly as possible— and possibly to 
have privileged political connections.
Like Barcelona city council, Bilbao city council was also successful in its pleading. On 
the 27th of April 1940, it was granted a subsidy covering 50 per cent of the cost of 
reconstructing the bridges, the Ordunte dam, and the public water supply system. The 
subsidies would be paid by the Instituto de Credito contingent on a report from the 
Direction General de Regiones Devastadas and the approval of the Ministry of 
Governance. Bilbao was granted a total of 2,305,004.35 pesetas. Interestingly, this 
amount seems to be less than 50 per cent of the total sum appearing on the municipal 
settlement documents, which suggests that the state did not fully cover the share it had 
promised in the end. According to the Jefe de la Casa Civil de SE (Head of the Civil 
House of His Excellency), however, the news of the grant was received with great 
enthusiasm by Bilbaoans. In a note dated 29th of May 1940, he thanks the mayor and 
the city council on Franco’s behalf for the “demonstrations of fervent support” recently 
shown by Bilbao’s population, and stresses that the reconstruction subsidy “is the best 
proof of the interest with which His Excellency follows the problems of that City 
[sic]”.327 The actual extent to which people had gone out onto the streets to celebrate 
Franco’s generosity remains unclear today, but there is little doubt that the news of the 
grant must have filled the members of the city council with enormous relief.
Despite the material difficulties involved, the reconstruction of the four fixed bridges 
was a relatively smooth and successful process. The reconstruction of the two 
drawbridges, on the other hand, turned out to be more challenging. Unlike the fixed 
bridges, the drawbridges were not finished structures when they were blown up. 
Administrative and financial agreements with private contractors and other public 
entities were in place, and, unlike some of the contractors who wished to renegotiate the 
terms from scratch, the new municipal administration proved unwilling to ignore the 
existing agreements.
327 Fomento Afio 1941/Secci6n XIV/Legajo 411/Numero 6, “Fomento. Subvencion Del Estado Por 
Reconstruccion De Puentes Fijos.”
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5.2 The reconstruction of the drawbridges: rebuilding the unfinished
5.2.1 Unclear contractual responsibilities
The position of Basconia and partners on the attack on the Deusto bridge becomes clear 
from a letter that their representative Jesus Chirapozu y Ceniga addressed to the city 
council on the 24th of July 1937. After evaluating the damage to the bridge, which he 
still refers to as the Deusto bridge (and not as the Generalisimo’s), Chirapozu states that 
“[since] significant damage has occurred beyond the contractor’s control, the 
situation of the works wholly differs from when the works were delivered to the 
city council and put to public use. Notwithstanding this alteration, Basconia and 
partners, without aiming to determine their [legal] situation vis-a-vis the City 
Council because of the use previously made of the bridge, take great pleasure in 
putting themselves at the [City Council’s] service to restore, in the shortest time 
possible, the enormous disaster caused by the Red-Marxist barbarism, which 
has been so disruptive to Bilbao’s normal life, and which we all should 
contribute to overcoming within our capacity” (italics added).328
The Public Works Committee’s reaction to the contractor’s letter suggests it had a very 
different assessment of the situation. The Committee rejects the contractor’s 
“insinuations concerning any alteration of its contractual situation” and implies that 
“neither this attack nor any of the previous circumstances entail a decrease of the 
Contractor’s obligations, which continue to be in force”. Chirapozu’s sympathetic 
words condemning the attack by the Red-Marxists, and his generous offer in the name 
of Basconia and partners to undertake the reconstruction works, are derisively 
interpreted by the Public Works Committee, whose members “merely appreciate [such 
good disposition] as a guarantee of the urgency with which the Contractor will perform 
the task that is part of his contractual obligations”.329
328 “Que al producirse ajenamente a esta contrata, danos y peijuicios de gran importancia varia por 
completo la situacion en la obra de como estaba cuando fue previamente tomada de la misma contrata por 
la Corporacibn Municipal y dedicada por esta a uso publico. Pero que no obstante esta variation la Cia. 
Anma. ‘Basconia’ y consortes, sin entrar a determinar la situacion en que se hallan frente a ese Excmo. 
Ayuntamiento por esa utilization anterior del puente, se complace en ponerse a su disposition para 
reparar con la brevedad posible el enorme desastre causado por la barbarie roja-separatista, tan peijudicial 
a la normalization de la vida en Bilbao y que todos debemos contribuir en la medida de nuestras 
capacidades a remediarlo.” Fomento Ano 1948/Seccion XIV/Legajo 765/Numero 1292, “Proyecto De 
Construction Del Puente De Deusto.”
329 “Entiende esta Comision que no pueden ser aceptadas de manera alguna las insinuaciones que hace el 
Contratista sobre la modification de su situacion contractual, como consecuencia del mencionado 
atentado y otros antecedentes de su relation con el Excmo. Ayuntamiento, manteniendo, por el contrario,
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In sum, Basconia and partners were not expected to sign a new contract for the 
reconstruction works, but to take on the works as part of their original contract. 
Nonetheless, the city council recognised that the armed attack on the bridge was beyond 
the contractor’s control, which essentially meant that the damage to the bridge was 
indemnifiable.330 Consequently, while the carrying out o f the reconstruction work was 
mandatory for the contractor as part of his contractual obligations, the contracted 
companies would in due course receive compensation. The original budget for the 
Deusto bridge was increased by 17 per cent to cover the scrapping and clearance of 
debris and the actual reconstruction works. The rental of any ad hoc equipment was to 
be paid for separately. It was also determined that the contractor would continue to be 
paid every month until the works on the bridge were finally completed. Finally, the city 
council “strongly encouraged the Contractor to deploy maximum diligence in the 
reconstruction works”, adding that such diligence would be taken into account, “as well 
as other aspects o f the Contractor’s behaviour”, with a view to speeding up the payment 
o f earlier, unpaid instalments.331
Eventually and in spite of their initial position, Basconia and partners accepted the 
conditions imposed by the city council without major resistance, possibly because the 
city council had made clear that the payments for works carried out prior to the 
destruction of the bridge were conditional on the companies’ progress in reconstructing 
the bridge. Through this financial arrangement, Basconia and partners were to some 
extent in the hands of the city council. Along with the invoices for the present salvaging 
works, it went on submitting invoices for units of work carried out prior to the 
destruction of the bridge.332
con toda conviccion, la tesis de que ni este atentado, ni ninguno de los antecedentes conocidos, significa 
disminucion de las obligaciones del Contratista, que continuan todas ellas vigentes. La buena disposition 
en la que el Contratista manifiesta encontrarse para llevar a efecto el trabajo de reconstruction, debe ser 
solamente apreciada como garantia de la diligencia que ha de emplear en la realizacidn de un trabajo que 
forma parte de sus obligaciones contractuales.” Ibid.
330 Reglamento de 17 de ju lio  de 1868 (Regulation passed on 17 July 1868).
331 Fomento Ano 1948/Seccion XIV/Legajo 765/Numero 1292, “Proyecto De Construccion Del Puente 
De Deusto.”
332 Fomento Ano 1943/Secci6n XIV/Legajo 493/Numero 679, “Relaciones Valoradas De Las Obras De 
Construccion Del Puente De Deusto.” Fomento Ano 1943/Secci6n XIV/Legajo 467/Numero 4, 
“Certificaciones Del Puente Del Generalisimo Franco Posteriores a La Liberation De La Villa,” (Archivo 
Municipal de Bilbao).
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However, it was only several months later, on the 5th of October 1938, that the city 
council approved the payment for any reconstruction works on the Generalisimo Franco 
bridge.333 This was only three weeks before the bridge was officially (re)inaugurated on 
the 25th o f October 193 8.334 Once again, the bridge was opened despite not being fully
thfinished. At this point, aside from the unpaid pre-19 June construction works and the 
post-19th June reconstruction works, there were post-19th June construction works 
awaiting payment. These corresponded to works on parts of the bridge that had not been 
finished by the time it was destroyed, and were managed separately from the other two 
categories of works.335
The accumulation of instalments relating to these three different categories of works 
might explain why it was not until the summer o f 1943 that the Deusto bridge was 
completely finished and every payment settled. On the 19th of July 1943, the city 
council finally approved the return o f the deposit that Basconia and partners originally 
paid when they took on the works for the drawbridge in 1932,336 thereby terminating 
the contract and releasing the contractor from any further responsibilities. All in all, it 
had cost more than 9 million pesetas and thirteen years to complete the construction of 
the Deusto drawbridge.337
333 Fomento Ano 1943/Seccion XIV/Legajo 467/Numero 4, “Certificaciones Del Puente Del 
Generalisimo Franco Posteriores a La Liberacion De La Villa.”
334 Deliberately or not, the opening coincided with the second anniversary o f  the signature o f  the 
friendship treaty between Italy and Germany, which gave rise to the Rome-Berlin axis.
335 Fomento Ano 1943/Secci6n XIV/Legajo 467/Numero 4, “Certificaciones Del Puente Del 
Generalisimo Franco Posteriores a La Liberacion De La Villa.”
336 Fomento Ano 1943/Seccion XIV/Legajo 493/Numero 679, “Relaciones Valoradas De Las Obras De 
Construccion Del Puente De Deusto.”
337 See Fomento Ano 1943/Seccion XIV/Legajo 469/Numero 32, “Tomo Correspondiente a La 
Liquidation Final De Las Obras Del Puente Del Generalisimo Franco, Suscrito Por La Direction De La 
Oficina Tecnica De Puentes Moviles, Bilbao, 28 De Abril De 1943.,” (Archivo Municipal de Bilbao).
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Fig. 5.22 The Deusto/Generalisimo Franco's bridge (2006) (photographed by the author).
5.2.2 Lengthy indemnification proceedings
The city council exercised the same logic in its relationship with Babcock & Wilcox, 
the contractor for the moving parts on the General Mola bridge, former Begoha bridge. 
As with Basconia and partners, the city council established that the payment for 
previous construction works was conditional on the com pany’s progress in 
reconstructing the bridge. This placed Babcock & W ilcox in a difficult situation. The 
com pany’s workshops had been militarised and m ost o f their capacity was devoted to 
the production o f  war supplies. Hence, the company was not able to commence 
reconstruction o f  the bridge span, which m eant that it could not be paid for the removal 
o f  debris that it carried out immediately after the explosions, given that payments were 
conditional on the progress made on reconstructing the bridge. The com pany claimed 
that the municipal administration had earlier determ ined that debris removal would be 
considered as separate from both construction and reconstruction works, and therefore 
not subject to the above condition, but the city council turned a deaf ear. The 
payments were further complicated by the drawn out indem nification proceedings, 
since the city council also argued it could not pay Babcock & W ilcox until the 
com pany’s indemnification file had been processed.
338 Fomento Ano 1943/Seccion XIV/Legajo 467/Numero 3, “Relaciones Del Desguace Y Reconstruction 
Del Puente Del General Mola. Margen Izquierda.,” (Archivo Municipal de Bilbao).
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After some time, however, the city council, advised by the Public Works Committee, 
changed its mind displaying some readiness to pay, and arguing contrarily that a 
significant share of the construction works carried out by Babcock & Wilcox prior to 
the dynamiting of the bridge remained unpaid, and also that “the delay o f the 
indemnification proceedings could not be blamed on the Contractor, but was instead 
related to the administrative difficulty caused by the destruction”.339 At the same time, 
the city council made clear that this in no way implied that it acknowledged the 
existence of a new contract (a reconstruction contract) or that it committed itself to any 
further payments. This particular payment was simply an advance on account of the 
unpaid sums that corresponded to the company’s earlier works on the bridge.340
In spite o f the city council’s remarks, the above procedure—-justifying current payments 
on account of past works—was repeatedly used with Babcock & Wilcox, even though 
officially no works related to the reconstruction of the General Mola bridge could be 
reimbursed until the indemnification proceedings had been resolved.
This irregular situation lasted for as long as the indemnification process. In September 
1940, two and a half years after the first payment in spring 1938, the city council 
approved another substantial payment of 233,565.58 pesetas, this time for actual 
reconstruction works, despite Babcock & Wilcox’s indemnification file still being 
under review. Interestingly, in the municipal report approving the payment it is also 
implied that the city council had previously lent money to Babcock & Wilcox (a total of
920,000 pesetas). This suggests the existence of yet another legal and financial 
subterfuge through which the city council advanced money to Babcock & Wilcox while 
the indemnification process continued.
Another two years went by without the financial relationship between the city council 
and Babcock & Wilcox being officially resolved. On the 28th o f May 1942, the general 
manager of the company personally wrote to the mayor requesting the settlement of the 
payments for the construction and reconstruction of the General Mola bridge. To date, 
the company had only been paid the 233,565.58 pesetas for reconstruction works, 
which was the amount it received in September 1940. Approximately another 800,000
pesetas were pending. In a strikingly friendly tone, Babcock & Wilcox’s general 
manager asks the mayor that at least the 600,000 that the company had requested in 
mid-July 1941— which the mayor had promised to reimburse in late February 1942—be 
paid.341 By now, the indemnification proceedings were resolved and there was no 
administrative obstacle to making the payments. Nevertheless, Babcock & Wilcox’s 
repeated requests and the mayor’s unfulfilled promise suggest that the city council was 
still not in a position to pay.
5.2.3 The financial difficulties faced by the city council
The city council’s approach to the contractors of the drawbridges may appear harsh and 
at times also unreasonable, even though based on existing administrative regulations. 
But the city council faced its own difficulties in trying to keep the municipal finances 
up to date. A report by the Municipal Treasury Committee dated 23rd September 1941 
reveals a gloomy picture. The 1927 municipal budget allocations for the construction of 
the Deusto and Begona bridges were almost exhausted, and the same was true for the 
1939 municipal extraordinary budget allocations for their reconstruction. With the total 
of 248,402.22 pesetas remaining in the municipal coffers for the drawbridges it was 
utterly impossible for the city council to settle the pending payments. As noted earlier, 
the city council’s share of the budget for the construction of the drawbridges was 50 per 
cent and only 25 per cent when it came to the reconstruction budget. The rest was to 
come from other public administration entities. Yet few of the funds promised by the 
Biscay provincial deputyship, the central administration and the port authority for the 
construction of the bridges had been paid in when their destruction took place in 1937. 
And by 1941, when the report was written, the reconstruction funds from the central 
administration had still not arrived.
What is most striking about the whole situation is that, despite being underfunded, but 
probably in view of the pressing need to finish the bridges, the city council carried on 
with the works although it was largely unable to pay the contractors. The usual response 
to a shortage of funds would have been to enhance the allocations with supplementary 
credits. But the Municipal Treasury Committee strongly discouraged the city council 
from doing so, urging it instead to collect the promised funds, using the fact that the
341 Ibid.
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works were completed as an incentive for the central administration and the other 
public entities involved to pay their share once and for all.342 Taking into account the 
fact that the city council had to cope with reluctant payers, it is perhaps more 
understandable that it used all the available legal means to defer paying the contractors. 
Ultimately, the city council played the thankless, combined role of coordinator, 
intermediary and attendant, caught between the urge to reopen the bridges, the 
contractors’ legitimate payment requests and the co-sponsors’ neglect of previously 
accepted financial responsibilities.
It could be argued that the situation described above is typical o f what occurs when 
local governments engage in public works that exceed their funding capacity and force 
them to depend on other public entities for funding. The additional challenge in this 
case was the pressure of time. Such an essential set of infrastructures for Bilbao as the 
bridges had to be reconstructed quickly. To delay the completion of the works, which is 
perhaps the usual outcome in similar circumstances, was seemingly not an option either 
for the city council or the contractors. Nobody seemed to question that it was the city 
council’s responsibility to make sure that the destroyed bridges were replaced. But it 
could also be argued that the replacement of the bridges was in the interest of the 
contractors. Restoring normality to Bilbao was a means to ensure that the city’s 
commercial and economic activities resumed their dynamism, ultimately benefiting the 
private sector. Finally, in the contractors’ view, the change of municipal governments 
probably called for a patient and flexible attitude, as a way of gaining the favour of the 
new leadership and getting more contracts in the future or making other advantageous 
arrangements.
The practical or administrative continuities in the management o f the construction and 
reconstruction of the two drawbridges explained above once more contrasts with the 
ideological discontinuities that resulted from the new municipal authorities’ emphasis 
on breaking with Bilbao’s immediate Basque-Republican past. The inauguration of the 
Generalisimo Franco’s bridge in October 1939 aptly illustrates how the reconstruction 
of the drawbridges provided an ideological moment for the manipulation of the recent 
past, which celebrated the advent of a new era o f order and prosperity.
342 Ibid.
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Fig 5.23 The Ayuntamiento/Begoha/General M old’s bridge (2006) (photographed by the author).
5.3 The inauguration of the Generalisimo Franco’s drawbridge
5.3.1 Programme o f events
The inauguration o f the G eneralisim o’s bridge took place on the 25th o f  October 1939. 
The program me for the day involved a series o f  carefully planned events, aside from the 
inauguration o f the bridge, to make the most out o f the visit o f  the M inister o f Public 
W orks, A lfonso Pena Boeuf, to Bilbao. After his arrival at 9:30 a.m., the M inister 
would first visit the Portugalete rail station and adjacent new streets and preside over 
the inauguration o f Capitan Haya street. Before lunch, timetabled for 2 p.m. at the Club 
Maritimo del Abra (the Abra Sea Club), the M inister was to travel along the Ria to visit 
the Free Port, and attend the opening o f  the drawbridge. After lunch, he was to attend 
the inauguration o f  the m onument to Churruca,343 following which he would be shown 
the aerodrom e and its accesses. An afternoon buffet was organised from 6 p.m. in the 
town hall’s Araba room, presumably to offer the guests the opportunity to mingle more
343 In the late nineteenth century, engineer Evaristo Churruca designed the port o f Bilbao and the 
channelling o f the Ria.
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freely. At 8:30 p.m., the Minister would have dinner together with his professional 
colleagues, the civil engineers, at the Bilbaina restaurant.
O f all these visits and inaugurations, the one that received most attention from the 
public and the media was the opening of the Generalisimo Franco’s bridge. On the 24 
of October, the newspaper La Gaceta del Norte, distributed in northern Spain, and 
Hierro, a nationwide evening paper, included notes on the next day’s opening events on 
their front pages. On the 25th, the day of the openings, El Correo Espanol, published 
nationwide, referred to the opening of the bridge, the monument to Churruca and the 
opening of Capitan Haya street on its second page, within the events section. Hierro, on 
the other hand, featured a large picture of the Minister cutting the opening ribbon of the 
bridge on its first page. On the 26th, most papers dedicated part o f their headlines to the 
“solemn” inauguration that had taken place on the previous day. La Gaceta del Norte 
devoted its first page to the ceremony with photographs o f the relevant attendees. El 
Correo Espanol included a large picture of the open drawbridge. The text emphasised 
the role of Bilbaoan crowds in making the day all the more festive. Hierro, in turn, 
featured several pictures, including one of the Deusto bridge destroyed.344 It might be 
worth noting that the directors of these newspapers were all invited to attend the 
splendid lunch that had been organised to celebrate the inaugurations at the Club 
Maritimo del Abra.
5.3.2 Mayor Zuazagoitia’s speech
At about 12.30 p.m. the Minister and his retinue gathered in front o f the Generalisimo 
Franco’s drawbridge and a sequence of official speeches followed. A copy of what 
appears to be the original draft of the mayor’s speech is available in the municipal 
archive.345 In his introductory words the mayor referred to the opening event as a re- 
inauguration, recalling that among the attendees there were those who had crossed the 
bridge on their way to prison after the bridge was first inaugurated on the 1st of 
December 1936. As supporters of the rebels, some of the present attendees had been
344 See Fomento Ano 1940/Seccion XIV/Legajo 277/Numero 109, “Inauguracion Del Puente Del 
Generalisimo Franco Y Demas Actos Que Se Celebraran El 25 De Octubre De 1939. Ano De La Victoria 
Y Monumento a Churruca..”
345 The idea that it might be the original draft, and not the speech that was actually delivered, is based on 
the fact that it seems too long to have been read in full within the half an hour that was programmed for 
the inauguration ceremony, considering also that the Minister, and perhaps other leading figures, also 
spoke.
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arrested by the Basque-Republican authorities in the months following the military 
coup. Through this second inauguration, the mayor suggested, their honour was being 
restored:
“Therefore, the Generalisimo Franco’s bridge represents under his name, like a 
banner, the effort of those illustrious Bilbaoans who were singled out by the 
enemies of God and Spain as their most outstanding champions because they 
maintained a conscience, an orientation, and an ideal, all based on the authentic 
principles of our Fatherland. Allow me to direct our thoughts towards them in 
the belief that the recollection of the combatants of yesteryear, of the war, and 
those who remain in the thick of things is the best way of symbolising the name 
of our Caudillo, Generalisimo Franco.”346 
Zuazagoitia then went on to examine the chronology and vicissitudes of the 
construction and reconstruction of the bridge, emphasising that it was
“[p]lanned by [mayor] Moyua’s city council under Miguel Primo de Rivera’s 
dictatorship; projected during the last monarchic city council, under the 
presidency of Adolfo Careaga; it is a fully accomplished reality today”.347 
The mayor omitted the entire Republican period, between 1931 and 1936, when most of 
the progress on the construction of the drawbridges was made. By linking the last 
monarchic city council with the current one, the impression created is that the years in 
between were almost non-existent or that they lacked historical identity. Zuazagoitia’s 
reference to the first opening of the bridge implicitly acknowledged that the bridge was 
finished under Republican rule, but it seems clear that his aim was not to recognise the 
efforts of the Basque-Republican city council, but instead to stress the political
tV»repression suffered by the rebels in the loyalist zones after the 18 of July military 
coup.
346 “Por ello, este Puente del Generalisimo Franco, representa bajo su nombre como guion. el esfuerzo de 
aquellos ilustres bilbainos que por mantener una conciencia, una orientation y  un ideal basado en los 
principios autenticos de nuestra Patria, fueron senalados por los enemigos de D ios y de Espana como sus 
mas destacados paladines. Permitidme que a ellos dirija mi recuerdo en estos momentos, por creer que 
asi, pensando en los combatientes de antano, en los de la guerra y en los que en la actualidad siguen en la 
brecha, es como mejor se simboliza el nombre de nuestro Caudillo el Generalisimo Franco.” Fomento 
Ano 1940/Seccion XIV/Legajo 277/Numero 109, “Inauguration Del Puente Del Generalisimo Franco Y  
Demas Actos Que Se Celebraran El 25 De Octubre De 1939. Ano De La Victoria Y Monumento a 
Churruca..”
347 “Planeada por el Ayuntamiento de Moyua durante la Dictadura de Primo de Rivera, proyectada en el 
ultimo monarquico, presidido por Adolfo Careaga, llega a ser una realidad completamente terminada en 
el dia de hoy[...].” Ibid.
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Zuazagoitia’s chronological review gained momentum as he described the blowing up 
of the bridges in June 1937:
“Here we arrive at the 19th of June 1937, when the works were almost finished 
and the events you are all familiar with took place. The enemies, who were 
practically defeated, concentrated their hate and destruction on these [two] 
constructions, which were thefruit o f  years ofeffort and administration; and our 
dear Bilbao, which they say they loved so much, was subject to horrible 
explosions that rent asunder the two riverbanks” (italics added).
Here, Zuazagoitia was both acknowledging the efforts of the Republican municipal 
administration in the construction of the bridges (“the fruit of years of effort and 
administration”), while denouncing the barbarism of the “enemies”, who were also 
Republicans.
Nevertheless, Zuazagoitia seems to have had some interest in emphasising the 
continuities in the construction of the bridge. This may have been because two of the 
leading figures behind the project since its inception, architect Bastida and engineer 
Ortiz de Artinano, who continued to lead the construction and reconstruction works 
after the explosions, were present at the opening:
“7 will not remain silent about the commendable work of the project-designers 
of the bridge, one of them Architect Bastida, and the other Engineer Ortiz de 
Artinano, currently the director of the reconstruction works” (italics added).349 
At the same time, Zuazagoitia remained silent about the role of engineer Rotaeche, 
whom the new city council purged because of his Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) 
membership. Paradoxically, by emphasising that he was not remaining silent, the 
mayor’s formulation became an implicit confession of his exercise of omissions.
Zuazagoitia also took the opportunity to expand on his particular idea of the role of 
Bilbao for the New Spain by explaining the aim of the construction o f the drawbridge. 
Although the goal of the original project had been to materialise the connection 
between Abando and the recently annexed Deusto, Zuizagoita wanted to underscore
348 “Y asi llegamos al 19 de junio del 37, en que estando las obras casi concluidas, acaecen los sucesos 
que todos conoceis. Los enemigos, en franca derrota, centran su destruccion y odio en las construed ones 
fruto del esfuerzo y administration de anos; y nuestro Bilbao, a quien tanto dicen querer, se encuentra 
sometido a horribles explosiones que tras de si aislan las dos margenes de la ria.” Ibid.
349 “No he de silenciar la meritoria labor de sus proyectistas, uno el Arquitecto Sr. Bastida, y el otro el 
Ingeniero Sr. Ortiz de Artinano, hoy director de su reconstruccionf..].” Ibid.
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that the long-term ambition was to develop the estuary and the port as part o f a wider 
national economic vision:
“The municipality of Bilbao could not carry out a project thinking only about 
the present moment. Our people’s character has always been entrepreneurial; 
with this in mind [the municipality] thought o f expanding the port and 
establishing a port station along the riverbanks, connecting [Bilbao] directly 
with the interior to facilitate the exportation of the products that come from our 
Mother Castile” (italics added).350 
A more refined version of Zuazagoitia’s theory of the relationship between Bilbao and 
“Mother Castile” can be found in a conference paper he delivered in March 1946 in 
Madrid with the title Problemas urbanisticos de Bilbao y su  zona de influencia (Urban 
problems of Bilbao and environs). There, Zuazagoitia emphasised how Bilbaoans’ 
industrious and dynamic qualities stem from their Castilian ancestors, the merchants 
from Burgos, who arrived in the area in the early Middle Ages. Thus Bilbao soon 
became the port of Castile, its only access to the sea. Aside from the indigenous 
production of iron, Zuazagoitia maintained that it was the trade with Castilian wool that 
made the town rich. Moreover, in its permanent strife against the independent 
anteiglesias (Abando, Deusto, etc.), “the illustrious town of Bilbao” had always 
received the support of the Castilian authorities.351 According to the mayor, the links 
with Castile were hence enmeshed in the very foundations of Bilbao.
The defence of Castile as Bilbaoans’ original motherland was a relatively bold strategy 
for the new Basque leadership to “cleanse” the image of the city from the Nationalist 
taint left by the Basque-Republican city council, ensuring that the purity of its 
“Spanishness” was restored along with the bridges.
5.3.3 Post scriptum: lunch at the Club Marltimo del Abra
A total of 53 guests attended the lunch at the Club Maritimo del Abra, including leading 
civilian and military authorities, representatives of various chambers and trade unions, 
newspaper directors, members of the city council, and the president of the Abra Sea
350 “N o podia el Municipio bilbaino realizar una obra pensando exclusivamente en el momento. Las 
caracteristicas de nuestro pueblo siempre fueron emprendedoras; penso en ellas y miro la posibilidad de 
engrandecimiento del Puerto y del establecimiento en las margenes de su ria de una Estacion portuaria 
que le ligue directamente con el interior para exportar los productos que vengan de nuestra Castilla 
Madre.” Ibid.
351 Joaquin de Zuazagoitia, “Problemas Urbanisticos De Bilbao Y Su Zona De Influencia” (1946).
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Club. Interestingly, neither the directors of the construction companies, nor any other 
representatives from the corporate world were invited, except for Jose Luis Aznar, 
leading representative of the Aznar family’s shipping company. Judging from the 
bill, no expenses were spared to provide the guests with generously served food, drinks 
and cigars. Sherries of various brands, ginger vermouths, Martinis, red wine, brandies, 
anisettes, coffee liquor and other spirits were repeatedly ordered throughout the meal. 
The total cost of the lunch, 3,394.60 pesetas, was split between the city council and the 
port authority.353 It is not difficult to picture this animated, very masculine crowd, 
smoking, laughing and toasting over their dishes. Sixteen months after the end of the 
war, and in spite of the permanent food shortages among the population and the 
difficulties in paying the contractors, it must have seemed justified from the point of 
view of the new authorities to organise a feast that met the expectations of the 
victorious and joyful builders of the New Spain.
5. Conclusion
This chapter has examined how the new local authorities that the rebel military 
appointed in Bilbao in June 1937 were able symbolically and physically to mark the 
change of regime that resulted from the Civil War through the reconstruction of the 
destroyed fixed bridges and drawbridges while, in practice, significant administrative 
continuities underpinned the reconstruction process itself. As has also been explained, 
historically, floods, wars and urban planning have had significantly destructive 
consequences for the bridges of Bilbao. However, despite a long history of making and 
remaking, the destructive impact of the dynamiting of the bridges in 1937 was without 
precedent, and so was the ideological appropriation of the events by the new authorities.
Traditionally seen as infrastructures aimed at securing communication between the two 
riverbanks, from the late nineteenth century the bridges were increasingly seen as part 
of circulation axes across the older and newer parts of the city. The planning and 
construction of the drawbridges Begona and Deusto beginning in the 1930s were part of 
the early twentieth-century liberal and Republican city councils’ project for a modem,
352 The Naviera Aznar became part o f  one o f  the most important corporate holdings during Franco’s 
dictatorship as it merged with Banco Urquijo , one o f  the leading banks at the time.
353 For all these details, see Fomento Ano 1940/Seccion XIV/Legajo 277/Numero 109, “Inauguration Del 
Puente Del Generalisimo Franco Y Demds Actos Que Se Celebraran El 25 De Octubre De 1939. Ano De 
La Victoria Y Monumento a Churruca..”
223
coherently designed, industrial Bilbao. The relevance of these two pieces of 
infrastructure became even more evident after the outbreak of the Civil War in 1936 
when port activity and car traffic increased in the city, calling for a premature opening 
of the drawbridges. The tension between the military logic o f exception and the civilian 
logic o f normality was specifically illustrated by the Basque-Republican military’s 
demand to use the substructure of the Deusto bridge to hide war supplies and set up 
military workshops, and the city council’s reluctance to put such costly public work at 
risk by turning it into a target of rebel air attacks.
The Basque-Republicans’ dynamiting of all the bridges at once on the eve of the 19th of 
June 1937 created an unprecedented opportunity for the Nacionales to mark 
symbolically the Ria and Bilbao as a whole. The magnitude of the desire to mark the 
break with the previous regime was possibly also unprecedented. The Nacionales’ idea 
of a New Spain, in their view an alternative to the Republicans’ anti-Spain, was a 
modem ideological project, even though inspired by old, if not archaic values 
sometimes. Initially at least, while under the Falangist banner, it was introduced as a 
transformative, totalitarian project, which sought to launch Spain on a new, historic 
path— it was, from this perspective, the inauguration of a new era.354 It is argued that 
symbolic and physical markers of the new era were eagerly looked for. In this sense, the 
destruction of the bridges constituted a powerful event that could be conveniently 
portrayed as the founding moment of the new Bilbao. By this logic, the old bridges had 
perished, victims of the violence of the barbarous Reds or the enemies of the true 
Spain. Yet out of their ashes emerged the new bridges, purportedly embodying the 
ideals of the New Spain: sobriety, humility, worthiness, pride...
The simple and straightforward design of the new four fixed bridges, and the 
construction material deployed, essentially reinforced concrete, adequately embodied 
these ideals, while reflecting the circumstances in which the bridges were reconstructed, 
in the middle of the war, as well as the engineers’ own aesthetic preferences. The four 
fixed bridges were all inaugurated on the 19th of June 1938 the first anniversary o f the 
rebels’ entry in Bilbao— further marking, at a symbolic level, that a new Bilbao 
emerged on the date the rebels took over the city.
354 See Jose Luis de Arrese, La R evolution Social D el Nacional-Sindicalismo (Madrid: Ediciones del 
Movimiento, 1959) 13.
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On the other hand, the practical dimension of the reconstruction of the two drawbridges 
challenges the idea that there was a break with the recent past. As has been shown, the 
continuous presence of certain companies, municipal employees and technicians, and a 
series o f administrative and corporate agreements in the construction and administration 
o f the two drawbridges before and after the rebels’ seizure of Bilbao, brings to light a 
different story. The intricate legal arguments and administrative procedures underlying 
the reconstruction of the drawbridges were essentially the result of the new city 
council’s refusal to view their destruction as a tabula rasa, which would have forced it 
to start the works from scratch. Instead, no new contractors were looked for, and 
Basconia and Babcock & Wilcox continued working on the construction and 
reconstruction of the drawbridges; no new reconstruction contracts were signed with the 
contractors; two o f the three professionals originally hired to direct the works, Ricardo 
Bastida and Jose Ortiz de Artinano, continued in their posts; the pre-war financial 
agreements with other public entities, such as the port authority and the Biscay 
provincial deputyship, remained in force; and the reconstruction works were basically 
resumed as if part of the original construction projects.
There is perhaps nothing surprising about such practical or administrative continuities. 
Could the new city council—and Franco’s government by extension—ultimately afford 
to discard the knowledge and expertise of the staff involved in the construction of the 
drawbridges? Bureaucrats and businessmen who were more directly identified with the 
Second Republic and Basque nationalism, like engineer Rotaetxe, were purged. Yet, 
fortunately for the new city council, there were a number of individuals who, in spite of 
having worked for the Republican authorities, sympathised with the rebels’ cause or, 
more often perhaps, did not have any explicit ideological affinities. These individuals 
could be kept in their posts without jeopardising either the image or values of the 
nascent regime. The attitude of Basconia and partners, on the other hand, who 
immediately and explicitly aligned themselves with the new leadership, is perhaps 
symptomatic of the ambiguous political position of the Basque industrialists during and 
after the war. But then again, neither the new regime nor the corporate world could 
afford to ignore each other without putting at risk their own survival in these politically 
constitutive stages. It is likely that those company members who disagreed with the new
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political situation were simply silenced or removed to ensure the survival of the 
companies as wholes.
Aside from emphasising these practical continuities, it has been described how the 
exceptional challenges that the Nacionales’ city council met as it tried to collect the 
necessary funding to cover the cost of rebuilding the bridges were fundamental to the 
process of reconstruction. Apart from the regular and extraordinary municipal budgets 
and the funds promised by the port authority and the Biscay provincial council for the 
construction of the drawbridges before the war, the city council tried to claim funding 
from the central administration retrospectively, on the basis of the new national laws 
regulating reconstruction after 1939. Even though Bilbao was granted a state subsidy to 
cover 50 per cent of the costs incurred, it took several years before the money came 
through. Meanwhile, the city council found all manner of legal means to delay the 
payment of the contractors, who nevertheless carried on with the works, arguably 
because they also had an interest in replacing the destroyed bridges and restoring 
normality to Bilbao.
The way in which Bilbao’s city council was essentially left to its own devices for the 
immediate reconstruction of the bridges and only retrospectively granted partial state 
funding illustrates how reconstruction took place after the war in other Spanish towns 
and cities such as Barcelona (see previous chapter). This was partly the outcome of the 
anti-urban approach of the new regime, partly the result of a convenient institutional 
arrangement, which discharged the central government from the responsibility of 
directly and integrally reconstructing the country; only Madrid would be treated 
differently—at least on paper—as will be discussed in the following chapter.
The inauguration of the Generalfsimo Franco’s drawbridge on the 25th of October 1939 
shows how the reconstruction of the drawbridges, like that of the fixed bridges, was 
used to underscore symbolically the break with the recent past. As described above, the 
new leadership overtly condemned the destructiveness of the Republicans, while 
conveniently manipulating the past, and celebrating its own constructiveness in the 
discourses that accompanied the opening ceremony. One interesting aspect of mayor 
Zuazagoitia’s speech on the occasion of the opening was his urge to draw solid ties 
between old Castile and the Basque Country, and Bilbao in particular. Subsuming
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Bilbao’s fate to that of Castile’s was equivalent to reaffirming its “Spanishness”, and a 
way of annulling the memory of the recent experience of Basque political autonomy.
Hence, both through the aesthetics of the reconstructed bridges and the official 
discourses accompanying their opening and setting to use, Bilbao’s new leadership was 
able to mark the Ria with the promise of the New Spain, while omitting or understating 
the practical and historical links that tied the bridges to the city’s most recent past.
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Chapter 6
From grand reconstruction plans to piecemeal rebuilding: 
Imperial Madrid and the ruins of the Cuartel de la Montana
6. Introduction
The shift from the very ambitious early reconstruction plans for Madrid to the 
significantly piecemeal, privately driven rebuilding process that eventually took place 
in the capital city was typical of many of the Franco regime’s policies, and more 
generally of many post-war regimes faced with reconstruction. By focusing on a 
particular site, the ruins of the Cuartel de la Montana—a military complex built in the 
mid-nineteenth century on the Montana del Principe Pio (Prince Pio’s Hill), in the 
western part of the city, and practically destroyed during the conflict—the chapter aims 
to show how both economic and ideological causes, as well as issues related to history 
and memory, account for the abandonment of the Falangist plans for a neo-imperial 
Madrid, including the construction of Falange’s Party Headquarters on the ruins of the 
Cuartel.
Within the regime’s predominantly anti-urban discourse, the immediate attention paid 
to the capital city itself constituted an exception. After the war, the Falangists saw the 
opportunity to redesign the capital city in a top-down approach that was explicitly 
conceived as state planning. But Spain’s harsh economic situation, including the arrival 
in Madrid of large unemployed populations from rural areas, together with the changing 
international scenario after 1945—which led Franco to distance himself from 
Falangism—resulted in a gradual rejection of the initial and possibly over-ambitious 
state planning projects. The reconstruction process of the capital city ended up largely 
in the hands of private owners and redevelopers. Public planning guidelines continued 
to exist but had little impact because they were seldom enforced. Moreover, although it 
is difficult to find documentary proof of this, both private and public entities used 
different legal and financial subterfuges to circumvent inconvenient planning 
regulations. The fate of the ruins of the Cuartel de la Montana poignantly illustrates this 
abandonment of ideology and planning for a more pragmatic, yet eclectic and 
unpredictable response to the reconstruction needs of the capital city.
228
The chapter is once more divided into two parts. The first part examines the pre-war 
and wartime history of the Cuartel de la Montana and its environs, and the second 
explores the post-war fate of the ruins of the Cuartel and the western part of Madrid 
(essentially, old Madrid and the district of Arguelles) more generally. The first part 
starts by addressing the history of the Montana del Principe Pio, on which the military 
headquarters were located. This is a long and symbolically charged history, including 
the hill’s prominent role during the Spanish War of Independence (perhaps better 
known as Napoleon’s Peninsula War in an English speaking context) in the early 
nineteenth century. On the 20th of July 1936, the mutiny that was organised by the rebel 
military in the Montana barracks and the subsequent control of the rebel military by 
Republican forces inaugurated the Spanish Civil War in the capital city. The following 
section briefly examines the destruction of the building on that day and subsequently. 
The building was damaged continuously throughout the conflict because it stood very 
close to the front line. Its early destruction led the Republican Committee that was 
responsible for the sanitation and reconstruction of the capital city during the war to 
plan the construction of a new parliament building on the site. The third section 
considers the project for the new parliament building and the comprehensive plan for 
post-war Madrid that Julian Besteiro, the director of the Republican Committee and his 
team, designed throughout the conflict and published just before Franco’s troops 
entered the capital city and the war ended.
The first section of the second part of the chapter discusses the planning guidelines that 
the Falangists set out for the capital of the New Spain immediately after the war, and 
more specifically architect Pedro Bidagor’s Plan. In spite of the many structural 
continuities with previous plans, including Besteiro’s, the Falangist rhetoric suggested a 
break with the past. The differences were not merely rhetorical, however, and some key 
aspects such as the different socio-economic division of the city pointed to organicist, 
Nazi-inspired conceptions of the urban. Moreover, particular prominence was given to 
the fachada  or grand facade of Madrid, which was seen as the head of Spain’s national 
being. The ruins of the Cuartel were part of the grand fa9ade, and a project for the Casa 
del Partido, or the Falangist Party’s Headquarters, was designed for the site, echoing 
the massive structures that the Nazis built to hold popular gatherings.
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The second section illustrates some aspects of the Falangist architectural programme for 
the neo-imperial capital city. Hapsburg-inspired, austere, monumental architecture 
became the reference point, and a law to recover (or recreate) seventeenth-century 
historic Madrid was passed. As explained in the third section, however, both Falangist 
planning and aesthetic principles were soon dropped as Franco shifted from a pro-Axis 
position to a markedly anti-communist stance with which he sought approval by the 
Allies. At the same time, it became increasingly clear that the autarchic economic 
programme that was based on state intervention and imposed after the war bore little 
fruit, and the regime became increasingly open to the initiatives of private developers.
The project for the Casa del Partido dropped and a number of seemingly random and 
erratic projects for the site of the Cuartel, which are examined in the fourth section, 
followed. Meanwhile, the ruins of the Cuartel served their own purpose. During the 
1940s, a number of commemorations for the fallen soldiers during the mutiny of the 
20th of July 1936 and the eventual seizure of the barracks were held. The purportedly 
contradictory sentiments triggered by the events of 20th of July seem to have contributed 
to the difficulty in deciding what to do with the site, which remained in neglect for three 
decades. The design for a park in the early 1970s, followed by the placement o f an 
ancient Egyptian temple on the site, was perhaps an unexpected ending to the history of 
the ruins, also suggestive of the inconsistent and eclectic nature of the Franco regime.
The conclusion seeks to situate the history of the ruins o f the Cuartel—which arguably 
epitomises the shift from the early ambitious post-war plans to the more piecemeal 
rebuilding of Madrid—both within the particular context of Franco’s dictatorship and 
the broader context of reconstruction in Europe after the Second World War.
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Fig. 6 .I Section o f  "La pradera de San Isidro ” by Francisco de Goya (1787) showing la fachada or the grandfacade o f  M adrid and the Manzanares Valley (adapted 
from the web).
t oOJ
Part I
6.1 Historical overview of the Montana del Principe Pio
6.1.1 A strategic site
Madrid was originally built on a natural plateau that rises above the valley of the 
Manzanares river to the west, and the plains of La Mancha to the south. To the north 
and north-west the city is surrounded by the Guadarrama mountains. Along the edge of 
the plateau there are several protuberances or hills facing the valley. One of them is the 
Montana de Principe Pio. Located close to the hill where the Royal Palace stands, it has 
particularly privileged views of both the mountains and the plain. It is also one of the 
highest elevations in the city. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the 
ownership of these lands— including the palaces and country houses that were 
successively built on the hill (among them the famous palace La Florida)—passed 
through the hands of several clerics and noblemen. In 1792 the hill became the property 
of the Bourbon king Carlos IV.355
After the end of the second Carlist War356 in 1849, the plans for the construction o f a 
military complex on the Montana del Principe Pio were discussed for the first time. The 
Carlist Wars had shown that the Royal Palace remained relatively unprotected on its left 
flank. In addition, the rapid increase of the population in Madrid suggested the 
construction of new military barracks in key locations to secure the maintenance of 
public order in case of riots. The Montana del Principe Pio seemed to be the ideal site 
for the new military facility. However, before the actual construction began in 1860, 
several years of decisions, counter-decisions and paperwork followed. When delimiting 
the plot and designing the barracks, including a safety zone, the planners had to take 
into account the progressively expanding new district of Argiielles, adjacent to the hill. 
Even though Queen Isabel II had generously ceded the lands in the area of the hill to the 
Army, some plots within it had previously been sold to the developers of the new 
district. Hence, there was a clash between military and economic interests that 
contributed to the delay of the final project. Moreover, the irregularity of the
355 See Victor N ieto Alcaide, “La Montana Del Principe Pio,” in Madrid. Tomo V. D e La Plaza D e 
Espana a  El Pardo  (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1980), 1623-24.
35 As mencioned earlier, the Carlists defended the right to the Spanish throne o f  an alternative branch o f  
the Bourbons, and started three wars during the nineteenth century. Prior to the 1936-39 Civil War, these 
were known as the Spanish Civil Wars.
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topography of the hill posed some technical challenges to the architects and the 
planners.
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Fig. 6.2 Bird's eye view o f  western Madrid. The white circles show the Montana del Principe Pio (above) and the Royal Palace (below) (adapted from 
the wbe).
The facility was finally finished in May 1863 and named after Queen Isabel II, who, as 
noted, had pro-actively backed the project. (Let us recall in this context the construction 
o f the first drawbridge in Bilbao in 1844, which was also named after the Queen.) The 
same year the works were completed, the General in C hief o f  the area handed in a 
petition to the M inistry o f W ar asking for an enlargement o f  the Cuartel. Instead o f 
hosting the two Infantry battalions for which it had been originally designed, the aim 
was now to host two Infantry regiments, which essentially meant doubling the barracks’ 
capacity. Aside from the irony o f  this situation— the enlargem ent was being requested 
just as the works were finished— the fact was that overcrowding was endemic in most 
military headquarters at the time. It took six years to approve the enlargem ent project 
and yet the budget remained the same. This suggests that in the end the enlargement 
was not fully completed. Nevertheless, for several decades the Cuartel de la Montana, 
as it became known, constituted the largest and most m odem  military facility in the 
capital city. It was also one o f the few m ilitary barracks in Spain that had been 
originally constructed for this purpose.357
Fig. 6.3 Partial view o f  the Cuartel (1933) (Archivo Regional de la Comunidad de Madrid).
357 For a detailed account o f the history o f  the Cuartel de la Montana, see Jesus Cantera Montenegro, “La 
Construccion Del Cuartel De La Montana De Madrid,” Madrid: Revista de arte, geografia e historia, no. 
3 (2000).
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Fig. 6.4 View o f  the Royal Palace and the Almudena Cathedral from  the Montana del Principe Pio 
(2007) (photographed by the author).
6.1.2 The shootings o f the 3rd o f May 1808
In his famous painting Los fusilamientos del 3 de mayo de 1808, the Spanish 
nineteenth-century painter Francisco de Goya depicted the shooting o f a group o f rebel 
guerrillas by Napoleonic troops on the night between the 2nd and 3rd o f May 1808, at the 
beginning o f the Spanish W ar o f Independence. The shootings, which are well 
documented, took place in Madrid, on the M ontana del Principe Pio. The painting 
vaguely represents a section o f the skyline o f  the city, enough to convey the sense that 
the event took place in what were the outskirts o f Madrid at the time. The focus o f  the 
painting is instead on the contrast between the fear-stricken faces and desperate body 
gestures o f the guerrillas who are about to die, and the attitude o f  the anonymous, lined- 
up soldiers who, with guns on their shoulders, lean forward, ready to shoot.
Much has been said on G oya’s dramatic painting. The contrast between the chaotic 
appearance o f the guerrillas and the disciplined formation o f  the French soldiers has 
sometimes been viewed as representing the clash between Romantic and Enlightened 
politics, the nation and the state, popular liberty and state despotism, and also between 
irrationality and rationality. It is not surprising that G oya’s painting appears to represent 
the victims, the Romantic side, more favourably: the guerrillas after all were fighting 
for the freedom o f the Spanish nation against N apoleon’s occupation. At the same time,
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in his painting, Goya— who sympathised with the liberal ideas that emerged from the 
French revolution— depicts a large lantern on the side o f the soldiers, which illuminates 
the scene, particularly the guerrilla group. For Goya, Enlightenment could probably be 
viewed as facilitating state despotism (or totalitarianism ), but also as a source o f light 
with the potential to illuminate the popular classes, drawing them from ignorance and 
superstition. It could be argued that the com plicated dialectic o f Enlightenment (to use 
A dorno’s and H orkheim er’s celebrated expression) is well captured in Goya’s painting, 
which, by the way, was hidden from the public for decades after it was finished in 1814.
Fig. 6.5 Francisco de Goya. "El 3 de mayo de 1808 en Madrid: los fits i lam ientos en 
la montana del Principe Pio ” (adapted from the web).
6.1.3 The events o f  20 July 1936
More than a century later, on the night o f  the 20th o f  July 1936, another dramatic clash 
between ideological forces took place on the same site. It was the attack on, or the 
defence, and then surrender o f  the Cuartel de la M ontana m ilitary headquarters, where 
rebel officers, supportive o f the military coup against the Second Republic, had created 
a stronghold, waiting to take over Madrid. As other Spanish cities were seized by the 
rebels and the news o f  a mutiny in M adrid spread, military and security forces loyal to 
the Republican government and popular m ilitias began to surround the barracks to 
prevent the uprising in the capital city. There was an initial exchange o f gunfire on the 
evening o f the 20th o f July. As the hours passed and the rebel officers did not show any
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intention of surrendering, the Republican response grew fiercer: machine guns and 
bombers were deployed early on the 20th to subdue the men in the Cuartel. After several 
hours o f intense bombings and exchange of fire, the Republicans managed to gain 
access to the headquarters, arresting the heads of the mutiny while, apparently, letting 
most soldiers go free.
The description of the events in the Cuartel partly depends on the side from which the 
narrator writes. The Republican government presented the event as the attack and 
surrender of the mutineers. The rebel mutineers referred to it as the attack and defence 
of the headquarters. On the 21st of July, the daily Madrilenian newspaper El Sol—on the 
side of the government— carefully reported the events in the Cuartel.358 According to El 
Sol, “[t]he precautions of the Public authorities in the environs of the Cuartel”, where 
something “unusual was taking place”, on the afternoon o f the 19th were followed by 
“the beginning of the [formal] siege” at 5 a.m. on the 20th. “The first cannon shots” 
were heard at 6 a.m. A few hours later, “the rebel forces surrendered]”. El Sol reports 
that, according to the government, a soldier was sent from the barracks to tell the chief 
o f the loyalist forces that the troops inside the Cuartel “were ready to capitulate because 
they felt deceived [by the rebel officers]. The gunfire exchange continued, and by 11:10
a.m. the rebel officers hoisted the white flag in the headquarters.”359 Thus, El Sol 
concludes, “[t]he soldiers in the cuartel de la Montana [eventually joined] the side of 
the Government”. As a consequence, the rebel officers were unable to control the troops 
and surrendered. “The rebel leader, General Fanjul, was arrested by governmental 
forces.” Several other officers committed suicide before the Republican troops gained 
access to the barracks, according to El Sol.360
The rebels’ depiction of the events contrasted significantly with the above and other 
similar depictions, written from the Republican side’s point of view. Unfortunately, I 
have not been able to find direct testimonies by rebel supporters written on the day of 
the events or immediately after. On the other hand, two writings that came out after the 
end of the war, that is, three years later, are representative of how the events were 
interpreted and narrated over time on the rebel side. Particular effort was made in trying
358 “Various. Front Page,” El Sol, Tuesday 21 July 1936.
359 “Ataque Y Rendicion Del Cuartel De La Montana,” El Sol, Tuesday 21 July 1936, 3.
360 Ibid.
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to explain, or perhaps even justify, the defeat of the mutineers in the Cuartel on the 
basis o f treason. Writer Luis Montan, who took up the task of describing retrospectively 
the most significant events of the Civil War from the point of view of the rebels, 
suggested that the attack and defence of the Cuartel de la Montana was the most 
unknown episode of the war. Based on the accounts of a Falangist and a soldier who 
managed to flee the Cuartel before the Republicans seized it, Montan sets out to give an 
“exact and detailed version” of the incident. The account reaches its highpoint when 
“the mystery of the Cuartel (...), the mystery that helped backing the treason” is 
unveiled.
“In the midst of the gunfire, a white flag suddenly appeared in one of the 
windows on the lower floor facing Plaza de Espana. (...) Who placed the flag 
there? We might never be in a position to know.”361 
Montan continues:
“And as if an order had been given, the mysterious placement of the flag 
coincided with the irruption of waves of assault guards and militiamen from the 
streets nearby heading towards the Cuartel.”362 
And, finally, he concludes:
“The assault was so well prepared, that only through a secret arrangement with 
somebody inside the building could it unfold as swiftly and effectively [as it 
did].”363
It was thus clear to Montan that somebody had betrayed the mutineers, who might 
otherwise have been able to resist and carry on with the coup leading to the national- 
syndicalist revolution, which the Falangists claimed was always their aim. The writer 
also emphasised the barbarism of the Reds, who after gaining access to the Cuartel, had 
allegedly engaged in ruthless killings and pillage. He conceived the attack and defence 
of the Cuartel de la Montana as one of “the bloodiest pages of the civil war [sic]”, 
perhaps even “the first page of the history of this war, where the series of great crimes 
through which the red hordes [sic] would turn the lands o f Spain into an immense blood
361 “Estando en pleno fuego, aparecio de improviso en una de las ventanas de la planta baja recayente a la 
Plaza de Espana, una bandera blanca. [...] ^Quien coloco all! aquella bandera? Posiblemente nunca se 
sabra.” Luis Montan, Episodios D e La Guerra Civil: Asalto Y Defensa Heroica D el Cuartel D e La 
Montana, vol. 4, Episodios D e La Guerra Civil (Valladolid: Libreria Santaren) 23.
362 “Y como obedeciendo a una consigna, coincidio la colocacion misteriosa de aquella bandera blanca 
con la irrupcion en oleada de guardias de Asalto y milicianos salidos de las bocacalles proximas hacia el 
Cuartel.” Ibid. 24.
363 “El asalto estaba tan bien preparado, que unicamente por una secreta inteligencia con alguien del 
interior del edificio pudo ser tan rapido y eficaz.” Ibid. 25.
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stain began”.364 Yet, he regretted, the events of the 20th o f July remained enveloped by 
enigma and mystery, “which History [sic] might never solve”.365
In his novel El Cuartel de la Montana, significantly named after the military 
headquarters, Jose Maria Carretero alias El Caballero Audaz (the Audacious Knight), 
Falangist journalist and writer, narrates the days that preceded the outbreak of the war 
in Madrid, culminating in the attack and defence of the Cuartel. In contrast to the 
Republicans’ account o f the soldiers in the Cuartel feeling deceived by their officers, 
Carretero portrayed the “admirable fraternity and camaraderie” that emerged among the 
soldiery in the barracks during the key hours prior to the Republican forces’ final 
assault on the headquarters. In a perhaps typical, Falangist, epic rhetoric, he suggested 
that “[d]anger erased any distances uniting everybody in an identical hierarchy [sic] 
before Death”.366 Nonetheless, the author seems deliberately to avoid the description of 
the assault on the headquarters and the mutineers’ eventual defeat. Carretero’s account 
of the events concludes with a description of how a mediator sent by the Republican 
forces to negotiate the mutineers’ rendition was met with a firm and single response: the 
Cuartel would resist until the end—the mutineers were either to win or die.367 The 
“beautiful tragedy of the Cuartel”, in Carretero’s words, is left to the imagination of the 
reader.
The understanding of the trauma of the 1936 military uprising and the ensuing civil war 
is in some ways rooted in the interpretation of the trauma of the War of Independence. 
It is suggested that the War of Independence—especially Goya’s painting—has become 
a comfortable metaphor for the experience of the 1930s Civil War. There is often a 
collective assumption that the various conflicts that Spain has undergone in modem 
times share something essentially similar: the violent clash between revolutionary and 
reactionary forces, notwithstanding their ideological mutations and reconfigurations 
over time. And what better and more tangible example o f the idea of a single, recurrent
364 “Una de las mas sangrientas paginas de la guerra civil fue la del asalto y defensa del Cuartel de la 
Montana de Madrid. Podriamos decir que ella constituye la primera pagina de la historia de la guerra, y 
en ella se inician, por consiguiente, la serie de grandes crimenes con los que las hordas rojas habian de 
convertir mas tarde la tierra espafiola en una inmensa mancha de sangre.” Ibid. 5.
365 Ibid. 28.
366 “Se establecia, de hecho, una hermandad, una camaraderia admirable. El peligro borraba distancias y 
unia a todos en identica jerarquia ante la Muerte.” “El Caballero Audaz”, El Cuartel D e La Montana 
(Ediciones Caballero Audaz, 1939) 181.
367 Ibid.
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trauma haunting modem Spain than the overlap in one place of the two dramatic events 
just described?
6.2. Destruction in the capital city
6.2.1 The Cuartel de la Montana destroyed
The Cuartel de la Montana was badly damaged on the very day of its attack and 
defence. The air strikes, the impact of machine-gun bullets, and the physical violence 
exerted by defendants and attackers left the building in bad shape. Subsequently, this 
section of the grand fa?ade of Madrid and the district of Argiielles immediately behind 
it suffered the daily effects of bombings, but especially artillery fire, for more than two 
years. From the Cerro de Garabitas, a prominent hill, and other strategic positions in 
Casa de Campo where the rebels managed to establish their troops in November 1936, 
bullets and bombs rained over western Madrid day after day with varying intensity. 
Hence, Ciudad Universitaria (the University campus), Moncloa and Argiielles, 
including the Montana del Principe Pio, were among the most targeted areas (see Fig. 
6.2). Yet there was evidence of the persistent bombing and artillery fire across the city. 
As the famous Spanish novelist Max Aub noted, “in all the streets o f Madrid— leaving 
aside the Salamanca district—there [was] at least one bombed house, mined, with its 
innards in the open air”.368 The Salamanca district was the safety zone, which the 
Nacionales agreed on not attacking, and to which civilians were voluntarily evacuated. 
Unsurprisingly perhaps, this was the district where the conservative bourgeoisie 
resided.
368 Max Aub, Campo D el Moro (Andorra la Vella: Editorial Andorra, S.L., 1969 [1963]) 79.
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Fig. 6.6 View o f  a section o f  Ciudad Universitaria. The big hole in the ground was 
apparently produced by a mine (adapted from the web).
6.2.2 The role o f the Comite de Reforma, Reconstruccion y  Saneamiento 
As the war progressed, the increasing problems o f hygiene caused by the am ounts o f 
rubble, corpses underneath the debris, and hom eless people in M adrid required the 
direct intervention o f  the Republican government. The municipal authorities were 
simply overcome by the challenges. The Republican government intervened, and 
created a new body, the Comite de Reforma, Reconstruccion y  Saneamiento (CRRS\ 
Reform, Reconstruction, and Sanitation Committee) in April 1937, through the fusion 
o f a number o f smaller units that had been assisting the civilian population since the 
start o f  the war.369 Initially, the M inister o f  Public W orks, Julio Just Jimeno, was 
appointed president o f the Committee, but from June 1937 the legendary Socialist 
leader Julian Besteiro, who had abandoned politics a few years earlier but resumed his 
career when the war started, replaced him .370 The immediate duties o f  the Committee 
encompassed the clearance o f rubble, diverse sanitation tasks, and, when possible, the 
improvement and continuing urbanisation o f the city.371 Later that year, the 
Com m ittee’s functions were extended and included
“the defence and preservation o f  artistic heritage, the reconstruction, reform, 
urbanisation, and sanitation o f  the capital city, inner-city urban reforms, the
369See Comite de Reforma Reconstruccion y Saneamiento, “Memoria 1937-1938,” (Madrid: 1938), 13.
370 See “Gaceta De La Republica, Num. 92,” M inisterio de Obras Publicas (2 April 1937), 27; “Gaceta 
De La Republica, Num. 94,” Ministerio de Obras Publicas (29 June 1937).
371 “Gaceta De La Republica, Num. 92,” 27, 28.
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expansion and regional planning o f  post-w ar M adrid, as well as the regulation 
o f accessing roads, communication, transportation and any other services 
linked to the plan or various plans m entioned” .372 
The Committee was subdivided into six sections, including one for the assistance to 
bombed houses (Socorro de fincas bombardeadas).373 The interventions o f  this unit 
were systematically registered, allowing the Com m ittee gradually to create maps that 
detailed the levels o f  destruction o f  the districts, blocks and buildings that suffered the 
impact o f bombs and/or artillery.374 (Unfortunately, I have not been able to retrieve the
original maps, but I include a scan o f one o f  the sample maps that appear in the 
C om m ittee’s 1937-1938 M emorandum; see Fig. 6.7.)
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Fig. 6.7 Map o f  a section o f  Argiielles. The different patterns and shades represent different levels o f  
damage to the buildings: from  complete destruction (darkest shade) to undamaged (white) (scanned 
photocopy from the C RR S’s Memoria 1937-1938).
372 “Sera competencia del Comite el estudio de cuantas cuestiones se relacionen con la defensa y 
conservation del Patrimonio artlstico, reconstruccion, reforma, urbanization y saneamiento de la capital. 
As! como todo lo relativo a la reforma interior, extension y plan comarcal que hayan de integrar el fUturo 
Madrid y la regularization de accesos, comunicaciones, transportes y servicios relacionados con el plan o 
los planes mencionados.” Ministerio de Comunicaciones Transportes y Obras Publicas, “Decreto 
Disponiendo Se Rija Por El Reglamento Que Se Inserta El Comite De Reforma, Reconstruccion Y 
Saneamiento De Madrid.,” in Gaceta de la Republica ( 1937).
373 Comite de Reforma Reconstruccion y Saneamiento, “M em oria 1937-1938,” 13.
374 Ibid.
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In order to prevent destruction— especially o f  the city’s artistic heritage— the 
Com m ittee carried out works to protect the facades o f churches, museums, palaces and 
other significant buildings. The facades o f  the Prado M useum, for example, were 
covered behind piles o f  sandbags; the windows were protected behind layers o f brick, 
earth and wood, and the roof was reinforced with concrete-asbestos.375 Meanwhile, the 
most im portant artworks were transferred to safer locations like Valencia, where the 
Republican government also moved at the end o f 1936. Fountains and sculptures, like 
La Cibeles, were buried in concrete, covered with sand and earth, and supported with 
palisades, or brick walls, in what looked like small hills.
Fig. 6.8 Protective structure covering the fountain  La Cibeles with the Palacio de 
Correos (the Postal Palace) in the background during the war (adapted from the web).
Aside from keeping a record o f the destroyed buildings, the CRRS was also interested 
in planning ahead and taking advantage o f  the opportunities for urban redevelopment 
that emerged from the destruction brought about by the war. An example o f this was 
the C om m ittee’s projected expansion and em bellishm ent o f Paseo del Pintor Rosales, 
the long avenue flanking the district o f Argiielles and ending at the Cuartel de la 
M ontana.376
375 Bustamante Montoro, “Salvaguardia Y Trabajos De Emergencia Durante La Guerra Civil (1936- 
1939),” 79, Vaamonde V., Salvamento YProteccion D el Tesoro Artlstico Espahol Durante La Guerra, 
1936-1939 24.
376 Comite de Reforma Reconstruccion y Saneamiento, “M emoria 1937-1938,” 78.
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6.3 Planning the capital city during the war
6.3.1 The project fo r  the Montana del Principe Pio
The CRRS suggested that Paseo del Pintor Rosales could be extended down to the Plaza 
de Espana, thereby improving traffic circulation in an admittedly congested area. 
Moreover, because of its width and beautiful location, the avenue could potentially 
become one of Madrid’s most stately boulevards. Boulevards were an important 
element in the modernist conception of city planning at the time. The increasing volume 
of cars in circulation certainly demanded wide, multi-lane avenues, but the function of 
the boulevard was also still very much regarded as of political-representative nature. 
This is perhaps most evident in the case of the capital cities of the European 
dictatorships of the 1930s. Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin were all keen to have grand 
boulevards, often flanked by state buildings, cutting through the inner cities.377 
Although free from totalitarian connotations, there seemed to be a political motivation 
behind the extension (and possibly widening) of Paseo del Pintor Rosales, too. The 
Republican Committee was considering constructing the new parliament building on 
the top of the Principe Pio hill, an idea which had apparently circulated for some time. 
Even though the Committee chose not to push the idea too strongly in its 1938 report, it 
noted that no private interests would be involved if the project was carried out, since the 
lands on the hill were owned by the state or the municipality. The fact that no 
expropriations would be necessary was implicitly understood to be a significant 
advantage.378
6.3.2 Besteiro ’s Plan
The extension of Paseo del Pintor Rosales was one of the partial urban transformations 
proposed in the Esquema y  Bases para el Desarrollo del Plan Regional de Madrid 
(Scheme and Rules for the Development of a Regional Plan for Madrid), published by 
Julian Besteiro and the CRRS in spring 1939, close to the end of the war. The document 
has since become known simply as Plan Besteiro. Besteiro’s team worked tirelessly 
throughout the conflict on developing a basic scheme for the planning of post-war 
Madrid. In a constructive spirit, if one may say, Besteiro and his colleagues preferred to
377 See Herman van der Wusten, “Dictators and Their Capital Cities: M oscow and Berlin in the 1930s,” 
GeoJournal 52, no. 4 (2001).
378 Comite de Reforma Reconstruccion y Saneamiento, “Memoria 1937-1938,” 78.
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view destruction as a potential advantage for the improvement of the city, as in the case 
of the ruined Cuartel. The replacement of the military barracks with a widened avenue 
and a new parliament building was congruent with the aim of reconstructing and 
enhancing the grand facade of Madrid, but also with the aim of preserving the 
Manzanares Valley as a green belt around this part of the city. The Republican 1933 
Plan General de Extension de Madrid, which took up some of the ideas presented in the 
international urban planning competition that Madrid city council organised in 1929, 
had emphasised the need for a green belt between the historic city and the first radius of 
suburbs, taking advantage of the watercourses of the Manzanares river and the
^70Abronigal stream bed, which surrounded the plateau on which old Madrid rose.
Besteiro was fundamentally concerned with the situation of Madrid’s less advantaged 
residents, who concentrated in unhealthy and untidy blocks within badly serviced 
neighbourhoods both in the inner city and the outskirts. Consequently, he favoured the 
idea of constructing new towns
“outside the limits of the city and not in direct continuation with these limits, 
since the opposite would entail not only the persistence of the existing harms 
(the lack of open space and of contact with Nature), but their increase”.
This was also consistent with the city model that emerged from the 1929 competition
io i
and with broader European planning schemes (influenced by the 1933 CLAM ), which 
favoured the existence o f green belts between each new ring of urban population. Aside 
from the theoretical advantages of this concentric city-model, Besteiro acknowledged 
the practical difficulty of constructing (or reconstructing) affordable housing within the 
limits of the compact city where land prices were always on the rise. Realistically, he 
saw no other choice than exploiting land that was far away from the city centre, but
379 Luis Azurmendi, “Orden Y  Desorden En El Plan De Madrid Del 41 ,” Cuadernos de Arquitectura y  
Urbanismo,i\o. 1 (Numero especial), Arquitectura para despues de una guerra (1977): 15. See also Rafael 
M oneo, “Madrid: Los Ultimos Veinticinco Anos,” H ogary  Arquitectura (Revista bim estral de la Obra  
Sindical del Hogar), no. 75 (1968): 47-50.
380 “[L]as obras de nueva construction habran de emprenderse en terrenos situados fuera de los limites 
actuales de la ciudad y que no esten en inmediata continuidad con esos limites, porque otra cosa seria, no 
solo prolongar el mal existente (la falta de espacios libres y de contacto con la Naturaleza), sino 
acrecentarlos considerablemente.” AA.VV., Plan Besteiro 1939. Esquema YBases Para El D esarrollo  
D el Plan Regional D e M adrid  (Madrid: 2004) 16.
381 The 1933 Congres International d’Architecture M odeme had as its theme “The functional city”, 
producing the influential and controversial Athens Charter, which was not published until ten years later. 
The 1933 CIAM advocated lineal and not concentric urban expansion, which was hard to follow. It was 
instead the idea o f  creating green belts between different urban zones that contemporary planners picked 
up more eagerly.
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with the potential o f becoming well connected to the centre through the increasingly 
advanced means o f transportation that were available at the time.
For sanitary, but also picturesque reasons, Besteiro was particularly interested in 
preserving the complex o f gardens, parks, forests and hills that extended westward 
(Moncloa, Dehesa de la Villa, Casa de Campo and El Pardo), beyond the M anzanares 
Valley. Probably influenced by the vision o f the devastation caused to this part o f the 
Madrilenian countryside, which had acted as a wartime front since the winter o f 1936, 
he insisted on its “incalculable beauty and natural qualities”, recalling in romantic, if  
not nostalgic, language how it had “been interpreted by the pen and brush stroke o f 
[Spain’s] most famous artists”, thus tying it to “the best o f  [Spain’s] traditions” .
Fig. 6.9 Hollow structure and ruinedfaqade o f  the Cuartel (undated photograph) (Archivo General de la 
Administracion).
382 “[E]n el Hmite Noroeste de Madrid se extiende una amplia zona verde, o parda, [...] pero de bellezas y 
excelencias naturales de un valor incalculable, interpretada por la pluma y el pincel de nuestros m&s 
famosos artistas y ligada asi a lo mejor de nuestras tradiciones.” AA.VV., Plan Besteiro 1939. Esquema Y 
Bases Para El Desarrollo Del Plan Regional De Madrid 19, Esquema Y Bases Para El Desarrollo Del 
Plan Regional De Madrid (Plan Besteiro), (Madrid: Comite de Reforma, Reconstruccion y Saneamiento 
(Ministerio de Comunicaciones, Transportes y Obras Publicas), 1939).
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Indeed, Velazquez and other renowned Spanish painters set many of their royal and 
popular scenes (hunting, but also lunches and siestas) against the backdrop of the 
Manzanares Valley (see Fig. 6.1) and the Guadarrama mountains, which suggests a 
centuries-old, intimate relationship between Madrilenians and this part of the 
countryside. Besteiro saw the need for continuing and reinforcing such relationship by 
creating new green areas, but also improving the public’s access to existing ones. As 
will be explained, the protection of the Manzanares Valley, trying to avoid urban 
development on either of the two river margins, was also a priority in early post-war 
plans, even though it was soon dropped in practice.
Aside from Besteiro’s preoccupation with improving the poorest residents’ conditions 
and their contact with nature, one of his most important contributions to the planning 
discussions of the first half of the twentieth century was his idea that Madrid should be 
planned on a regional basis. Like Ricardo Bastida, who envisioned future Bilbao as a 
metropolitan area in his 1923 Plan, Besteiro argued that bordering municipalities should 
become part of the future planning endeavours for the capital city.383
As already intimated, Besteiro’s Plan was publicised just before the final defeat of the 
Republican government. Some authors suggest that, while knowing that his Plan would 
most likely be condemned to a shelf existence, Besteiro aimed to leave public testimony 
of the planning discussions and empirical work carried out on the Republican side 
between 1937 and 1939—hence his almost epic, last-minute effort to publish the 
document.384
383 AA. VV., Plan Besteiro 1939. Esquema YBases Para El Desarrollo D el Plan Regional De M adrid  17, 
18, Azurmendi, “Orden Y Desorden En El Plan De Madrid Del 41,” 15.
384 See Carlos Sambricios introduction in AA.VV., Plan Besteiro 1939. Esquema Y Bases Para El 
D esarrollo D el Plan Regional D e Madrid.
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Part II
6.1 Planning Madrid after the war
6.1.1 Maroto 's Plan
At the same time as Besteiro’s plan came out in Madrid in spring 1939, engineer Jose 
Paz Maroto received the commission to design a general urban plan for the capital city 
from Alberto Alcocer, a supporter of the Nacionales, whose future mayoralty in Madrid 
had been decided by Franco’s provisional government in Burgos. Paz Maroto had 
worked for the city council before the war, and had also been involved in the 1929 
planning competition. He was thus familiar with the urban problems and challenges of 
the capital city, although scholars like Carlos Sambricio suggest that it was probably 
more the fact that he was residing in Valladolid during the war, where Alcocer and 
other supporters of the Nacionales established themselves, which made the future 
mayor rely on him.385 In his plan, Paz Maroto developed many of the principles and 
ideas that had circulated in the 1920s and 1930s, including the need for viable routes of 
access to the city, better communications and transportation infrastructures, and 
urgently transforming the inner city. Nevertheless, Paz Maroto’s plan was 
surprisingly neutral and bureaucratically formulated considering the exceptional 
circumstances in which it was prepared, on the verge o f the rebels’ victory and Franco’s 
provisional government preparing for the final take-over of the state apparatus. The lack 
of triumphal words and monumental projects was probably the main reason for which 
the Plan was dropped once the Nacionales entered the capital city and officially won the 
war.387 Paz Maroto’s formulations were possibly too bland for the vigorous image the 
new regime, especially the Falangists, sought to transmit.
6.1.2 Bidagor’s Plan
As soon as the Junta de Reconstruction de Madrid (Madrid Reconstruction Board) was 
formed on 27 April 1939, barely a month after the seizure of the capital city, its 
Comision Tecnica de Reconstruction (Technical Reconstruction Commission) was 
assigned the task of creating a new plan for Madrid. Pedro Bidagor, who had been 
appointed head of the Department of Urbanism of the Direction General de
385 Carlos Sambricio, “Madrid 1941: Tercer Ano De La Victoria,” in Arquitectura En Regiones 
D evastadas (Madrid: MOPU, Centro de Publicaciones, 1987), 82.
386 Ibid. 83.
387 Azurmendi, “Orden Y Desorden En El Plan De Madrid Del 41 ,” 15.Luis Azurmendi, p. 15
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Arquitectura (General Architecture Committee) and was also part of the Technical 
Reconstruction Commission, became the guiding figure behind the new plan. During 
the war, Bidagor— who graduated as an architect in 1931 and was only 35 years old 
when he was appointed by the new regime—presided over some of the meetings that 
were held in the premises of the anarchist trade union CNT to discuss issues of urban 
planning and architecture, and his reputation grew among his colleagues, including Luis 
Moya, Carlos de Miguel and Gaspar Blein.388 Aside from the perhaps ironic fact that 
the future regime’s planners and architects exchanged their ideas in Republican Madrid 
under the auspices of the anarchists, it seems sensible to think that these wartime 
exchanges prepared Bidagor for his post-war commission. A first draft of the new plan 
was ready by 1942; it was then shown privately to Franco. The final draft was approved 
in 1944, but did not effectively become law until 1946.
The Falangists had already shown particular interest in the redesign of the capital city 
before the war. They saw the Madrid o f their time as full of bad imitations taken from 
foreign and other Spanish cities and cheap, tasteless representations of the castizo 
character or Madrilenian local colour. Apparently, Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, the 
founder of Falange, had once suggested that the best way of transforming Madrid would 
be to set fire on the city, placing fire-fighters close to the buildings that were worth
7RQpreserving. The war had somehow made Primo de Rivera’s wish come true, although 
many of the buildings he would have deemed worth maintaining had also been 
damaged. The Falangists were extremely preoccupied with authenticity. They believed 
that by rethinking Madrid as an imperial capital city, the city’s authentic character 
would be restored, including its genuine, profound Castilian spirit, which had nothing to 
do with the vulgar casticismo, which they identified with the all too colourful, 
nineteenth-century fa9ades and dubious customs of Madrid’s popular 
neighbourhoods.390 As was discussed in Chapter 4, for most Falangists, authenticity— 
and not merely in aesthetic terms— was ultimately associated with seventeenth-century 
imperial Spain. While for some of them this might have meant literally recovering the 
seventeenth-century built form, for others it was more about infusing the city with the 
spirit of command, austerity and deep religious faith which allegedly motivated Spain’s
388 Ibid.: 16, Moneo, “Madrid: Los Ultimos Veinticinco Afios,” 50.
389 Conde de Montarco, “Hay Que Cambiar La Fisionomia De Madrid,” Informaciones, 2 February 1940.
390 See “Madrid, Capital Imperial,” Informaciones, 29 June 1939.
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imperial rule under the Hapsburgs. The Falangists’ primary assumption was that 
Spain’s decline had essentially begun with the arrival in the early eighteenth century of 
the Bourbons, who had introduced foreign, dissolute customs and extravagant tastes.
Bidagor was successful in capturing the Falangist sentiment. He was able to convey the 
sense that his was indeed a new plan for a new imperial city, even though some of the 
planning conceptions underlying the plan mirrored earlier plans, including Besteiro’s. 
Among the continuities there was a need to alternate urban population rings with green 
belts and accentuate the city’s northern-southern axis. The latter essentially meant 
promoting the expansion of the city northwards and preserving the Manzanares Valley 
as part of a southern green belt by extending the Paseo de la Castellana and completing 
the subterranean railway between Atocha and Chamartin.
Unlike Paz Maroto’s allegedly bland, bureaucratic language, however, Bidagor’s 1944 
Plan displayed a radical, almost epic rhetoric inspired by the Falangist principles of 
hierarchy, service and fraternity. Bidagor aimed to reflect these in “the mode in which 
the various urban elements [were] arranged”.391 To the Falangists, hierarchy essentially 
meant that the city had to adapt to its geographical location, taking advantage of 
existing valleys and elevations, and reserving the high areas for the most honourable 
buildings and activities.392 Service was in a way a consequence of hierarchy, meaning 
that each zone of the city fulfilled a specific role according to its geographical location 
within the organic whole in which Madrid was conceived. Fraternity, on the other hand, 
implied that although there existed separate zones for different activities {special, 
commercial, residential, green and industrial, in Bidagor’s terms), the general aim was 
to ensure that different social classes lived together in districts and neighbourhoods or 
barrios so that they would “feel forced to adopt respectable behaviours”.393 In other 
words, Bidagor, who was possibly influenced by German Nazi economist and planner 
Gottfried Feder’s ideas, envisioned an organic city made up o f smaller, hierarchically 
structured, self-contained units where residents of different social backgrounds lived 
together sharing all the amenities, from civic spaces (church, local party headquarters,
391 “Plan General De Ordenacion Urbana De Madrid De 1944 (1946) “Plan Bidagor”,” (Cartoteca de la 
Consejeria de Medio Ambiente y Ordenacion del Territorio de Madrid, 
http://www.madrid.org/cobras_publicas/centro_document/pgou_l 944.htm, 1944).
392 See “Madrid, Capital Imperial.”
393 See “Necesidad Del Decoro Urbano,” A rriba , 12 November 1940.
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school) to shops to leisure areas as if they were a big family.394 The Falangists believed 
in the harmonious and virtuous coexistence of different social classes, and were deeply 
troubled by the isolation of workers in working-class districts where their material 
circumstances possibly improved, but where they were deprived of their dignity and the 
wealthier classes’ paternalist affection, both of which they enjoyed in the traditionally 
mixed buildings of the inner city.395
Bidagor developed the above ideas in the twelve chapters of his Plan, where some other 
issues that had preoccupied his predecessors such as access to the city, the redesigning 
of the old city, the completion of the extension projects, the redevelopment of existing 
suburbs, the creation of a green belt, and the construction of new satellite towns were 
also addressed. But Bidagor was particularly keen to emphasise the symbolic dimension 
of his plan: the attention to the spiritual implications of Madrid’s capital city status. 
Accordingly, he devoted the opening chapter to La Capitalidad—the capital’s status. 
The language in this section is particularly powerful and grandiloquent; it is a language 
aimed to please the regime’s leaders, primarily the Falangists, but also traditionalists 
and monarchists, who almost certainly did not feel alien to the reactionary implications 
of the idea of resurrecting Imperial Madrid.
The first consequence of Madrid’s capital status, according to Bidagor’s Plan, was that 
the city ought to become the bureaucratic centre from which the rest of the nation was 
to be ruled. This was consistent with the well-established centralist tradition that 
absolutist and constitutional regimes alike had followed in the past. Second, Madrid 
was to become a living example of history and tradition. Bidagor proclaimed that these
394 See Sambricio, “Madrid 1941: Tercer Afio De La Victoria,” 88.
395 Jos6 Luis de Arrese, one o f  the regime’s most prominent ideologues, illustrates the “moral 
implications” o f the physical separation o f  the working class by telling the story o f  Sefior Cruz, the panel 
beater, who lived in the attic room o f  Arrese’s building— a socially mixed building, which also housed 
the landlord, an industrialist, an aristocrat and a trader. Arrese tells the reader that each time Sefior Cruz’s 
wife gave birth, all the neighbours immediately offered the family something to eat or wear. In exchange, 
Sefior Cruz would repair the neighbours’ broken taps and clean their water pipes. When Arrese crossed 
Senor Cruz in the entrance doorway, they would chat, share a smoke, “and speak badly o f  the 
government”. But one day, “the union” offered Senor Cruz a flat in a working-class district. Once the 
panel beater moved there, Arrese claims, their “friendship and relationship was forever broken”. Sefior 
Cruz was now a worker, and Arrese and the other neighbours had suddenly become his potential 
employers. Arrese acknowledges that Senor Cruz’s new flat probably was larger and nicer than the attic 
room. But, he argues, Sefior Cruz, “is not a materialist, because he is a Spaniard”, and was almost 
certainly less happy than before. Not unlike a “plague victim”, Arrese concludes, Sefior Cruz had been 
ousted from the inner city and deprived o f  the comradeship that he enjoyed with the gentlemen in his 
former building. Arrese, La Revolution Social D el Nacional-Sindicalismo  167, 68.
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historical values ought to be associated with seventeenth-century Imperial Madrid, 
which, moreover, had produced a particular urban typology that subsequently became 
“characteristic of the most representative Spanish cities”.396 Third, not only was Madrid 
to look back into the (nation’s) past, it was to re-enact such a past in the present and 
carry on with Spain’s mission in the world. Such a mission was related to Spain’s 
imperial enterprises in America and North Africa, but also to its potential role as 
cultural and historical mediator between Africa and Europe. Finally, by engaging in the 
Liberation Crusade (the war) against the Republicans, the new regime had embarked on 
a specific mission aimed at safeguarding the nation’s integrity from the threat of 
Communist and atheist forces, in other words, the anti-Spain. This was possibly the 
New Spain’s most important mission.
Spain’s various “missions” were arguably captured in Bidagor’s design for three main 
routes of access to the city (which partly existed already): Via de la Victoria, Via de 
Europa and Via del Imperio. The three axes fulfilled different aims. The first celebrated 
Franco’s victory, the second connected Madrid to Europe, while the third “picked up 
the routes to Portugal, Africa and Hispanic America”. Moreover, Franco had explicitly 
manifested his dislike of the poor, ugly suburban dwellings that extended along the 
city’s existing roads of accesss. These gave a miserable impression, which did not live
TQ7up to the image of the capital city of the New Spain. Thus, the new lines of access 
sought to circumvent the slums on the outskirts and concentrate traffic to just three, 
monumentally conceived entrance avenues.
396 “Plan General De Ordenacion Urbana De Madrid De 1944 (1946) “Plan Bidagor”.”
397 See “Necesidad Del Decoro Urbano.”
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F/g. 6.10 Bidagor's Plan (1946). The curved dark line on the left shows the course o f  the grandfacade  (adapted 
from the web).
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6.1.2.1 The grand facade o f Madrid
One of the means by which Bidagor’s Plan aimed to reflect the spiritual and symbolic 
functions associated with Madrid’s capital status was the grand fa?ade of the city. 
Reference has already been made to the grand fa?ade as the particular result o f the 
geographical and topographical characteristics of the land on which the city was 
originally built: an elevation overlooking the Manzanares Valley, the Castilian plateau 
and the Guadarrama mountains. The notion of a grand fa?ade emerged in the sixteenth 
century when the Hapsburgs built the Royal Palace on the remains of the Moorish 
fortification, which had stood on one of the cliffs overlooking the Manzanares, and 
other significant buildings were constructed along the western edge of the plateau. The 
proximity to the Palace, but also the privileged view of the wide and beautiful 
landscape extending at the foot of the edge, made the location attractive for the 
construction of noble edifices, which gradually contributed to shaping Madrid’s 
physiognomy. The grand fa?ade became a place from where to look out on Nature, but 
also a place to be looked at from Nature. It was itself a mixture of natural and artificial 
qualities.
The notion of the grand fa9ade was thus not new to twentieth-century planners like 
Besteiro and Bidagor, and there had been a renewed interest in and celebration of the 
aesthetic qualities of this part of Madrid since the nineteenth century. As discussed 
earlier, Besteiro was keen to give prominence to the grand fa9ade, but perhaps more so 
to preserve the Manzanares Valley. Yet it was precisely this contrast between the open, 
green space of the valley and the silhouette of the monumental buildings on the 
platform that rose over the valley which allowed for the concept of the grand fa9ade. If 
the Republicans had won the war and located the new parliament building on the grand 
fa9ade, exactly on the site where the ruins of the Cuartel de la Montana stood, it would 
have further signalled the symbolic shift from a monarchical to a Republican regime, as 
the new building would have shared or even displaced the prominence of the Royal 
Palace. But, as we know, the Republicans did not have the opportunity to build the new 
parliament premises, and after 1939 the project was abandoned. Nonetheless, the idea 
of adding a new, politically symbolic building to the grand fa9ade was not discarded by 
the Franco regime.
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6.1.2.2 The Falangist P arty’s Headquarters
In his opening chapter on M adrid’s capital status, Bidagor refers to “three symbolic 
buildings o f utmost national evocation” on the grand faipade, which together constitute
igo
an urban complex that “corresponds to the vital principles o f the New Spain”. He 
argues that “Religion, Fatherland and Hierarchy are expressed in the Cathedral, the 
Palace and the new building o f FET-JONS399 [Falange’s Party Headquarters] situated 
on the sacred plot o f  the Cuartel de la M ontana” . Bidagor also suggests that being 
surrounded by “the old City”, where the traditional and the popular come together, this 
complex o f buildings is even closer to perfection.400
Fig. 6 .11 Bombed-out houses in Argiielles (adapted from the web).
Unlike the Royal Palace and the Cathedral which already existed, even though in an 
unfinished state in the case o f the latter,401 the headquarters o f the Falangist Party (FET- 
JONS) was still merely a project. Bidagor planned the building on one o f  the most 
privileged locations o f  the grand fa<?ade, the M ontana del Principe Pio, exactly where 
the remains o f the military headquarters stood. Incidentally, as discussed earlier, the
39s “Plan General De Ordenacion Urbana De Madrid De 1944 (1946) “Plan Bidagor”.
399 FET y de las JONS (Falange Espanola Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional 
Sindicalista) became the official state party after Franco’s fusion o f  the Falangist movement Falange 
Espanola y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista (which was in turn the result o f a fusion) and 
the traditionalist Carlist movement.
400 “Plan General De Ordenacion Urbana De Madrid De 1944 (1946) ‘Plan Bidagor’.”
401 The Almudena Cathedral was not completed until the early 1990s.
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Cuartel de la Montana was the scenario o f the first clash between rebel mutineers and 
Republican forces in the capital in July 1936. The first rebel fighters (or “ liberators” 
from the Nacionales’ point o f view) had fallen there, infusing the soil with their blood, 
which in the Falangist imaginary possessed alm ost sacred qualities. The implications o f 
Bidagor’s choice to build the Casa del Partido on the sacred plot o f the Cuartel will be 
explored in the third section.
Fig. 6.12 The district ofArgiielles (within the dotted lines) and the ruins o f  the Cuartel 
(within the dotted circle) (scanned photograph from the Cartoteca de la Consejeria de 
Urbanismo y Medio Ambiente de la Comunidad de Madrid).
Bidagor implied that a considerable portion o f  the district o f  Argiielles, largely in ruins 
because o f the war, could be demolished, thereby creating space on the grand faqade for
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some of the Ministries, the “Ministries of Strength and Spirituality” (Ministerios de 
Fuerzay Espiritualidad), to quote Bidagor’s own words, and perhaps also for the most 
representative embassies and other international offices. By locating most of the 
political organisation in Argiielles, close to the Royal Palace and the Almudena 
Cathedral, Bidagor sought to fulfil his organic concept of the city, where the grand 
fa?ade was equivalent to the head of Madrid. The “Ministries corresponding to the 
material interests”, on the other hand, could be located elsewhere, most likely in 
Nuevos Ministerios, which, in this view, represented the heart and bowels of the city.402 
Through the metaphor of the living being in which organs and limbs occupy distinct 
positions, Bidagor gave expression to the Falangist notion of hierarchy identified 
earlier.
6.1.3 Organisation and implementation o f the new urban planning guidelines 
Besteiro had suggested the need for “an organisation to harmonise the various interests 
at stake”403 if Madrid was to develop into a larger regional entity. For Bidagor and his 
followers the idea of a single authority was intrinsic to the theory of the organic city and 
Madrid’s capital status. It was argued that the economic and administrative challenges 
posed by the reconstruction of Madrid could “only be overcome through Unity [sic]”.404 
According to Bidagor, the Junta de Reconstruccion effectively reflected the need to 
“unite the different centres that intervene in the development of the city in a single 
organisation”, including “Madrid city council, the town councils of close-by villages, 
the Military Ministries, the National Movement Ministry, and the Ministries of Public 
Works, Industry, Agriculture, Finance and Government” 405
The notion of the need for a unified political leadership, a single administrative 
authority, involving both local and national entities, was shared by other key figures in 
the planning process for the new Madrid. When discussing the difficulties in
402 See “Plan General De Ordenacion Urbana De Madrid De 1944 (1946) ‘Plan Bidagor’.”
403 Esquema Y Bases Para El Desarrollo D el Plan Regional D e M adrid (Plan Besteiro), 18.
404 “Madrid, Capital Imperial.”
405 “[...] reunir en un organismo unico los diferentes centros que intervienen en el desarrollo e la ciudad, 
que son: el Ayuntamiento de Madrid, los Ayuntamientos de los pueblos limitrofes, los Ministerios 
Militares, del Movimiento, Obras Publicas, Industria, Agriculture, Hacienda y Gobemacion”. Pedro 
Bidagor Lasarte, Orientaciones Sobre La Reconstruccion D e M adrid : Texto Taquigrafico D e La 
Conferencia Pronunciada P  or Don Pedro Bidagor Lasarte. ..E n El Instituto Tecnico De Construccion Y 
Edificacion, El D ia 19 D e Febrero D e 1941 (Madrid: Direction General de Regiones Devastadas y 
Reparaciones, 1941)3 .
258
reconstructing the capital city, the head of the city council’s Department of 
Architecture, Gaspar Blein, contends:
“We have to assure ourselves that planning Madrid is such a significant matter 
that, if I may say, should put all the Ministries and the Municipalities in check. 
It is not about a few lines and coloured spots on some plans; Spain will not 
function if all its state mechanisms are not synchronised, starting with its head 
[i.e. Madrid], and precisely this is what we are proposing in order to tackle the 
reconstruction of Madrid. I repeat: unity of leadership.”406
The appointment of Jose Moreno Torres— who had already been appointed head of 
Regiones Devastadas—president of the Madrid Junta de Reconstruccion, effectively 
reflects the idea of “unity of leadership” or “single command”, to quote Bidagor.407 
From the Falangists’ point of view, the reconstruction of Spain could not take place 
without the reconstruction of Madrid. Such a metonymical relationship is poignantly 
expressed by Blein when he argues:
“In Spain’s being, [Madrid] represents the head, and if Madrid is not perfectly 
organised to accomplish its mission, it will be difficult for the national being to 
function properly.”408 
In contrast to Besteiro’s acknowledgement of the need for coordination but 
simultaneous warning against the creation of a “new Minerva”, fully armed and “ready 
to fight heroic battles”,409 the Falangist planners wanted exactly this: a powerful, 
omniscient, administrative Minerva to infuse all the parties involved in reconstructing 
and planning Madrid with a single (heroic) spirit and a common practice.
406 “Hay que convencerse de que la ordenacion de Madrid es asunto tan serio que, si me permitis la frase, 
tiene que poner en jaque a todos los Ministerios y Corporaciones. Que no es cuestion de unas rayas y 
unas manchas de color en unos pianos; que Espafia no fiincionara, mientas no se sincronicen, empezando 
por la cabeza, todos sus mecanismos estatales, y justamente esto es lo que proponemos para desarrollar la 
reconstruccion de Madrid. Repito: unidad de direction.” Gaspar Blein, “Dificultades En La 
Reconstruccion De Madrid,” (Instituto Tecnico de la Construccion y Edificacion, 1941), 5.
407 See Bidagor Lasarte, Orientaciones Sobre La Reconstruccion D e M adrid: Texto Taquigrafico De La 
Conferencia Pronunciada P or Don Pedro B idagor Lasarte... En El Instituto Tecnico D e Construccion Y 
Edificacion, El D ia 19 De Febrero D e 1941 5.
408 “En el ser de Espafia representa la cabeza y, sin que Madrid este perfectamente organizado para 
cumplir su mision, dificil ser6 conseguir que el ser nacional funcione como debe.” Blein, “Dificultades 
En La Reconstruccion De Madrid,” 1.
409 Esquema Y Bases Para El D esarrollo D el Plan Regional D e M adrid (Plan Besteiro) 18.
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6.2 Falangist aesthetics and post-war architecture in the capital city
6.2.1 Seventeenth-century Imperial Madrid
Parallel to, and often enmeshed in, the design of a general plan for the capital of the 
New Spain, there ran the search for the city’s genuine aesthetics, which, as already 
suggested, was soon identified with seventeenth-century Imperial Madrid. The 1940 
December issue of the magazine Reconstruccion, published by Regiones Devastadas, 
explored the motivations for such choice. To architect Luis Moya, for example, looking 
back to the seventeenth century was the only way of transcending the stylistic chaos 
generated by the incapacity of modem Spain to assimilate foreign and ancient stylistic 
contributions. Spain, Moya contended, had possessed
“the power of assimilation—the power to receive and elaborate— sometimes 
with higher, sometimes with medium standards, but always sufficiently to be 
able to consider foreign and past contributions as the necessary nourishment to 
keep alive [our] style, always unique through the uninterrupted course of 
tradition”.410
Moreover, Moya referred to the colonisation of America and the successful building 
enterprise that Spain had engaged in at the time through the prolific construction of 
towns in the newly conquered lands 4,1 To Moya, the secret of Spain’s success in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries lay in its capacity to appropriate diverse influences 
and produce something genuinely Spanish and imperial. In his view, it was mainly 
through the mediation of Juan de Herrera, the architect of El Escorial, that Spanish 
golden-age architecture had been successful in incorporating
“the oriental method—more as a rebirth of the Hispanic-Arab tradition than as 
an importation—the Italian method of the more severe times, and even certain 
aspects of the Flemish, [producing] an architecture [with] abundant means for 
responding to any kind of programme that a great Empire might need, and 
[becoming] a true Imperial architecture, like the ancient Roman” 4,2
410 “[...] Espana poseia un poder de asimilacion— un poder de recepcidn y elaboration— en grado superior 
unas veces, mediano otras, pero siempre suficiente para considerar las aportaciones de lo ajeno y de lo 
antiguo como alimentos necesarios para la vida del estilo, siempre unico en el cauce de una tradition no 
interrumpida.” Luis Moya, “Orientaciones De Arquitectura En Madrid,” Reconstruccion , December 
1940,11.
4.1 Ibid. 15.
412 “Incorporada en la corriente tradicional por Herrera la manera oriental— como una nueva vida de lo 
hispano-arabe mas que como una importation— la italiana del momento mas severo, y hasta el modo 
flamenco en algunos aspectos, adquiere aquella arquitectura medios riquisimos para satisfacer toda la 
clase de programas que pueda requerir un gran Imperio, y es una verdadera arquitectura Imperial, como 
la de la Roma antigua.” Ibid.
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6.2.2 Historic Madrid
To the Falangists, architecture had thus the potential of recreating the atmosphere of the 
old Spanish Empire in contemporary Madrid, and one of the city council’s projects 
(referred to in Bidagor’s Plan as well) was restoring the historic, Hapsburg district of 
the capital city. Mariano Garcia Cortes, author of Madrid y  su fisionomia urbana 
(Madrid and its urban physiognomy) suggested, however, that
“‘Historic Madrid’ has to produce the feeling of what it might have been, of 
what Imperial Madrid should have been, the head of the State, ‘where the sun
 ___ _ 4. j  « 4 13never set .
According to Garcia Cortes, this could sometimes involve “falsifying” what had 
actually been there in the name of “historical truth”.414 Overt manipulation of the 
historical built environment was hence acceptable to Garcia Cortes, who probably 
envisioned a stylised Imperial Madrid made up of both originals and replicas of 
plateresque415 and Hapsburg architecture. And this did not include the inconveniences 
of the seventeenth century such as using “the streets [as] dumping sites” or restoring 
poor and miserable houses, which Garcia Cortes associated with the old Jewish and 
Moorish neighbourhoods in southern Madrid and the hovels “a la malicia”.A]6
The anti-Semitic elements of the regime’s early neo-Hispanic imperial discourses are 
probably familiar to the reader by now. In particular, the association between Moorish 
and Jewish neighbourhoods with crammed and narrow streets and brick-architecture of 
poor quality seems to have turned into a cliche in the early 1940s (let us recall the 
discourses around the redevelopment of the Barri de la Catedral in Barcelona). At the 
same time, not even the Falangists could ignore the magnificent architectural
413 “El ‘Madrid Historico’ ha de producir la sensacion de lo que pudo ser, de lo que debio ser el Madrid 
Imperial, la cabecera del Estado, ‘en cuyos dominios no se ponia el so l’.’’Mariano Garcia Cortes, “El 
“Madrid Historico” Debe Evocar Y El Genio Y Poder De Nuestro Pueblo,” Reconstruccion, December 
1 9 4 0 ,3 2 ,3 3 .
414 Ibid. 32.
4,5 Plateresque is an architectural style that developed in Spain in the 15th and 16th centuries characterised 
by its ornate qualities, emulating the craft o f  a silversmith.
416 Garcia Cortes, “El “Madrid Historico” Debe Evocar Y El Genio Y Poder De Nuestro Pueblo,” 34. 
“Casas a la malicia” (which could be translated into something like houses with malice) were the kind o f  
constructions that emerged in Madrid in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as a result o f  residents’ 
legal obligation to host the king’s servants more permanently. In order to avoid such obligation, 
Madrilenians began deliberately to construct their houses so they would not fulfil the minimum standards 
required to host the royal employees. They did this by subdividing each floor into more rooms or 
“hiding” rooms in the upper storeys, thus creating rather uncomfortable and reduced living spaces.
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achievements of the period of Islamic domination or the fact that most of the street grid 
of old Madrid, including the noblest areas, still followed the original Moorish street 
layout. Hence, it was not without contradictions and with limitations that the terms 
Moorish and Jewish could be used in this context as metaphors for poverty and 
ugliness, which, on the other hand, as noted, were also identified with the working class 
and the Reds.
In an essay entitled Espafia: germanos contra bereberes (Spain: Germans against 
Berbers), written while in prison in the summer of 1936, Jose Antonio Primo de 
Rivera—introduced earlier as the founder of Falange—partly resolves this contradiction 
by distinguishing between the Arabs and the Berbers, and ultimately replacing cultural 
difference with class difference. While he sees the Arabs— a higher civilisation— as 
leading the invasion of Spain in the eighth century, he views the Berbers— a nomadic, 
lower people, in his view— as the population group that in practice took over the 
Peninsula. According to Primo de Rivera, the (class) affinities between the Berbers and 
the indigenous Iberian peoples—who had previously been dominated, yet not 
integrated, by the Romans—resulted in their crossbreeding. Thus, in Primo de Rivera’s 
elitist view, the Christian, Gothic kings that fought the Reconquista managed only to 
expel the Arab leaders. The remaining lower castes, who were by then a mixture of 
Berber and Iberian indigenous peoples, were vanquished and subsequently subjugated 
by the Christian noble caste of Gothic descent.417 When understood as part of this quite 
simple class dynamics, the apparently contradictory act of praising the achievements of 
the Arab civilisation— including its urbanism and architecture—while showing disdain 
for the Berber or Moorish culture appears conceptually less problematic.
The acknowledgement of the contribution of the Arab civilisation to the Spanish nation 
resonates in the apparently more sophisticated and generous interpretation of Madrid’s 
diverse pasts and traditions that Falangist intellectual Victor d ’Ors proposes when he 
celebrates Madrid as “a border city, within a territory, Spain, which is itself already a 
border” 4,8 By 1947, the redevelopment plans for historic Madrid— or “Magerit” as 
d’Ors refers to it, using Madrid’s originally Arabic name—had made little progress, and
417 Miguel Primo de Rivera y Urquijo, ed., Papeles Postumos D e Jose Antonio (Barcelona: Plaza & Janes 
Editores, S.A., 1996) 160-62.
418 “Ordenacion Historico-Artistica De Madrid. Conferencia Pronunciada Por D. Victor D ’Ors En El 
Instituto De Estudios De Administracion Local,” Revista N acional de Arquitectura  61 (1947): 51.
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d ’Ors blamed the delay on the continuing lack of a set of general aesthetic principles 
with which to reorder not only historic Madrid, but the city at large. In trying to 
overcome more rigid understandings of Imperial Madrid, which tended to privilege the 
north-western, allegedly nobler part of the city, he suggested that “Madrid has two 
faces, the silver face that looks to the north and the north-west, and the golden face that 
looks to the south and south-east”.419 According to d ’Ors, the stony, yet solemn, bluish 
and greyish “Velazquean [and Herrerian] landscape” to the north-west—which Besteiro 
nostalgically evoked in the introduction to his 1939 Plan— had its counterpart in the 
yellow and red tones (“the Aragonese brick, Arab roof-tiles and Andalusian 
whitewash”), which he sees as typical of the south-eastern landscape, and were 
“immortalised by the brush of the early Goya”.420
“Madrid looks, on the one hand, to Europe and the Western world; on the other, to 
Africa and the Mediterranean”, d’Ors wrote. In architectural terms, Madrid had 
inherited “the grey German slates and the Baltic pinnacles, the Flemish windows, the 
alternating arrangement of openings and protruding volumes of France, and even the 
far-away Scandinavian spires and today still, the New York skyscrapers” from northern 
Europe (and North America). From the Mediterranean, on the other hand, Madrid had 
taken over “the arcades of Florence and the cupolas of Rome and part of the strong 
chromatics of Byzantium”.421
D’Ors ends his comprehensive homage to the overlapping cultural influences to be 
found in the capital city by claiming that:
419 “Madrid tiene dos caras, la cara de plata que mira al N. y N.O., y la cara de oro que mira al S. y al 
S.E.” Ibid.
420 Ibid. It is perhaps worth noting that there were less poetic and more technical appraisals o f  the role o f  
brick in Madrid’s historical architecture, too. Luis Vivanco, for example, suggests that brick has both a 
M udejar (Spanish-Moorish) and a neoclassical dimension. The two differ in terms o f  how brick is 
incorporated into the buildings. While in the first case, brick is an active component o f  the design o f  the 
building, in neoclassical architecture brick becomes a passive component as the “expressiveness” o f  the 
building rests on the usually white stone mouldings and cornices deployed. See Luis Felipe Vivanco, 
“Funcionalismo Y Ladrillismo,” Revista Nacional de Arquitectura, no. 119 (1951).
421 “Madrid mira por un lado a Europa y el mundo occidental, por otro al Africa y al Mediterraneo. [...] 
Su mirada N. y N.E. abarca la piedra que viene de la montana, especialmente con su gran genio Herrera, 
y las grises pizarras alemanas y los chapiteles del Baltico, las ventanas de Flandes, la ordenacion de 
cuerpos en entrantes y salientes de Francia y aun las mas lejanas agujas escandinavas y hoy todavia los 
rascacielos neoyorquinos. [...] por el Este y el S.E.? Por ahi Madrid alcanza a mirar las arquerias de 
Florencia y las cupulas de Roma y casi el fuerte cromatismo de Bizancio.” “Ordenacion Historico- 
Artistica De Madrid. Conferencia Pronunciada Por D. Victor D'ors En El Instituto De Estudios De 
Administracion Local,” 51.
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“[Madrid’s] task is the same as that of Spain as a whole, but because of its 
border condition and capital status, with all the more reason: to hold [back] both 
tendencies, temper them, and finally integrate them into a higher harmony.”422 
D ’Ors suggests that the integration of the two Madrids into a “higher harmony” 
involves maintaining their distinct styles, colours and construction materials, and 
establishing the right proportion of each of the two traditions in the reconstruction of 
the old city and the development of the new city.423 However, the notions of 
“tempering” and “holding back” again suggest the existence of an elite, a dominant 
class, who are seen as naturally responsible for maintaining the delicate social and 
aesthetic equilibrium of Spain. And, from a Falangist perspective, that class was at that 
time embodied in the victors of the Civil War.
6.3 The Falangist programme abandoned
Both Bidagor’s Falangist inspired planning conceptions and the initial exaltation of 
Imperial Madrid were abandoned by the regime after a few years. As the Second World 
War evolved and the defeat of the Axis powers seemed increasingly possible, hardcore, 
pro-German Falangists, including Serrano Suner, who had been one of the architects of 
the initial political organisation of the regime, were displaced. In view of the change of 
direction of the war, especially from 1943, Franco sought to distance himself from the 
identification of his regime with the Axis, giving more and more ideological room to 
the traditionalist (Carlist) family424 and the Church.
As explained earlier, Bidagor’s Plan was not effectively in force until 1946, thus after 
the end of the Second World War. From the start, however, it was largely ignored in 
practice. This was partly because of its ideological connotations and the difficult 
economic situation, but also because it had been conceived as a long-term plan that 
depended on the subsequent approval of hierarchically subordinated partial plans to 
become successful.425 The curtailing of the initial ideological enthusiasm, which had 
motivated the Plan, together with the chronic lack of state funding, made it very
422 “En resumen, su tarea as la misma que la de Espafia entera, pero aqui, por encrucijada y por 
capitalidad, con mucho mayor motivo: sujetar ambas tendencias, atemperarlas, integrarlas, por fin, en una 
armonia superior.” Ibid.
423 Ibid.: 51 ,52 .
424 The different ideological tendencies within the Franco regime are usually referred to as fam ilias  or 
families.
425 Juan Manuel Toledano, “Los Proyectos Parciales Del Plan Bidagor,” in Plan B idagor 1941-1946. 
Plan General De Ordenacion, ed. Carlos Sambricio (Madrid: Comunidad de Madrid; Nerea, 2003), 64.
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difficult to implement Bidagor’s planning guidelines. Private interests started to play a 
predominant role, negotiating if not imposing their own priorities in the drawing-up of 
the partial plans and the design of specific projects.426 Bidagor’s Plan had mirrored the 
Falangist architects’ belief in top-down state-planning. According to some scholars, it 
was the last of a series of attempts to define a city project for Madrid, or in other words, 
the last effort to conceive of the future Greater Madrid from a unitary and global 
perspective 427 In practice, the design of the new city ended up, or rather continued, in 
the hands of redevelopers such as the brothers Otamendi 428 The result, over time, was a 
fragmented, uneven development of the capital city.
It is also worth noting that, by 1951, Bidagor himself acknowledged that his Plan, 
although well designed, had a number of weaknesses. These he saw as stemming from 
his earlier preoccupation with producing a rigid, monumentalist city, based on a 
traditional conception of the urban, and his disregard for more contemporary ideas, 
which now, a few years later, he considered better suited to address the needs o f a 
twentieth-century capital city.429 Bearing in mind the Falangists’ idealisation of the 
seventeenth century, it is suggested that Bidagor’s Plan can be understood in light of the 
European Baroque city-planning tradition, in which the fundamental aim of planning 
was the staging of power. And it was this preoccupation with the symbolic dimension 
of power that seemed increasingly alien to the later Bidagor and possibly his followers.
Parallel to the abandonment of Bidagor’s Plan, the obsession with finding the genuine 
aesthetics and architectural style of the capital city as the head of the New Spain also 
dissolved, and individual architects gained more freedom of manoeuvre towards the end 
of the 1940s. According to Rafael Moneo, two competitions held in 1949 signalled the 
commencement of a new period in Madrilenian architecture and Spanish architecture as 
a whole: the competition for the Basilica Hispano-Americana de la Merced (the 
Hispanic-American Mercy Basilica), which was won by Luis Laorga and Francisco 
Javier Saenz de Oiza, and the competition for the Casa Sindical (the Syndical House)
426 See Moneo, “Madrid: Los Ultimos Veinticinco Afios,” 52.
427 Alberto Humanes Bustamante, M adrid No Construido. Imageries Arquitectonicas D e La Ciudad  
Prometida  (Madrid: COAM, 1986) 29.
428 The brothers Otamendi were behind the construction o f  the first underground line in Madrid, 
inaugurated in 1919. See Toledano, “Los Proyectos Parciales Del Plan Bidagor,” 66.
429 See Moneo, “Madrid: Los Ultimos Veinticinco Anos,” 54.
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on Paseo del Prado, which Franciso Cabrero won (see Chapter 3, p. 100).430 Discussions 
in architectural magazines became increasingly eclectic and previously banned foreign 
influences and ideas from Western Europe and the United States were again 
introduced.431 Spanish golden-age architects had been celebrated for their capacity to 
synthesise diverse influences, but it was the particular result of their achievement in the 
seventeenth century that Falange had tried to revive in the 1940s without success. What 
the Falangist architects failed (or refused) to see was that the revival of a mummified 
style would never produce the kind of magnificent architecture which they envisioned. 
They failed to understand that the potential for success lay in the process itself—the 
openness to foreign influences and the capacity to assimilate them. This is possibly 
what many of them realised towards the end of the 1940s.
Hence, the attempt to find and impose a genuine Falangist aesthetics, especially in 
Madrid, constituted a relatively brief interlude in the history of planning and 
architecture under Franco. The ideological foundations of Falange were arguably 
weaker and shakier than those of Nazism or Italian Fascism. It could also be argued that 
the Falangist programme, regardless of its consistency, had few chances of surviving in 
the post Second World War international scenario, which led Franco to attempt to gain 
the favour of the Allies by getting rid of the most explicit signs of his association with 
the Axis powers, and instead exploit his pro-Christian, anti-Communist stance. But 
above all such reasons, Spain’s economic limitations were decisive.
In spite of the chronologically and intellectually limited nature of the Falangist 
ideological experiment, the attempt to plan a new capital city and develop a national 
style testify to the enthusiasm that many men and women felt at the end of the war at 
the possibility of constructing a new Spain. In hindsight, with Franco’s 40-year long 
repressive, but also lethargic, dictatorship in mind, it is perhaps difficult to understand
431 See, for example, “Algunas Fotografias Que Han Figurado En La Exposicion Iberoamericana,” 
Revista Nacional de Arquitectura , no. Numero Extraordinario [Special Issue] (1946), “Amate 
L ’architettura [Excerpt from Gio Ponti's Publication],” Revista Nacional de Arquitectura, no. 189 (1957), 
Azorin, “La Psicologia Y La Arquitectura,” Revista Nacional de Arquitectura, no. 12 (1941), Fernando 
Chueca, “Experiencias Arquitectonicas De Un Viaje a Norteamerica,” Revista Nacional de Arquitectura, 
no. 133 (1953), “Notas De Una Visita a Estocolmo,” Revista Nacional de Arquitectura, no. Numero 
Extraordinario [Special Issue] (1946), Diego Plata, “El Momento Espafiol,” Revista N acional de  
Arquitectura, no. 184 (1957), J. Ramirez de Lucas, “Madrid - Mildn: Empate Y Prorroga,” Revista  
Nacional de Arquitectura, no. 199 (1958).
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that such enthusiasm ever existed. The fate o f the ruins o f  the Cuartel de la M ontana— 
considering their key position in B idagor’s project for the grand fa9ade— is particularly 
revealing o f how this initial passion dissipated, and how the potential for change at the 
end o f the Civil W ar soon turned into status quo.
6.4 The projects for the ruins of the Cuartel de la Montana
6.4.1 Commemorating the events o f the 20th o f  July
“Today, in the hours o f  peace, the ruins o f  the Cuartel de la M ontana are 
eternal.”432
Fig. 6.13 Gathering in the ruins o f  the Cuartel de la Montana (undated photograph, early 1940s) 
(Archivo Regional de la Comunidad de Madrid).
After the war, the Cuartel de la M ontana and the district o f  Argiielles, including the 
buildings along Paseo del Pintor Rosales and Ferraz, were almost com pletely in ruins. 
In spite o f the buildings’ precarious condition, a num ber o f poorer families had found 
temporary accommodation in them. There is evidence that, in some cases, the families 
remained in these houses for years after the end o f  the conflict, refusing to abandon 
them despite the legal measures taken by the owners who wanted to reconstruct their 
properties.433 Housing became an enormous problem  in post-war Madrid. However, as
432 “Hoy, en las horas de paz, las ruinas del Cuartel de la M ontana son etem as.” “Madrid. El Cuartel De 
La M ontana,” Reconstruccion, August-September 1940.
433 See, for example, Signatura 6-287*-42, “Ayuntamiento De Madrid N° 3066. Negociado De Obras De 
Ensanche. Clase Finca En Ruinas. Expediente. Ferraz 73,” (Madrid: Archivo de Villa, 1941).
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discussed in previous chapters, the bureaucratic processes that proprietors had to go 
through to receive state subsidies for reconstructing their buildings were extremely 
lengthy, and although no works were being undertaken on the ruined properties it was 
probably more difficult to evict potential squatters.
Figs. 6.14 and 6.15 Living among the ruins on Paseo del Pintor Rosales (1953) (Archivo Regional de la 
Comunidad de Madrid).
While the projects for the grand facade o f the capital city, and more specifically the 
Casa del Partido, took shape in B idagor’s Plan, the ruins o f  the military barracks served 
their own purpose. A series o f  photographs— today available at the Archivo Regional 
de Madrid— indicate that a number o f m asses and com m em orations o f  the uprising 
were celebrated amidst the remains, especially in the early 1940s.434
At least two masses were held in 1941, one o f  them to celebrate San Fernando, the 
patron saint o f the Army Engineers, which was the military corps that had traditionally 
resided in the Cuartel. In 1942, the sixth anniversary o f the defence o f  the Cuartel was 
also celebrated with a mass. There are also more than twenty very expressive, yet 
undated pictures o f  a cerem ony that was held in honour o f the officers and soldiers 
fallen in the Cuartel. All the photographs are suggestive o f the nature o f  these religious 
and ultra-patriotic events: hundreds o f wom en and men in black clothes, soldiers and
434 See Coleccion Fotografica D. M. Santos Yubero, “Cuartel De La Montana. Signaturas 32106,32112, 
37689, 45388,” (Madrid: Archivo Regional de la Comunidad de Madrid, 1920-1987).
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religious representatives congregating amidst piles o f  rubble and dust and surrounded 
by the solitary, breached fa?ade walls o f  the once impressive structure o f the Cuartel. 
The photographs poignantly evoke an atm osphere o f  combined devotedness and 
patriotism.
Fig. 6.16 Mass in the ruins o f  the Cuartel (undated photograph, early 1940s) (Archivo Regional de la 
Comunidad de Madrid).
Open air masses were a common practice in the early days o f  the regime. The practice 
started during the war in the cities that the Nacionales took over. The cerem onies were 
usually staged with care, suggesting a mixture o f religious baroque and fascist military 
aesthetics, even though it is partly unclear who the actual “designers” were. The masses 
at the Cuartel were in this sense not unique, but instead part o f  a vast, com prehensive 
programme o f tributes to the fallen and celebrations o f  the victory that became 
especially important in the immediate post-war period and even more so in the capital
435 See Mary Vincent, “Expiation as Performative Rhetoric in National-Catholicism: The Politics o f 
Gesture in Post-Civil W ar Spain,” in The Politics o f  Gesture, ed. Michael Braddick (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press for Past and Present, (forthcoming)).
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Fig. 6.17 Improvised altar in a ceremony amidst the ruins o f  the Cuartel (1942) (Archivo Regional de la 
Comunidad de Madrid).
There was perhaps something distinct about the celebrations in the ruins o f  the Cuartel. 
It w as noted earlier that Bidagor referred to the ruins o f  the military headquarters as the 
“sacred plot o f the Cuartel de la M ontana” . In the context o f the sacrificial mystique 
that impregnated Falangist beliefs and rhetoric the statement is not remarkable.436 As 
already intimated, the soil o f the Cuartel was sacred in this view because it was imbued 
with the blood o f  the young soldiers who died for the Falangist cause at the very 
beginning o f the Liberation Crusade. However, as explained previously, the Cuartel was 
eventually seized by the Republican forces after a several hour-long battle, and the 
m ilitary uprising was thereby subdued in M adrid. It is suggested that the rebels’ initial 
setback in M adrid, which, from their point o f view, involved both their m en’s 
courageous behaviour and yet their defeat, posed a challenge for the now victorious 
m ilitary regime as to how to remem ber and represent these events.
It could be argued that for as long as the ruins o f the barracks remained untouched, the 
am biguity o f  the 20th o f July events did not really need to be addressed. There was 
perhaps som ething comforting about the ruins and as the introductory quote suggests, 
perhaps an unspoken wish to leave the place in ruins forever, eternally. In a way, the
436 The three ideological pillars Religion, Fatherland and Hierarchy, which Bidagor also referred to in his 
Plan, all involve the notion o f sacrifice to some extent. (For example, the Falangist Youth, a small 
organisation nowadays, still has the motto “Demand o f  sacrifice” . See www.iuventudesFalangistas.es/.)
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ruins better reflected the notions of sacrifice and defeat, which the regime seemingly 
associated with the assault and defence of the Cuartel.
In the light of this, Bidagor’s choice of locating headquarters of the Falangist Party on 
the sacred soil of the Cuartel, which at first sight might have seemed like a logical 
initiative through which to honour the fallen, becomes more ambiguous. Why erect the 
Party headquarters there and not a memorial or a temple, or a combination of both, 
similar to what later became Valle de los Caidos (Valley of the Fallen)?437 Is it 
legitimate to wonder whether the trilogy Religion, Fatherland and Sacrifice would not 
have been equally compelling and true to the Falangist credo had Bidagor chosen to 
locate a memorial in replacement for the ruins of the Cuartel? Perhaps the defence of 
the Cuartel was not deemed a sufficiently heroic event, something the regime could not 
feel enough pride in to raise a permanent, monumental memorial. The intention behind 
the projected building, therefore, might instead have been to convey the strength and 
solidity of the new regime, almost in direct contrast to the mutineers’ defeat and the 
crumbling military headquarters.
6.4.2 The successive projects fo r  the ruined plot o f  the Cuartel 
According to the administrative documentation available, the plot was indeed ceded to 
FET y de las JONS for the construction of the Casa del Partido (House of the Party). 
On the 17th of July 1943, the Caudillo approved the preliminary plans for the building 
that Falangist architects Manuel Ambros, Jose Maria Castell and Eduardo Olasagasti 
had prepared. It was a neo-Herrerian438 design for a monumental, 70,000-square-metre, 
five-storey building, which “combine[d] the representative and symbolic character of 
traditional Spanish architecture with the utilitarian qualities required by the daily and 
intensive activity of the Party”.439 In December 1944, Regiones Devastadas was 
commissioned to undertake the works. The demolition works and cleaning up of the
437 Valle de los Caidos is the monumental memorial and burial compound that Franco had construct 
outside Madrid, close to El Escorial, using the labour o f  thousands o f  prisoners o f  war and political 
prisoners.
438 As previously discussed, Juan de Herrera, the architect o f  El Escorial, and Herrerianism  became the 
stylistic reference point for Falangist architects.
43 “Se trata de un edificio aunador en si del rango representative y simbolico de la tradicional 
arquitectura espanola y del caracter utilitario que requiere la diaria y acentuada labor de Partido.” Julio 
Trenas, “La Nueva Casa Del Partido. Version Arquitectonica Del Nacionalsindicalismo,” Fotos. 
Semanario Grafico, 24 July 1943. See also Cecilio Barberan, “La Arquitectura Ante Las Ideas,” Diario  
de Cadiz, 3 September 1943.
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area began in early 1945 and lasted until the summer o f  1948. Almost 30,000 cubic 
metres o f remaining stone and brickwork were dem olished and removed, another
13.000 cubic metres o f destroyed material was excavated and removed, and more than
20.000 cubic metres o f earth were taken out from certain sections and used to flatten 
other sections o f the plot. The total cost o f  the works was 3,381,649.76 pesetas.440
Fig. 6.18 Model o f  the Casa del Partido (1943) (scanned photograph from Fotos. Semanario Grafico).
440 See (04)111 Caja 2392 Top. 76/03, “3. M inisterio De La Gobernacion. DGRD. Seccion De 
Construcciones Oficiales. Proyecto De Derribo, Descombro, Explanacion Y Construccion De 
Cerramiento Del Cuartel De La Montana. “M adrid”,” (Madrid: Archivo General de la Administracion).
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Casa del Partido en el solar del Cuartel de la •---- . ...
Montafia. Madrid 1945
Fig. 6.19 Drawings o f  the projected Casa del Partido (scanned from Cuadernos de Arquitectura y  
Urbanismo).
Nevertheless, by the end o f the 1940s the project for the Falangist Party’s had been 
abandoned. As explained earlier, the regim e’s increasing distancing from Falangism 
probably made the concept o f  a vast, monumental party house, where up to 18,000 
militants could gather, less attractive. The regime was less and less com fortable with 
the notion o f  active party m embership advocated by the Falangists, and found in the 
more passive and traditional role o f the parish m em ber a better model for civic 
participation. There were probably also financial reasons for not embarking on such a 
demanding building project. Ironically, though, one o f M adrid’s most emblematic high- 
rises, the Torre de Espana, was constructed during these years on Plaza de Espana, not 
far from the M ontana del Principe Pio, under the auspices o f the brothers Otamendi. It 
has been suggested that Torre de Espana in many ways replaced the project for the Casa 
del Partido, becoming one o f the fundamental architectural com ponents o f  M adrid’s 
grand fa9ade and an unmistakable feature o f  the city’s skyline, thereby poignantly 
reflecting the regim e’s eventual alignm ent with the economic elites and its 
abandonment o f  state-sponsored programmes, including architectural projects.
Subsequently, the plot o f the former Cuartel was the object o f  an erratic series o f 
unrealised projects, which point to the difficulties o f finding an adequate use for the 
site. In 1952, a project to exhibit the models that Regiones Devastadas had created o f
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some of the reconstructed villages and buildings was prepared. Apparently two 
pavilions remained on the site of the Cuartel, which could be adapted and reused for 
this purpose. It is not clear, however, whether any works were carried out or whether 
the exhibition finally took place.441 Other data indicate that there existed a picadero or 
horse breeding facility and riding school on the plot by 1954.442
By the end of 1958, six years after the model exhibition venture, yet another project for 
the plot was designed. The Direccion General de Arquitectura planned to set up a clinic 
on the site and some minor works had already been undertaken by the time that the 
project was officially presented in March 1959. Nothing is said about the horse 
breeding facility, on the other hand. It is again unclear how far the works went and if 
the clinic was actually completed and eventually put to use 443
6.4.3 A park and an Egyptian temple
At the end of the 1960s the site had still not been given a definite function and was 
largely deserted, aside from some semi-abandoned sporting facilities, which may have 
included a football field. Suddenly it appears as if the interest in the neglected site 
revived. In June 1968, journalist Manuel Pombo Angulo, a renowned writer and 
journalist at the time, expressed his concern in La Vanguardia that no fewer than three 
ministries (Government, Army and the General Secretariat of the Movement) had 
requested licences for constructing on the site.444 Pombo Angulo was shocked at what 
he saw as a contravention of the municipal law. It is not clear to which specific 
regulation Pombo Angulo referred to, but he argued that the public administration had 
the obligation of protecting the green area comprising the Montana del Principe Pio and 
the adjacent parks Campo del Moro and Parque del Oeste. This goes back to earlier 
planners’ attempts to safeguard the Manzanares Valley as part o f a south-western green 
belt. However, by the beginning of the 1970s, most parts of the valley had been 
urbanised according to later, alternative plans aided by pressure from private
441 (04)111 Caja 2392 Top. 76/03, “3. Ministerio De La Gobemacion. DGRD. Seccion De 
Reconstruction. Proyectos. Habilitacion De Locales Para Exposici6n De Maquetas En El Antiguo 
Cuartel De La Montana. Comarcal Zona Sur De Madrid. Memoria Documento Numero 1,” (Madrid: 
Archivo General de la Administracion).
442 “Plano Parcelario De Madrid (1954). Hoja N° 65,” (Madrid: Ayuntamiento de Madrid. Gerencia 
Municipal de Urbanismo, 1954).
443 (04) 1 1 1 Caja 2392 Top. 76/03, “Proyecto De Acondicionamiento En El Cuartel De La Montafia De La 
Clinica De La Direccion General De Arquitectura,” (Madrid: Archivo General de la Administracion).
444 Manuel Pombo Angulo, “Cuartel De La Montana,” La Vanguardia Espahola, 6 June 1968.
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redevelopers, who envisioned the potential for urban growth and development of the 
area. It was perhaps in view of this that Pombo Angulo saw the Montana del Principe 
Pio as a last un-urbanised stronghold, which should be spared from redevelopment. He 
hoped, he wrote, that the news about the construction licences was simply a 
misunderstanding.445
It was not just the potential damage to the landscape that worried Pombo Angulo, but 
also that Madrilenians were forgetting the history of the hill. While Goya’s painting and 
the events of the 2nd of May 1802 were often talked about, he claimed, the events of 20th 
of July 1936 were more seldom evoked, aside, he wrote, from the yearly masses that 
continued to be held in memory of the fallen in the Cuartel. “It would be sad for all of 
us [to forget]. Because it is always sad— for everybody—to forget a sacrifice”, he 
concluded.446 Pombo Angulo’s article is interesting in that it takes up the motif of the 
sacrifice almost 30 years after the end of the war, yet this time with the subtly conveyed 
understanding that the sacrifice had involved not only the supporters of the rebels but 
“thousands of Madrilenians of all classes, tendencies and opinions”. (This could be 
interpreted either in line with the expiation rhetoric which the regime often made use of, 
and according to which Spaniards regardless of their position or ideology had been part 
of a collective purge to redeem the Spanish nation; or as a more condemnatory 
comment on the horrors of the war and, in particular, the unnecessary deaths of the 
thousands of people who had perished in Madrid during the conflict.) In sum, Pombo 
Angulo’s article suggests that there existed concern among residents, observers and 
possibly also institutional representatives regarding the fate of the plot of the Cuartel— 
not just because of the natural and aesthetic qualities of the Montana, but because of the 
historical and symbolical meaning of the site.
Fears regarding the construction of the area proved unjustified. That same year (1968), 
a project for a park and a scenic overhang on the Montana del Principe Pio was 
publicised and this time the works would be completed. The main goal was now to 
create a green zone on the hill. As suggested in an article that appeared in Hoja del 
Lunes, the hill was “the logical complement and a connecting link in the chain of parks
445 Ibid.
446 “Sen'a triste para todos [que olvidasemos esto]. Porque siempre es triste— para todos— olvidar un 
sacrificio.” Ibid.
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( ...)  that enveloped western Madrid”. It was argued that the plot of the Cuartel was the 
only black spot in an otherwise unspoilt chain of green and beautiful leisure areas. 
Aside from the semi-abandoned sporting facility, which the article does not provide 
more information about, the plot remained in a state of neglect, but this was now going 
to change. The article enthusiastically announced that suddenly “from the very centre of 
Madrid the most beautiful spectacle of Nature will be offered, something few European 
cities can provide; a place for rest and solitude, which Madrilenians need more and
” 447more .
Thus, in spite of the disregard for the plans for a green belt along the Manzanares 
Valley, the need for creating a green area seemed to be the main justification for the late 
1960s city council’s decision to finally turn the site of the Cuartel into a park. 
Moreover, it is implied in some of the press articles on the subject that the city council 
had been involved in a long and tedious battle against the pressures from real estate 
companies, who aimed to redevelop the site.
The news about the park were well received, and journalist Francisco Casares, for 
example, argued that “[the] purpose [of the park] is reasonable, taking into account that 
Madrid does not have a surplus of green zones and that everything that is done in this 
sense will help the city”.448 For Casares, green areas primarily addressed the needs of 
children and the elderly. “Children [need them] for their games and their recreation and 
the elderly for their rest [.. .].”449 It is perhaps significant that Casares moves from these 
considerations straight into the evocation of the events of the 20th of July 1936 when 
“the crowds (...) assassinated almost all the defendants and afterwards engaged in acts 
of debauchery and masquerade, walking around the streets of Madrid amidst screams
447 “Desde el mismo centro de Madrid se brindara el mas bello espectaculo de la Naturaleza, como 
pueden ofrecer muy pocas ciudades europeas, y un lugar de descanso y soledad del que estan necesitando 
cada vez mas los madrileflos.” “El Cuartel De La Montana Sera Una Bella Comisa,” Hoja del Lunes, 
Monday 4 November 1968.
448 “El proposito es plausible, si se tiene en cuenta que Madrid no anda sobrado de zonas verdes y todo lo 
que se haga en ese sentido beneficiara a la ciudad.” Francisco Casares, La Vanguardia Espahola , 20 
November 1968.
449 “Los ninos, para sus juegos y esparcimientos y los viejos para su descanso, necesitan ese tipo de 
espacios al aire libre.” Ibid.
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and denunciations, carrying the uniforms, guns, leathers and cartridge holsters that they 
had stripped off the victims”.450
The contrast between the innocent scene of the children and the elderly playing and 
resting in the park and that of the killing of the officers in the Cuartel could be seen as 
symptomatic of the problematic relationship to the events of the 20th of July among 
those who identified with the cause of the uprising. Imagining the innocent scene of 
infants and elderly people enjoying the greenery on the former site of the military 
headquarters, while reminding the reader of the mutiny and the uprising could be seen 
as yet another attempt at recalling the tragic events by simultaneously displacing them, 
in the sense of disassociating them from the material site where they occurred. 
Arguably it would be difficult for Madrilenians to associate a park full of children and 
elderly people with “the attack and defence of the Cuartel”. Perhaps inevitably, the 
secular, ecologist-inspired discourse about the benefits of the new park for the city was 
interspersed with fragments of the lingering preoccupation with the spiritual and 
symbolic dimensions of the site. Two years later, in December 1971, the park was 
inaugurated by the then Prince of Spain, Juan Carlos, and a selected group of public 
officials.451
In the meantime, something happened which gave the history of the plot of the former 
Cuartel an unexpected twist. When the Egyptian government offered Spain an ancient 
temple in gratitude for the efforts of the Spanish archaeological mission in the Nubia 
Campaign (which the UNESCO organised to prevent the Nubia monuments from 
disappearing under the water of the Aswan high dam constructed in 1960), the Spanish 
authorities deemed the new park an ideal location for the Egyptian shrine.452 
Constructed in the fourth century BC by pharaoh Azakheramon for the worshipping of 
Isis of Philae, among other divinities, the Debod temple was taken into account in the 
design of the park, including the vegetation. Cactuses, palm trees and other exotic 
species were planted around a large rectangular pool in the middle of which the two
450 “[L]as turbas [...] asesinaron a casi todos los defensores y despuds se entregaron al desenfreno y la 
mascarada paseando por las calles madrilenas entre gritos y denuestos los uni formes, fusiles, correajes y 
cartucheras que habian despojado a las victimas.” Ibid.
451 Manuel Marlasca Perez, “Pasado, Presente Y Futuro De La Montana Del Principe P io,” Villa de  
Madrid, January 1971.
452 Nieto Alcaide, “La Montana Del Principe Pio.”; 1628-1229. See also 
http://www.unesco.org/culture/heritage/tangible/egypt/html_eng/index_en.shtml
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independent doors leading to the temple and the temple itself were placed, suggesting 
their original position on the Nile bank.
Parallel to the placement of the millenary Egyptian stones on the top of the hill, sculptor 
Joaquin Vaquero Turcios was commissioned to design a monument to commemorate 
the fallen in the Cuartel. The monument was approved by a specially designated 
committee in February 1972.453 Vaquero Turcios, who was bom in 1933, designed a 
modernist composition consisting of a concave space representing piled sandbags in 
stone or a trench, in front of which he placed a mutilated human figure in bronze, 
reminiscent of the broken sculptures that can be found on the friezes of ancient Greek 
temples.454 The ensemble was to be located precisely where the two ramps that once led 
to the main entrance of the Cuartel started out on the avenue Pintor Rosales, and thus at 
the feet of the hill in the new setting. Ancient Egypt and classical Greece had made 
their way to the sacred plot of the Cuartel de la Montana.
It is tempting to analyse the meaning behind the location o f the Egyptian temple on the 
site— the fact, ultimately, that a pharaonic relic took the place of Falange’s neo- 
pharaonic project for the mined site. This could be tied to what was discussed earlier on 
the distinction made by Falangist intellectuals between the products of the Arab 
civilisation and the habits of the Berber peoples. In this case, it is the products of the 
Egyptian civilisation that are valued by the regime regardless of their otherwise 
problematic Northem-African origins. There is another possible interpretation that 
suggests a certain emulation of the European colonial practice of placing colonial icons 
on prominent urban sites. However, Egypt was never a Spanish colony, and the temple 
was offered voluntarily to the Spanish authorities by Nasser in the midst of the 
European decolonisation process. Therefore, the regime’s conscious decision with 
regard to the location of the temple was probably more the result of functional than 
symbolic considerations. However, the question may still be left open as to the 
unconscious motivations behind the decision.
453 The Comision Ejecutiva de la Hermandad del Alzamiento Nacional (National Uprising Brotherhood 
Executive Committee) was specifically created to select the final project. It was presided by the Captain 
o f  the I Military Region, Tomas Garcia Rebull, and included, among others, the civil governor o f Madrid, 
the president o f the Brotherhood and representatives o f  the Brotherhoods o f  the three Armies and o f  the 
“Mothers and Relatives” o f the fallen in the Cuartel. See “Sera Levantado En El Parque De Debod 
Monumento a Los Caidos Del Cuartel De La Montafla,” El Alcazar, 22 April 1972.
454 Ibid.
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On the 20th of July 1972, the 36th anniversary of the mutiny and the failed uprising in 
Madrid, the temple and the commemorative monument were simultaneously 
inaugurated. The news appeared on the front page o f at least one daily paper, the 
Madrilenian Ya, and other newspapers such as the official paper Arriba referred to the 
event in their Madrid section.455 The day after the opening, Ya devoted its entire front 
page to the inauguration, including two large-sized pictures, one of mayor Arias 
Navarro delivering his speech in front of the unveiled monument, and another of the 
Debod temple. The pictures generally predominated over the text, yet Arriba also 
included an article by Falangist veteran Carlos Rivas, a combined homage to the fallen 
and a call for attention to the present generations written in an arguably typical 
Falangist language:
“We ought to continue to make ourselves responsible for the great 
accomplishment of the 18th of July and for the lesser accomplishment of the 
Cuartel de la Montana, of all the implications and all the efficacies [sic], since 
only by starting out from these events will we be able to operate in current times 
devoid of lazy, unyielding and egoistic attitudes; by copying the heroic military 
and militant dynamism in the minority of officers, Falangists and requetes 
[Carlists], soldiers of a juncture and a cause, who in the midst o f the urgent 
anxieties of the battle, vanquishers or vanquished depending on the case, were 
already forging more than a military victory, which was of course necessary, but 
would not have been sufficient.”456
Rivas’ article is also interesting in that it attempts to defend the benefits from the failed 
mutiny from a military point of view in the same passionate language that Luis Montan 
used when he depicted the events more than 30 years earlier. Rivas claims that the 
rebels were aware of their slim chances of succeeding in the capital city, “the defeat
455 See M. Santos Yubero, “Hoy Se Inaugura El Monumento a Los Caidos Del Cuartel De La Montana,” 
Ya, Thursday 20 July 1972.; and “Esta Tarde Se Inauguran: Monumento a Los Caldos Del Cuartel De La 
Montana Y El Templo De Debod,” Arriba, 20 July 1972.
456 “Habrd que seguir haciendonos responsables de la gesta grande del 18 de julio y de esa gesta menor 
del Cuartel de la Montana, de todas sus significaciones y de todas sus eficacias, puesto que tan solo  
partiendo de tales hechos podremos operar sobre el tiempo actual sin inmovilismos perezosos y egolstas; 
copiando aquel heroico dinamismo militar y militante, en las minorias de militares, de falangistas y 
requetes, soldados de una coyuntura y de una causa, que en medio de las urgentes angustias del combate, 
vencedores o vencidos en cada caso, ya estaban foijando algo mas que una victoria guerrera, que era, 
claro esta, necesaria, pero que no hubiera sido suficiente.” Carlos Rivas, “Cuartel De La Montafia,” 
Arriba, 20 July 1972.
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[being] almost expected from the very first moment”. But he emphasises the importance 
of the “smaller deed” of the Cuartel and the failed uprising in Madrid within the larger 
scheme of things. Thanks to the mutiny, he argues, “thousands of red soldiers and 
militiamen with a lot of armaments were immobilised in the capital of the nation, 
unable to reach other critical places, where things hung from a thread, thus facilitating 
the consolidation [of positions] that were later decisive for the victory”.457
Rivas’ military-strategic interpretation of the events of the 20th of July 1936 adds to the 
already complex map of meanings ascribed to the Montana del Principe Pio as it finally 
received a clearer function at the beginning of the 1970s. History, ideology, economic 
interest, urbanism and environmentalism came together on the Montana del Principe 
Pio in an eccentric material and rhetoric manifestation, which is somehow captured by 
journalist Marlasca Perez in the following excerpt:
“Because all that is in relation [to the Montana del Principe Pio] is staggered 
over time, immersed in a battle for something beautiful, edifying: the fight and 
death of a handful of Madrilenians against and for the French invader in 1808; 
the fight and death of General Fanjul and his men, Spaniards, against and for 
other Spaniards imbued by strange ideas and foreign ways, for the independence 
of Spain; the fight, this time without bloodshed, of a mayor, Don Carlos Arias 
Navarro and his Corporation, for a Madrilenian, territorial vindication; the 
heroic fight—bloodless too— of these same men against environmental 
pollution and land speculation.”458
457 “[M]iles de soldados y milicianos rojos, con mucho armamento, quedaron inmovilizados en la capital 
de la nacion, no pudiendo acudir a otros lugares decisivos, donde todo pendia de un hilo, facilitando con 
ello consolidaciones que luego fueron decisivas para la victoria.” Ibid.
458 “Porque todo lo que con ella se relaciona se halla escalonado en el tiempo, inmerso en un batallar por 
algo hermoso, edificante: la lucha y la muerte de un punado de madrilefios contra y por invasor frances, 
en 1808; la lucha y muerte del general Fanjul y sus hombres, espanoles, contra y por otros espanoles 
imbuidos de ideas extranas, extranjerizantes, por la independencia de Espafia; la lucha, en esta ocasion  
incruenta, de un alcalde, don Carlos Arias Navarro y su Corporation, por una revindication territorial 
madrileiia; la lucha heroica— aunque tambien incruenta— de estos mismos hombres contra la 
contamination atmosferica y la especulacidn del suelo.” Marlasca Perez, ‘‘Pasado, Presente Y Futuro De 
La Montana Del Principe Pio,” 16.
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F i g .  6 . 2 0  The temple o f  Debod on the hill (2007) (photographed by the author)
F i g .  6 . 2 1
T H e  f e m o r a , i v e  s c u l p , ure by Vaquero Turcios (photographed by the author).
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6. Conclusion
At the end of the Spanish Civil War, the planners o f the nascent political regime led by 
General Franco had an unprecedented opportunity of redesigning Madrid, the capital 
city. Unlike Fascist and Nazi planners who after all often cut through the existing, 
undamaged urban fabric of pre-war Rome and Berlin to complete their neo-imperial, 
megalomaniac projects, Falangist planners and architects in post-war Madrid faced a 
city in ruins, which allegedly made it easier (and less expensive) to undertake public 
works. While generally averse to the idea of the big city and much more prone to 
celebrating the rural, when it came to Madrid, the Falangists made an exception. In their 
hierarchical, organic understanding of reality, Madrid embodied the head of the 
national being, so the city needed careful planning guidelines which guaranteed that it 
would function adequately as the absolute political and administrative centre of Spain.
The new plan for the capital city authored by Pedro Bidagor was a tangible 
interpretation of the principles of the New Spain. The Falangists’ conceptual trio 
hierarchy, service and fraternity was itself a response to the liberal revolutionary 
principles (liberty, equality and fraternity) of which only fraternity was maintained. The 
Falangists despised the liberal planning principles, which, according to them, led to 
anarchic and dysfunctional urban formations. Moreover, each part o f the city should not 
be treated equally, but according to its importance for the whole. Finally, although 
fraternity and camaraderie lay at the very foundations of the Falangist ethos, these were 
very much permeated by a notion of military hierarchy and a conservative and 
patriarchical concept of the family according to which there exist “natural” hierarchies 
and distinctions between family members. An organic city, hierarchically divided into 
representative, commercial and residential zones, and made up of self-contained barrios 
or neighbourhoods where residents of different social backgrounds shared amenities, 
was, in synthesis, their ideal.
The initial enthusiasm that these simultaneously reactionary and revolutionary ideas 
triggered in planners, architects and possibly some members of the public— 
notwithstanding the parallel, brutal repression and massive killings of sympathisers of 
the former Republican regime—was soon dispelled. Aside from the increasing 
unpopularity, or inconvenience, of Falangist ideological conceptions after the defeat of 
Nazism and Fascism in Europe, the economic reality of post-war Spain called for more
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pragmatic approaches to reconstruction. Top-down state planning was essentially 
abandoned for a combination of public planning guidelines and private projects, which 
in practice meant that private interests would predominate in the reconstruction and 
redevelopment of Madrid in the following decades. Along with private capital often 
came speculative and corrupt practices, of which there is a lack of documentary 
evidence.
As discussed earlier, the attempt to devise general urban reconstruction plans was 
pursued in several European countries after the Second World War. And as in Madrid, 
they were often discarded after some time. Municipalities trying to lead the 
reconstruction process in their cities faced private property management problems and 
usually lacked the resources to back comprehensive plans on their own. Most of the 
times town and city councils realised that they had to involve private developers, 
residents’ associations, commercial chambers and so on in the reconstruction planning 
procedures, which meant that planning decisions were seldom bold and straightforward, 
but more often the result of compromises, resulting in the fragmentation of the 
reconstruction process.
But Falange’s city plan and architectural programme for Madrid were problematic in 
their own terms as well. The emphasis of Bidagor’s Plan on the symbolic display of 
power through neo-Baroque axes and squares and monumental buildings proved 
excessive in light, among other things, of the city’s critical economic situation and the 
urgent need of housing for Madrid’s growing population. On the other hand, the 
celebration of seventeenth-century Hapsburg Madrid as the capital city’s genuine 
architectural style showed itself to be markedly reductionist. As Falangist intellectual 
Victor d ’Ors pointed out in 1947, Madrid’s Moorish—or Arab— legacy was as intrinsic 
to the city as the Hapsburg tradition. The historic-artistic planning guidelines for the 
city ought therefore to incorporate both the northern, fundamentally Germanic 
influences, and the southern, African and Mediterranean influences, ensuring a balance 
between the two. It was implied that this delicate aesthetic balance had to be guaranteed 
from above by the regime’s cultural elites. There was another challenging balance that 
the Falangists seemingly sought to maintain, namely that between traditional and 
modem values. However, despite the rhetorical appeal of the idea of a twentieth-century 
Madrid based on the spirit of seventeenth-century Madrid it was difficult to translate
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this idea into practice. Moreover, as the case of the ruins of the Cuartel de la Montana 
shows, there were sometimes “wrong” memories attached to the “right” place, which 
hindered the realisation of the neat, idealised Imperial Madrid that was originally 
envisioned by Bidagor and other Falangist architects.
The purportedly heroic defeat of the Falangist mutineers on the 20th of July 1936 was 
perhaps best reflected in the eternal ruins of the Cuartel. Yet, the nascent regime sought 
a more categorical solution to the devastated but symbolically and geographically 
prominent site on the grand fa?ade of the city. Pedro Bidagor’s suggestion of locating 
the Falangist Party’s headquarters on the sacred plot of the Cuartel seemed to fit 
coherently within this logic. The monumental compound of architects Ambros, Castell 
and Olasagasti on the Montana del Principe Pio would not only have complemented, as 
was the intention, but also surpassed the other two buildings of “utmost national 
evocation” on the grand fa?ade of Madrid, the Royal Palace and the Almudena 
Cathedral.
When the project for the Casa del Partido was abandoned in the mid-1940s it became 
arguably difficult for the regime to come up with an alternative for the site. The 
adjacent district o f Argiielles was also not becoming the political and institutional head 
of the city that Bidagor had envisioned. Instead, it was turning into a conventional, 
residential area for the regime’s bureaucratic and economic elites. Perhaps as a result of 
these changes in the direction of the development of the city, the regime lost interest in 
the Montana del Principe Pio for some time.
The decision almost three decades later to design a park and place the ruins of the 
ancient Egyptian Debod temple on the site seemed in many ways a comfortable 
solution, which did away with the pressures from the real estate sector and buried once 
and for all (maybe) the ghosts of the Falangist mutineers, who had a small monument at 
the foot o f the hill on a dedicated site. It is perhaps tempting to interpret the placement 
of the ancient Egyptian shrine—a building pretty much alien to Spanish culture— in 
more psychoanalytical terms (as indicative of Spain’s complex relationship with North 
Africa, for example), but it is argued that the decision was of a more practical nature. 
By the early 1970s, the regime was largely in the hands of conservative bureaucrats 
who were less prone to epic monumentalisations and celebrations of old Falangist
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heroes, and more comfortable with technocratic discourses about the benefits o f green 
areas for the city.
The fate of the ruins of the Cuartel is a reflection of the regime’s abandonment of the 
grand reconstruction plans for the capital city and their substitution for a significantly 
more piecemeal, privately driven rebuilding process. But the fate of the Montana del 
Principe Pio also echoes the political and ideological shifts that Spain underwent during 
a fundamental part of its twentieth-century history. Within less than 50 years the hill 
saw the existence and/or projection of a nineteenth-century military compound, a 
parliament building, the headquarters o f the Falangist Party, and, finally, the Egyptian 
Debod temple— not to mention the various more modest projects that were designed in 
between. Nowadays, few Madrilenians are aware o f the rich history of the site and even 
fewer are conscious that it was once a Falangist relic. It could be argued that the Franco 
regime was eventually successful in burying the uncomfortable memory of its own 
supporters’ early defeat— a memory that also inevitably evokes the fierce resistance 
against the Liberation Crusade of the Republicans who remained in the capital city—as 
well as Falange’s dreams of a grandiose, imperial post-war Madrid.
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Conclusion
The underlying aim of this thesis has been to demonstrate the usefulness of approaching 
history and political discourse in the context of war and violent political change by 
examining the transformations o f the urban built environment. The thesis rests 
implicitly on the assumption that historically war itself, and the fear of war, have 
significantly impacted the structure of urban formations. By examining the destruction 
and reconstruction of three prominent sites in Barcelona, Bilbao and Madrid during the 
Spanish Civil War and its aftermath, three propositions have been introduced as 
exemplary of the intimate relationship between drastic historical events, the discourses 
that accompany them, and ensuing transformations in the built environment. Although 
the three propositions are potentially applicable to other, similar instances of urban 
wartime destruction and post-war reconstruction, they take on a particular meaning 
within the context of the Spanish Civil War and Franco’s dictatorship. The Spanish 
situation in 1939, when the Civil War ended, was fundamentally divergent from that of 
most contemporary European countries. When Spain began to recover from a brutal and 
exhaustive internal conflict, the latter were mired in the most destructive world war. 
Despite the intervention of foreign troops and volunteers, the Spanish Civil War was an 
internal war, which lends the conflict itself and the post-war recovery part of their 
distinctiveness. Moreover, the dictatorial regime that the victorious side founded after 
the end of the conflict was a unique combination of symbolic imperialism and material 
destitution. The aspirations to revive Spain’s golden past coexisted with the attempt to 
achieve economic autarchy based on modem agricultural mass production. The latter 
soon proved impossible, but the discourses on sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 
imperial and Catholic Spain covered over the objective failure to bring the country back 
to the international forefront both economically and politically.
The Spanish Civil War can be understood as exemplary of traditional systems of 
warfare, involving regular armies, popular militias and clear front lines. In contrast, the 
extensive use of aerial warfare techniques and the systematic attacks on targets that 
were not necessarily on the front line, including major cities, constituted novel features. 
Spain became a testing ground for the German Luftwaffe and the Italian Aviazione 
Legionaria. While the destruction of Barcelona was mainly the result of air raids, 
Madrid suffered from both air raids and artillery fire. Bilbao was also the victim of
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bombings and subsequently of artillery fire during the seizure of the city. Both the rebel 
and the Republican troops viewed aerial bombings as a means to destroy the enemy’s 
supplies and weaken their morale—although the rebels were more active in the air. 
There is enough evidence to suggest that they also saw it as a means of terrorising the 
population. The fervent resistance of cities like Barcelona and Madrid and their 
radicalised working-class populations against the rebel military reinforced the latter’s 
anti-urban sentiment. It is likely that the air raids were also conceived of as a way of 
punishing cities—the most prominent symbols of the atheist, libertine and Communist 
anti-Spain {la anti-Espaha) in the rebels’ view—thus anticipating the kind o f political 
violence seen more recently in the context of the Balkan War and identified as urbicide.
Not unlike the experience of some European cities during both the First and the Second 
World Wars, emergency reconstruction efforts in all three cities, notably Barcelona and 
Madrid, were fairly successful. Historic edifices were protected, rubble was removed, 
damaged fatpades were held up, records of the damage were kept, and smaller but 
important projects such as disinfection clinics to avoid epidemics were carried out. 
Extensive networks of air-raid shelters were constructed in most cities. As explained in 
Chapter 3, Barcelona’s shelters are particularly well documented. Local passive defence 
boards were in charge of these efforts in most towns and cities. This was the case in 
Barcelona, where residents’ associations and trade unions also played an important role 
in the construction of air-raid shelters. In Madrid a wartime Reform, Reconstruction and 
Sanitation Committee was created exceptionally by the government, in view of the 
magnitude of the problems faced by the besieged capital city. Considering the 
unprecedented nature of the destruction caused by the new types of bombs used by the 
military and the unremitting lack of proper construction materials, both the refuges and 
the protective structures shielding monuments and edifices were surprisingly effective.
When Franco’s troops won the war and his provisional government fully took over 
power, several institutions, some of which had been created before the end of the 
conflict, were put in charge of the reconstruction process, a process viewed as a 
physical, economic and moral enterprise. In spite of the regime’s emphasis on unity of 
command, the responsibility for the rebuilding of the New Spain was fragmented across 
different bodies and branches such as the Direccion General de Regiones Devastadas y 
Reparaciones, the Instituto de Credito Nacional para la Reconstruction, the Direccion
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General de Arquitectura and the Instituto de Colonizacion. Such fragmentation did not 
particularly contribute to making the process more efficient. Moreover, aside from the 
case o f the “adopted villages”—which were reconstructed in full by the state—most of 
the initiative was placed in the hands of private owners and municipalities. The state 
offered partial loans and subsidies that the former could apply for from the Instituto de 
Credito to fund their reconstruction projects. The application procedures were often 
tedious, and it could take years for the funds eventually to arrive, as demonstrated by 
the cases of both Barcelona and Bilbao city councils’ applications.
Franco allegedly refused to receive foreign finance, but few countries were anyway in a 
position to offer monetary aid to Spain while they were themselves caught up in 
financing the Second World War. After 1945, although most European countries were 
economically assisted by the United States, the Allies were not particularly keen on 
lending Franco a hand. The regime had to rely fundamentally on “national sources” 
during its first two decades of existence. But Franco’s autarchic programme was 
presented to the public as a deliberate, ideologically informed choice. The confiscations 
and economic sanctions imposed on individuals who had remained loyal to the 
Republic during the war was one of the national sources that the government drew 
from. Another important source was the income generated by the employment of 
prisoners of war and political prisoners as forced labour, including on major works of 
reconstruction. Of the salaries that both private and public companies paid for hiring 
prisoners, the state kept a substantial part, which went straight into its coffers.
Cities did not figure prominently on the regime’s agenda. The regime’s main priority 
was rural reconstruction as a means of preventing or deterring peasants and villagers 
from migrating to the cities, and developing the kind of class resentment that, according 
to the victors, had fuelled the communist revolutionary atmosphere leading to the 
outbreak of the war. Through initiatives such as the colonisation of irrigated lands, 
coordinated by the Instituto de Colonizacion, the regime sought to anchor the 
population in functional agricultural units where families were offered decent and 
hygienic households, and taught “proper” living habits. Part of Falange’s discourse 
presented the city and the countryside in strong opposition, the former being viewed as 
a place of ruin and degeneration, the latter as a source of honesty and virtue. The 
European metropoles, and London in particular, were regarded as liberal aberrations,
288
unworthy of emulation and essentially alien to Spanish planning tradition. Such 
tradition, as has been explained, was identified with Spain’s intensive building activity 
in its American colonial domains in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. At other 
times, Falange’s ideologues sought something closer to a compromise between the 
urban and the rural—“countryside urbanism and city ruralism”— and were especially 
keen to rehearse their planning ideals in the capital city.
One might find examples of the three modes of reconstruction discussed in Chapter 1— 
restoring, replacing and leaving in ruins— among the reconstruction plans and actual 
works of Regiones Devastadas, including some notable examples of deliberate ruin 
preservation such as Old Belchite. Generally, and in accordance with the predominantly 
backward-looking spirit that animated the regime, restoration was preferred. Initially, 
the restoration designs for destroyed buildings in towns and cities as well as the designs 
for new constructions in the adopted villages or new colonies were filtered through the 
so-called “national style”. This style was based on a broad understanding of traditional 
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Spanish imperial and colonial architecture. While 
the more “imperial” emulations of El Escorial were reserved for monuments and 
official buildings, the simpler Baroque, colonial architecture was the guiding concept 
for the design of town and village houses. The general preference for sober lines and 
little ornamentation was motivated by the austere atmosphere of the post-war years, as 
well as by the actual scarcity and limited selection of construction materials available. 
Reinforced concrete was hard to obtain, for example, and bricks and tiles were 
produced by craftsmen using traditional methods.
Nevertheless, it could be argued that Falange had a genuine desire to devise something 
akin to a national reconstruction programme. The emphasis on rural reconstruction, the 
belief in the importance of rebuilding a representative capital city as the physical head 
of the nation, the aim to achieve moral regeneration through the renewal of the built 
environment, and the search for a national style were some o f the fundamental 
principles on which this programme was based. The problem was that it was difficult to 
ground modem economic growth on agricultural production in a country that had 
undergone few changes to its predominantly quasi-feudal system of landownership. 
And the conservative landowners who had supported Franco in his Liberation Crusade 
were unwilling to give up their age-old privileges. Without economic growth from
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which to extract public funds, few of the other principles could translate into practical 
results.
When Falange was removed from its role as the ideological backbone of the regime, the 
idea of the New Spain became increasingly vague, eventually disintegrating into the 
various ideological components that had been brought together under the banner of the 
Liberation Crusade in the first place: the military, the reactionary Church, and the 
financial oligarchy. Even though the institutional framework for reconstruction 
remained largely unchanged throughout its existence over the two decades of autarchy, 
the direct participation of the private sector in public reconstruction works and building 
enterprises increased over time as the members of the financial oligarchy were 
appointed chief executives and advisers of the newly founded state companies 
producing effectively a symbiosis o f public authority and private capital. This was also 
to the detriment of planning guidelines and regulations, which were enforced less and 
less. The result was an uneven expansion of most Spanish cities, including Barcelona, 
Bilbao and Madrid. Moreover, Falange’s search for a national style, immediately 
understood as a reactionary exercise, bore less intellectual fruit than many architects 
had expected, and did not produce particularly notable practical results, except for a few 
representative urban buildings—especially religious institutions— and the “adopted” 
villages that Regiones Devastadas reconstructed in full.
Within this context, the opening of Avenida de la Catedral in post-war Barcelona 
illustrates how destruction can facilitate the implementation of controversial planning, 
acting as a catalyst for urban redevelopment. For seven decades the plans for the 
opening of Gran Via C were brought back and forth in trying to mitigate the impact of 
the pickaxes on the dense, historic fabric of the old city. But one city council after 
another persisted in this aim. At the beginning of the 1930s it finally seemed as if the 
works were going to take place despite residents being against the opening of the 
avenue as well as the most progressive architects, the members of the GATCPAC. The 
outbreak of the Civil War in July 1936 put the plans on hold.
Nevertheless, the bombs that the rebel air force dropped on the port city between 1937 
and 1939 did a substantial part o f the pickaxes’ work. With the Barri de la Catedral in 
ruins after the conflict, it was much simpler for the city council to justify its demolition.
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Despite the drastic change in political regime, the purges and the appointment of a new 
city council, the pre-war plans for reforming the inner city were simply resumed. The 
difference was that nobody openly complained now, except for the members of the 
urban property chamber, who were concerned that public funds were being used to 
finance projects that went beyond reconstruction in the strictest sense, arguing that this 
would ultimately involve, as it did, increased property taxes. Like most city councils, 
Barcelona city council faced the challenge of putting together sufficient funding to 
tackle reconstruction. In the end, the city received a state subsidy to cover cleaning and 
clearing tasks and a partial state loan for reconstruction. But the most substantial part of 
the funding was negotiated with Banco de Espana, the national bank.
Although Barcelona’s politically privileged position as the capital o f an autonomous 
Catalonia during the Second Republic and its reputation as a meeting point for the 
cultural avant-garde ended with the advent of Franco’s military dictatorship, the 
Barcelonan economic elites were able to preserve their power and secure the city’s role 
as an industrial and commercial port enclave. At the same time, commerce and trade 
were not overly and openly valued within the new regime’s Spanish nationalist- 
Catholic, anti-Semitic ideology. One way the city’s political and cultural authorities 
found of compensating for Barcelona’s strong commercial tradition was to highlight the 
city’s Roman military legacy.
The opening of Avenida de la Catedral allowed the city council to continue the project 
of unveiling the Roman military belt, including its impressive towers. This was at the 
expense of the commercially vibrant Barri de la Catedral, which like most suburbs or 
vilanoves had its origins in the Middle Ages, a culturally ambiguous period in Spain’s 
history with which the regime identified much less. More than the purely archaeological 
value of this venture, some commentators seemed interested in justifying the demise of 
the old houses and stores by stressing the superiority of Roman Barcelona, the city of 
stone, over medieval Barcelona, the city of brick, associated with Jews and Reds. Other 
journalists and writers celebrated the transformation of this part of old Barcelona in 
terms of progress and modernity. Still others, such as Ricardo Sune, implicitly 
challenged the project by producing nostalgic accounts of the Barri de la Catedral and 
old Barcelona as the genuine repositories of Catalan customs and traditions. The 
celebration of the 600th anniversary of Plaza Nueva in October 1955 offered an
291
extraordinary opportunity for nostalgic Barcelonans to mourn publicly the demise of the 
old square and the Barri de la Catedral.
The reconstruction o f the bridges of Bilbao reveals the difference between the symbolic 
and the practical rupture that a change of political regime involves. Whereas the new 
city council purportedly used the reconstruction of the fixed bridges as a means to mark 
Bilbao and the Ria symbolically and visibly with the stamp of the New Spain, the 
continuities in the administrative procedures, and even financial arrangements 
underpinning the rebuilding of the two drawbridges, suggest less of a rupture. The sober 
aesthetics of the four new concrete fixed bridges contrasted with the richer and more 
ornamented design of their predecessors, arguably replicating what was conceived as an 
opposition between the Falangist (and ultimately Spanish) ideals of restraint, honesty 
and hierarchy, and the excessive and sinuous character of the products of Liberalism. 
Such aesthetic choice, as noted, was also motivated by the scarcity of construction 
materials available at the time and possibly the engineers’ preference for rationalist 
design.
The city council’s determination to maintain the pre-war contracts for the two 
drawbridges as well as certain pre-war funding agreements with other public entities is 
seen as evidence of the administrative and practical continuities that simultaneously 
characterised the new authorities’ management of reconstruction. Moreover, the city 
council’s delay in paying the bridge contractors was once more the result of the 
difficulties it envisaged in trying to collect sufficient funding. Aside from the money 
granted by the Biscay provincial deputyship and the port authority on the basis of 
existing pre-war agreements, Bilbao was granted a state subsidy that covered 50 per 
cent of the cost of reconstructing the bridges. Yet the funds did not arrive until a few 
years after the works had been completed, thus forcing the city council to exhaust all 
the available legal means to justify the postponement of the payments to the contractors.
The emphatic condemnation of the Republican troops for blowing up the bridges and 
the more or less subtle silencing of the fact that the two drawbridges were essentially 
built during the years of the Second Republic again reflect the new authorities’ need to 
emphasise symbolically the break with the previous regime. Thus post-war regimes 
tend to blame all the destruction on the vanquished enemy and often use wartime ruins
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to discredit it. Furthermore, post-war regimes can easily take full credit for the 
accomplishment of a building or piece of infrastructure as if they had not just 
reconstructed it, but conceived of and built it in the first place. Finally, like Barcelona’s 
new authorities, which did not want the city’s history to be exclusively associated with 
trading, Bilbao’s officials were keen on reinforcing the city’s Spanish pedigree after the 
brief but intense experience of Basque autonomy. Bilbao was now depicted as the 
historical port of Mother Castile, and Bilbaoans as the direct descendants of old 
Castilian merchants.
The modest fate of Falange’s and Pedro Bidagor’s very ambitious plan for a new 
Madrid based on Nazi and neo-imperial conceptions of the urban—including the project 
for Falange’s headquarters on the ruins of the Cuartel de la Montana—confirms the 
proposition that excessively idealist reconstruction plans, founded on the aspiration to 
create new cities, are not necessarily successful. In spite of the unique opportunity to 
create something entirely novel that a flattened city represents, most of the experiences 
of post-war Europe, including Spain, suggest that there are often structural and 
circumstantial factors that work against a complete redesign o f the pre-war city. In the 
case of Madrid, the economic situation of post-war Spain did not allow for large public 
expenditure. As already intimated, the lack of public funding called for an increasingly 
leading role for private capital in the reconstruction and redevelopment endeavours in 
the capital city and a growing leniency with regard to the application of urban planning 
regulations. Moreover, Franco’s apparent enthusiasm for the Falangist project for a 
modem neo-imperial capital city lasted only three or four years— for as long as he 
deemed it useful to align the regime with the Axis powers. Ideology, or perhaps the lack 
of a consistent ideology, thus also worked against the implementation of Bidagor’s 
Plan.
Situated on the emblematic Montana del Principe Pio, on which the first members of 
the Spanish guerrillas were shot by Napoleonic troops in early May 1808, the ruins of 
the Cuartel de la Montana, or rather their post-war history, encapsulates some of the 
contradictions that arguably characterised the Franco regime 150 years later— 
contradictions which doubtlessly helped the dictator to remain in power for as long as 
he did. The untouched sacred plot of the Cuartel, imbued with the blood of the 
Falangists who died in the failed Madrid mutiny, for which one project after the other
293
was designed, but never implemented, in some ways mirrors the Caudillo’s ability to 
promise, to commit to the different groups that supported him, and then to withdraw 
without consequences.
In the early post-war years, numerous masses and commemorations of the fallen were 
celebrated (or staged) amidst the ruins of the Cuartel. The design for a massive 
monumental compound to host Falange’s headquarters—yet another emulation of El 
Escorial—in 1943, arguably reflected Falange’s determination to assert its power and 
future existence and not just mourn its fallen soldiers. But by then, the power of 
Falange within the regime was already being questioned in view of the fate o f the Axis 
powers. In the early 1970s, after almost four decades o f neglect, the last remains o f the 
former military barracks were finally levelled. That the plot was turned into a park 
subsequently, and an ancient Egyptian temple placed on the top of such a historically 
and symbolically charged site, can be interpreted as another indication o f Franco’s 
cynicism. But the history of the ruins of the Cuartel could also be seen as characteristic 
of Spain’s collective inability to digest the events o f the 2nd of May 1808 and the 20th of 
July 1936— in other words, the inability to overcome the trauma of the nation’s secular 
modernisation.
In this sense, the Spanish War of Independence (1808-1814) can be viewed as the 
opening of a historical interlude in Spain’s political trajectory as it prompted a brief, yet 
unprecedented period of liberal constitutionalism (1812-1814), which was however 
immediately followed by the restoration of monarchic absolutism. More than a century 
later, the Spanish Civil War put an end to the equally brief, ground-breaking interlude 
of the Second Republic, and led to the establishment of a reactionary dictatorship. Yet 
the Civil War can be seen as both a re-enactment and a closure of that early nineteenth- 
century interlude and all ensuing failed attempts by liberal elites to place Spain on the 
track of progressive, secular modernisation. In its own attempt to overcome the trauma 
of the nation’s secular modernisation, the Franco regime followed a reactionary 
modernist path, which consisted of designing a new political fa?ade on the solid 
remains of the structure and foundations that previously sustained the edifice of 
absolutism and militant Catholicism (the military, the Church and the landowning 
nobility). Through this political edifice—notwithstanding its mutations over the years— 
the regime sought to preserve the old order within the nation using modem state means,
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while symbolically restoring the values and aesthetics of Spain’s golden past. Although 
the tensions and contradictions between the regime’s practical concerns and symbolic 
aspirations are already tangible in the discourses on, and plans for, the post-war 
reconstruction of the specific sites examined in this thesis, further research on the post­
war reconstruction of Spain’s built environment under the same premises would 
probably reinforce the analogy made between the realms of the political discourse and 
the built architecture of the regime. What is perhaps disturbing in such an analogy is 
that the new fa?ade and old foundations of the regime’s political edifice were reflected 
in traditional facades and modem interiors in its built architecture.
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